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Kenneth Joseph COSGROVE 1990
Abstract of a thesis to be submitted for the degree of 
Ph.D. at the London School of Economics in the 
University of London
This thesis examines the American anti-colonial 
tradition’s role in establishing the principle of 
international accountability for administering dependent 
peoples in the League of Nations mandates and the United 
Nations trusteeship systems. Where relevant, British ideas 
and schemes are compared with American ones in so far as 
this helps to understand the latter and where the final 
outcomes were based on Anglo-American compromises. It 
contributes to the literature on international relations in 
two main areas. First, it analyses the formulation, 
development and inter-relation of the American anti­
colonial tradition and international accountability.
Second, it is the first study of the interplay of those two 
concepts within the context of differing Anglo-American 
views on creating the mandates and trusteeship systems.
There are eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the 
main objectives and themes. Chapters 2 and 3, the 
conceptual heart of the thesis, examine imperial and 
colonial relationships, the American anti-colonial 
tradition, and international accountability for dependent 
peoples. Chapter 4 focuses on the interplay of those 
concepts and the American role in establishing the League 
mandates system. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 do the same regarding 
the United Nations trusteeship system. Chapter 7 also 
contains a postscript on trusteeship developments since 
1945. Chapter 8 summarises the thesis* conclusions. 
Throughout, the methodological approach is analytical and 
historical rather than theoretical.
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The overall conclusion is that so long as the national 
interests of the United States were protected, the American 
anti-colonial tradition did play the major role in 
establishing the principle of international accountability 
within both the mandates and the trusteeship systems. The 
determination and anti-colonial sentiments of Presidents 
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were especially 
important. American policy was usually based on the right 
of all peoples to freedom; the practical application of 
this precept hastened the demise of Western European-style 
colonialism.
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Chapter 1 ; Introduction
1• Objectives and Perspective
This thesis examines the role of the American anti­
colonial tradition in the evolution of the principle of 
international accountability for the administration of 
dependent peoples. It focuses on the tradition*s part in 
establishing the mandates system of the League of Nations as 
set forth in Article 22 of the Covenant and the trusteeship 
system of the United Nations as enshrined in Chapters XI,
XII, and XIII of the Charter. Events since the establishment 
of the United Nations trusteeship system at the San Francisco 
Conference of 1945 and the submission of the original 
trusteeship agreements in 1946/47, lie outside the main 
purview of the thesis. They are outlined in Chapter 7, 
however, in so far as they throw light on the response of 
the United States to the efforts of the anti-colonial powers 
to bridge the constitutional gap in the Charter and give the 
United Nations comparable powers over non-self-governing to 
those it possessed over trust territories. This culminated 
with the establishment in November 1961 of the Special 
Committee to report on the implementation of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 1960.
The thesis is confined primarily to examining ’official* 
and ’semi-official* American sources for ideas and plans 
regarding international accountability, mandates, and 
trusteeship. The methodological approach is analytical 
rather than theoretical. Throughout, the emphasis is not on 
the facts as such and what actually happened, but rather on 
analysing the issues raised by the inter-play of the two 
concepts, the American anti-colonial tradition and 
international accountability for dependent peoples.
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The Anglo-American dimension. Where relevant, British 
schemes are examined in so far as they help to understand 
American ones, were in marked contrast to them, or because 
the final outcome was based on an Anglo-American compromise. 
This comparison is undertaken because Great Britain, the 
foremost colonial power in the nineteenth and first half of 
the twentieth centuries, was the country against which much 
of American anti-colonial sentiment was directed. Great 
Britain and the United States, moreover, were the two powers 
who made the greatest contribution to the principle of 
international accountability for dependent peoples.
An important intellectual distinction between American 
and British blueprints should be underlined. Although a 
generalisation, there is an element of truth in the 
contention that whereas British stands on colonial issues 
tended to move from specific to more general conceptions, the 
Americans were more inclined to be influenced by conceptual 
propositions in particular matters. For example, during the 
Second World War, the British Colonial Office’s views 
regarding independence and/or self-government were based 
largely on its understanding of the lessons to be drawn from 
the experience of specific colonies and the evolution of the 
white Dominions to autonomy within the British Empire and 
Commonwealth. The attitudes of many officials within the 
State Department to such questions as the future of Indo­
china, however, in part were determined by the intellectual 
constraints of concepts like the Mopen door'*, ,fthe right of 
all peoples to independence1', and the general ethos of 
American anti-colonialism. If this intellectual distinction 
is borne in mind when probing their wartime policies 
regarding international accountability, then it is easier to 
appreciate more fully the occasional mutual incomprehension 
which the Americans and the British had for each other's 
proposals•
A further point is that when comparing American and 
British plans, clear analytical threads may well now be drawn
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which at the time were by no means apparent to the actual 
people dealing with them. Another complication is that it is 
not always clear, nor was it always clear at the time to the 
protagonists themselves (even within their own planning 
circles), whether differing American and to a lesser extent 
British proposals on international accountability were to be 
universal or confined to specific categories of non-self- 
governing territory such as the colonies of the enemy Powers.
Anglo-American mistrust in large part arose from 
differing cultural and historical heritages* British 
responses to American mandate and trusteeship proposals 
tended to vacillate between regarding them as ill-conceived 
but only so much hot air to positively dangerous threats to 
the existence of the British Empire. This was especially 
important during the Second World War when the United States 
was the senior partner in the wartime alliance who would 
inevitably exert major influence over the postwar colonial 
situation. On colonial issues at least, there never has 
been an Anglo-American ‘special relationship*.
The intellectual framework. At the heart of the thesis is 
the American anti-colonial tradition*s role in predisposing 
the United States to favour international accountability for 
dependent peoples. The tradition*s origins, nature and 
impact are analysed in Chapter 2. At this stage, however, it 
should be pointed out that the tradition derives from the 
image perceived by almost all citizens of the United States 
that their country was the first one in modern times to win 
its independence in a war of liberation against a colonial 
power. Myth and imagery are very important in the American 
view of the United States* revolutionary origins. The 
consequent anti-colonial implications have helped to provide 
a sense of historical purpose in American political folklore. 
In this respect, especially in so far as it promoted a 
national sense of identity, American anti-colonialism bears 
some resemblance to the emotional and psychological aspects
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of post-1945 Afro-Asian anti-colonialism. The American self- 
image has been renewed and reinforced by both the teaching of 
history in American schools and the ideological tenets of the 
Declaration of Independence. The impact of the latter was 
emphasised by Cordell Hull, Franklin Roosevelt's long-serving 
Secretary of State:
"I suggest that these should be memorized by every schoolboy 
and girl....'All men are created equal,...they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
Rights....among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.... to secure these Rights, Governments are 
instituted among them, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed."1
Whether or not American policy-makers have lived-up to 
the Declaration's idealism, for the purposes of this thesis 
is not so important as the fact that it predisposed them to 
believe that colonialism was a moral wrong which the United 
States should not support. In the words of Harry Hopkins, 
Franklin Roosevelt's long-time White House adviser: "Nor do
I see why this nation should not state unequivocally its 
belief in the political and economic freedom of all people 
throughout the world. Now, you can say that that spells the 
doom of all the Colonial Empires. Well, it probably does":
"I am not recommending that we stir up revolutions all over 
the world, but I do say that the United States should not 
cooperate in any international enterprise that will tend to 
solidify for all time a political relationship which does 
not give actual and complete freedom to the people who want 
it."2
The fact that the American War of Independence was 
fought against the England of George III gave many Americans 
a special distaste for British colonialism. The impact this 
has had on American historical and political images is also 
somewhat analogous to Afro-Asian post-independence memories. 
For example, Jawaharlal Nehru's comments on the post­
independence legacy of Asian anti-colonial nationalism are 
apposite to the ethos of American anti-colonialism: "the
memories of past colonialism are very vivid in our minds. 
Today a few individuals may escape those memories or get over
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them but the vast masses of the people do not forget them".^ 
This aspect is examined further in Chapter 2 as is the 
American belief in their own "higher morality*1 regarding 
colonial questions. For the moment it is sufficient to quote 
Franklin Roosevelt's remark to Prime Minister Churchill: 
"Winston, you have four hundred years of acquisitive instinct 
in your blood and you just don't understand how a country 
might not want to acquire land somewhere if they can get 
it".^ The Prime Minister's response to President Roosevelt's 
statements on British colonialism in general and India in 
particular, was that "States which have no overseas colonies 
or possessions are capable of rising to moods of great 
elevation and detachment about the affairs of those who 
have".-*
Within the United States, "carefully selected and highly 
sentimentalised memories of America's liberation from England 
conditioned an attitude of sympathy, if only sentimental", 
towards peoples living under European especially British, 
colonial rule. "Conveniently" overlooked by most Americans 
in their "self-righteous condemnation" of colonialism was 
"their country's own imperialist ventures and pursuit of 
self-interest".^ Indeed, even in the last decade of the 
twentieth century, "America does not like to think it has 
colonies, and many of those who live in them wince at the 
very word":
"Official language speaks of commonwealths or territories. 
But facts are facts. Military conquest and strategic need 
over the past 100 years or so have left America a modest, 
yet far-flung empire of islands. Most have governments and 
flags of their own, but none is free. And though they are 
sovereign territory of the United States, and use its 
currency, neither are they part of it. They have no direct 
say in its political process. Colonies they are."'
The nature of American empire building and the 
similarities or otherwi se  to that oC the Europe an colonial 
powers is outside the scope of this thesis except in so far 
as light is shed on the American anti-colonial tradition and 
the role this played in predisposing the United States to
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favour international accountability for dependent peoples.
To many non-Americans, however, United States* anti­
colonialism has often appeared to be a cloak for the pursuit 
of her own national interests. This aspect is also 
elaborated upon further in Chapter 2. For the moment it is 
sufficient to point out that the more severe critics of 
American policy have characterised it as "the curious picture 
of a state ruthlessly pursuing its own ends under the mantle 
of the highest idealism".** The frequent stress on the innate 
virtues of their policies by some American policy-makers has 
irritated both European and Afro-Asian statesmen and 
commentators. To quote Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia; "Is God 
white? Is he American?"^ Nevertheless, a constant theme of 
this thesis is that there has been a very real element of 
idealism in American anti-colonial pronouncements and 
policies. Although at times it is very hard to draw the line 
between self-delusion and hypocrisy, the central contention 
is that the United States in large part motivated by anti­
colonial sentiments in the idealistic sense, played the most 
important role in establishing the principle of international 
accountability for dependent peoples as laid down in the 
League mandates and the United Nations trusteeship systems.
Nevertheless, the element of self-interest in American 
plans cannot be ignored. It was a persistent theme, and 
often the dominant one. Consequently, throughout the thesis 
there is consideration of such questions as the degree of 
tension between idealism and self-interest in the American 
schemes to promote international accountability for dependent 
peoples? To what extent did American policy constitute a 
continuum in the respective planning for the League mandates 
and the United Nations trusteeship systems? In particular, 
how important was the desire in both sets of plans to 
restrict any potential enemy (namely, Japan) having 
‘unfettered* control over the German Pacific Islands North of 
the Equator? In fact another constant theme is American
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suspicion of Japan and desire to safeguard the national 
security of the United States.
Analysis of these issues throws considerable light on 
both American anti-colonialism and international 
accountability for dependent peoples. In particular, they 
demonstrate the key role of the former in developing the 
latter. The term international accountability is used 
throughout the thesis, although many commentators tend to 
regard it as synonymous with international responsibility. 
International accountability, however, embraces three ideas, 
one of which is international responsibility. First, the 
sacred trust principle; essentially the idea that colonial 
rule should be for the benefit of the governed rather than 
the governors. Second, that in undertaking their 
administration, colonial powers have a responsibility to the 
international community at large. Third, giving teeth to 
that responsibility by the provision of institutional 
measures sufficient to provide the international community 
with a meaningful role or over-sight in the actual conduct of 
colonial administration.
international accountability originated in the experiences of 
the British Empire, but American efforts in both world wars 
reinforced the international element. "Whereas the British 
had considered a colonial trustee answerable only to his own 
conscience, and perhaps to a vague world conscience, the 
mandates system added a third party, the Permanent Mandates 
Commission and the League Assembly*'. President Woodrow 
Wilson played a major role in this 'internationalisation' of 
colonial trusteeship. The international accountability 
element was extended further during the Second World War by 
the American planners for the postwar world under the 
leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt. The key role of 
the United States in establishing the international dimension 
within both the League mandates and the United Nations
Chapter 3 demonstrates that many involved in
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trusteeship systems is the subject of Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 
of this thesis,
A number of background and qualifying factors to the 
thesis should be pointed out. First, colonial policy in 
general and international accountability for the 
administration of dependent peoples in particular had very 
low priority in the two world wars. Both the League of 
Nations and the United Nations were designed as agencies to 
keep the peace; colonial aspects having only a relatively 
small part to play. To quote Lord Beloff on the Paris Peace 
Conference and the creation of the League of Nations: "it
might have been expected.... that Woodrow Wilson's 
commitment to national self-determination would extend to the 
subject nationalities of the British Empire. But Wilson's 
concerns were Eurocentric and.... only the former Ottoman 
Empire provided serious non-European issues of a political 
kind".-^ The fate of the former German colonies and even 
that of the former Turkish territories was not a serious 
threat to world peace compared with the European settlement.
Colonial issues were more important during the Second 
World War; especially to President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull 
who believed that future threats to world peace could well 
arise through the efforts of dependent peoples to throw off 
the chains of colonial bondage. Allied wartime propaganda, 
moreover, centred on the ideals of democracy and freedom 
which essentially meant rejecting the idea of the strong 
ruling the weak. Alien rule in Africa and Asia had long been 
resented, if only passively, and such wartime Allied 
pronouncements as the Atlantic Charter Declaration aroused 
hopes of colonial emancipation. However, even though the 
Americans devoted considerable efforts from 1942 onwards to 
planning for a postwar international trusteeship system under 
the auspices of the envisaged United Nations (efforts 
strongly supported by President Roosevelt), these still had 
very low priority compared with defeating the Axis powers and 
establishing international peace and security on a firm
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basis. American trusteeship plans were only a facet of the 
latter.
Another related qualifying factor is that although 
obviously significant as parameters against which policy was 
conceived, the thesis itself is not concerned as such with 
the roles of dependent peoples in the two world wars, debates 
on whether particular dependent peoples should be independent 
or self-governing, the disposal of individual dependent 
territories, or the detailed wartime planning for the future 
League of Nations and United Nations. Rather the conceptual 
focus is on the roles which the United States thought the two 
organisations should play in furthering international 
accountability for dependent peoples. In examining the 
various mandate and trusteeship plans, furthermore, the 
centre of enquiry is upon the evolution of ideas rather than 
the details of actual negotiations and the parts played by 
particular individuals. The details of diplomacy, however, 
are important in the evolution of ideas especially in so far 
as a particular idea is eventually contained in written draft 
proposals. The motives behind the mandate and trusteeship 
schemes have to be evaluated against the exigencies of high 
and low diplomacy. In other words, the various economic, 
military, political and other requirements for actually 
winning the two world wars and laying the foundations for 
successful peace settlements.
It is also necessary to bear in mind that the documents 
emanating from international wartime meetings and conferences 
were often conceived in haste and after the event appeared 
highly ambiguous. Sometimes, indeed, this was the deliberate 
intention of the drafters themselves. In particular, this 
qualification should be remembered when examining the 
Atlantic Charter’s provisions and the Yalta agreement on 
trusteeship. The participants at conferences and meetings, 
moreover, were not always certain themselves of the actual 
significance of what had been decided. Individuals, 
furthermore, perceived events in different ways. For
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example, as is developed in Chapter 6, many commentators have 
maintained that Winston Churchill’s outburst regarding 
American trusteeship proposals at the Yalta Conference in 
January 1945 was an important factor in making the United 
States more circumspect regarding its plans in this area.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, then Permanent Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office and a participant at the Conference, however, 
was very scathing in his comments on the Prime Minister’s 
outburst:
’’Silly old man - without a word of warning to Anthony [Eden] 
or me, he plunged into a long harangue about World 
Organisation, knowing nothing whatever of what he was 
talking about and making complete nonsense of the whole 
thing. The worst of it was that what he said was 
completely contrary to the line already agreed with the 
Americans! However, I was able to explain privately to 
them that they needn’t take it too tragically, that it 
didn’t really mean anything and that we could clean up the 
mess afterwards.”1^
Another qualifying factor is that the roles of 
individual American policy-makers in furthering international 
accountability is not a primary concern of this thesis. 
However, while the primary focus is upon the evolution of 
ideas, the part played by key individuals or groups is also 
obviously important in regard to both the American anti­
colonial tradition and international accountability. The 
American military, for instance, in the Second World War 
especially tended to be suspicious of British objectives and 
pro-annexationist regarding territories like the Japanese 
mandated islands which they believed important to American 
security. In contrast, State Department officials, although 
also aware of security requirements, tended to be anti­
annexationist. Individuals like Harley Notter (a special 
adviser in the State Department) and Leo Pasvolsky (Executive 
Director of the Committee on Postwar Programmes), were pro- 
British, but disliked European colonialism .
Similarly, at the highest political level, in the First 
World War, Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing, and in the
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Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, in one 
way or another could all be described as Anglophiles, 
although without enthusiasm for British colonialism. The 
tenacity and conviction of Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt 
played crucial roles in developing the principle of 
international accountability for dependent peoples. The 
anti-colonial sentiments of President Roosevelt were of 
particular importance. He was not a conceptual thinker and 
did not have the academic training and abilities of Woodrow 
Wilson. Franklin Roosevelt probably could not have sat down 
and drafted his own United Nations trusteeship proposals in 
the same way President Wilson did with the League Covenant. 
His distaste for colonialism of the European variety, 
however, was such that he wished to place even the Japanese 
Pacific islands mandate under trusteeship, although 
recognising their importance to American security. If he had 
bowed to the annexationist pressures emanating from Congress 
and the American military, the United States would have found 
it much more difficult to gain the European colonial powers 
acceptance of the United Nations trusteeship system.
The power of the presidency was crucial as "in those 
areas in which he chose to exercise his authority, the 
President was not only independent but supreme". Both 
Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt could dominate policy-making 
regarding the formulation of the mandates and trusteeship 
systems respectively. Woodrow Wilson was almost his own 
State Department so far as the Covenant and mandates were 
concerned, while Franklin Roosevelt controlled and 
manipulated the State Department in so far as it was possible 
with any bureaucratic machine and kept its trusteeship 
policies in line with his own aims and objectives. His own 
administrative procedures have been described as disorderly 
by Henry Stimson and others, but President Roosevelt chose to 
work through the State Department. This was "in contrast to 
the procedure of the First World War, when a Commission of 
Inquiry - the famous 1 House Inquiry1, under the chairmanship
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of Colonel M. House - was established by President Wilson to 
study the problems of peace-making and operated, for all 
practical purposes, without reference to the Department of 
State". President Roosevelt was also ably served in that 
"Secretary Hull endeavoured to make postwar planning during 
the Second World War more farsighted than that of the House 
Inquiry. As a result of his initiatives, preparations were 
begun early and were largely centred on his department as the 
one chiefly responsible for advising the President on the 
conduct of foreign a f f a i r s . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  the Roosevelt 
Administration had detailed trusteeship proposals giving it 
the initiative when dealing with Great Britain and the other 
European colonial powers. This initiative was essentially 
maintained up to and during the San Francisco Conference 
despite the severe modification in the State Department's 
plans brought about by the American military's desire to 
annex the Japanese Pacific islands mandate;
The racial issue as such lies outside the purview of 
this thesis and it will not be examined except to illuminate 
the nature and practical manifestations of American anti­
colonialism. Sufficient to state that whatever their views 
on colonialism as such, almost all the American and British 
participants in creating the mandate and trusteeship systems, 
were people of their time and usually did not believe that 
non-whites were the equals of whites. Arthur Balfour, for 
example, decried the tenet in the American constitution that 
all men were created equal: "I do not believe that any man
can approach this question wisely who really thinks that all 
men are equal in that sense". Given the perspective of the 
times, however, it was not wholly inconsistent for Americans, 
"who tricked and bullied the Indian tribes" and "ill-treat 
their own Negroes", to be anti-colonialist and to "preach 
virtue to others".^
Finally, a central hypothesis of the thesis is that the 
American anti-colonial tradition combined with international 
accountability for colonial administration contributed to the
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demise of Western European-style colonialism. Few Western 
European colonies now remain and even the Russian empire in 
Eastern Europe is being dismantled. The United Nations* 
Committee of 24 continues to investigate the remaining bits 
and pieces of Western European colonialism, mostly-remote and 
sparsely populated islands, but without the fervour and 
publicity of the 1960s and 1970s. All but one of the 
territories placed under mandate and/or trusteeship have 
either achieved independence or otherwise ceased to be a 
matter for international accountability. The Trusteeship 
Council itself only remains in existence because a part of 
the American strategic trust of Micronesia has still not 
determined its future. The territory is Palau, a collection 
of small Pacific islands with an estimated population of 
14,106.^ In the plebiscite of February 1990 on whether 
Palau should enter into a "Compact of Free Association1* with 
the United States, 7621 valid votes were cast. "4,663 or 
60.8 per cent, were cast in favour of the Compact, and 2,988 
or 39.2 per cent, were cast against. The Compact did not 
pass because of a constitutional stipulation that a 75 per 
cent majority was required.**^® In the next plebiscite, if 
the extra 1000 or so votes are found to give the required 75 
per cent, then the age of United Nations colonial trusteeship 
will be over.
2. Methodology and Chapter Summaries
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 
introduces the main themes and concepts. Chapters 2 and 3, 
the conceptual heart of the thesis, examine the main ideas 
underlying the American role in establishing the League 
mandates and the United Nations trusteeship systems; imperial 
and colonial relationships, the American anti-colonial 
tradition, and the principle of international accountability 
for dependent peoples. The "open door" concept is also 
investigated in so far as it is an aspect of international 
accountability. The concept embraces the notion that for the
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good of both dependent peoples and the international 
community, trade with colonies should be open to all 
countries and not restricted to the colonial metropoles 
concerned.
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, focus on the interplay of the 
anti-colonial and accountability concepts in the American 
role in establishing the mandates and trusteeship systems. 
Chapter 7 also contains a brief postscript on trusteeship 
developments since 1945. Chapter 8 outlines the overall 
conclusions of the thesis.
The examination in Chapters 4 to 7 is undertaken in 
broad chronological order: first the League mandates system
and then the United Nations trusteeship system within the 
context of American anti-colonial sentiment, developments in 
the notion of international accountability, and the 
exigencies of wartime planning and Anglo-American 
cooperation. An alternative (and rejected .strategy) was to 
examine concurrently the various problems and aspects of 
international accountability involved in creating the League 
mandates and the United Nations trusteeship systems within an 
analytical institutional framework. This approach would have 
entailed continuously moving the historical framework back 
and forth, and required chapters on the future of colonial 
domains, the advancement of dependent people, and 
international administrative machinery (including supervisory 
powers and functions). The approach has merit, but was 
rejected for four inter-related reasons. First, the various 
American ideas and institutional proposals would have had to 
be investigated within their own historical perspectives. To 
compare contemporaneously proposals from different historical 
periods/backgrounds could give false images and conclusions 
in so far as each proposal has to be seen against its own 
historical background. At the extreme, moreover, although 
apparently comparing the comparable, seemingly similar ideas 
and blueprints might not actually be comparable; the time 
factor being all important. Second, although to some extent
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this problem might be overcome by constantly re-emphasising 
the differing time frames, a lot of tedious repetition would 
be involved. Third, a considerable increase in the thesis' 
word length would be required. The final and key reason was 
that the thesis objective is to examine the impact and inter­
relation of American anti-colonialism and international 
accountability for dependent peoples over a specific time- 
scale determined by the two world wars. The objective is not 
to conduct a comparative analysis of institutional machinery 
as such.
Nevertheless, the questions posed in such a comparative 
institutional approach are underlying themes within the more 
historical methodology of the thesis. Thus, throughout, 
there is repeated reference to such questions as which 
colonies should be placed under mandate or trusteeship, 
should there be a 'colonial charter' covering all dependent 
peoples, and who should be the administering states? How 
should the interests of dependent peoples be advanced and 
should this include the right to self-government or 
independence? What kind of international administrative 
machinery would be required? Should it be regionally or 
globally based, possess real power or merely be a clearing 
house for ideas and information? Who should undertake the 
actual administration: the international organisation
directly, groups of states, or individual states? If the 
latter, should it be those states best qualified, small or 
neutral ones, or those in actual possession of the 
dependencies concerned? To what extent should the wishes of 
the dependent peoples themselves be taken into account when 
selecting administrative authorities? What should be the 
duties of the latter? Should they report to an international 
body, and if so, what should be the actual distribution of 
supervisory powers and functions? Where did sovereignty lie? 
What, if any, should be the possible sanctions on 
administering authorities in the event of maladministration? 
How should a mandate or trusteeship be terminated? Who
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should decide whether a dependency was ready for self- 
government or independence and the desirability of target 
dates for achieving either status?
Chapter Summaries;
Chapter 1 , the introduction, consists of three sections: a
long section on objectives and perspective, and two shorter 
ones on methodology and chapter synopses, and documentary 
sources and the original contribution to knowledge made by 
the thesis.
Chapter 2 is concerned with colonialism and the American 
anti-colonial tradition. There are three sections: an
investigation of imperial, colonial and neo-colonial 
relationships designed to illustrate American understanding 
of the terms; the nature and origins of the American anti­
colonial tradition; and the implications which the tradition 
has had for American policy.
Chapter 3 analyses the notion of international accountability 
for dependent peoples. It is divided into two main sections: 
the sacred trust principle; and the substance and development 
of international accountability itself. Throughout, American 
traditions and historical experience are contrasted with 
European ones, especially those of Great Britain.
Chapter 4 investigates the American role in creating the 
League of Nations mandates system. It is divided into three 
main sections: the proposals on dependent territories and
peoples which the United States brought to the Paris Peace 
Conference; the American contribution to the Conference 
decision to create the League mandates system; and American 
involvement with the mandates system.
Chapter 5 looks at the development of the trusteeship 
principle by Franklin Roosevelt’s Administration. It is 
divided into four sections: the Administration’s ideas on
international accountability for dependent peoples prior to 
American entry into the Second World War; the evolution of 
American trusteeship proposals during the war up to the
21
intervention by the Navy and War Departments in the policy­
making process in the summer of 1944; President Roosevelt*s 
attitude to trusteeship; and wartime British views on 
trusteeship.
Chapter 6 primarily focuses on the impact on American 
trusteeship proposals of the desire by the Navy and War 
Departments to annex the Japanese mandated islands in the 
Pacific, It is divided into four sections: the roots of the
opposition by the American military to trusteeship; the 
continuing Anglo-American dialogue on trusteeship; the final 
stages of the internal American debate on trusteeship and the 
impact of President Roosevelt's death; and the actual 
trusteeship proposals which the United States brought to the 
San Francisco Conference.
Chapter 7 is divided into two sections: the American role
during the San Francisco deliberations on trusteeship; and 
American attitudes to the constitutional aspects of United 
Nations concern with colonial problems up to the 
establishment of the Committee on Decolonisation in November 
1961.
Chapter 8 draws the various strands of the analysis together. 
It provides an overall assessment of the arguments in the 
thesis as a whole and summarises the role played by the 
American anti-colonial tradition in establishing the 
principle of international accountability for dependent 
peoples.
There is also a bibliography on the sources consulted in 
compiling the thesis and five appendices: a map illustrating
the contemporary American empire; details of territories 
placed under League mandate; a list of former United Nations 
trust territories; Articles 22 and 23(b) of the League 
Covenant relating to mandates and dependent peoples; and 
Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the United Nations Charter on 
the non-self-governing and trust territories.
22
3. Sources and a Contribution to Knowledge
The thesis is based on a wide range of documentary 
sources, published and unpublished, together with some 
interviews. The overwhelming bulk of the research has been 
library based. Many papers, articles and books were read for 
background information, but not cited in the thesis. The 
thesis bibliography lists the main sources quoted in the 
text.
The major documentary source for information on American 
attitudes to colonial problems and international 
accountability was the Foreign Relations of the United States 
series published by the State Department. Particularly 
useful were the published records of the Paris Peace 
Conference, the Yalta Conference, and the San Francisco 
Conference. The State Department's Postwar Foreign Policy 
Preparation, 1939-1945 was also very useful. Other sources 
of primary material were the State Department's "Notter Files 
on Postwar Policy" and the British Cabinet, Colonial and 
Foreign Office state papers. United Nations documents were 
another source of basic information.
The biographies, diaries and memoirs of American 
statesmen such as James Forrestal, Cordell Hull, Robert 
Lansing, Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Stimson, and Woodrow 
Wilson were a major fount of ideas and information. For 
general ideas on colonial problems and American attitudes, 
the writings of Richard van Alstyne, Rupert Emerson, and Hans 
Kohn were especially useful. Four books were particularly 
valuable on the United States and the League of Nations 
mandates system: George Louis Beer's African Questions at
the Paris Peace Conference, Lawrence Gelfant's The Inquiry: 
American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919, Seth Tillman's 
Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919, and Quincy Wright's Mandates under the League of 
Nations. The incomparable source for the American role in 
establishing the United Nations was A History of the United 
Nations Charter by Ruth Russell and Jeannette Muther. Useful
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commentaries on the United Nations trusteeship system were 
James Murray*s The United Nations Trusteeship System, Emil 
Sady*s The United Nations and Dependent Peoples, and George 
Thullen's Problems of the Trusteeship System. Two books were 
particularly useful on Anglo-American relations: Great
Britain and the United States by H. C. Allen, and The 
*Special* Relationship edited by William Roger Louis and 
Hedley Bull.
Overall, the numerous writings of William Roger Louis on
colonial problems and Anglo-American relations were 
stimulating sources for ideas and basic information. If some
of his work had been published earlier, especially 
Imperialism at Bay, I would have been saved much painstaking 
library-based research. Indeed, in formulating many of the 
ideas and propositions contained in this thesis, much is owed 
to the work of Professor Louis as well as to that of 
Professors Emerson, Kohn, and Russell. Finally, a special 
debt of gratitude is due to Professor Geoffrey Goodwin. It 
was his idea, many years ago, that I should investigate the 
American involvement in colonial problems within the context 
of international cooperation.
To what extent does the thesis make an original 
contribution to the body of literature on international 
relations? The thesis itself is a synthesis drawing together 
the ideas, research and writings of numerous other observers. 
The originality lies in looking at the material, asking 
questions and posing propositions, and putting them 
altogether within a logical framework in a manner which 
nobody else has done before. The specific contribution to 
knowledge lies in four areas. First, it is a British 
commentator looking at a field usually the preserve of 
American researchers. The second, and key aspect, lies in 
the intellectual heart of the thesis; the formulation, 
development and inter-relation of the two concepts, the 
American anti-colonial tradition and international
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accountability for dependent peoples. To my knowledge nobody 
else has done this with the same degree of intellectual 
rigour. For example, the writings of William Roger Louis are 
diplomatic surveys rather than the examination of ideas as 
such. Similarly, Rupert Emerson has analysed many of the 
basic ideas, although not the concept of international 
accountability as such, without dwelling on the institutional 
aspects. Third, the thesis is the first study to trace the 
inter-relation of the American anti-colonial tradition and 
international accountability within the context of differing 
Anglo-American views and the creation of the League mandates 
and United Nations trusteeship systems. Finally, the thesis 
provides another study of the inter-play of idealism and 
national interest in American foreign policy. This has not 
been done before within the context of American anti­
colonialism and international accountability and the 
establishment of the mandates and trusteeship systems.
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Chapter 2 : Colonialism and the American Anti-Colonial
Tradition
United States' attitudes towards international 
accountability for dependent peoples cannot be understood 
without an appreciation of the nature and potency of the 
American anti-colonial tradition. The tradition has a strong 
sentimental appeal to many Americans who point with pride to 
the successful efforts of the Thirteen Colonies during the 
American War of Independence to rid themselves of the tyranny 
of George III. This they regard as the first example in 
modern times of a dependent people struggling against and 
succeeding in throwing off the shackles of colonial bondage. 
Their perception is well illustrated by John Foster Dulles' 
statement that "we ourselves are the first colony in modern 
times to have won independence. We have, a natural sympathy 
with those everywhere who would follow our example."^- From 
its birth, moreover, the United States insisted on striving 
for political, economic, cultural and idealogical 
independence from Great Britain despite the affinity and 
interdependence existing in all these respects between two 
peoples who had developed from the same historical roots. 
Their inability to do so, especially in the nineteenth 
century, gave rise to a vocal frustration resembling the 
protests against neo-colonialism by many Afro-Asians after 
1945.
Secretary of State Dulles along with other Americans, 
however, overlooked the fact that "the revolution of 1776 was 
a movement not of oppressed natives, but of North American 
Britishers who enjoyed more rights and liberties than did the 
Britishers in Great Britain. The Anglo-Americans had come as 
conquerors and settlers, they revolted against their 
motherland in a struggle over the interpretation of common 
constitutional r i g h t s . T h e  rule of George III, moreover, 
was relatively enlightened and benevolent when judged in
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contemporary terms compared, say, with Spanish rule in the 
Americas or the regimes to be found in continental Europe at 
that time. In addition, as is examined further in Section 2, 
there was no question then or for a long time to come of the 
newly independent United States granting full or even partial 
citizenship rights to either the native red indians or the 
negro slaves. In fact, the rebellion of the American 
colonies in 1776 was more analogous to the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the white Rhodesian regime of 
Ian Smith in 1965 than to, say, the struggles of the Kenyans, 
Indonesians, and North Africans respectively against British, 
Dutch and French colonial rule.
Nevertheless, the United States* perception of herself 
as the first and the foremost anti-colonial power was widely 
accepted until comparatively recently. On at least a 
superficial level American attitudes to colonial questions 
were strongly influenced by the values and myths pertaining 
to the birth of the United States and her heritage of 
idealism expressed in such documents as the Virginian Bill of 
Rights, the Declaration of Independence and the United States 
Constitution. Thus, when American interests were not 
endangered by so doing, policy-makers and others in the 
United States usually sympathised with the anti-colonial 
cause. Few Americans (or even non-Americans) whether 
academics, publicists or politicians contested the American 
anti-colonial image during the time period covered by this 
thesis.
The American anti-colonial tradition itself can be seen 
as a continuing, practical, case-by-case development arising 
out of the interplay between sentimental anti-colonialism and 
perceived American national interests. Fortunately for the 
United States during much of her history as a sovereign 
state, sentiment and national interest coincided. Where this 
has not been so, usually sentiment rather than national 
interest has been reinterpreted. This has been generally the 
case since the Second World War as well as during the period
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when the League of Nations mandates and United Nations 
trusteeship systems were being formulated. American anti­
colonialism has been subordinated to and sometimes employed 
to further geopolitical and other considerations.^
The analysis of the American anti-colonial tradition in 
this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 
investigates imperial, colonial and neo-colonial 
relationships in order to place the debate on American 
attitudes to colonialism into its conceptual perspective. 
Particular attention is paid to the understanding which many 
but by no means all Americans have had of the terms and the 
light they shed on the actions of the United States. Section 
2 probes the nature and origins of the American anti-colonial 
tradition and in so doing looks at the various factors 
contributing to its evolution. Section 3, the bulk of the 
chapter, examines the implications which the tradition has 
actually had for American policy. It is divided into eight 
inter-related sub-sections: the American emotional
commitment to anti-colonialism; the supremacy of the national 
interest; strategic imperatives; commercial considerations; 
the desire for power and influence without responsibility in 
the third world; a lack of knowledge and comprehension of 
colonial problems; the Anglo-American special relationship 
and colonial matters; and an assessment of the degree of 
sincerity or hypocrisy in American policy regarding 
colonialism. This last sub-section draws the various themes 
together and inevitably touches upon material already 
analysed. The overall conclusion is that the Americans had 
genuine doubts about whether their dependent peoples were 
ready for independence, and so advocated training for self- 
government over a specified time period. This they also 
advocated for the dependent peoples of the colonial powers. 
The American suspicion of the latter, moreover, predisposed 
the United States to favour international accountability in 
training dependent peoples.
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Much of the material analysed in this chapter is inter­
related and the examination often takes the form of looking 
at the same events or ideas from different standpoints, 
American attitudes to British colonialism and how the various 
aspects of the American anti-colonial tradition have impinged 
on Anglo-American relations are a constant theme. Although 
considered in much greater detail in Chapter 3,/attention is 
also paid to those aspects illustrating official American 
attitudes to international accountability for dependent 
peoples. The specific influence of the anti-colonial 
tradition on actual American planning for the League of 
Nations mandates and the United Nations trusteeship systems 
is not examined as this is undertaken in Chapters 4, and 5, 6
and 7 respectively. Throughout, because of the wide time
span involved, the record of events and issues is of 
necessity selective. The emphasis is not on what actually 
happened, but rather on what Americans believed happened and 
what they perceived as important. Indeed, the creation of 
myths and imagery and their impact on American policy-making 
is another underlying theme of this chapter.
1. Imperial, Colonial and Neo-colonial Relationships
In the latter half of the twentieth century the terms
"imperialism” , "colonialism” , and "neo-colonialism", with or 
without qualifying adjectives, have been usually employed as 
synonyms to describe Western European power and influence in 
the underdeveloped regions of the world.^ Imperialism 
itself, however, in the sense of "the extension of political 
power by one state over another, has been a principal feature 
of the inter-action of human communities all through the 
sixty centuries of more or less recorded history".^ It is an 
ill-defined term giving rise to many analytical problems: 
for example, to what extent were there aggressive aims and 
motives rather than reactions to external pressures; was an 
"empire" acquired by "accident", "reluctantly", or in a "fit
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of absent-mindedness"; what were the relationships between 
rulers and subjects?
Imperialism, moreover, often has pejorative connotations 
depending upon individual standpoints and prejudices. For 
example, to some Americans and others who dislike British 
pretentions and power in the world, the term has distinct 
anti-British or rather anti-English implications. Thus, a 
definition in a dictionary of English and American Literature 
published in 1966; "Imperialism, by which we mean the idea of 
the supposed right of Englishmen to govern over other 
territories and peoples".** The term is frequently employed 
to mean unjust, oppressive rule or control; especially white 
influence over non-white peoples. The domination of whites 
over whites or non-whites over non-whites is usually ignored. 
Until the Second World War, however, the various 
manifestations of this Western domination were "regarded, at 
the least, as one of the inevitable facts of life, at the 
most, as a desirable state of affairs for the ruling power 
and probably for the colonially ruled as well".^ This is in 
marked contrast to the situation prevailing in the second 
half of the twentieth century where Afro-Asian resentment at 
all forms of white Western dominance underlies the now widely 
held belief that "colonialism in all its manifestations in an 
evil which should speedily be brought to an end".**
For their part, the advocates of Western imperialism 
"saw themselves as the trustees of civilisation. They 
reckoned it their duty to see to it that civilisation was 
disseminated among as many beneficiaries as could be 
contrived."^ Their ambition was often the noble one of 
making the world a better place to live in; "to drive the 
blade a little further in our time".-^ Unfortunately for the 
imperialists, however, people do not like to be dominated 
whether or not they have benefited materially from the 
relationship. Indeed, Albert Hourani defined imperialism as 
the imposition of alien control over an unwilling people:
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"The essence of imperialism is to be found in a moral 
relationship - that of power and powerlessness - and any 
material consequences which spring from it are not enough to 
change i t " . ^  The Encyclopaedia Britannica*s definition 
emphasises this lack of consent; imperialism is "the policy 
of a state aiming at establishing control beyond its borders 
'over people unwilling to accept such control*".-^ The key 
to the unwillingness is a feeling of inferiority rather than 
exploitation as such. To quote W.R. Crocker: "People do not
like being exploited but they can put up with it. What they 
cannot put up with is being considered inferior.
Hans Kohn maintains that if imperialism is analysed in 
terms of the distribution of political power, then there are 
five principal models, of which one is the colonial.^ The 
first is when the dominant power grants the subject people 
full autonomy within its empire. There are two sub­
categories: first, the subject people participate in the
empire*s affairs on equal terms with the nationals of the 
paramount power; and second, the paramount power grants full 
"local" autonomy, but retains responsibility for defence 
and/or external affairs. The second model is when the 
dominant people grant individuals among the subject people 
full citizenship, but endeavour to sink their corporate 
status in the larger political unit as the English did with 
the Welsh. The third model is when the conquering people 
annihilate or expel the indigenes as the North American 
colonists did with the North American Indians. The fourth 
model is when the indigenes are permitted to remain, but only 
in a permanently inferior status. Good examples are the 
Boer*s relationship with the Bantu and that of the United 
States with the surviving North American Indians until well 
into the twentieth century.
The fifth imperial model is the colonial relationship:
"...created when one nation establishes and maintains 
political domination over a geographically external 
political unit inhabited by people of any race and at any 
stage of political development. It is terminated whenever
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the subject people becomes fully self-governing as an 
autonomous state, whether independent or as a voluntary 
associate within an imperial or commonwealth partnership 
from which it may withdraw at will. It is also terminated 
whenever a subject people becomes assimilated into the 
political structure of the colonial power on equal terms, 
or when their political unit is thus assimilated....The 
unilateral compulsive nature of this relationship is the 
essential factor....A simple test - indicative but not 
infallible - is to observe whether an outside power tacitly 
claims the right to oust an unfriendly government or 
sovereign."15
The Hans Kohn model is neutral so far as pejorative
sentiments are concerned; colonialism being understood in
terms of the distribution of political power only. It avoids
the exploitative connotations given by Marxist, many Afro-
Asian and some American commentators• ■LO For example, the
American Webster's Dictionary defines colonialism as "the
system in which a country maintains foreign colonies for
their economic exploitation".1  ^ The Hans Kohn colonial model
also indicates that legally independent states can be
colonies. For example, the United States* relationship with
Some of the central American and Caribbean republics until
comparatively recently was a colonial one; the successful
American interventions in Grenada and Panama in the 1980*s
s W*jp
suggest that relation/ with much of the area are still neo­
colonial" if not "colonial" in form. Similarly, until 1989, 
the Soviet Union*s relations with its Eastern European 
satellites was essentially a colonial one.
This was denied by those holding a legalistic view of 
colonialism. To them a colonial relationship exists "when 
the government of one political entity has a legal 
guardianship, recognised under international law, for the 
domestic and/or foreign affairs of another geographically 
external political unit**.1® Thus, many Afro-Asian leaders, 
pre-occupied as they often were with racialism and Western 
European style colonialism, maintained that independence 
"consists fundamentally and basically of foreign 
relations".1^ The Soviet Union's East European satellites
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were "members of the United Nations” and "independent in 
terms of international law" who therefore "could in no way be 
called colonies".
Hans Kohn's models also avoid many of the pit-falls 
associated with mechanistic views of imperialism and 
colonialism. Many Americans, however, understand these terms 
from a mechanistic viewpoint. For example, the distinctions 
drawn between "expansion", "colonialism" and "imperialism" by 
Quincy Wright, a distinguished American commentator upon 
international law and colonial questions during the interwar 
years:
"Expansion occurs where a people with a naturally increasing 
population gradually extends its frontier over an adjacent, 
vacant or almost vacant, territory...
Colonialism is much the same but with the difference that 
the colony is not territorially continuous with the 
motherland. It is separated by such natural barriers as a 
range of mountains, a desert, or a sea...
Imperialism occurs when a state attempts to control 
territory which may be adjacent or separated but which is 
inhabited by a.people of different characteristics and 
institutions•
The distinctions are based on the different processes of 
domination: to Professor Wright, "Expansion may be likened
to the growth of an organism and colonization to 
reproduction, but imperialism more nearly resembles the 
acquisition of property. The people in a state*s expanded 
area are but peripheral cells of the leviathan, colonies are 
its children, but the inhabitants of an empire tend to become 
its slaves.**^ He characterises expansion and colonization 
(in the sense of the original American settlements in the New 
World) as good, but imperialism as bad. To him the 
"expansion of the United States over its present continental 
area and of Russia over much of Siberia** is natural
o o
e x p a n s i o n . H a n s  Morgenthau underlined the prevalent view 
among Americans:
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"The settlement of the better part of a continent by the 
thirteen original states seemed to be an act of 
civilization rather than of conquest and as such 
essentially different from, and morally superior to, the 
imperialistic ventures, wars of conquest, and colonial 
acquisitions with which the history of other nations is 
replete."25
He proceeds to point out that "it was not so much 
political virtue as the contiguity of the sparsely settled 
object of conquest with the original territory of departure, 
which put the mark of uniqueness upon American expansion".
To expand, the United States "did not need to cross the 
oceans and fight wars of conquest in strange lands, as did 
the other great colonizing nations".2** Quincy Wright's 
distinctions overlook the element of power present in the 
relationships. Professor Morgenthau underlined the 
importance of this point in the American case; "the utter 
political, military, and numerical inferiority of the Indian 
opponent tended to obscure the element of power, which was 
less obtrusive in, but no more absent from, the continental 
expansion of the United States than the expansionist 
movements of other nations".2** Moreover, the mechanistic 
distinctions between "expansion" and "colonization", fail to 
provide adequate means of determining which geographical 
factors make either definition operative in marginal cases; 
how large the desert, how high the mountain, how wide the 
sea! In addition, as Quincy Wright recognised, "imperialism 
is not always easy to distinguish from expansion and 
colonization", as they depend upon such nebulous factors as 
the numerical strength and degree of civilization of the 
indigenes, and the extent to which they lose their separate 
identity through either extermination, expulsion, or 
intermarriage with the colonists.22
In fact, like many Americans, Professor Wright appears 
to have been influenced by the "salt water" concept. The 
"widespread but unwarranted assumption, which had its origin 
in the fifteenth century age of discoveries, that colonial
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empires are established by sea powers, whereas expansion into 
contiguous land masses does not produce empire or 
colonialism*'.^ Thus, with regard to twentieth century 
attempts to develop the principle of international 
accountability for dependent peoples, it was comparatively 
simple for Americans to accept the premise that "rule over an 
alien people separated from the mother country by open sea is 
intolerable and should be subject to international control 
whereas similar rule over an alien people on an unbroken 
stretch of dry land is neither suspect nor a matter for 
international concern".^ The impact of the concept is such 
that, to quote Walter Lippmann, many Americans have not 
thought of "China or Russia as an empire", but might well 
have done so if, say, Siberia "were on an island or group of 
islands separated from Russia", or "Mongolia, Manchuria, 
Tibet, and Sinkiang were scattered about in the Indian 
O c e a n " . I n d e e d ,  "the process of overland expansion has 
been awarded an acceptance and favour of a kind denied to the
o i
spectacular, far-flung depredations of the sea powers". -L To 
many Americans it was their "manifest destiny" and "morally 
binding" duty to expand "from the Atlantic to the Pacific". 
This, to them, was not colonialism, but a noble endeavour. A 
"significant myth" soon arose and the "image of 'the 
Frontier', whether invoked by television's unflinching heroes 
or by President John F. Kennedy, has never lost its potency 
and attraction".^ As John Plamenatz has underlined, 
although "severe critics of 'colonialism', the Americans like 
the Russians have attacked many peoples weaker than 
themselves, taking vast territories from them". For both of 
them, "fortunately", the "territories they seized touched 
upon their own and were sparsely populated":
"they could therefore absorb them as integral parts of their 
own countries. Russia and the United States extended their 
frontiers, while Britain and France remained the same size 
as before and reduced other countries overseas to 
subjection. This difference has seemed to the Russians
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and Americans to put them morally on a higher plane than 
the peoples guilty of * colonialism*.
The salt water concept and mechanistic understandings of 
colonial relationships were especially important in American 
planning for the future United Nations trusteeship system 
during the Second World War. In particular, President 
Roosevelt had a mechanistic view of imperial relationships 
and would not have regarded the salt water concept as a 
"fallacy” . Such attitudes themselves derive from the 
American anti-colonial tradition. Before examining that 
tradition, however, mention must be made of the term "neo­
colonialism" and its relationship to American attitudes.
The phenomena often described as neo-colonialist are not 
new occurrences in international relations. For example, in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the term 
"economic imperialism" was used to indicate a type of 
economic relationship similar to the economic model of neo­
colonialism. It characterised many European and American 
relationships with the formally independent states of Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. Similarly, the political-military 
spheres of influence of the European powers in Africa and 
Asia, and the United States in Latin America, were a form of 
domination which would now be denounced as neo-colonialism. 
Likewise, the very process whereby the European powers sought 
"to civilise" what they regarded as the backward areas of the 
globe, would now be denoted as neo-colonialism.
The actual term neo-colonialism "appears to have been 
first used in the late 1950*s following the beginning of 
Western Europe*s retreat from Africa and the tremendous 
growth of independent Black African states. The problem of 
definition is made particularly difficult owing to the 
nebulous and emotive sense in which the term is frequently 
used. Indeed, 'colonialism*, 'imperialism*, *nineteenth 
century imperialism*, and * neo-colonialism*, are often used 
as inter-changeable and derogatory terms for describing any 
western activity in the underdeveloped regions of the world.**
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Neo-colonial relationships themselves "can originate from 
either custom or domination (whether political, economic, or 
cultural), and be endowed with a veneer of legality in so far 
as they derive from either a formal treaty or a general 
informal association".3^
At least two models of neo-colonial relationships can be 
defined; both having a wider field of application than 
western hegemony in the third world. The definitions rest 
upon the distribution of non-indigenous power and influence 
in independent states. "In one model the emphasis is upon 
the existence of non-indigenous influence within a sovereign 
state and in the other upon a state*s claiming of special 
preogatives in an external geographical area. The first 
model is best understood by remembering that the leaders of 
the emergent states are prone to denounce as neo-colonialism 
any tie with the western world which appears to make their 
new-found independence less than absolute."33 Although not 
mentioning neo-colonialism as such, President Sukarno gave 
voice to this apprehension in an address to the Bandung 
Conference:
"I beg of you not to think of colonialism only in its 
classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in 
different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has 
also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, 
intellectual control, and actual physical control, by a 
small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful 
and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It 
does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever, and 
however it appears, colonial/sm is an evil thing, and one 
which must be eradicated from the earth.1*3®
In this reactive sense "neo-colonialism can be defined 
as any activity (whether political, economic, intellectual, 
or cultural) by a non-indigenous group (be it another 
sovereign state, international organization of whatever type, 
alien community within the state, or outside economic 
interest) which appears to undermine the independent status 
of a sovereign state".3  ^ This model of neo-colonialism can 
denote both real and imaginary activities by non-indigenous
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groups. Indeed, the myths of neo-colonialist threats are 
frequently employed by third world leaders as vital 
psychological aids in their endeavours to construct viable 
nation-states. Neo-colonialism, in effect, has a cohesive 
function in that it can help to cement the "still plastic 
unity” of a newly independent state.^
Neo-colonialism in this sense reflects the feelings of 
inadequacy and even at times inferiority felt by many 
emergent peoples. There is usually more dependence on the 
outside world than they desire. Moreover, although now 
possessing political sovereignty, they often assume that 
independence is incomplete so long as the alien metropole 
remains enmeshed in the life of its former colony. ”An 
emergent people cannot eradicate completely all their ties 
with the former metropole, however, as even if all the more 
formal bonds of the relationship are broken, its historical 
heritage is usually an integral part of the type of 
civilization, particularly in the technical sense, which they 
ardently desire to a c h i e v e . ” * ^  Thus, to compensate 
psychologically, some of the more nationalistic leaders 
denounce any acceptance of western cultural norms as "mental 
colonialism” and to over-stress the distinctive nature of 
their indigenous cultures. Their frustration is increased by 
the tendency of the western world until at least very 
recently to undervalue if not actually despise the emergent 
peoples' achievements and native cultures. At the grass 
roots level, moreover, independence day did not bring 
immediate satisfaction of rising economic and social 
expectations:
"The weak are still weak, and the strong are still 
strong. The former colonial power rules no longer but it 
is still there, one of an allied group of nations, 
including the United States, which wield immense power, and 
are united in their 'whiteness', whilst most of them 
exercise some form of colour-bar, or at least racial 
superiority, against the coloured world.
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This model of neo-colonialism, although usually confined 
to Western relations with emergent peoples, is also 
applicable to relationships among the emergent peoples 
themselves and to relationships within the Western world. 
Thus, a dislike of supposedly alien influences was applicable 
to relations between the newly independent United States and 
Great Britain. After the War of Independence, in "name” , the 
United States was "an independent nation with its own unique 
government. But in reality it would be many years before 
America could feel itself truly free of B r i t a i n . T h o m a s  
Jefferson's denunciation "of the 'bastard liberty' of the 
British with their aristocracy and i n e q u a l i t i e s " , ^  j[n part 
can be explained by President Bourguiba of Tunisia's comment 
that, "To show how truly independent one is, one insults the 
former colonial power".^ In fact, American reluctance to 
become embroiled in the European balance of power lest the 
new United States become tarnished with the 'imperialist' 
habits of the Old World, resembles the emergent states' fear 
of neo-colonialism. Like most of the latter, "the United 
States was a former European colony unable to sever all her 
cultural and historical ties with the former metropole and 
whose own national achievements tended to be despised by the 
longer established nations of western Europe".^ Americans 
were infuriated by the remarks of such British visitors as 
Mrs. Fanny Trollope: "I do not like their principles, I do
not like their manners, I do not like their opinions".^ 
Although by no means all Britons held such views as Mrs. 
Trollope, it was perhaps understandable that the reaction of 
some Americans should be "Gratitude! Gratitude to England! 
What does America owe to her?.... We owe her n o t h i n g ! " ^  
Indeed, like Afro-Asian nationalist sentiments in the 
twentieth century, there were advocates of an American 
culture to emphasise separation. Noah Webster in his 
American Dictionary of the English Language of 1828, even 
called for a new American language: "as an independent
nation, our honour requires us to have a system of our own,
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in language as well as government". ^  The perhaps natural 
attempt by the "hypersensitive ex-colony" to "define American 
interests and values as the opposite" of those of Great 
Britain,^ is a classic case of the emotional model of neo­
colonialism. It goes a long way towards explaining both the 
psychological roots of the American anti-colonial tradition 
and the general assumptions in the United States about 
colonial and related issues.
Finally, another point of similarity between the Afro- 
Asian and American reactions to new-found independence, lies 
in their desire to stand aloof from international conflicts 
which they believed were not of direct concern to them. In 
the 1950's and 1960's especially, there was widespread 
criticism in the United States regarding Afro-Asian desires 
for neutrality and nonalignment in the Cold War. It is 
somewhat paradoxical, therefore, that the United States held 
views regarding the power struggles of the "Old World" in the 
early days of her independence (and, in fact, until well into
the twentieth century) resembling those of the modern Afro-
Asians. Indeed, some passages of George Washington's revered 
Farewell Address could have been made by an Afro-Asian 
statesman advocating avoidance of becoming entangled in the 
Cold War:
"As avenues to foreign influence, in innumerable ways, such 
attachments are particularly alarming to the truly
enlightened and independent patriot. How many
opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic 
factions; to practise the arts of seduction; to mislead 
public opinion; to influence or awe the public councils! 
Such an attachment of a small or weak nation, toward a 
great and powerful one, dooms the former to be the 
satellite of the latter."**9
The second neo-colonial model describes a state's vital 
economic and or strategic interests in external geographical 
areas where its influence is preponderant vis a vis other 
states. Usually the geographical area is outside the 
external state's formal judicial orbit in that normally it 
does not have responsibility for the area's internal
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administration. "Forceful" diplomacy might have been 
applied, however, to extract commercial and legal privileges 
for its citizens or to obtain formal treaty rights to 
preserve vital economic, political and strategic interests. 
The model embraces both a specific vital interest in one or 
more states or general spheres of influence. It can be 
defined as when a state possesses either an economic and/or 
strategic interest in an external geographical area covering 
one or more political units, whose preservation it regards as 
vital to its national well-being. It differs from a colonial 
relationship as defined by Hans Kohn in the degree of 
interference in the domestic administration of the political 
unit in question. Usually the state claiming special 
prerogatives does not possess either formal governmental 
responsibilities or the political will and/or de jure right 
to intervene in the day-to-day administration of purely 
domestic affairs. The neo-colonial relationship is 
terminated whenever the state claiming special privileges no 
longer possesses either the necessary political-will, 
diplomatic dexterity, economic, or military power to 
safeguard those privileges in the face of either indigenous 
ambitions and challenges or those of other external states.
In effect, this model of neo-colonialism is based on 
"informal" rule as opposed to the "formal" governmental 
powers normally found in colonial relationships.
American expansion in the twentieth century "generally 
followed 'informal* methods of commercial and financial 
penetration, most notably in Latin America".^ In fact, 
United States' use of the Monroe Doctrine and relations with 
the Latin American states, especially those situated in the 
Caribbean, are classic examples of the second model of neo­
colonialism. Her relations with Latin America and the Monroe 
Doctrine itself are examined more fully in Section 3, and for 
the moment only a few general points need to be made. 
Essentially, the Latin American states have had to accept the 
Monroe Doctrine and its various corollaries, unilaterally
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pronounced by Washington, as they did not possess the 
necessary economic, military or political strength to 
challenge effectively the United States* claim to hegemony in 
the New World. While Americans sometimes described the 
relationship in idealistic and moral terms, it remained one 
based on power.
Although now less marked than in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the relationship is still 
essentially a neo-colonial one for the Central American and 
Caribbean states; witness the successful United States* 
interventions in Grenada and Panama during the 1980*s. The 
advent of the Castro regime, however, severed the neo­
colonial tie between Cuba and the United States, despite 
continued American occupation of the Guantanamo base and the 
successful efforts of the Kennedy Administration in 1962 to 
have the Soviet Union’s Cuban missile sites dismantled. The 
United States still possesses the economic-military means to 
overthrow the Castro regime, but does not use her full power 
to do so for a mixture of internal domestic considerations, 
the risk of forfeiting Latin American good-will, and until 
recently, perhaps, the threat of Soviet retaliation.
2. The Nature of the American Anti-Colonial Tradition
American anti-colonial sentiments are rooted in the fact 
that the United States itself is the product of a successful 
revolt by thirteen British North American colonies against 
the nominal rule of George III. It was a revolt, however, of 
whites against whites; there was no question of civil rights 
for non-whites. With regard to the Red Indians, as 
Representative Dorn of South Carolina pointed out in June 
1955, "we did not advocate self-government for American 
Indians. That would have been a b s u r d . N e g r o  slavery was 
widely accepted and regarded by many as part of the natural 
order of things. Stoughton Lynd, among others, has argued 
that at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 which framed 
the American federal constitution, slavery was "central** to
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the compromises reached and the "clauses providing for 
federal suppression of [slave] insurrections and capture of 
fugitive slaves, as well as for postponing the abolition of 
the slave trade, were all integral to the framing of the new 
government” .^2 To Thomas Jefferson, a principal author of 
the Declaration of Independence, the rights of man meant 
essentially "white m a n " . ^  A Supreme Court judgement of 
March 1857 upheld this interpretation by five votes to four. 
Chief Justice Roger Taney ruled that "a Negro slave or a free 
Negro whose ancestors were slaves, could not become a United 
States citizen” . Negroes had not been "intended to be 
included under the word * citizens1” in the Constitution:
"They had for more than a century before been regarded as 
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to 
associate with the white race, either in social or 
political relations; and so far inferior that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect and that 
the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery 
for his benefit.
The American anti-colonial tradition itself has varied 
in content and intensity at different epochs of the history 
of the United States. There is an ideological core, however, 
from which the various forms of American anti-colonial 
sentiment derive. John Quincy Adams expressed its basic 
tenets in 1821:
"colonial establishments cannot fulfil the great objectives 
of governments in the just purpose of civil society....They 
are incompatible with the essential character of our 
American institutions, and as engines of wrong it would in 
time be the duty of the human family to abolish them, as 
they are now endeavouring to abolish the slave trade.
The potency of this central ideological core stems from 
and is reinforced by the American political heritage. In 
particular, the American "Declaration of Independence" denied 
the ideological basis of permanent colonialism with the 
assertions that "all men are created equal", and that 
governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the 
governed". Although the United States* own treatment of her 
non-white "citizens" did not live up to these assertions
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fully until well into the twentieth century, this did not 
prevent many Americans from alleging that European colonial 
practices were undemocratic and unjust. The believed lessons 
of the American frontier experience further reinforced the 
ideological core. There arose the myth that the transit of 
the settlers across the North American plain during the 
nineteenth century demonstrated that if men were left to 
their own devices, their innate capacities and goodness were 
such that they could stand on their "own two feet11 and govern 
themselves wisely. Again, in the eyes of many Americans, the 
fact that in the nineteenth century those qualities were 
attributed to "whites" only, was irrelevant to the tenet that 
colonialism hampered the fullest development of human 
capacity. Finally, as is discussed more fully later in this 
section, the influx of immigrants in the nineteenth century 
often brought with them a dislike of the European empires 
which gave additional strength to the conviction that the 
"American-way" was both different from superior to the 
imperialist and other practices of the Old World.
From the basic postulate on the unjustness of colonial 
rule, two distinct yet related convictions have sprung: 
first, colonialism impedes world trade; and second, it 
threatens international peace. The former is underpinned by 
two historical factors arising from Anglo-American commercial 
differences. The first is rooted in the economic causes of 
the American War of Independence; namely, the attempt of 
George Ill's government in Westminster, influenced by 
eighteenth century mercantilist doctrines, to regulate the 
trade of the North American colonies. The second factor 
derives from the confounding of the American expectation that 
after their revolution, they would "continue the privileges 
and profits that had formerly been theirs, particularly the 
once lucrative trade with the British West Indies". Instead, 
the British Government treated "the United States as the 
foreign nation it had so ardently desired to become", and 
endeavoured "to strengthen the empire by reserving the
benefits for those colonies, such as Canada, that had 
remained l o y a l " . T h e  resulting American contention that 
colonialism created artificial trading barriers detrimental 
to the economic interests of both dependent peoples and other 
sovereign states, was reinforced by the belief that a 
principal reason for the United States' own tremendous 
economic growth in the nineteenth century was the absence of 
such barriers between the states of the North American Union. 
Many Americans and Europeans as well, moreover, believed that 
European competition for overseas empire to obtain economic 
advantages and the subsequent practice of the colonial 
"closed door" was a fundamental cause of international 
conflict. For example, Cordell Hull's comments in 1944 on 
ending "preferential arrangements in the British Empire after 
the end of the war":
"Unless the business people of our two countries recognise 
that we have to turn over a new page in economic affairs 
and go forward....resolutely.... there will simply be no 
foundation for any stable peace structure in the future.
On the contrary, there will be the inevitable seeds of 
future wars in the form_of vast unemployment and hunger 
throughout the world.
Closed door practices in the Philippines and other 
American territories were usually overlooked or explained 
away. The American concern with what they considered to be 
the economic dangers of colonialism made them firm advocates 
of the "open door", especially in plans for international 
accountability for dependent peoples.^®
The second American conviction on the dangers of 
colonial rule was that it threatened international peace and 
security because colonial regimes were inherently unstable 
due to the desire of subject peoples to be free. A good 
example of this belief is provided by the remarks of Frances 
B. Sayre (a son-in-law of Woodrow Wilson) in 1943 when 
serving as a special assistant to Cordell Hull:
"The problem of colonial government which has tormented 
Europe for over four centuries never will be solved until 
they come to realise that the supreme values in the world 
are human personalities. Every alien rule based upon mass
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injustice or exploitation contains the seeds of unrest and 
revolution and makes against international stability and 
lasting peace.
Indeed, as is demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, 
underlying the Roosevelt Administration's endeavours during 
the Second World War to establish a viable system of 
international accountability for dependent peoples as an 
integral component of the envisaged postwar United Nations, 
was the conviction that once the Allies were victorious over 
the Axis powers, a major threat to international stability 
could well arise from attempts by the European colonial 
powers to retain and/or to regain control of their Asiatic 
and African empires. For example, President Roosevelt's 
remarks to Elliott Roosevelt in January 1942: "I'm talking
about another war....I'm talking about what will happen to 
our world if after this war we allow millions of people to 
slide back into the same semislavery....Don't think that 
Americans would be dying in the Pacific tonight if it hadn't 
been for the shortsighted greed of the French and the British 
and the Dutch."^® Once she entered the war, the United 
States put considerable pressure on Great Britain both to 
hasten the march to independence of colonial dependencies, 
especially India, and to cooperate in establishing an 
international trusteeship system to assist that process.
Another factor behind the American anti-colonial 
tradition was the already mentioned frustration at the 
fledgling Republic's inability to break all its ties with 
Great Britain. In particular, throughout much of the 
nineteenth century, there was considerable national 
frustration due to the fact that American insular security in 
large measure rested on the Pax Britannica. The position was 
aggravated in that Great Britain was the one state with the 
potential to challenge seriously American power in the New 
World. Again, when the United States began to extend her 
interests into the Caribbean, the Pacific, and Asia, almost
47
always, the main, usually already entrenched, rival was Great 
Britain
American anti-colonialism was given an added impetus by 
the hostile feelings which many of the nineteenth century 
influx of European immigrants had for the European empires.
Of particular importance was the hatred many American Irish 
had for England and all her works; they brought "few 
possessions" to the United States, but "a wealth of bitter 
memories rooted in eviction, poverty and famine". ^  In the 
words of the American historian, Merle Curti, "the presence 
of the British-hating Irish led our politicians to curry 
their favour by 1 twisting the lion’s tail* so vehemently that 
friendly relations with the mother country suffered repeated 
strains".^2 The growing Anglo-German rivalry of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was also reflected 
in the anti-British sentiments of many Americans of German 
stock. A good example is provided by the then Secretary of 
State, John Hay's account of the 1900 Democratic Presidential 
Convention: "We had great trouble to prevent the Convention
from declaring in favour of the Boers and the annexation of 
Canada". He deplored the harm to Anglo-American relations 
"because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are 
fools", declaring that it was "enough to drive a man mad".^3 
Later, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, when writing of the 
groups in the United States who opposed American entry on the 
Anglo-French side in the First World War, refers to the 
efforts of those of "German and Austrian descent", and 
especially the efforts of "the Irish-Americans who 
sympathized with those who were trying to free Ireland from 
British domination".^ After the war at the time of the 
Paris Peace Conference, the American Irish "were bombarding" 
President Wilson for not forcing Great Britain "to grant the 
Irish independence".^ It was "significant that Senator 
David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, himself of Irish lineage, 
was one of the few Democratic senators who refused to support 
Wilson four square on the League".^
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In the twentieth century, moreover, there have been 
numerous attempts by other hyphenated American ethnic groups 
to influence United States policy regarding colonial 
questions, especially important at election times, American 
Jews have been the most powerful of these groups in both 
financial and opinion-making terms. The American Zionist 
lobby in the second quarter of the century added to the anti­
colonial chorus through its propaganda against British stands 
on creating a Jewish national home in Palestine.^
The American anti-colonial tradition has been kept alive 
by the perpetuation of historical images. Certainly during 
the period covered by this thesis, the teaching of history in 
American schools reinforced the historical memory of believed 
past colonial injustice. Robert Lansing referred to the 
"influence" of Mthe textbooks in teaching American history to 
the youth of the land. Unavoidably there was implanted in 
the minds of the students in our public schools the idea that 
England was our hereditary foe". **8 American history teaching 
was such that the "ghosts” of George III and Lord North 
"still haunted the American scene" during the Second World 
War. Richard Law of the Foreign Office reported that "it may 
be these ghosts will never be laid, and that it will not be 
possible to instruct the American people in the real nature 
of the British Empire".*^
Overall, the key factor influencing the growth and 
direction of the American anti-colonial tradition was the 
historical circumstance of the United States* birth as an 
independent state; namely, that she obtained her independence 
by fighting a revolutionary war against the Great Britain of 
George III. Folk-memories of the Boston Tea Party reinforced 
American anti-colonialism. Image, not reality is all 
important. As has also been the case with many newly 
independent Afro-Asian states, the real or imagined 
circumstances of the birth are not so important as the fact 
that the United States was once the dependency of a colonial 
power whose values and interests were still intertwined with
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those of the fledgling North American Republic; legal 
independence could not remove all the cultural, economic and 
political ties between the United States and Great Britain 
inherited from the colonial era. This aspect was aggravated 
by the fact that the British Empire was her chief commercial 
rival once the United States began to take a wider interest 
in international relations. The historical memory is 
perpetuated by American "historical landmarks" which for 
British visitors are "one deep humiliation after another":
"Most of the sights celebrate ignominious British defeats or 
defiant American triumphs over colonial oppression,...
The message is clear. Divine intervention, aided by the 
fact that the spineless British were easily scared, allowed 
right to triumph."70
Finally, it should be underlined that Americans have 
never disliked the other European colonial empires in quite 
the same way as they did the British empire. From the early 
days of the new republic, in the words of John Adams, Canada 
and the other British possessions in the New World meant that 
Great Britain will "be the enemy of the United States, let 
her disguise it as much as she will". To him, France was 
"the natural ally" of the United States.7^ Indeed, over a 
hundred years later, Secretary of State Lansing referred to 
"the sentimental friendship which had persisted from the days 
of the American War of Independence. The aid which France 
had furnished to the colonies during the days of the 
Revolution had never been forgotten. France was our historic 
friend to whom we owed a debt of g r a t i t u d e . T h i s  was 
certainly true up to the Second World War when President 
Roosevelt demonstrated a marked distaste for French 
colonialism as is shown in Chapter 5. In his view, however, 
the British Empire was the primary obstacle to international 
trusteeship as a staging post on the road to colonial 
emancipation.
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3. Anti-Colonialism and American Policy
(a) The emotional commitment to anti-colonialism 
The emotional potency exerted on the public life and 
policies of the United States by the usual American view of 
their national origins and subsequent anti-colonial tradition 
may be gleaned from the fact that in official language she 
has never possessed colonies or protectorates. When Hawaii 
and Puerto Rico were acquired at the end of the nineteenth 
century, they were denoted as "territories1', while the United 
States' other outposts in the Caribbean and the Pacific were 
described as "insular possessions":
"The word colony itself disappeared from official 
terminology; the Philippines became referred to as a 
dependency or as an insular possession as were Guam, Wake, 
Samoa, Midway and other Pacific islands (which were 
administered by the U.S. Navy). Generations of Americans 
grew up without being aware of the colonies of the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico existing behind the facade of 
an administration of insular affairs."'^
In fact, in the words of Richard van Alstyne, "in the 
United States it is almost a heresy to describe the nation as 
an empire".^ William Fox writing in 1943, referred to the 
word "empire", as having "an evil connotation in America". 
Until recently, many American historians tended to discount 
their country's expeditions into the colonial field. Julius 
Pratt maintained that, "We practised colonialism in the first 
third of the twentieth century with an uneasy conscience and 
a more or less steady purpose to return to the paths of 
virtue".^ Similarly, Nevinjf and Commager's evaluation of 
the American "imperialist phase" of the 1890's:
"Time was to prove that the overseas responsibilities which 
the United States assumed were in part merely temporary, 
and at heart the nation remained non-imperialistic. As the 
years passed it chose to reduce its overseas holdings, not 
to enlarge them."''
Until after the Second World War it was comparatively 
simple for the United States to feel and to pose as an 
opponent of colonialism. A constant theme of this section, 
to quote Emil Sady, is that the anti-colonialism "firmly
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established in the American value system, happily coincided
with the interests of the national security of the United
States, of American missionaries in the welfare of the people
concerned, and of private corporations in the materials,
trade, and investment opportunities in the colonies",^
Until the 1890's and her emergence as a "world power",
moreover, she was too preoccupied with expanding across the
North American continent to be greatly interested in oceanic
expansion. It was recognised, however, that force was used
in that continental expansion. For example, John Foster
Dulles's testimony to the Senate's Foreign Relations
.WoOricrtJ
Committee s hearings on the United/Charter in 1945: Largely
through force or the threat of force we expanded our domain 
from a small strip along the Atlantic seaboard to a general 
continental and, almost world empire.
The American belief in their own virtue has some 
substance in that for most of the nineteenth century each new 
territory acquired was destined by law to become an integral 
part of the American Union with eventual statehood; its 
inhabitants, or at least the white ones, becoming United 
States citizens. The principle was first formulated in the 
treaty governing France's cession of Louisiana to the infant 
United States in 1803:
"The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be 
incorporated in the Union of the United States and admitted 
as soon as possible according to the principles of the 
federal Constitution.
The American colonists prior to the War of Independence, 
had favoured the extension of British power in North America. 
Benjamin Franklin, for example, "demanded more living room 
and admonished the British that a prince 'that acquires a new 
Territory, if he finds it vacant, or removes the Natives to 
give his own people Room' deserves to be remembered as the 
father of his nation. Past gains established the duty that 
Britain now owed her C o l o n i e s . T h e  United States' own 
continental expansion, furthermore, was by no means morally
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superior to British oceanic expansion. Indeed, as is 
developed further in Chapter 3, a sometimes overlooked cause 
of the War of Independence was the hostility in the frontier 
regions to a British proclamation of 1763; one of whose 
purposes was preserving "Indian rights to their lands and 
hunting grounds".^ George Washington, in fact, was one of 
those colonists who acquired lands which created problems 
with Indian Chiefs anxious "to keep the whites out of their 
country"; increasing the difficulties of a British government 
endeavouring "to honour its obligations to the Indians to 
restrain the whites from taking their lands".
The march of the independent United States across the 
North American continent was marked by deceit, treachery, and 
violence. The Indian tribes were bullied and tricked out of 
their hunting grounds. The white American settlers broke 
treaty after treaty with the Indians in their search for 
acreage and precious metals. In fact, John Collier has 
maintained that in the middle of the nineteenth century 
American policy "drifted" to one "of the destruction of all 
Indian organisation". It "became - and was actually called 
officially - a policy of liquidation applied to Indian 
properties and Indian life".^ In 1867, General William 
Tecumseh Sherman remarked that, "The more I see of these 
Indians, the more convinced I am that they all have to be 
killed or be maintained as a species of p a u p e r s " . A n o t h e r  
Civil War general, Phil Sheridan, "urged destruction of the 
bison herds, correctly predicting that when they disappeared 
so would the Indian"; by 1885 the bison were virtually 
extinct and the Indians starving.
(b) The supremacy of the national interest
In both the North American continent and the Western 
Hemisphere as a whole, the United States tended to 
subordinate her anti-colonial tradition to the believed 
requirements of her national interest. California, New 
Mexico and Texas were obtained through military conquest,
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while in 1903, American control of the proposed Panama Canal 
was ensured by instigating a revolt in the Colombian province 
of Panama; the new, "independent11, state of Panama granted 
the Canal Zone to the United States in perpetuity, Mexico 
was probably the main victim of American imperialism in the 
New World, Even Americans like Abraham Lincoln who opposed 
the war with Mexico over Texas in the 1840's, still supported 
the "patriotic" cause and those "ready to pour out their 
hearts' best blood, and their lives with it, on a foreign 
shore, in defense of the American flag and American glory". 
This was a time of "Manifest Destiny"; a "dream" of "an 
ocean-bound republic" stretching from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific oceans.**** Alonso Aguilar, a Mexican, has summarised 
the results "of the aggression against Mexico":
"the United States first acquired Texas and shortly after, 
in 1848, another large slice of territory. Altogether, the 
United States incorporated some 945,000 square miles - a 
vast area which today includes the states of Texas,
Arizona, New Mexico, California, Nevada, Utah, and part of 
Wyoming. After appropriating these lands, to which it had 
no right whatsoever, the United States paid $26.8 million 
for them - as though this made the annexation legal."89
During the nineteenth century the Monroe Doctrine was a 
valuable diplomatic instrument for protecting the United 
States' insular security, commercial interests, and political 
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. As suggested earlier, it
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was a classic example of neo-colonial^. The Doctrine itself 
was enunciated by President James Monroe in his annual 
message to Congress, December 2, 1823. The essential premise 
was "that the American continents, by the free and 
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, 
are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future 
colonization by any European powers".9^ John Foster Dulles 
described the Doctrine as "originally enunciated and pursued" 
as "a doctrine of national self-defence".9^
After its initial use to justify opposition to European 
conquest and recolonisation of Spain's former colonies in 
Latin America, the Doctrine was not really employed until
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"explicitly revised" by President James Polk in December 1845 
regarding disagreements with Great Britain over Texas and the 
Oregon territory.^ His corollary to the Doctrine took the 
form of a "no-transfer" principle: "We must ever maintain
that people of this continent alone have a right to decide 
their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting 
an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our 
Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to 
determine without any foreign influence." The United States 
"can never consent that European powers shall interfere to 
prevent such a union".^
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the success or 
otherwise of the Monroe Doctrine to a large extent depended 
on the forbearance of the European powers, especially Great 
Britain. By the 1890's, however, the United States herself 
was a "Great Power" with the actual ability to ensure 
compliance. In 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney 
extended the Doctrine in an Anglo-American dispute over the 
Venezuelan boundary. Olney's "Fiat" proclaimed that the 
United States would be the judge in disputes between the 
European powers and the Latin American states: "Today the
United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and 
its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its 
interposition".^ President Theodore Roosevelt extended the 
Doctrine in addresses to Congress between 1901 to 1905.
Under his corollary, the United States set herself up as the 
guardian of "good government" and "good behaviour" in the New 
World:
"Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a 
general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in 
America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by 
some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the 
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may 
force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant 
cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of 
an international police power....We would interfere with 
them only in the last resort, and then only if it became 
evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice
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at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United 
States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment 
of the entire body of American nations.
From the late 1890's until the early 1930's, the Monroe 
Doctrine was used to justify establishing de facto 
protectorates in the Caribbean to safeguard American 
interests as well as to forstall possible European 
intervention. There were numerous American interventions in 
and even occupations of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Mexico, and Nicaragua.^ The Doctrine also ideologically 
justified the Wilson Administration's protection of American 
security by purchasing the Danish West Indies in 1917 for $25 
million in case Germany "conquer Denmark and come in that way 
into legal t i t l e " . i n  1928, Franklin Roosevelt summarised 
the Doctrine's overall impact and American policy generally 
on Latin America:
"The nineteen or twenty republics to the south of us in 
Latin America do not scorn us, they hate us. They have 
seen us in Haiti, Nicaragua and San Domingo. They have 
seen what they call our imperialism."^8
There was some change in American policy with the advent 
of Roosevelt's own Administration in 1933 and the 
inauguration of the "Good Neighbour" Policy.^9 This rested 
on two basic principles. The first was that to promote 
better relations with the Latin American states, the United 
States would not insist on all her legal rights. The second 
was that she would endeavour to cooperate with them rather 
than undertake unilateral actions. The new style American
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diplomacy led to("Pan Americanism" and "the principle of 
American solidarity" as expressed in the Buenos Aires 
Declaration of December 1936: "a moral union of all the
American Republics in defence of their common interests based 
upon the most perfect equality and reciprocal respect for 
their rights of autonomy, independence and free 
development".^ 0  As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, 
however, the sheer size and relative power of the United 
States combined with continued unilateralist inclinations,
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meant that she still retained a neo-colonialist relationship 
with much of Latin America, especially those states in the 
Caribbean and Central American regions. Nevertheless, "Pan- 
Americanism" did at least involve the semblance of collective 
action by all the American states. Of the greatest 
importance for the purposes of this thesis, moreover, as is 
shown in Chapter 5, it was from the desire to foster inter- 
American solidarity, that the Roosevelt Administration 
formulated its first proposals for international trusteeship.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, however, the 
United States continued to refrain from acquiring territories 
not destined for eventual statehood within the North American 
union. In fact, as Julius Pratt has pointed out, the 
anticipation of "eventual statehood, was the prevailing one 
among the men of the 1850*s who urged expansion into the 
Caribbean and Central America in the name of 'manifest 
destiny'. That Cuba, if annexed, would become a state - a 
slave state - was assumed by both advocates and opponents of 
such annexation."101 in the post Civil War period, some 
American statesmen had distinct colonial-style ambitions. 
Secretary of State William Seward was probably "the central 
figure of nineteenth century American imperialism". With the 
end of the Civil War in 1965, he began a series of 
expansionist initiatives:
"He threw out several lines in the Caribbean, hoping (though 
in vain) for at least one island; and he boldly seized the 
bait Russia suddenly held out in 1867 in letting him know 
she was ready to sell Alaska....[He also] made a futile 
gesture at annexing Hawaii, long since Americanized by New 
England merchants and missionaries; but he got Midway 
Island, thus registering the trend toward Asia."10<<i
The debate over President Grant's abortive ambitions for 
San Domingo, "produced in 1870/71, the first clear argument 
in Congressional history on the issue of 'colonialism' or 
'imperialism' as American policy". There was still a marked 
distaste for colonial adventures. Senator Thomas Bayard, 
denounced the proposal that the United States should embark
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"upon the vast and trackless sea of imperialism, to change it 
into an imperial Government of outlying and distant 
dependencies with a foreign population, strangers to us in 
race, in blood, in customs, in all their systems, political, 
social, moral and religious'*. Senator Carl Schurz "warned 
that free institutions cannot flourish in the tropics":
"To govern tropical islands as 'satrapies' would 'demoralise 
and corrupt our political life....and impart to our 
Government a military character most destructive of its 
republican attributes'. To admit them as states would be 
to induct into Congress 'people who....have neither 
language nor tradition, nor habits, nor political 
institutions, nor morals in common with us'."*
In the Pacific, the region most important to her 
national interest after the Americas and the Caribbean, until 
the end of the nineteenth century, the direct extension of 
United States' power was confined to the forceful diplomacy 
of Commodore Perry's expedition of 1853 which extracted 
commercial concessions from Japan, annexing a few small 
islands such as the Midway Group in 1867, obtaining the 
exclusive use of the Samoan harbour of Pago-Pago as a naval 
base in 1878, and exercising a paramount influence in, but no 
formal responsibility for, Hawaii from the 1870's onwards.
With the United States' emergence as a World Power in 
the 1890's, "the arguments for overseas expansion won 
widespread popular a p p r o v a l " . F o r  example, writing in 
1895, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge maintained that, "the great 
nations are rapidly absorbing for their future expansion and 
for their present defense all the waste places of the earth. 
It is a movement which makes for civilization and the 
advancement of the race. As one of the great nations of the 
world, the United States must not fall out of the line of 
march."105 Divergence from her anti-colonial tradition was 
governed by similar motives to those influencing the 
contemporary European expansion; more general acceptance of 
the duty to assume "the white man's burden" and help the less 
advanced coloured peoples, national prestige and Great Power
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rivalry, strategic requirements arising from the imperatives 
of sea power, and commercial interests. In particular, in 
American business circles there was a belief that a "base in 
the Philippines would aid in keeping open the Chinese door 
for American trade, now threatened by the exactions of the 
European powers".106 Overall, American inhibitions regarding 
colonialism were modified to such an extent that the United 
States procured an overseas empire not essentially different 
in kind from, although smaller in scale to, those of the 
European Powers. In 1897, she annexed Hawaii, and as a 
result of the Spanish-American War of 1898, she wrested Guam, 
the Philippines, and Puerto Rico from Spain.
A popular notion in American political folklore is that 
the United States took the Philippines from Spain primarily 
for the good of the Filipino people. Often ignored is the 
fact that once the latter realised that they were not going 
to obtain the independence they had generally expected, the 
subsequent Filipino guerilla warfare was firmly suppressed by 
the United States with a degree of brutality no different 
from that sometimes undertaken by the European colonial 
powers. There is evidence, for example, of water torture; of 
Filipinos being held "beneath a water faucet turned on full 
force, and of army medical officers using a syringe to inject 
salt water into the nostrils".107 William Pomeroy maintains 
that it was "a matter of significance that virtually all of 
the ranking American military commanders in the Philippines 
were veterans of the American Indian Wars, which had 
frequently turned into wars of e x t e r m i n a t i o n " . 108 The
"widespread attitude" by the "white American soldiers" was 
that the Filipinos were "racially inferior people"; very 
often described as " n i g g e r s " . 109 The overall American record 
in the Philippines left much to be desired: "during the
period of United States rule from 1900 to 1946 it is doubtful 
whether the living standards of the peasants and agricultural 
labourers (the overwhelming bulk of the population) 
registered any marked improvement over the miserable
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conditions of the nineteenth century Spanish colonial 
regime” . T h i s  is not to criticise American rule as such, 
but rather to underline that American colonial practice was 
no better or worse than that of the European colonial powers.
The American anti-colonial tradition was still operative 
in that jurisdiction over the Philippines was widely viewed 
in the United States as only temporary. For example, 
President Wilson in his first annual message to Congress in 
December 1913, declared that ”We must hold steadily in view 
their ultimate independence, and we must move toward the time 
of that independence as steadily as the way can be cleared 
and the foundations thoughtfully and permanently laid” .^-^ 
Nearly fifty years passed, however, before the United States 
considered that the Filipinos were sufficiently educated in 
the practice of democratic institutions to be capable of 
governing themselves. The Roosevelt Administration passed 
the necessary independence legislation in 1934, but for a 
variety of reasons (in particular, the Second World War and 
Japanese occupation of the Islands) the Philippines didnoh 
become independent until 1946; only one year before the 
British granted independence to the Indian sub-continent.
The United States, moreover, ”retained by treaty, military 
and naval bases in the Philippines which Britain never sought 
from India” .
Anti-colonial sentiment did play a role in American 
decisions to grant varying degrees of self-government to her 
overseas territories at a relatively early stage. ”Hawaii 
became an 'incorporated territory1 - autonomous in local 
affairs and with the possibility of ultimate statehood 
(granted in March 1959). In Puerto Rico and the Philippines, 
where Spanish rule had afforded little experience in 
democratic practices, measures of self-government were 
introduced and rapidly enlarged, so that by 1917, the people 
of each dependency elected their own bicameral legislature 
and through this largely regulated their own affairs, subject 
to the supreme legislative authority of Congress in which it
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had no voice and the veto power of appointed governors."
After their purchase in 1917, the Virgin Islands continued to 
have "the same limited rights of self-government that they 
had enjoyed under Denmark" until 1936. With populations of 
less than 10,000 and 6,000 respectively, Guam and American 
Samoa became "naval stations", commanded by naval officers; 
their "native assemblies had advisory powers only".^^
(c) Strategic imperatives
It is within the realm of "naval stations" or bases, 
that probably the greatest qualification to the American 
anti-colonial tradition arises. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan 
underlined the importance of sea power and hence overseas 
base facilities in his book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History published in 1890:
"Colonies....afford.... the surest means of supporting abroad 
the sea power of a country.... Such colonies the United 
States has not and is not likely to have....Having 
therefore no foreign establishments, either colonial or 
military, the ships of war of the United States, in war, 
will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own 
shores. To provide resting-places for them, where they can 
crawl and repair, would be one of the first duties of a 
government proposing to itself the development of the 
powers of the nation at sea."11^
The United States had sought strategic gains in both the 
Caribbean and the Pacific even before she reached Great Power 
status in the 1890*s. National security requirements went a 
long way towards sublimating American anti-colonialism, 
especially after the American Civil War. "In the Caribbean, 
American ambitions had only failed to reach a climax in the 
years before the Civil War because they were primarily 
Southern, and therefore increasingly suspect in the 
N o r t h " . S .  F. Bemis has underlined the strategic motives 
behind the abortive post Civil War Caribbean initiatives of 
Secretary of State Seward and President Grant:
"The national exigencies of the Civil War, and the foreign 
interventions in Mexico and Santo Domingo had convinced the 
United States Government of the desirability of adequate 
naval bases in the Caribbean to prevent such intrusions in
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the future and to cover the approaches to the isthmean 
transit which held an important relationship to Seward’s 
expectations of expanding trade and navigation in the 
Pacific and Far East."116
The 1890's and new found status as a Great Power renewed
United States interest in the Caribbean due to a recognition
of the importance of sea power in general and the Panama
Canal project in particular. As a result of the Spanish War,
strategic facilities were acquired in Cuba and Puerto Rico,
while the Panama Canal Zone was obtained through Theodore
Roosevelt's forceful diplomacy, and the Virgin Islands
purchased in 1917. The remaining European dependencies in
the Caribbean region were also viewed with interest for their
strategic value by the United States. For example, in
January 1918, the General Board of the Navy argued that the
"intrinsic strategic value" of the Bahamas, Bermuda,
Guadeloupe, Jamaica and Martinique, was such that the United
117States should acquire them.-*--*-'
Similar sentiments were held at the time of the Second 
World War. For example, in July 1939, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral William Leathy, in a memorandum to 
President Roosevelt advocated acquiring "limited base 
facilities at a large number of locations in British 
Caribbean possessions".^^ In January 1941, regarding the 
Anglo-American Lend-Lease agreement, President Roosevelt 
suggested that "There is always the possibility of their 
putting up their sovereignty to and over certain colonies 
such as Bermuda, the British West Indies, British Honduras 
and British G u i a n a " . E a r l i e r  in 1940, the United States 
had loaned Great Britain, fifty over-aged (but badly needed 
by the British) destroyers in return for ninety-nine year 
leases of bases in Antigua, the Bahamas, British Guiana, 
Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Trinidad.^ 0  So far as American 
opinion was concerned, moreover, the security of the Panama 
Canal took clear precedence over anti-colonialism. According 
to a Gallup Poll of July 1940, 87 to 13 percent favoured the
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United States taking "immediate possession of the English, 
French and Dutch territories in the area of the Panama Canal" 
if Great Britain was defeated by Germany.^ 1
The Pacific basin, especially the North Pacific, became 
as important to American security as the Caribbean region 
with the United States accession to "Great power" status. 
Prior to the United States' to the Pacific coast of
North America and the opening of the Panama Canal, American 
security interests in the region were of only secondary 
importance. The emphasis of American policy at first had 
been to prevent other states obtaining bases and concessions. 
For example, with regard to Hawaii, in 1842, President John 
Tyler declared that while having "no designs on Hawaiian 
independence", the United States "would be 'dissatisfied* to 
see any other power threaten to take possession of the 
islands, colonise them, or subvert the native government".
Mention has already been made of the Senate's refusal to 
approve the ambitions of Secretary of State Seward and 
President Grant in the Caribbean. This was also true of 
their strategic designs in the Pacific; in particular, 
regarding the Samoan Archipelago. "In 1872 an American naval 
officer Commander Meade, drew up a treaty with the Great 
Chief at Pago-Pago. It provided that the United States was 
to have the exclusive privilege of establishing a naval 
station there in return for extending 'friendship and 
protection'." The Senate did not ratify the t r e a t y . ^ 3
the United
States sometimes still preferred that no European power 
should obtain bases rather than actually doing so herself.
For example, as late as 1906 regarding the Galapagos Islands, 
owned by Ecuador and at the turn of the century occasionally 
up for sale or lease, Assistant Secretary of State Alvey Adee 
declared, "We don't want them ourselves and won't allow any 
European power to exercise control of t h e m " . 124 As is 
examined in Chapter 5, the Galapagos Islands were the subject
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of the Roosevelt Administration's first ideas on 
international trusteeship in the 1930's.
The forbearance over the Galapagos Islands, however, was 
at variance with the general tenor of United States' security 
policy in the Pacific region from the 1890's onwards. In 
1887, she obtained the exclusive right to the Naval base of 
Pearl Harbour; the Hawaiian Islands being finally annexed in 
1897. "Of all Pacific island groups, the most important to 
the defence of the United States; being nearer to the 
American mainland than to the domains of any other power".^ 5  
Another strategic base was obtained in 1899, when the United 
States and Germany divided the Samoan islands between them. 
The most dramatic American advance in the Pacific, however, 
was the Philippines' acquisition following the Spanish- 
American War of 1898. Even William Jennings Bryan, the 
Democratic presidential candidate and anti-imperialist, "was 
not opposed to obtaining naval bases as such", but rather 
against acquiring the Philippines and other islands as 
colonies.^ 6  At that time, Woodrow Wilson also "approved" 
acquiring the Philippines "as they were a necessary foothold 
for the United States in the East"; they were required as 
"new frontiers".-^7
The Philippines' perceived strategic importance was such 
that well into the twentieth century, some American policy 
makers opposed their eventual independence. Thus, Henry 
Stimson, fcWs. [Secretary of State in 1926, maintained that the 
United States should "never let them go and must make that 
intention perfectly c l e a r " . T h e  desire for additional 
strategic bases in the Pacific, moreover, was a policy 
objective of the anti-colonialist, President Franklin 
Roosevelt. For example, in the previously mentioned 
memorandum of January 1941, on how the British might pay for 
Lend Lease equipment, he argued that, "In the Pacific there 
are certain small British Islands which not from the 
population or economic point of view, but from the military 
and naval point of view, might be a distinct asset":
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"There are the Islands south of Hawaii (Canton,
Enderbury, Christmas, the Phoenix group etc., and down to 
Samoa) and the Islands southwest of Hawaii and south of the 
Japanese mandate Islands (the Gilbert and Ellice group).
If we owned them they would be valuable as stepping stones 
in the control of the central Pacific area."1^9
President Roosevelt was concerned with the threat of 
Japanese aggression as his memorandum goes on to state.^ 0  
This fear of Japan combined with the American anti-colonial 
tradition played a dominant role in American plans for 
international accountability for dependent peoples under both 
the League Covenant and the United Nations Charter. In other 
words, security interests to a large extent determined 
American policies on mandates and trusteeship. This aspect 
is considered in detail in Chapters 4 to 7, but a few general 
points should be made at this stage. American suspicion of 
Japanese ambitions in China and the Pacific dated back to the 
end of the nineteenth century. Late entry into the First 
World War, prevented the United States from seizing the 
German Pacific islands as they had already been taken by the 
British Empire and Japan. At the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919, however, the desire to restrict Japanese control of the 
German Pacific islands north of the Equator, influenced 
American schemes for the League mandates system. American 
security interests regarding these islands also impinged upon 
the Roosevelt Administration *s trusteeship proposals during 
the Second World War. The United States conquered the 
islands and the American military authorities wished to 
retain^unfettered control over them; an ambition conflicting 
withp?resident*s desire for a wide-ranging trusteeship 
system. The eventual compromise was a crucial factor in 
modifying the more ambitious American trusteeship proposals 
and in creating the special category of "strategic trust 
territories". American anti-colonialism, in effect, both 
helped to extend and to modify the principle of international 
accountability for dependent peoples.
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d. Commercial aspects and the Open Door
The commercial roots of the American distaste for 
colonialism were discussed in Section 2, while the open door 
as a concept is examined in Chapter 3, A brief mention is 
necessary at this stage, however, of some of the actual 
implications for American policy. The basic point is that 
whether or not United States' grievances were well-founded, 
they played important justification roles in her efforts to 
increase American trade with the colonies of the European 
Powers and in her commercial competition with them in areas 
outside formal colonial rule. Thus, a factor underlaying the 
Monroe Doctrine's enunciation was Secretary of State John 
Quincy Adams' hostility to colonialism "because it was 
connected in his mind with commercial monopoly, and the 
exclusion of the United States from the markets of the New 
World".^ 1  in particular, he disliked the infant United 
States' exclusion from trade with the West Indies and the 
general commercial exclusiveness of the European colonial 
empires of the time. It was commercial interests again at 
the end of the nineteenth century which largely dictated 
Secretary of State John Hay's advocacy of the "open door" in 
China; he too, did not wish the United States to be excluded 
from profitable markets by the activities of the European 
powers (and Japan) in China.
Woodrow Wilson also "believed in the open door";^^ a 
belief, as is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, which played a 
large part in its inclusion in the provisions of the League 
mandates system. The believed commercial and economic ills 
caused by colonialism were even more strongly held by 
President Franklin Roosevelt and were a factor underlying his 
attitude towards future international trusteeship systems.
For example, at "the first summit" meeting with Winston 
Churchill in August 1941 which proclaimed the Atlantic 
Charter Declaration, the President declared that "one of the 
preconditions of any lasting peace will have to be the 
greatest possible freedom of trade". There must be no
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artificial barriers to trade like the British Empire trade 
agreements: "It's because of them that the people of India
and Africa, of all the colonial Near East and Far East, are 
still as backward as they are".-^^
In her own "open door" practices, United States policy 
did not always live up to the idealism of American 
principles. For example, Sir Keith Hancock pointed out that 
whereas in 1933, Great Britain supplied 24% of her colonies' 
imports and received 32% of their exports, the United States 
was responsible for 80% of her dependencies' imports 
(including the Philippines) and took 96% of their exports.
In fact, although a strong advocate of international 
trusteeship * as a means to preserve the open door, the 
agreement which the United States submitted for the former 
Japanese mandated islands in 1947, was the only one placed 
before the United Nations which specifically excluded the 
open door for international commerce.^ 5  The difference 
between American theory and practice combined with perpetual 
American "preaching" irritated British leaders and opinion- 
makers throughout the Second World War. For example, Winston 
Churchill's comment in January 1943:
"Considering that for seventy or eighty years we kept our 
colonies absolutely open to the trade of the whole world 
without claiming the slightest preference or imposing any 
taxation except for revenue, and that it was the Americans, 
by their high tariff policy, who led the world astray, it 
is pretty good cheek of them now coming to school-marm us 
into proper behaviour.
Some Americans usually regarded as anti-colonialists, 
themselves advocated overseas territories for the economic 
benefits they might confer on the United States. For 
example, in 1907 when still a college professor, Woodrow 
Wilson apparently justified colonies for mercantilist 
reasons:
"Since trade ignores national boundaries and the 
manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the 
flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the 
nations which are closed against him must be battered down. 
Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by
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ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling 
nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be 
obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the 
world may be overlooked or left unused."1^'
Despite their high moral tone and denunciation of
European colonial practice in the economic sphere, the United 
States' own record in the economic aspects of colonial 
administration was not always as exemplary as Americans 
wished to believe. For example, Alfred Cobban highlights the 
American relationship with Puerto Rico in the 1930's and 
1940's, "which did 95 percent of its total trade with the 
United States": The "ghastly spectacle of wealth drained
from a starving people into the richest country on earth is 
sanctimoniously entitled in the official reports, 'a 
favourable trade balance .138 The replacement of Spanish by 
American rule had brought no noticeable economic benefits; 
"under American, as under Spanish control, the people of 
Puerto Rico live at a desperately low standard of life and 
there is no early prospect of change in that condition".-^9 
At the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, however, 
President Roosevelt privately stated that, "Exploit the 
resources of an India, a Burma, a Java; take all the wealth 
out of those countries, but never put anything back into 
them, things like education, decent standards of living, 
minimum health requirements - all you're doing is storing up 
the kind of trouble that leads to war".l^
(e) Power and influence without responsibility
The American attitude to the commercial aspects of 
colonialism also illustrates another general tendency within 
the United States' anti-colonial tradition; namely, an 
inclination to seek the economic and other advantages of 
colonialism, but without assuming its responsibilities. For 
example, in the 1890's some Americans opposed acquiring 
overseas dependencies because this would entail "a large 
standing army, a large navy, and a burdensome colonial 
service, all of which would be extremely costly and would
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require the imposition of heavy taxes, as well as being a 
corrupting force in the nation*'. The actual "political 
control of areas abroad" was not necessary; the United States 
was already "trading successfully with British colonies".
The already mentioned opposition of William Jennings Bryan to 
American acquisition of colonies, "was based on the effect of 
holding colonies on the interests of the American people, and 
not the effect on the peoples to be subjugated":
"Imperialism would be profitable to the ship owners, who 
would be able to carry live soldiers to the Philippines and 
bring dead soldiers back; it would be profitable to the 
officials whose salaries would be fixed here and paid over 
there, and profitable to those who would seize upon the 
franchises; but to the farmer, to the laboring man and to 
the vast majority of those engaged in other occupations it 
would bring expenditure without return and risk without 
reward.
President Roosevelt's previously mentioned memorandum of 
January 1941, favoured leased bases in the Caribbean, not 
ownership; the latter would mean "two million headaches, 
consisting of that number of human beings who would be a 
definite economic drag on this country, and who would stir up 
questions of racial stock by virtue of their new status as 
American c i t i z e n s " . E a r l i e r  in January 1940, when Great 
Britain was fighting for survival, the United States 
bombarded her about "violations" of American economic treaty 
rights due to the wartime imposition of import and exchange 
restrictions in Kenya and the mandated territories of 
Tanganyika. Although refusing to join the League of Nations 
and thus serve on the Mandates Commission, the United States 
still "confidently" expected the British Government to 
"recognise" American rights and take steps to ensure that 
there were no "adverse" effects on American trade.
During the Second World War, the British were suspicious 
of American attitudes to the future of the British empire. 
Earlier, however, especially at the Paris Peace Conference of 
1919, they tended to favour American entry into the colonial 
field for the benefit of the indigenous people concerned.
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This was recognised by some Americans. For example, Joseph 
Grew's comment of February 1919 the British "have a very 
definite feeling that the United States must assume her share 
of the White Man's B u r d e n " . A l t h o u g h  President Wilson was 
so inclined, the Senate was not as is demonstrated in Chapter
4. The United States condemned Turkish atrocities against 
the Armenians, but refused to assume the mandate for Armenia:
"We wished the Armenians well, but we wished them well at a 
distance. We hoped the resilient Sick Man of Europe would 
stop butchering them; we sympathized deeply with them in 
their troubles. We would send missionaries; we would dole 
out some bread; but that was all. We were not our 
brother's keeper - especially in other continents."1^®
(f) A failure to appreciate the intricacies of colonial 
problems
The desire to avoid overseas entanglements which might 
prove costly and were not directly relevant to American 
interests, went hand-in-hand with actual ignorance of 
colonial problems. For example, Duff Cooper records of a 
lecture tour in the United States during September to 
November 1939, that his primary objective "was to give 
information and to correct misunderstanding. Not one percent 
in any audience had heard of the Statute of Westminster or 
believed that the Dominions were really self-governing. 
Equally few were aware of the Mohammedan problem in India or 
had any idea of the bloodshed that was bound to follow 
British withdrawal."1^
Shallow comprehension and lack of knowledge made it 
comparatively easy for Americans, policy-makers and general 
public alike, to suggest simple solutions to vexed colonial 
problems. For example, the cable President Roosevelt sent to 
Winston Churchill in March 1942 suggesting that the 
"Continental Congress" and the later "Articles of 
Confederation" set up by the original thirteen American 
colonies before creating the American federal union, was a 
useful precedent which the British could follow with regard
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to India: Establish a government '‘headed by a small group
representative of different religions and geographies, 
occupations and castes" which could "be recognised as a 
temporary Dominion G o v e r n m e n t " . N o t  all Americans at the 
governmental-level, however, believed that United States or 
European precedents were necessarily applicable to people 
under colonial rule. For example, when the Philippines 
achieved independence in July 1946, Henry Stimson, a former 
governor of the Islands, "still had old doubts" about their 
ability "to preserve democratic independence".
The lack of knowledge in governmental circles was acute 
during the First World War. Thus, the Inquiry team set up by
Colonel House to investigate the possible problems of a
future peace settlement for President Wilson, found that 
these "are lands intellectually practically unexplored":
"On many of the problems of first rate importance there is a
real famine in men and we have been compelled practically 
to train and create our own experts. This is especially 
true of problems connected with Russia, the Balkans, Turkey 
and Africa."150
In fact, it was not until after the Second World War and 
the United States' attainment of international dominance that 
American scholarship on problems relating to colonialism (and 
other international ) flourished. The outstanding work
of scholars like Rupert Emerson and Hans Kohn filtered up to 
government circles, aided by the American practice of ready 
inter-change between the academic and official worlds. 
American sentiment generally still remained with dependent 
peoples, but it became more informed sentiment.
Earlier, at the practical policy level, however, once 
the United States entered the Second World War, superior 
manpower and economic resources meant that she dominated 
Allied policy-making. So far as colonialism was concerned, 
President Roosevelt and his advisers believed that the United 
States had sufficient bargaining power to obtain changes in 
British policy. For example, his remark just prior to the 
Yalta Conference: "The point is that we are going to be able
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to bring pressure on the British to fall in line with our 
thinking in relation to the whole colonial q u e s t i o n ' * . A t  
that conference, however, Winston Churchill strongly 
expressed his opposition to American plans to include 
trusteeship provisions in the United Nations Charter:
"I will not have one scrap of the British Empire....lost.... 
after all we have done in the War*...I will not consent to 
a representative of the British Empire going to any 
conference where we will be placed in the dock and asked to 
defend ourselves. Never. Never. Never... Every scrap pf 
territory over which the British flag flies is immune.
Herbert Feis, among others, has argued that, "whatever 
the President had in the past thought should be done about 
Hong Kong and other British and French imperial outposts, he 
did not now risk the whole United Nations project by 
challenging the Prime Minister". British opposition had 
also modified earlier American attempts to open up the whole 
question of European colonialism. The Atlantic Charter 
Declaration of August 1941 with its ringing Anglo-American 
statement that "they respect the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live", 
and "wish to see self-government restored to those from whom 
it has been forcibly r e m o v e d " , l a t e r  served as part of the 
Afro-Asian ideological justification of their demands for 
independence. This was also the American interpretation, but 
the Churchill government, especially the Prime Minister 
himself, remained firm in the belief that it only applied to 
those European peoples conquered by the Axis powers. Indeed, 
throughout the war on such issues as a proposed Anglo- 
American Joint Declaration on the Colonies-*-^ and the future 
of India, by and large the British would not agree to the 
more radical American proposals.
The Americans, in effect, were unable to exert their 
full diplomatic and economic muscle. The first priority was 
to fight the war against the Axis powers. "The necessity of 
maintaining good relations with the Allied colonial powers 
and American reluctance to allow outside meddling in problems
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of their own territories",-^^ moderated the Roosevelt 
Administration's actual policies as opposed to declaratory 
pronouncements on colonial issues. As Cordell Hull 
recognised the United States should not compel the European 
colonial powers to be more liberal; "we could not alienate 
them in the Orient and expect to work with them in 
Europe” . B r i t i s h  opposition, in the words of Dean 
Acheson, was an example "of a relatively weak ally by 
determined... decisions changing and even preventing action 
by a much stronger one” . ^ ®  The modification of the earlier 
radical American trusteeship proposals in large part was due 
to this factor combined with the demands of the United States 
military for unrestricted control over the Japanese Pacific 
island mandates and, perhaps less importantly, the 
realisation that a too sweeping United Nations system might 
also embrace the Virgin Islands and other American overseas 
dependencies.
The moderation in American policy did give rise "to 
considerable anti-American feeling among the Indians" (and 
other dependent peoples), who felt that the United States was 
"buttressing" the colonial empires.^ 9  At the time, however, 
the Americans had more urgent priorities than the well-being 
of dependent peoples. "Indeed, the yielding up of the South 
East Asia Command to the British in August 1943 combined with 
her decision to drop the first atomic bombs, thereby bringing 
the war with Japan to a rapid end, meant that the United 
States left the way open for the colonial Powers to make an 
attempt to restore the pre-War regional colonial status quo. 
That they were not able to do so was due to their relative 
economic, military and political decline, and the resistance 
of the nationalists rather than the exercise of American 
inf l u e n c e . " ^ 0  gy the 1970s, and outside the direct purview 
of this thesis, United States' ambiguity on colonial problems 
combined with her stands on cold war issues generally 
(especially Indo-China), communist propaganda, and jealous 
suspicion of her power and influence, meant that she had
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replaced the European colonial powers as the leading white 
imperialist in the eyes of the Afro-Asian peoples,
g. The Special Relationship
Throughout this chapter a constant theme has been Anglo- 
American disagreements arising from British colonialism. In 
fact, at times the American anti-colonial tradition almost 
equates to an an'ti-British tradition. So far as colonial 
matters are concerned, the "special relationship" between 
Great Britain and the United States has never existed, at 
least in American eyes. In the words of J.D.B. Miller and 
David Watt, "the special relationship, fruitful and 
attractive as it has been, flourishes only in Atlantic water 
and European soil".^l The special relationship itself lies 
outside the scope of this thesis, but a brief mention of it 
must be made in so far as it, or rather its absence sheds 
light on American anti-colonialism.
The Roosevelt Administration like many of its 
predecessors often regarded British overseas interests and 
stands on colonial matters as fundamentally different from 
and injurious to those of the United States. For example, 
after the fall of Singapore in February 1942,
c>\ YV.R. poTei^ts O - ^ i r e p o r t e d  that "the Americans 
now regarded the British not just as "Imperialists but 
bungling I m p e r i a l i s t s " . T h e  prevalent view of the British 
Empire by American policy-makers and the general public 
throughout the Second World War was antagonistic. Maurice 
Colbourne quotes Senator Bennett Clark as stating that 
"Britain is fighting to retain her hold on the riches of the 
Empire", and Senator Gerald Nye's belief that the "British 
Empire is the most despotic, arbitrary and sometimes 
tyrannical ruler of almost half a billion people".^ 3
As already pointed out, underlying these attitudes was 
acute irritation at British patronizing attitudes. There was 
also mutual Anglo-American distrust at the highest levels.
For instance, Lloyd George described Woodrow Wilson as "cool
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and crafty. We shall have to watch that in our efforts to 
annihilate the Germans we do not annihilate ourselves. One 
cannot talk publicly like this, but these are factors to be 
borne in mind."-^^ For his part, President Wilson found "the 
French more open than the British” :
"One knew where Clemenceau stood and what he intended to do; 
one never knew where Lloyd George stood: he never stood
twice in the same p l a c e .
Woodrow Wilson himself, certainly before he became 
President, was an anglophile and keen student and admirer of 
British political institutions. Hartley Notter refers to the 
fact that the "relationship between England and America was 
really intimate, to Wilson - so close that he sometimes 
identified the two as to character, principle, and world 
obligations, under the pronoun ' our1" . ^ ^  ^s demonstrated 
in Chapter 4, his clashes with Lloyd George and the British 
Empire delegation at the Paris Peace Conference over the 
German colonies arose from matters of principle and American 
national security rather than anti-colonial sentiments as 
such.
This was not the case with Franklin Roosevelt during the 
Second World War. Although probably one of the best American 
friends Great Britain has ever had, the President was deeply 
suspicious of British colonialism. These suspicions 
sometimes coloured his attitude to the British people as 
such. For example, in February 1945, a few weeks before he 
died, Secretary of State Stettinius reported him as saying 
that "the British were imperialistic and worse than the 
Argentines" (a pet hate of the President). The Secretary of 
State recorded that, "It is very apparent that he distrusts 
the British and dislikes them i m m e n s e l y " . f a c t ,  
although maintaining superficially friendly relations with 
Winston Churchill during the war, the President feared the 
Prime Minister's imperial ambitions and their possible impact 
on the United States. According to his son, Elliott 
Roosevelt, he felt that after the war, Winston Churchill
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"believed that Great Britain would have a bigger Empire and 
greater influence, that he would take advantage of the help 
given by America, and that we would still be in a secondary 
r o l e " . Franklin Roosevelt's dislike of British 
colonialism will be developed further in Chapters 5 and 6.
For the moment it is sufficient to reiterate that throughout 
the war an "important phase" of his foreign policy was a 
"vigorous and persistent opposition to colonialism":
"He definitely believed in that section of the Atlantic 
Charter which affirmed the right of all peoples to choose 
their own form of government: in his opinion it was as
applicable to the peoples of Asia as to those of Europe.
His conception of a future world order to be developed 
through the....United Nations had as onefigf its basic 
provisions a final end to imperialism.
There is much wisdom in Michael Howard's comment that in 
many respects "the 'Special Relationship' was the creation of 
Winston C h u r c h i l l . S o  far as colonialism was concerned, 
however, there never was such a relationship either before or 
during the Second World War. To quote Lord Beloff, "The 
United States for its part, while often seeing eye to eye 
with the British on matters affecting the stability of Europe 
and the balance of power in the Far East, never looked on the 
British or other European empires as positive factors".*^* 
American plans during both world wars for the future of 
dependent peoples have to be continually assessed against a 
backcloth of dislike and suspicion of British colonialism.
(h) Sincerity or hypocrisy
Throughout the period covered by this thesis and beyond, 
the American "gut" reaction was one of sympathy to the 
aspirations of dependent peoples; especially if this did not 
cost too much in terms of American help and/or coincided with 
the perceived national interests of the United States. The 
question arises, however, as to the extent to which the 
United States believed that dependent peoples were actually 
capable of ruling themselves? Certainly, until recently the
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white American attitude to their fellow Americans whether 
black, brown or yellow was one of superiority; a general 
belief that the latter were intrinsically inferior to whites. 
In the early days of the American occupation of the 
Philippines, moreover, the harsh treatment and even torture 
of Filipino guerillas or those suspected in aiding them, was 
justified on the grounds that "These people are not 
civilized"• Another unattractive theme during the period 
under consideration was the American racial attitude to 
Chinese and Japanese people. Woodrow Wilson, for the times, 
an enlightened liberal, on behalf of the United States 
opposed the Japanese desire at the Paris Peace Conference to 
insert a "racial equality" clause into the League 
C o v e n a n t . u n t i l  after the Second World War, moreover, 
Asiatics faced severe restrictions on immigrating to the 
United States and were normally "debarred from becoming 
naturalized Americans".^ 4  Franklin Roosevelt himself was a 
man of his time and had many attitudes which would now be 
denounced as racialist. One of his biogtaphers, Ted Morgan 
points out that he "routinely used the word 'nigger*" and 
"evidently thought blacks were inferior".
Given this background of endemic and incipient racial 
prejudice, normal and acceptable for the times in white 
Anglo-American societies, it is perhaps not surprising that 
many Americans doubted the capacity of non-white peoples to 
govern themselves. For example, one American justification 
for annexing the Philippines, was that self-government should 
only be given to those "who are capable^of self- 
government".^^ Henry Stimson, thei .^Secretary of State, 
after visiting the Islands in 1926, maintained that the 
Filipinos were racially unfit to govern themselves: "The
Malay race is generally characterized by a lack of the power 
of cooperation in governmental functions and by a lack of 
initiative". He argued that the United States should retain 
the Islands and develop them as "self-governing possessions 
or colonies whose citizens did not participate in our
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citizenship". Unusually for an American, Henry Stimson 
favoured the British empire model; suggesting that the United 
States learn from the British experience and travel "along 
that general path the other group of English speaking peoples 
known as the British empire is already travelling".
Indeed, until well into the twentieth century, like the 
Europeans, most Americans had a restricted view of the 
principle of self-determination. Certainly this was the case 
at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919:
"Self-determination, like the earlier principles of equality 
and the rights of man to which it bore its uncertain 
relation, had been proclaimed as a dogma of universal 
application, but in practice it was not intended by the 
Western allies to reach significantly beyond the confines 
of Europe or, even there, to penetrate into the territory 
of the victors."1^8
Most American leaders justified retaining the 
Philippines on the grounds that as the Filipinos were not yet 
capable of ruling themselves, it was the duty of the United 
States to train them for the tasks of self-government. This 
attitude was generally true of both Republicans and 
Democrats. For example, it was the view of William Taft, the 
future Republican president, when chairman of a commission on 
the Philippines in 1900. He believed that as the Filipinos 
were "nothing but grown-up children", a training period of 
"50 or a hundred years" was required before they would be 
ready for self-government. At about the same time,
Woodrow Wilson referred to the "'peculiar duty' to teach 
colonial peoples 'order and self-control' and to 'impart to 
them if possible'" the required "'drill and habit of law and 
obedience' which the United States inherited from 'English 
history'".180
It was the first Democratic president after Woodrow 
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, whose administration in 1935 set 
an actual "target date" for the Philippines' independence. 
Indeed, as Ruth Russell has pointed out, "President 
Roosevelt's somewhat vague vision of an international
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trusteeship system was a projection of United States policy 
in the Philippines"; a twin theme of "training for self- 
government and the establishment of target dates for 
independence".*®* The idea of leading colonies "gradually to 
independence"*®® combined with target dates where 
appropriate, was consistently urged by the United States on 
Great Britain throughout the Second World War. This was at a 
time when some British ministers knew in their "heart of 
hearts that most of the colonies, especially in Africa, will 
probably not be fit for complete independence for 
centuries".*®® Except for strategic bases, discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, however, the general American view was that 
more positive steps towards colonial emancipation should be 
taken than the British desired.
While not necessarily envisaging i
ore/co ihVW* short -for long training periods might 
well be required, the United States favoured dependent 
peoples having the opportunity to achieve eventual 
independence. The American anti-colonial tradition, in 
effect, espoused the longer term goal of the demise of 
colonialism. Most colonies, however, were ruled by the 
British and other European powers who had different 
perspectives from and disagreed with the United States. A 
measure of international accountability would be one vehicle 
for both changing the attitudes of the colonial powers and 
achieving the goal of colonial independence. The remainder 
of this thesis examines the role of the American anti­
colonial tradition as an ideological driving force and an 
instrument of practical expediency in the debates and 
diplomatic manoeuvres entailed in establishing the principle 
of international accountability for dependent peoples in the 
League mandates and the United Nations trusteeship systems.
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Chapter 3: International Accountability for the
Administration of Dependent Peoples
The United States is usually represented as a firm 
advocate of international accountability for the 
administration of dependent peoples. Two principal ideas 
underlie this concept: the well-being of the indigenous
inhabitants (the sacred trust principle); and the belief 
that accountability should be rendered to the international 
community at large. An alternative formula for 
differentiating between the two aspects is to denote them 
as national and international trusteeship. The sacred 
trust principle dates back to at least the beginnings of 
European expansion overseas in the sixteenth century and 
was sometimes seen as almost synonymous with the sense of 
mission whereby the European powers justified the extension 
of their rule to the Americas, Asia and Africa. 
International accountability itself, is of more recent 
origin; being rooted in nineteenth century European 
experience. It is at the heart of both the League of 
Nations mandates and the United Nations trusteeship
i
systems•x
The tendency to regard American traditions and 
historical experience as of paramount importance in the 
interplay of precedents and concepts embodied in the League 
mandates and hence the United Nations trusteeship systems 
was noted by H. Duncan Hall; there exists "the popular 
myth1* that the mandates system originated in "the sudden 
welling up in the barren desert of European diplomacy of 
transatlantic idealism, bearing with it the new gospels of 
'no annexation* and the welfare of native peoples".^ This 
mental picture primarily derives from the potency of the 
American anti-colonial tradition analysed in Chapter 2.
The notion possesses some validity, but its proponents tend 
to undervalue the important role played by Old World ideas
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and historical experience in creating both the mandates and 
trusteeship systems. Old World conceptions and precedents 
anticipated American ones in all aspects of international 
accountability. They afforded the more important 
precedents underlying the mandates and trusteeship systems.
This chapter focuses on the roles of the Old World and 
the United States in the genesis of the notion of 
international accountability. A constant theme is the 
impact of the American anti-colonial tradition. The 
analysis is undertaken by contrasting the roles played by 
American traditions and historical experience with those of 
the Europeans in the intellectual continuum underlying the 
formation of the mandates and trusteeship systems. 
Particular attention is paid to the role of Great Britain, 
the foremost nineteenth century colonial power. The 
chapter itself is divided into two main sections: first,
the sacred trust principle; and second, the actual 
development of international accountability for 
administering dependent peoples. There is also a brief 
concluding section on the vital American contribution to 
the principle of international accountability. The "open 
door" principle is examined as a component part of 
international accountability. The narrative itself 
demonstrates how abstract conceptions can both arise from 
the contingencies of particular situations and be adjusted 
to deal with them.^
1. The Sacred Trust Principle
This principle expresses the conviction that states 
with colonial dependencies hold them as a trust of 
civilisation; the interests of the dependent people taking 
a clear precedence over those of the metropole. In other 
words, a "colony must be administered primarily for the 
benefit of its native population, and that the material 
interests of the metropolitan Power must be given very
93
minor consideration".^ All the European colonial powers 
emphasised that their governance benefited the dependent 
people concerned. Unfortunately, the reality did not 
always equate with their more idealistic declarations. To 
them, the sacred trust principle meant essentially national 
trusteeship; the colonial powers being accountable only to 
themselves. Anglo-American relations in the years 
immediately following the American War of Independence 
demonstrate' how colonial powers used the well-being of 
dependent peoples as a guise for furthering their own 
interests. After that War, Great Britain justified 
retention of forts and outposts along the borders of the 
fledgling United States by the need to protect the Indians. 
Following the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France, 
however, by the Treaty of Greenville of 1795, London left 
the Indians to the care of their bitter enemies, the white 
American settlers:
"the Americans now assumed the old British guarantee to 
the Indians, and the Indians accepted - they had little 
choice - the exclusive protection of the United States. 
For the way that protection was exercised in the future 
the British felt they had no responsibility
Originally, the sacred trust principle entailed merely 
a continuing guardian-ward relationship between the 
dominant and the dependent peoples. The emphasis was on 
maintaining law and order; economic and social development 
in the modern sense holding a very low priority in the 
colonial powers* scale of objectives until the twentieth 
century. It was not until 1929, for example, that Great 
Britain allocated funds for colonial development in areas 
such as fisheries, forestry, irrigation and water supplies, 
and tropical agriculture. The Colonial Development and 
Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 carried the matter further by 
explicitly recognising that welfare needs were an integral 
part of colonial development. The British argued that the 
two Acts marked "the ending of the laissez faire attitude 
towards colonial development*' and "the end of platitudinous
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talk about trusteeship".® The previous British notion of 
trusteeship as the colonial power*s duty to protect the 
rights of its subject peoples, was augmented by the view 
that the metropole should also facilitate their economic 
development and general public welfare; albeit on a scale 
which would now be regarded as rudimentary if not actually 
niggardly. Indeed, until after the Second World War, 
positive welfare government was alien to the ethos of 
colonial rule; the philosophy of the welfare state jtxsf
boxojfttiv^  fashionable even in Western Europe.
The sacred trust principle*s final and logical 
development, however, requires much more than the pursuit 
of social and welfare goals; no matter how desirable in 
themselves they might be. It requires a relationship such 
that the dependent peoples obtain the economic and 
political training necessary for self-government. This is 
another comparatively recent development. For example,
George Louis Beer, a thinker in many respects ahead of his 
time so far as the advancement of dependent peoples was 
concerned, doubted negro capacity for self-government:
"The negro race has hitherto shown no capacity for 
progressive development except under the tutelage of other 
peoples".^ Similarly, during the Second World War, Herbert 
Morrison maintained that it was "dangerous nonsense to talk 
about grants of full self-government to many of the 
dependent territories for some time to come. In those 
instances it would be like giving a child of ten a latch­
key, a bank account, and a shot-gun."® Similarly, Sumner 
Welles and the American State Department planners during 
the Second World War believed that self-government for 
dependencies like the Belgian Congo would "certainly take 
more than a hundred years", and for Portuguese Timor "take 
a thousand years".^ They also believed, however, that 
while not yet able to "make decisions themselves", the 
purpose of the American "trusteeship programme is to help 
these people to make their choice".
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By the middle of the Second World War, some leading 
British colonial experts such as Lord Hailey were arguing 
that trusteeship itself was an out-of-date concept; being 
decried as patronising and extremely irritating by the 
opinion-making elites among dependent peoples. The notion 
of partnership was more apposite in his view, symbolising 
as it did a relationship whereby Great Britain worked with 
rather than for its dependent peoples. Lord Hailey 
recognised that the new partnership relationship would not 
be one between equals:
"If we need to express ourselves in a formula at all, let 
our relations be those of senior and junior partners in 
the same enterprise, and let it be said that our contract 
of partnership involves the progressive increase of the 
share which the junior partners have in the conduct of 
the undertaking. 11
Whereas British colonial practice traditionally 
emphasised the "separateness" of dependent peoples, France 
stressed the need to assimilate her dependent peoples and 
promote a sense of belonging to French civilisation. Lord 
Wed<^ wood underlined this distinction: "The difference
between the native under British rule and the native under 
French rule is that the French coal-black Sene^S-lese nigger 
can strike his chest and say * I am a French citizen*. You 
do not get that same sense of citizenship in any part of 
the British E m p i r e . T h e  French view was that their 
dependent peoples* future was neither "independence" nor 
’'self-government**, but rather incorporation into the all- 
embracing bonds of France outre-mer.
In the twentieth century, the Asian, Middle Eastern 
and eventually Black African leaders, did not wish to be 
junior associates in essentially European dominated 
enterprises. They desired freedom, not subordination, no 
matter how attractive the superficial conditions of their 
junior partnership. Their ideological banner was the 
Anglo-American Atlantic Charter Declaration of August 1941. 
To them, if the sacred trust principle had any meaning at
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all, and this itself was extremely doubtful in their eyes, 
it was assistance towards independence. The question, in 
European eyes, however, was how to determine the 
qualifications necessary for independence or self- 
government. As early as 1932, the League of Nations 
Permanent Mandates Commission formulated guiding principles 
for determining satisfactory conditions to be met for 
changing the status of a mandated territory to that of an 
independent state:
"In order that a Mandate may become a state it must:
(a) have a settled government and an administration 
capable of maintaining the regular operation of essential 
governmental services; (b) be capable of maintaining its 
territorial integrity and political independence; (c) be 
able to maintain internal peace and order; (d) have at 
its disposal adequate financial resources to provide 
regularly for normal governmental requirements;
(e) possess laws and a judicial organisation which will 
afford equal and regular justice to all."1J
It was not until after the Second World War that the 
majority of Asian and Arab peoples obtained independence; a 
status not achieved by the African peoples until the late 
1950s and early 1960s. In fact, by the 1960s with the then 
almost universal acceptance, in lip-service if not always 
in deed, of the principle of self-determination, the sacred 
trust principle came to be denoted as the duty of a 
colonial power to prepare its dependent peoples for 
independence in the shortest possible time. The United 
Nations Declaration of December 1960 on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples maintained 
that self-government was intrinsically superior to good 
government by an alien metropole:
"All peoples have the right to self-determination, by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. Inadequacy of political, 
economic, social or educational preparedness should never 
serve as a pretext for delaying independence."-^
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In truth, the difference in ethos between the working 
of the League mandates and the United Nations trusteeship 
systems is to be discerned in the fact that with the former 
the emphasis was on "good government11 in the sense of law 
and order, while with the latter it came to be placed on 
the achievement of independence in the shortest possible 
time. The voting in the United Nations General Assembly 
"on almost all colonial issues, exemplifies the prevailing 
international dogma than in non-self-governing territories 
the right of the majority to self-government and 
independence is a moral law overriding the rights possessed 
by an entrenched minority".^  The fact that the latter 
were usually white, whereas the ruled majority were non­
white, sometimes gave bitter racial overtones^colonial 
problems•
a. The Contribution of the European Powers
During the early period of European overseas empire 
building in the sixteenth century, some attention was paid 
to the interests of the indigenous inhabitants. For 
example, in the New world, Queen Isabella urged generous 
treatment of the Mexican and Peruvian Indians, and some 
Roman Catholic missionaries endeavoured to popularise their 
cause in Spain as well as bringing them the benefits of 
Christianity. The Spanish conquistadors, however, often 
treated the indigenous inhabitants as pieces of property, 
heathens lying outside the pale of Christian civilisation. 
Although humanitarian considerations began to play a role 
in the treatment of subject races by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, their welfare still depended upon the 
humanity and sense of expediency of their imperial masters.
The late eighteenth century revival of the concepts of 
natural law, however, brought with it the novel 
propositions that "all men were created equal" and 
possessed certain "inalienable" rights. At first the
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propositions were applied only to peoples of European stock 
and little attention paid to their possible universal 
application. For example, as pointed out in Chapter 2, 
following the American War of Independence, the new United 
States did not grant citizenship rights to the indigenous 
Indians and the Negro slaves. Indeed, as was also pointed 
out in Chapter 2, an underlying cause of the War was the 
resentment engendered in the American frontier regions by a 
British proclamation of 1763, treating territory acquired 
from France as a result of the Seven Years War, as a trust 
to be held for the Indians:
"One of the main purposes of the proclamation was the 
preservation of Indian rights to their lands and hunting 
grounds: * the several Nations or Tribes of Indians....who 
live under our Protection, should not be molested or 
disturbed in the Possession of....their Hunting Grounds*. 
The hinterlands of the new territories were to be 
preserved for the use of the Indians and governors were 
forbidden, *upon any Pretence whatever, to grant warrants 
of Survey, or pass any Patents* for such lands. And 
within the territories.themselves private purchase of 
lands was forbidden."1**
So far as colonial relationships were concerned, the 
liberal sentiments underlying the American Declaration of 
Independence and the Rights of Man of the French Revolution 
meant that there was now a need to justify imposing the 
rule of one people over another and for ignoring the 
"natural right** of peoples to govern themselves. The 
answer found was that the non-white peoples were not 
capable of ruling themselves and therefore it was to their 
advantage to be governed by a civilized white people. 
Logically, this meant that the latter*s rule should be for 
the subject peoples* benefit, and it was no longer possible 
to maintain that colonies existed merely for their imperial 
master*s profit.
Edmund Burke, because of his speeches on Fox*s India 
Bill of 1783 and Warren Hastings* impeachment in 1788, is 
often credited with first applying to the administration of 
non-white dependent peoples, John Locke’s maxim that
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political power is a trust. Burke maintained that Warren 
Hastings had "betrayed" both the "parliamentary trust" of 
"the Commons of Great Britain" and "the people of India".^ 
He developed the sacred trust principle regarding the 
peoples of India by embracing the notion of accountability: 
"Every species of political dominion... are in all the 
strictest sense a trust; and it is of the very essence of 
every trust to be rendered accountable".-^ Edmund Burke 
advocated national trusteeship; accountability being 
rendered to the British Parliament. No reference was made 
to the argument he had used earlier to vindicate the 
rebellion of a white dependency; namely, that the bad 
government of George Ill's ministers justified the American 
War of Independence. Indeed, although maintaining that 
parliament must apply an "imperial justice" by enlarging 
"the circle of national justice to the necessities of the 
empire",-^ he did not argue that the Indian peoples had a 
right to some form of responsible or self-government.
The ethos of late eighteenth century liberal thought 
gave rise to a few idealistic declarations about the 
inherent equality of white and non-white peoples. For 
example, a French revolutionary decree of 1792 stated that 
"all men, without distinction of colour, domiciled in the 
French colonies are French citizens and enjoy all the 
rights assured by the Constitution".^ So far as the 
white, subject peoples of Europe were concerned, the 
"theory of national self-determination was put forward in 
and after 1848 with growing success in central and central 
eastern Europe":
"Public opinion in the English speaking countries 
supported this trend. It endorsed Mazzini, Garibaldi, 
and Kossuth; it favoured Greeks and Poles. Pasquale 
Stanislao Mancini....in 1851....declared with words 
clearly intended against Austria that a state in which 
several nationalities found themselves forced into a 
union was not a political body but a monster incapable of 
life. 'The nationalities', he wrote, 'which do not 
possess a government issuing from their inmost life.... 
and which are subject to laws which are imposed upon them
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from the outside,.. have become means for the purposes of 
others and, therefore, mere objects*. In those words 
Mancini justified the ethos of national self- 
determination by linking it with the teachings of Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant, with the Declaration of Independence 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man."^1
By 1914, ,fthe notion that the eventual independence of 
[European] dependencies was inevitable and expedient tended 
to the notion that it was a right*1.^ As the First World 
War progressed and **its character changed after the Russian 
Revolution of March 1917, and the entry of the United 
States into the War one month later, the rights of 
nationality and of national self-determination became one 
of the principles for which the Allies avowedly fought'*.^3 
The Bolsheviks' brand of self-determination obtained a 
world platform, while the Western European concepts of 
liberalism and nationalism culminated in general Anglo- 
American pronouncements of postwar self-determination for 
all the dependent peoples of the Central Powers.
While the application of the principle to European 
subject peoples was not in much doubt, this was not the 
case regarding non-white dependent peoples as is looked at 
further in Chapter 4. In the nineteenth century the notion 
of eventual self-government for non-white peoples under 
British tutelage was given some semi-official approval.
For example, in 1824, the Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas 
Monroe, declared that it was Great Britain's duty "to train 
Indians to govern and protect themselves".^ Indeed,
Thomas Macauley's schemes in the 1830s for reforming 
British India's administrative and educational systems 
created the foundation for responsible Indian government 
envisaged by the Montagu-Chemsford Report of 1918. Thomas 
Macauley's words when introducing the Government of India 
Bill before the House of Commons in 1833 are particularly 
apposite:
"We are told that the time can never come when the natives 
of India can be admitted to high civil and military 
office. We are told that we are bound to confer on our 
subjects every benefit....which we can confer on them
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without hazard to our own domination. Against that 
proposition I solemnly protest as inconsistent alike with 
sound policy and sound morality....It may be that the 
public mind of India may expand under our system till it 
has outgrown that system; ....that, having become 
instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some 
future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a 
day will ever come, I know not. But never will I attempt 
to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be 
the proudest day in English history.1*25
Earl Grey, the British Colonial Secretary concerned 
with putting responsible Canadian government into effect, 
favoured gradually training West African Negroes "until 
they shall grow into a nation capable of protecting 
themselves and of managing their own affairs**; a similar 
doctrine was put forward by the West African Royal 
Commission of 1865.2^ In 1883, at the height of Europe*s 
last colonial expansion phase, as fervent an advocate of 
British empire building as J.R. Seeley, observed that there 
was some doubt as to the expediency of retaining domination 
over non-white peoples:
"When the state advances beyond the limits of nationality, 
its power becomes precarious and artificial. This is the 
condition of most empires; it is the condition....of our 
own in India.*'28
Some British colonial administrators like Lord Lugard, 
even viewed the growth of discontent among some of Great 
Britain's non-white dependent peoples during and 
immediately following the First World War as an indication 
of the success of British colonial policy:
"If there is unrest and desire for independence, as in 
India and Egypt, it is because we have taught the people 
the value of liberty and freedom, which for centuries 
these peoples had not known,. Their very discontent is a 
measure of their progress''.28
Undue importance should not be attached to these 
sentiments, however, as until well into the twentieth 
century few members of the British establishment believed 
that the British Empire's non-white subjects would be 
capable of ruling themselves in the foreseeable future.
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Indeed, while The Durham Report of 1839 advocated 
responsible self-government for white colonies and the 
British North American Act of 1867 established the right to 
self-government for at least some of them, it was not until 
1926 that the right of all Great Britain’s dependent 
peoples to a degree of self-government when and where
O Q
practicable, became official policy. y Prior to the Second 
World War some Arab ’'nationalities*' achieved a measure of 
independence, but Europe's subject peoples in Asia and 
Black Africa did not; although some (notably the peoples of 
the Indian sub-continent) obtained a large degree of 
responsible government. Finally, the brand of independence 
achieved by the Arabs during the inter-war years, 
especially the Iraqi model, today would be denounced by 
anti-colonialists as a legal fiction; the economic and 
strategic links with the Western World being stigmatised as 
examples of neo-colonialism.
b. The Contribution of the United States
Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson's biographer, among
others, maintained that "the central idea of trusteeship
had its deep roots in the traditional principles and
policies of the United States".^ His statement has a
certain validity in that as early as 1831 the Supreme
Court, via Chief Justice Marshall's judgement on the
Cherokee Nation vs the State of Georgia case, ruled that
the federal government was in the position of trustee
regarding the American Indians. The Chief Justice ruled
that the Indians were "domestic dependent nations" under
the Federal Government's protection and had an "undisputed
right to the lands they occupy":
"They are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the 
United States resembles that of a ward to her guardian. 
They look to our government for protection.... and address 
the President as their great father".^
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There is also some substance in W.F. Willoughby's 
claim that American colonial policy was primarily for the 
dependencies' "benefit or advancement and in no way 
constituting a field for exploitation in the interest of 
the mother country".^2 Within the ethos of this liberal 
outlook, trusteeship notions were frequently mentioned when 
the United States acquired territory not contiguous to the 
American mainland for purposes other than settlement. For 
example, in December 1900, President McKinley declared that 
the Philippines were "the wards of the nation":
"Our obligation as guardian was not lightly assumed; it 
must not be otherwise than honestly fulfilled, aiming 
first of all to benefit those who have come under our 
fostering care."^
Professor Willoughby claimed that two further maxims 
of American colonial policy were "conferring on territory 
the largest measure of self-government that the conditions 
and character of its inhabitants render, feasible", and when
impracticable to admit a dependency to statehood within the
North American Union, to grant its inhabitants "that 
measure of autonomy or independence which they are fitted 
to enjoy, and which conditions render safe".^ His claims 
have some substance when applied to the territorial results 
of the American "imperialist phase" of the 1890s. For 
example, the Senate Resolution of February 1899 on the 
future of the Philippines:
"it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the 
Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, 
nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as 
an integral part of the territory of the United States; 
but it is the intention of the United States to establish 
on said islands a government suitable to the wants and 
conditions of the inhabitants of the said islands, to 
prepare them for local self-government, and in due time 
to make such disposition of the said islands as will best 
promote the interests of the United States and the 
inhabitants of said islands". 5
Although in 1901 the Supreme Court ruled that the
Resolution had no legal effect and that the Philippines did
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come "under the complete and absolute sovereignty and 
domination of the United States", ^  in December 1904, 
President Theodore Roosevelt declared that he "earnestly 
hoped that in the end they will be able to stand, if not 
entirely alone, yet in some relationship to the United 
States as Cuba now stands".^ The Jones Act of 1916 
recognised the Philippines* right to eventual independence:
"It is as it always has been, the purpose of the people of 
the United States to withdraw their sovereignty from the 
Philippines and to recognise their independence as soon 
as a stable government can be established therein."^®
Thus there was some justification in Theodore 
Roosevelt*s comment of December 1904, that American work in 
the Philippines was distinguished from that of other 
"civilized powers*' with possessions in the Orient by the 
"endeavour to develop the natives themselves so that they 
shall take an ever-increasing share in their government".^
Earlier the Berlin Conference on Africa of 1885, had 
accepted an American suggestion that the authority of any 
power in the Congo Basin should be based on treaties with 
the native chiefs. John Kassan, the American 
representative stated:
"Modern international law follows closely a line which 
leads to the recognition of the rights of native tribes 
to dispose freely of themselves and of their hereditary 
territory. In conformity with this principle, my 
government would gladly adhere to a more extended rule to 
be based on a principle which should aim at the 
voluntary consent of the natives whose country is taken 
possession of inwall cases where they have not provoked 
the aggression.
The United States, however, was neither directly 
concerned with nor unduly interested in the Congo Basin, 
and the adoption of her suggestion was due to the fact that 
it accorded with both the views of the European powers and 
the then generally accepted theory of protectorates. But 
over sixty years prior to the Conference, the growth of 
American feeling against slavery had led to the foundation 
of American negro settlements on the West African coast in
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1821, Although British abolitionists anticipated this act 
by founding Sierra Leone in 1788, the latter remained a 
British colony unlike Liberia which was in theory an 
independent state.
With regard to Cuba, occupied by the United States at 
the end of the Spanish-American War, in 1901 the Supreme 
Court ruled that it was "a territory held in trust for the 
inhabitants of Cuba to whom it rightfully belongs and to 
whose exclusive control it will be surrendered when a 
stable government shall have been established by their 
voluntary action".^ British occupation of Egypt was also 
considered to be temporary, but lasted for some fifty 
years, whereas the United States remained formally 
responsible for Cuban affairs for only a few years.
The argument should not be unduly stressed, however, 
as the United States did not desire to preserve undue 
influence in Liberia. It had almost no significance for 
American national interests unlike, say, France's interest 
in Tunisia and Morocco. Moreover, it is arguable whether 
American "benevolent non-interference" in political matters 
was actually to Liberia's disadvantage. Washington 
acquiesced in the American-owned Firestone Corporation's 
control of a large part of the economy, but was not 
prepared to take responsibility for Liberia's political 
development. Furthermore, as was argued in Chapter 2, up 
to and even after the advent of Franklin Roosevelt's "Good 
Neighbour" policy in the 1930s, when her interests were 
threatened, the United States did not shrink from 
intervening in Cuban affairs and also those of other de 
lure sovereign Latin American republics in the Caribbean 
region to preserve what she herself defined as "good" and 
"stable" government. Again as was also pointed out in 
Chapter 2, while proclaiming from the outset of her 
dominion, that the objective was to equip the Philippines 
for the rigours of an independent existence, the United 
States took nearly fifty years to fulfil this task. The
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result was that her trust was completed only a year prior 
to the end of British rule in India,
Finally, as shown in Chapter 2, until well into the 
twentieth century, United States' guardianship of her own 
non-white population left much to be desired. Even prior 
to American entry into the First World War, at times this 
caused some diplomatic embarrassment to the United States, 
For example, when in September 1915, American ships "were 
dispatched" to Turkey to give aid and protection to the 
Armenian Christians, the Sultan's Ambassador in Washington 
issued a public protest. President Woodrow Wilson 
instructed his then Secretary of State, William Jennings 
Bryan, to rebuke him. The ambassador retorted by sending a 
letter to the White House stating that "the Americans had 
no business to talk of possible massacres of Christians in 
Turkey so long as they themselves were lynching Negroes and 
torturing Filippinos".^
2. International Accountability
The concept of international accountability expresses 
the conviction that states with dependent peoples should be 
accountable to the international community for the conduct 
of their administration. In other words, "the principle 
that what an imperial power does inside its empire is the 
just concern of world opinion".^ At first these 
responsibilities were undertaken only by observing the 
Christian ethic; international accountability being 
expressed as a responsibility to God. But by the end of 
the nineteenth century the international community's role 
was seen as entailing a positive function and came to be 
represented as the dual mandate principle: "that
trusteeship for dependent peoples involved not only duties 
by the colonizing Power towards the peoples under trust but 
also obligations towards the family of nations which 
themselves also had a collective responsibility in the 
matter".^
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The dual mandate itself, however, would be better 
termed the triple mandate comprising as it does three 
distinct elements. The first is the self-regard of a 
colonial power; in particular, its duty to God and/or its 
sense of national honour. The second element is the 
responsibilities of a colonial power to its dependent 
people - the sacred trust principle. The third is a 
colonial power*s obligations to the international 
community; namely, the protection of the interests of 
external nations in its dependent territories, and a 
responsibility to other * advanced* nations when undertaking 
its ’civilising* tasks. The latter’s positive role in late 
nineteenth century colonial practice should not be unduly 
stressed. For example, Lord Lugard, whose experiences in 
West Africa led him to formulate, work out in practice, and 
to popularize the dual mandate principle, did not favour 
colonial powers being ultimately responsible to the 
international community. He believed that in their efforts 
to further the interests of both the international 
community and dependent peoples, final responsibility lay 
with the metropoles themselves.
The open door principle is an integral part of the 
dual mandate in that it rests on the implicit assumption 
that dependent peoples* interests are best served when 
colonial trade is open to all. The principle is examined 
separately at the end of this section.
International accountability rests on two assumptions. 
The first is that a high level of general international 
cooperation exists predisposing the advanced and/or 
colonial powers to work together in furthering the welfare 
of dependent and/or non-white peoples. The second is that 
they will promote that welfare by formulating an 
international code of conduct, observance to some extent 
being guaranteed by adequate international supervisory 
machinery. The reference to dependent and/or non-white 
peoples is made to emphasise the point that the adoption of
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the mandates system was a "next step in a long course of 
evolution beginning with the action of the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815", when it was "resolved that all eight 
members of the Congress, whether possessing colonies in 
Africa or not, were entitled to participate in the 
consideration of measures for cooperative action in 
abolishing the African slave trade, because, as they held, 
the subject of the relations of civilized states with 
backward people should be determined by all the Powers 
collectively".^
With regard to international accountability, 
distinctions should be made between international 
guarantees in the sense of either generally accepted or 
legally binding codes governing administration, 
international supervision to ensure that those codes are 
actually observed by the administering powers, and 
international administration in the day-to-day conduct of 
affairs. As will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6, during the 
Second World War the British Colonial Office and the 
American military authorities were united, albeit largely 
unwittingly, in their suspicion and dislike of 
international supervision. The American State Department, 
however, believed that the way to ensure progress by 
dependent peoples was to have an international body, in 
which the United States should play a leading role, to 
supervise the observance by colonial regimes of agreed 
codes of colonial administration.
The international sanctions which the international 
community can exert on recalcitrant colonial powers are 
largely limited to moral persuasion and the threat of bad 
publicity. The latter helped to persuade the administering 
powers under both the League mandate and United Nations 
trusteeship systems to take greater care in presenting and 
justifying their colonial policies to international opinion 
than would probably have been the case in their absence.
In endeavouring to put policies and actions forward in the
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best possible light, the colonial powers perforce re­
examined them and perhaps adopted more "enlightened” 
attitudes as a result. At the same time, moreover, if 
Great Britain, for instance, adopted more liberal policies 
in administering Tanganyika and other territories under 
mandate or trusteeship, this might well "spill over" into 
its administration of neighbouring Kenya, Uganda and other 
territories not directly subject to international 
accountability.^
Furthermore, in so far as information on colonial 
administration was supplied to an international body, the 
metropoles gave an important role to any international 
secretariat. Even if the latter merely received and 
collated that information, the very style of its reports 
could well influence international opinion. This happened 
regarding the work of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 
and became even more important regarding the United Nations 
Secretariat’s role in compiling reports on information 
given by metropoles for both trust and non-self-governing 
territories. The vital significance of the colonial 
powers' undertaking to present information to the United 
Nations was emphasised by Krishna Menon as early as June 
1945:
"The most important innovation now made is to institute 
a limited system of reporting on all dependent 
territories. The administering authorities have 
undertaken an obligation to transmit regularly to the 
Secretary General for information purposes statistical 
and other information of a technical nature relating to 
economic, social, and educational conditions in the 
territories for which they are responsible". °
Of crucial importance in international accountability 
is the degree to which colonial powers are willing to grant 
supervisory rights to an international body. To some 
nationalists, the very principle of international 
supervision is calculated to give annoyance. Ernst Haas 
underlined this aspect regarding the attitude of French 
nationalists to the envisaged mandates system at the end of
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the First World War. "One could trust to the wisdom of 
France", wrote Gontaut-Biron, "to organise at her will the 
liberated territories of which she should take charge":
"France is no longer a minor and has no need of lessons 
to regulate her conduct. Since there is sufficient proof 
of her moderation and justice in her past actions we may 
wonder why it is pretended to tie down her tgue interests 
with definite obligations to the contrary". 9
Indeed, during the planning stages of both the League 
mandates and the United Nations trusteeship systems many 
British traditionalists argued that international 
supervision was unnecessary so far as Great Britain was 
concerned as her standards of colonial administration were 
of the highest; in terms of justice, economic and social 
conditions, higher than in many sovereign states. Similar 
arguments were made by some Americans during the Second 
World War when it was suggested that Puerto Rico, Hawaii 
and other United States overseas possessions might be 
placed under international trusteeship.
The opponents of international accountability also 
pointed out the possible danger of confusing where 
sovereignty and responsibility actually lay. This was 
underlined by Sir William Battershill, then a Deputy Under­
secretary of State at the Colonial Office, when commenting 
in November 1944 on the possibility of visits of inspection 
to territories under mandate:
"Inevitably a visit, made even with the purest of 
motives will result in an inspection; and the body 
visiting will at once become the focus for every 
disgruntled individual and body of individuals....I feel 
that the authority of the local Government is likely to 
be considerably reduced by visits....We are proposing to 
set up a very complex organisation which though 
comparatively harmless in theory will be apt to become 
dangerous in practice - dangerous in that they seem to be 
interposed between the local legislative and Government 
and the Secretary of State and Parliament."^0
It was not until the formation of the League of 
Nations after the First World War that the international 
community obtained any real influence on the conduct of
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colonial administration. As is shown in Chapter 4, under 
pressure from the United States, particularly President 
Woodrow Wilson, the Western European colonial powers 
created the mandates system; the first truly international 
machinery for supervising colonial administration. Under 
the mandates system, the League had the right to receive 
both reports from the administering Powers and petitions 
from the indigenous inhabitants. The League*s principal 
overseer, the Permanent Mandates Commission, was composedocj<^(\QU-y 
of yViA^ eminent private individuals, most of whom had had 
experience in colonial administration. lfThe Commission 
examined written and oral reports presented by the 
Mandatory Powers once each year, and then reported with 
observations to the Council of the League which might, or 
might not, act upon the Commission’s recommendations**.-^ 
Unfortunately, the mandates system lacked teeth. The 
administering powers conducted the day-to-day 
administration and League supervision was nominal to say 
the least. The fact that the Permanent Mandates Commission 
reported to the League Council, meant that the mandatories 
could expect more sympathetic hearings than if it had 
reported to the Assembly where all League members were 
represented. In effect, *'the mandates system was a system 
of national administration under international 
supervision**:
"Members of the Commission could not, or did not, visit 
the territories to see for themselves how the terms of 
the mandate were being administered. Nor could natives 
or inhabitants of the territories present their petitions 
in person, but only, (except for the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine) through the mandatory government which might 
make a written or oral comment on the petition. Many 
petitions were designated nonreceivable as being counched 
in abusive language or for other reasons."^
The question of supervision and where sovereignty lay 
under the mandates system intruded into international 
politics after the Second World War because 
of South Africa’s relationship with South West Africa
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(Namibia), Three factors lie at the root of the 
controversy. The first is that mandates were allocated by 
the Allied and Associated Powers and not the League as 
President Wilson originally suggested. The second is that 
both Article 22 of the Covenant and the individual mandate 
agreements were either silent or ambiguous as to the 
question of sovereignty. Indeed, during the discussions of 
the Allied Council of Ten it was intimated that the class 
"C" mandates would be eventually annexed by their 
mandatories; a contingency given tacit approval by the 
provisions of paragraph six of Article 22 of the Covenant. 
The third is that both the League Council and the Permanent 
Mandates Commission were neither able nor exhibited much 
inclination to put themselves into a position to enforce 
compliance with their edicts; compliance almost always 
being a voluntary act on the part of an administering 
power. If the mandates had been given to "Small Powers", 
as President Wilson originally suggested, then the League 
might have been in a much stronger position vis a vis the 
mandatories, providing it had the open and active support 
of a sufficient number of Great Powers. The League’s lack 
of power was well illustrated by Japan’s failure to comply 
with the open door and the "no-fortification" provisions of 
Article 22 of the Covenant. At the time of the League’s 
establishment, however, most academic commentators were in 
accord with H. W. V. Temperley’s belief that the 
administering powers would not possess sovereign rights in 
their mandated territories:
"What sharply distinguishes the Mandatory System from 
all such international arrangements of the past is the 
unqualified right of intervention possessed by the League 
of Nations. Tne Mandatories act on its behalf. They 
have not sovereign powers, but are responsible to the 
League for the execution of the terms of the mandate.
Although possessing little validity when applied to 
the League’s actual powers during the interwar years, the 
comment implicitly recognized the importance of adequate
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supervisory machinery for international accountability to 
have any real substance. Indeed, as is shown in 
Chapter 7, although there were fewer trust than mandated 
territories, it was only with the creation of the United 
Nations trusteeship system that the international community 
assumed a truly positive role in the conduct of colonial 
affairs. The anti-colonial group in the General Assembly 
from the very beginning of the United Nations* existence 
used its growing numerical voting strength to discredit 
colonial rule. They were given a legal lever for 
influencing constitutional developments in trust 
territories under the provisions of Chapters XII and XIII 
of the Charter. The Trusteeship Council, while composed of 
governmental representatives, is equally divided in 
membership "between those Members of the United Nations 
which administer trust territories and those which do 
not**.-^ Apart from matters relating to strategic trusts 
under Article 83, the Trusteeship Gouncil works under the 
authority of the General Assembly to which it reports, not 
the Security Council where the two leading Western European 
colonial powers (France and Great Britain) possess veto 
powers. Unlike the mandates system, moreover, under the 
trusteeship system there is provision for the "General 
Assembly and under its authority, the Trusteeship Council" 
both to "accept petitions and examine them in consultation 
with the administering authority" and to "provide for 
periodic visits to the respective trust territories at 
times agreed upon with the administering authority".^
The second section of Chapter 7, examines the use made 
by the General Assembly*s anti-colonial majority to use 
their voting strength to attempt to bridge the 
constitutional gap in the Charter between the United 
Nations* functions over trust territories and those over 
non-self-governing territories. Their efforts gave the 
international community some say, even if at times indirect 
and more vocal than real, in the administration and
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evolution of non-self-governing territories. This activity 
culminated in Resolution 1654 (XVI) passed by the General 
Assembly on November 27, 1961, establishing a Special 
Committee to report on the implementation of the 
Declaration of December 1960, Despite the antipathy of 
most of the colonial powers, including at times the United 
States, the Committee endeavoured to persuade all states 
administering trust and non-self-governing territories to 
"take action without further delay with a view to the 
faithful application of and implementation of the 
Declaration**.^  Rupert Emerson has maintained that the 
Committee's greatest achievement has been to furnish "the 
anti-colonials with a meeting place and machinery to co­
ordinate their efforts"; it provides "an invaluable 
platform from which to broadcast their views to the world 
at large",^ Indeed, it is within the realm of publicity 
that the United Nations has perhaps taken the greatest 
strides towards greater international accountability for 
dependent peoples.
So far as Western European colonialism is concerned, 
only the debris of empire now remain; vexed and highly 
inflammable though some of those bits and pieces could 
still be. The impetus towards greater international 
accountability has been switched from assisting colonial 
peoples towards an independent existence to helping them 
tackle the development problems confronting them in their 
post-independent existence. This aspect of international 
accountability lies outside the scope of this study.
a. The Contribution of the European Powers
Cooperation for the welfare of non-white peoples. It 
was indicated earlier in this chapter that attempts to 
regulate and then abolish the slave trade in the early 
nineteenth century marked the first significant steps 
towards international cooperation for the welfare of non- 
white peoples. At first it was primarily due to British
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efforts that the European powers agreed to undertake this 
task. For example, at the Congress of Vienna, Great 
Britain extracted a promise from the newly restored Bourbon 
dynasty that French subjects would be forbidden to engage 
in the slave trade after 1819. The complementary role of 
British leadership and naval power were crucial:
"There was only one way of suppressing this trade. If 
no slave ships crossed the Atlantic, there would be no 
slaves to sell. The passage of the slave-ships could be 
prevented if the warships of those nations which 
patrolled the west coast of Africa had the right to 
examine all vessels, whatever their flag and nationality, 
under suspicion of carrying slaves. An effective police 
measure of this kind required international agreement. 
Great Britain had more ships on patrol work than any 
other nation; she had made agreements about the right of
France and, in 1835, with
There were also instances where Great Britain assumed 
a unilateral right of supervision over another state*s 
guardianship of non-white peoples. For. example, she 
reserved the right to supervise the Nicaraguan 
administration when renouncing her protectorate over the 
Mosquito Indians in favour of Nicaragua in 1860. In 
Emperor Franz Joseph*s award in the British-Nicaraguan 
arbitration of 1881, it was understood that Great Britain’s 
insistence on her treaty rights was neither,
"intermeddling*' with Nicaragua's internal affairs nor the 
claiming of "a continued exercise of the relinquished 
protectorate'', but rather the claiming of "a right of its 
own*' to press for observance of the treaty clause assuring 
"certain political and pecuniary advantages for the 
Mosquitoes".*^ Similarly, when entrusting Queensland 
(whose rights were later transferred to the Australian 
Federal Government) with administering British New Guinea 
in 1887, and when entrusting the Union of South Africa with 
administering Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland in 
1909, Great Britain reserved the right to enforce 
regulations for protecting the indigenous inhabitants.
search with other Powers 1831 and 1833, with
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Moreover, during the Imperial War Cabinet*s discussion of 
the mandates idea towards the end of 1918, Lord Milner 
maintained that **the mandatory principle** had characterised 
British administration in Egypt:
'*Our administration of Egypt for thirty-five years was 
carried out on that principle, and subject to innumerable 
obligations which we consistently fulfilled, at one time 
even to the extent of giving a decided preference to 
other nations over ourselves. The more we had been able 
to get rid in Egypt of a condominium, the more 
satisfactorily .were we able to carry out our duties as a 
mandatory.
The first important example of multilateral 
co-operation by the European Powers for promoting the 
welfare of non-white peoples did not take place until the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. Commencing in 
1885, at the peak of their rivalry for African colonies, 
the European powers concluded the series of international 
agreements known as the Congo Basin Acts. Indeed, H.W.V. 
Temperley argued that *'the only previous analogy in history 
to the [League of Nations] mandatory system is to be found 
in the Berlin-Congo Act of 1885 whereby the principal 
European Powers concerned in Africa entrusted the task of 
administering the Congo Basin to King Leopold II of the 
Belgians subject to the limiting conditions of the Berlin 
Congo Act'*.^ Although the Act*s primary purpose was to 
avoid disputes among the interested European powers, 
Temperley*s comment is pertinent in that agreement was also 
reached on common measures for protecting native welfare: 
first, abolishing slavery and prohibiting the slave trade 
(Article XI of the General Act of the Conference marked the 
final recognition that the slave trade was "forbidden*' by 
the "principles of international law"); second, provisions 
for the "preservation" of the native tribes and "the 
improvement of....their moral and material well-being"; 
third, curtailing traffic in arms, ammunition and 
spirituous liquors; and fourth, the control of disease.^2 
The reference to these measures and the recognition of the
117
open door for the trade and navigation of all countries in 
the Basin, was an implicit acknowledgement of the dual 
mandate. The Brussels Anti-Slavery Act of 1890 underlined 
the humanitarian objectives of the Berlin-Congo Act. In 
the words of Suzanne Miers, in developing "the doctrine of 
international trusteeship the Brussels Act was a landmark 
....the idea had been voiced and the responsibility 
accepted, and the principles embodied in it were adopted by 
the League of Nations and eventually passed on to the 
United Nations*'.^
The importance of the Congo-Basin Acts as precedents 
for the mandates and trusteeship systems should not be 
unduly stressed. First, Jan Smuts almost certainly 
conceived his mandates system model as much from the 
previously mentioned British Empire arrangements as from 
the experiences of the European powers in the Congo Basin. 
Second, the provisions of the Berlin and Brussels Acts and 
the passing reference to the world’s public conscience by 
the use of such phrases as "In the name of Almighty God", 
did not prevent King Leopold’s administration becoming an 
international scandal. Third, although the Conference 
allotted the administration of the Basin to King Leopold’s 
International Association of the Congo, the European powers 
lacked the political will and the supervisory powers 
necessary to prevent the Congo Free State becoming first, 
King Leopold’s "personal property" and then, by the Belgian 
Colonial Charter Act of 1909, coming under Belgian
lxsovereignty. H Fourth, there was an absence of adequate 
supervisory machinery in the Congo Basin arrangements. At 
the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George observed that the 
basic difference "between the mandatory principle and the 
principles laid down by the Berlin Conference", was the 
absence in the latter of "external machinery" for ensuring 
compliance with the dual mandate principle. He declared 
that this "was no large difference",^ but the lack of
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adequate supervisory machinery had made the provisions of 
the Congo Basin Acts somewhat ineffective.
International Supervisory machinery. During most of the 
nineteenth century there was a lack of the political will 
and the historical precedents necessary for inter-state 
cooperation to obtain a definite structural pattern in the 
sense of adequate supervisory machinery for observing 
agreed codes of international conduct. Thus, although 
international supervision was sometimes provided for 
dependent territories, the regulations of the relevant 
conventions were very indifferently observed. This point 
is well illustrated by three examples from the European 
experience prior to the Berlin African Conference of 1885.
The first example is the "mandate" for the Ionian 
Islands conferred on Great Britain by Austria, Prussia and 
Russia. The Treaty of Paris of November 1815 declared that 
the Islands were "an independent state ... under the 
immediate and exclusive protection of the King of Great 
Britain and Ireland". The failure to provide adequate 
"international" supervision enabled Great Britain to expand 
her "authority until the manifest desire of the people to 
unite with Greece led to a conference at London which 
resolved on August 1, 1863, that the islands should be 
united to Greece" under the sanction of a European Act; 
Great Britain played the leading role in this grant of 
self-determination.^
The second example is the Concert of Europe*s 
authorisation in 1860 to Napoleon III to send French troops 
to the Lebanon to protect the Lebanese Christians from 
persecution and massacre. There was no machinery for 
supervising the French intervention apart from the fact 
that the "mandate" was obtained from, and its duration 
regulated by, a European conference; at first for a period 
of six months, later extended for a further three months, 
at the end of which time the French troops withdrew. By
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conferring the "mandate" on France, the European powers 
assumed a collective responsibility for the Eastern 
Question which contradicted the sentiments of Article IX of 
the Treaty of Paris of 1856; namely, that it was "clearly 
understood" that they had no right "to interfere either 
collectively or separately" in the Ottoman Empire,^
The third example is the supervisory functions over 
the Ottoman Empire’s administration of its subject 
nationalities taken by the European powers at the Congress 
of Berlin in 1878. For example, the Porte was required 
"periodically to make known the steps taken [to guarantee 
the Armenians* security] to the Powers who will superintend 
their application". Apart from furthering their individual 
ambitions in the Ottoman Empire, however, the European 
powers made little practical use of their right of 
protection.
Nevertheless, the experiences of the Concert of Europe 
with the Eastern Question provided a body of precedents 
from which the conventions concluded during the Berlin 
African Conference of 1885 can be said to have emerged.
The absence of adequate supervisory machinery, however, 
meant that neither set of arrangements provided much more 
than an emotive model for the League mandates system. The 
regulations in the conventions governing French and Spanish 
administration of Morocco agreed to at the Conference of 
Algeciras in 1906, afforded a more important model. Due to 
the important American contribution, their examination is 
deferred until the end of the following sub-section.
b. The Contribution of the United States
Some American commentators have argued that the 
European experiences were not very important as precedents 
for the international accountability aspect of the League 
mandates system. For example, James Murray maintained that 
"the supervisory powers of the Congresses of Vienna and 
Berlin, while of an international character, were somewhat
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less than effective; and the supervision of England over 
Australia and South Africa no doubt as effective as the 
mother country desired, was not really international".^ 
Similarly, George Louis Beer pointed out that the British 
Empire arrangements were "not international but domestic or 
intra-imperial".^ It has already been shown that there is 
substance in this type of criticism; criticism also 
applicable to the role of the United States in the 
evolution of the principle of international accountability.
Until the late nineteenth century, the United States 
followed a policy of "splendid isolation" and did not join 
the European powers in their first tentative steps towards 
international cooperation. In fact, during the first half 
of the nineteenth century she not only retained slavery as 
an institution in the southern States, but was also the 
only leading white power who refused to cooperate with 
Great Britain in suppressing the West African slave trade; 
this was due in part to the influence of American pressure 
groups with an economic interest in its retention, and in 
part to jealousy of Great Britain*s naval power and dislike 
of her naval pretensions. Article 10 of the Treaty of 
Ghent of 1814 between Great Britain and the United States 
proclaimed that "the Traffic in Slaves is irreconcilable 
with the principles of humanity and Justice", and "it is 
hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use 
their best endeavours to accomplish11 its abolition. The 
United States, however, insisted on compensation for the 
non-return of slaves carried off by the British during the 
War of 1812; claims not finally settled until 1826.^
As was pointed out in Chapter 2, within the Western 
Hemisphere, the United States preferred unilateral not 
collaborative action with the European powers. The Monroe 
Doctrine, although cloaked in an anti-colonial guise, was 
essentially a unilateral diplomatic instrument for 
protecting American national interests rather than for 
promoting the welfare of the Spanish Americas; hence
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Washington*s original refusal to join London in a bilateral 
declaration. The late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century extensions of the Doctrine by Secretary of State 
Olney and President Theodore Roosevelt, emphasised American 
unwillingness to cooperate with the European powers on 
international issues relating to Latin America.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
however, the United States became more willing to cooperate 
with the European powers in settling the future of the "un- 
Europeanised** areas of the globe outside the Americas. For 
example, she was interested in the fate of the Congo Basin. 
There were three principal American policy objectives:
**First, that all nations should unite in founding *a 
great state in the heart of western Africa whose 
organisation and administration [should] afford a 
guarantee that it is to be held for all time, as it were, 
in trust for the benefit of all peoples*; second, that 
the obligations of this international trusteeship should 
be * the civilization of the native races* and the 
assurance of ‘equal privileges for all* as respects 
‘commercials enterprises*; third, that the proposed 
trustee State, in order to fulfil its international 
trusteeship, should be ’neutralized against 
aggression
Unfortunately, the United States apparently believed 
that these ideals would be served by King Leopold*s 
International Association of the Congo, and was the first 
state to recognize it. Moreover, although attending the 
Berlin African Conference of 1885 and pressing for measures 
to protect the Congo Basin's indigenous inhabitants, her 
role was marginal compared with that of the interested 
European powers. Indeed, attendance at the Conference 
proved to be only a temporary deviation from the tradition 
of standing aloof from the affairs of the Old World; the 
United States failed to ratify the Congo Basin Convention 
of 1885 and played no significant role in the series of 
international agreements on tropical Africa enacted between 
1885 and 1914.
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With the opening of the twentieth century and Theodore 
Roosevelt's elevation to the Presidency, the United States 
began to show a more active concern with the affairs of the 
"un-Europeanized" areas of the globe outside the Americas.In 
p&f irtouAftr, Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Elihu 
Root, suggested that the Moroccan Question could be solved 
if the powers made France and Spain their "mandatories" in 
Morocco. In February 1906, an American plan based on 
international accountability was put forward:
"That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers 
report annually to the government of Morocco, and to the 
government of Italy, the Mediterranean Power which shall 
have the right of inspection and verification, and to 
demand further reports on behalf of and for the 
information of the Powers. The expenses of such 
inspection, etc, to be deemed as part of the cost of 
police maintenance.
As was noted and deprecated by Pitman Potter in the 
1920s, however, some commentators underrated this plan as 
the "modern" model for the League mandates system. Potter 
quoted from the work of Robert Batsell:
"Batsell.... argues that the use of the term 'mandate' by 
Roosevelt and Root in 1906 'is by no means the first use 
of the word mandate in its present connotation, that it 
is used by practically every writer to describe the 
status of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1878 and 1908, 
that it is used repeatedly in the correspondence 
concerning Egypt after 1880, and that even more clearly 
than in the Roosevelt correspondence it was used in the 
negotiations between the representatives of Great 
Britain, Germany, and the United States at Washington.... 
(in the summer of 1887)....to discuss the disposal of 
Samoa'
Potter's counter-argument maintained that partial 
adoption of the American plan by the Conference of 
Algeciras was the origin "of the mandates system in the 
form in which it now exists and is operated by or under the 
League of Nations":
"The facts of the matter are that not until 1906 was the 
mandate scheme worked out so as to assume its present 
form, that in the Moroccan case it came to possess all 
the essential elements, i.e. international bestowal of a 
mandate for administration over colonial territory in a
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nation not holding sovereignty of that territory, 
definition of the mandate, and, most important of all, 
supervision of the execution of the mandate; that it 
was.... actively put into operation in Morocco - with 
Swiss rather than Italian inspection on behalf of the 
powers; and that the plan of 1906 actually was 
influential in the deliberations of 1919,
Potter's argument has the linguistic merit of 
distinguishing between the technical use of the terms 
"mandate" and "mandatory" as employed in the League of 
Nations Covenant and their frequent late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century use for describing various types of 
"restricted" colonial rule. He was correct in pointing out 
that the Algeciras arrangement was a "favourite model for 
international colonial reorganisation" for such writers as 
Walter Lippmann and among "English Liberal and Socialist 
thinkers in the period 1915-1918".^ Nevertheless, he 
neglected to give adequate weight to the fact that their 
arguments tended to be based on the need to give it "teeth" 
by providing more viable supervisory machinery: 
Switzerland's legal rights, power, and status as the 
international overseer having been far from adequate. 
Moreover, Potter grossly exaggerated in suggesting that, 
because the League mandates system was based on the 
Roosevelt-Root plan via the Algeciras arrangements, it was 
essentially an American conception. The importance of the 
plan should not be underrated, but its roots were in the 
late nineteenth century European experience; to paraphrase 
Quincy Wright, "doubtless" Roosevelt and Root had "the 
proposals of the Berlin Congress [of 1885] in mind".^ 
Moreover, many of the ideas of George Louis Beer, the 
principal source of the Wilson Administration's plans 
regarding international accountability, were based on the 
experiences of the European powers f r o m  fckfi,
Berlin African Conference of 1885 onwards.^®
The United States' relationship with its de facto 
client state, Liberia, in the years immediately preceeding
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the First World War, affords another important example of 
international cooperation regarding the problems of non­
white peoples. The Liberian government was corrupt and 
financially insolvent and the United States endeavoured to 
prevent Liberia*s annexation by one of the European powers 
via **peaceful penetration through economic measures**• ^  It 
**devised the international receivership agreement of 1912, 
which was administered jointly by the German, French, 
British and American governments with an American receiver 
general".®^ The results of this international control were 
not encouraging and by 1919 *'the British and the French 
frankly urged the Americans to accept a mandate or to 
establish some form of a protectorate".®^ Some Americans 
such as George Louis Beer, wished the Americans to assume
Q  O
such responsibilities. ^
c. The Open Door
The open door principle had many ardent American 
advocates, but was essentially a British conception, 
evolving from the efforts of Adam Smith’s disciples to 
obtain Westminster’s adherence to free trade in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Writing in 
1918, George Louis Beer pointed out that the general 
principle **had been scrupulously regarded in all parts of 
the British Empire under the control of the London 
Parliament".®® Indeed, as applied to colonial 
dependencies, the germ of the idea was implicit in the 
previously mentioned British proclamation of 1763, which 
stated that (at least for Great Britain and the American 
colonies), "Trade with the said Indians shall be free and 
open to all our subjects whatever".®^ By the late 
nineteenth century the principle comprised four basic 
maxims: first, "that goods of every origin and imported on
any vessels should enter a colony on equal terms"; second, 
"that colonial products may be freely shipped to any 
destination without discrimination*'; third, "that there
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should be complete freedom of navigation on rivers1*; and 
fourth, "that foreign merchants and traders should have 
unrestricted access to such colonies and also full freedom 
to settle there and hold property1*.^ In theory if not 
always in practice, the need "to protect the natives from 
exploitation" was "far more important than any 
arrangement••••to secure the interests of the European and 
American states in,...backward countries",
The main American contribution to the evolution of the 
open door principle was the emotive-propagandist one of 
frequent denunciation of real and imagined discrimination 
by the European powers against American trade with their 
colonies. As indicated in Chapter 2, this facet of the 
American anti-colonial tradition originated in the economic 
causes and consequences of the American War of 
Independence. Thus "from the first moment of 
independence**, the United States "set her face against the 
European policy of commercial exclusion and monopoly in the 
colonies, and her whole commercial diplomacy" was "directed 
to forcing her way into the closed system of the British 
Navigation Acts**. This "policy arose directly from her 
national economic interests and was not based in any great 
degree upon theoretical principles, except in so far as it 
was motivated by a mistrust of colonialism natural in the 
heirs of the American Revolution*'. Anglo-American 
commercial rivalry in the early nineteenth century, 
especially in the Western Hemisphere, "fed on fear of 
colonialism and mistrust of political intentions on desire 
for trade":^
"The word colony brought to American minds a train of 
unpleasant associations. To them it signified the old 
colonial system instituted by Spain and Portugal and 
followed in large measure by all the colonizing 
nations.
Thus, although Great Britain's adoption of free trade 
policies and efforts to apply open door precepts were 
appreciated by some Americans like George Louis Beer,
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European-American trade rivalry combined with their 
historical perspective, predisposed most Americans to 
stress the economic discrimination motive in late 
nineteenth century European colonial expansion. For 
example, Ray Stannard Baker*s description of President 
Woodrow Wilson's attitude:
"if the mandatory system were to be sincerely adopted as 
the policy of the world it meant a knockout blow to many 
of the advantages of foreign spheres of influence in 
which the old diplomacy was so deeply interested. It 
meant for example the 'open door'! And of what use was 
colonial expansion without economic contact or 
privilege."89
This attitude was pertinent in that the expansion of 
the international frontier in the late nineteenth century 
entailed a high degree of European trade and investment in 
such regions as North and Central Africa, the Levant, 
Southern Asia and China. To safeguard their economic 
interests when not assuming sovereignty, the European 
powers extracted capitulatory rights, leased zones, 
international zones, and customs receiverships. Their 
intense rivalry, however, made for attempts at compliance 
with the open door. For example, the Berlin African 
Conference of 1885 provided for the open door in the vast 
area extending across Central Africa from the Atlantic to 
the Indian Ocean. But this was only done on the suggestion 
of the United States; the European powers had proposed to 
confine the open door to the Congo Basin. Moreover, 
Portuguese Mozambique was excluded and the Brussels African 
Conference of 1890 permitted the imposition of import 
duties of up to ten per cent in the Conventional Basin. 
There was also substance in American protests that their 
commerce did not prosper as much as that of the European 
colonial metropoles in their dependencies during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
"The general effect of the methods of development in the 
Belgian Congo and of the preferential systems established 
in the Portuguese and in some of the French possessions 
was that colonial trade tended to centre on the mother
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country. Thus, approximately, one half of the total 
foreign commerce of the French territories in Middle 
Africa was with France. This condition was, however, 
even more marked in the British and German colonies, 
where there were no discriminatory duties to influence 
the course of traffic. Of the total trade of the British 
possessions in this region, fifty-five per cent in 
1913-14 was with the United Kingdom. In the case of the 
German colonies, the percentage was higher still; sixty- 
three per cent of their foreign commerce in 1912 was with 
the Motherland.1,90
George Louis Beer pointed out that "the close 
commercial relations11 of metropole and colonies were due 
not only to preferential systems: "‘that trade tends to 
follow the flag is largely inherent in the colonial 
s t a t u s " . T h e  crucial reason for this was the ,fpersonal 
equation*1 rather than "protective barriers** in that "it was 
easier for a Frenchman to do business in a French colony 
than it was for a German and vice v e r s a " . Neither 
language barriers nor national preference should be 
underestimated as often there is "greater confidence in a 
compatriot than in an alien'*:
"Until national prejudices are eradicated, not until the 
State is no longer regarded as carrying on trade through 
its individual members, commerce is bound to follow the 
flag to a more or less marked extent.
Chapter 2 demonstrated that there was little substance 
in claims that "America had a more liberal background for 
its colonial policy than did any of the nations of the Old 
World" and that "the necessities of commerce and the 
investment of capital never imposed on" her "obligations 
for colonial expansion as it did on Great Britain".9^ For 
example, the economic motive was of great importance in the 
American annexation of Hawaii. Similarly, by limiting 
trade from the United States with American Samoa to 
American vessels, she violated the spirit if not the letter 
of the open door provisions of the American, British, and 
German joint Samoan Agreement of 1899. Likewise, treatment 
of the Philippines as part of her metropolitan territory 
for commercial purposes was as much a denial of the open
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door as if Great Britain had done so with regard to India. 
Indeed, in May 1918, George Louis Beer remarked that it 
would be "very awkward for the United States, in view of 
the existing tariff arrangements in force in Hawaii, Puerto 
Rico, and the Philippines and the preferential agreement 
with Cuba", to criticise European open door violations 
Furthermore, she was in accord with the European powers in 
seeking extra-territorial rights and like privileges in the 
international frontier regions. Beer pointed out that "the 
clearest enunciation" of capitulatory rights was "in the 
Treaty of 1830 between the United States and Turkey":
"Citizens of the United States of America, quietly 
pursuing their commerce, and not being charged or 
convicted of any crime or offence, shall not be molested; 
and even when they may have committed some offence they 
shall not be arrested and put into prison by the local 
authorities, but they shall be tried by their Minister or 
Consul, and punished according to their offence, 
following in this respect, the usage observed towards 
other Franks.
The fact that in, say, Egypt, American extra­
territorial rights were "obeyed to the letter",97
illustrates the tendency of the United States to criticise 
European "imperialist" practices while pursuing her 
commercial activities under the cloak of their protective 
power. In one respect at least the European powers were 
more enlightened than the United States in that unlike her 
they were willing to undertake "civilizing" and political 
responsibilities in return for their privileges. However, 
two points should be made in the United States* favour: 
first, concern with the open door often entailed the notion 
that its "application should not only be rigid, but that 
the manner of the application should be for the benefit of 
the country to which the door leads" ^ ;  and second, the 
economic aspects of American anti-colonialism as expressed 
at the Paris Peace Conference, played the leading role 
enshrining the open door principle in the League mandates 
system.
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Quincy Wright among others, emphasised that the 
"mandates conception as set forth by General Smuts and the 
President Wilson did carry a general requirement of the 
open d o o r " t h a t  mandated territories should offer equal 
economic opportunities to all League members. The "United 
States subsequently insisted that it was only after this 
requirement had become an ‘understanding' of the Peace 
Conference that it felt itself able and willing to agree 
that the assignment of certain enemy territory by the 
victorious powers would be consistent with the best 
interests of the world".^ 0  The principle was incorporated 
into the "A" and "B" class mandate |without undue 
difficulty. The delay in approving "C" class mandates, 
however, was due in part to an unsuccessful Japanese 
attempt in the face of Australian and New Zealand 
opposition to have it applied to those in the Pacific 
region. The Japanese argued that the "principle of 
equality of treatment in the economic sphere must be 
understood among the guarantees provided.... in the interest 
of the native population"; the guarantees of equality of 
treatment in Article 22 of the Covenant were "as much in 
the interests of the native population as in that of 
foreign nationals".^02
The Permanent Mandates Commission included in its 
questionnaires requests for information about economic 
equality for all League members in trade with mandated 
territories. Economic equality was discussed, for example, 
at the Commission's twelfth session in October 1927. M. 
Rappard, among others, emphasised that the safeguards 
regarding economic equality "were inserted for the 
advantage of the inhabitants and not merely for the benefit 
of individual Members of the League":
"The clause prescribing economic equality had been 
inserted in the Covenant both in the interests of the 
territory and in the interests of the States Members of 
the League. In his opinion, those interests were one and 
the same. There might, however, arise a contradiction 
between the interests of the mandatory power and the
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interests of the mandated territory, and in that case it 
was for the Mandates Commission to intervene in order to 
obtain a solution favourable to the mandated 
territory.1,103
As is demonstrated in Chapter 4, during the interwar
years, the United States consistently emphasised the open 
door provisions of the mandates system and her rights to 
equality of economic opportunity under them. In the 
immediate period prior to her entry into the Second World 
War, she made various representations to the colonial 
metropoles stressing American treaty rights to commercial 
access to particular dependencies. A good illustration is 
the example quoted in Chapter 2 of the State Department's 
note to the British Foreign Office of January 1940 
protesting at the imposition of import and exchange 
regulations in Kenya and mandated Tanganyika in November 
1939. The Americans were also suspicious of the complex 
system of imperial commercial preference established by the 
British Empire and Commonwealth under the Ottawa Agreements 
of 1932. The preferences were designed to achieve imperial 
self-sufficiency during the bleak international economic 
climate of the interwar years and, in part, to help protect 
the British colonies and Dominions from undue commercial 
penetration by American business concerns.104 American
attitude to them is well illustrated by Sumner Welles' 
comments in May 1943:
"The whole history of British Empire preference is a 
history of economic aggression....[Other] countries found 
their markets throughout the vast reaches of the Empire 
restricted, and the prosperity of their people 
correspondingly impaired. Such a system is adopted to 
'protect' the people within the country employing it, but 
it strikes at the interests of other peoples as surely as 
if this were its object, and makes more difficult of 
solution their problem of getting a living.
Throughout the Second World War, the Roosevelt 
Administration attempted to use Great Britain's urgent need 
of American economic assistance as leverage to obtain 
London's consent to postwar modification if not total
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abolition of imperial preference and the adoption of more 
open door policies in British colonies. Particular 
attention was focussed on securing London*s adherence to 
the proposed American draft of what became ^rhicN S. four 
of the Atlantic Charter Declaration of August 1941:
**They will endeavour to further the enjoyment by all 
peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal 
terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the 
world which are needed for their economic prosperity."108
Winston Churchill disliked the phrase **without 
discrimination and on equal terms** as it might "prejudice 
the future of Imperial Preference*', but believed that 
President Roosevelt would accept British amendments "for 
the sake of speedy agreement".^ 7  The President eventually 
accepted those amendments rather than delay publishing the 
Atlantic Charter Declaration:
"they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing 
obligations to further the enjoyment by all states, great 
or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal 
terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the World 
which are needed for their economic prosperity."108
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who had not attended 
the Newfoundland meeting, considered the qualifying phrase, 
"with due respect to their existing obligations deprived 
the article of virtually all significance, since it meant 
that Britain would retain her Empire tariff against which I 
had been fighting for eight y e a r s " . H e  failed to obtain 
a supplementary statement from London to the effect that 
the phrase did not preclude the adoption of a liberal 
postwar British economic policy regarding Empire and 
Commonwealth trade generally.
Cordell Hull then attempted to obtain British 
agreement to the economic equality clause in the American 
draft of Article VII of the pending Anglo-American Lease- 
Land Agreement. At first the British were "unwilling to 
barter Empire preference in exchange for money and goods,
i.e. planes, tanks, guns", and wanted to include a clause 
stating that the word "discrimination" did not apply "to
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special arrangements between Members of the same 
commonwealth or federation such as the British Commonwealth 
and the United States of America and its possessions11*
After considerable American pressure, the British 
unenthusiastically accepted the American text of Article 
VII in February 1942. The postwar consequences of Article 
VII were minimal, but the negotiations themselves 
demonstrate the American commitment to economic equality 
and the open door as well as the potency of the economic 
aspects of the United States anti-colonial tradition. The 
eventual outcome of the negotiations also illustrate the 
changing Anglo-American balance of power: the British need
for American economic and other assistance was such that 
they had to accept Washington's conditions.
The Americans were also committed to having open door 
clauses inserted into any postwar trusteeship system 
succeeding the League mandates system. The key individual, 
apart from Cordell Hull and his commitment to international 
tariff liberalisation, was Benjamin Gerig;
a former official of the League of Nations' secretariat and 
the wartime chairman of the State Department's Committee on 
Dependent A r e a s . T h e  American role in incorporating 
open door provisions into the United Nations trusteeship 
system is examined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
3. The Vital American Contribution to the Evolution of 
the Concept of International Accountability for 
Dependent Peoples 
Despite the qualifications contained in this Chapter, 
the traditions and historical experience of the United 
States did play a unique role in the intellectual genesis 
of both the League mandates and the United Nations 
trusteeship systems. Initially, this derived from the fact 
that her anti-colonial tradition predisposed the United 
States during the First World War to oppose either the 
return of the dependencies of the Central Powers or their
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annexation by any of the Allied and Associated Powers. 
Similar considerations pertained during the Second World 
War with the additional factor that the Roosevelt 
Administration wanted the mandates system extended rather 
than watered down or abolished as the British desired. 
American traditions, however, did not entail the belief 
that non-white peoples were automatically equipped for the 
tasks of self-government. Indeed, as indicated in 
Chapter 2, the United States was predisposed to favour 
international accountability for dependent peoples almost 
by default; there being no other possible solution to the 
problem of the disposal of the Central and Axis powers' 
dependencies in keeping with her traditions. The actual 
evolution of American wartime planning regarding the 
creation of both the League mandates and the United Nations 
trusteeships systems is the subject of the remaining 
chapters of this study. For the moment it is sufficient to 
state that a crucial factor was the impact of American 
democratic and anti-colonial principles on Presidents 
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. Although their 
policies were tinged with expediency, the tenacity and 
principles of both were vital ingredients in developing the 
principle of international accountability for dependent 
peoples.
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Chapter 4: The United States and the League of Nations
Mandates System
The League of Nations mandates system was an 
arrangement whereby dependent territories formerly belonging 
to two of the defeated Central powers of the First World 
War, Germany and Turkey, were placed under the guardianship 
of certain of the victorious Allied powers as an alternative 
to their annexation by the victors. The United States 
played a key role in formulating that system. Both during 
the First World War and at the Paris Peace Conference, she 
was more interested than the Entente powers in placing the 
ex-enemy dependencies under some form of international 
supervision. This is not to dispute that pre-dating 
American ideas, wartime suggestions by British liberal and 
socialist groups for disposing of the German and Turkish 
dependencies envisaged mandate-type schemes; their ideas 
being drawn upon by Jan Smuts in composing his famous The 
League of Nations: A practical Suggestion.^- General Smuts,
along with Philip Kerr, also largely drafted Article 22 of 
the League of Nations Covenant setting out the basic 
principles of the mandate system.^
The unique American role lay in the fact that unlike 
Great Britain and her Dominions, the United States was not 
interested in obtaining further overseas responsibilities. 
Some Americans would have liked Washington to lay claim to 
Germany*s Pacific island colonies, but these had been 
conquered by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan prior to 
American entry into the war. The need to restrict Dominion 
and Japanese control over these Pacific islands combined 
with the potency of the American anti-colonial tradition, 
predisposed the United States to oppose any of the Allied 
powers obtaining outright ownership of the German and 
Turkish dependencies. It was not considered practical to 
grant the dependencies their immediate independence, nor was
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it part of the American tradition to hold that all non-white 
dependent peoples were automatically fitted for the tasks of 
self-government and independence. Consequently, although 
there was some support for the Arabs* right to national 
self-determination, American traditions made for sympathy 
with the idea of some form of international administration 
for the German and Turkish dependencies. A solution based 
on direct international administration or some form of 
condominium was not favoured because of the belief that 
previous examples of these types of administration had 
proved unsatisfactory.
Perhaps the most immediately important American 
contribution to the creation of the League mandates system, 
was the election of a President in 1912 who ardently 
believed in the American democratic-value system.J 
Influenced by American documents like the Virginia Bill of 
Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the United 
States Constitution, Woodrow Wilson held '*that when properly 
directed, there is no people not fitted for self- 
g o v e r n m ent**President Wilson himself admitted that there 
were degrees of fitness,-* but believed that administering 
powers had a duty to make the best possible arrangements for 
their dependencies* social and political evolution. He 
brought to American wartime planning and the Paris Peace 
Conference a firm belief in the sacred trust principle 
without advocating immediate independence for all dependent 
peoples whose affairs were the Conference’s concern. 
President Wilson also had a sense of involvement regarding 
their eventual fate; far more perhaps than would have been 
the case if the United States had been represented by a less 
fervent proponent of her democratic-value system.
This Chapter itself is divided into four sections: an 
analysis of the proposals on dependent territories which the 
United States brought to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919; 
an investigation of the American role in the Conference 
decision to establish the League mandates system; an
144
examination of American involvement in the League mandates 
system; and an overall survey of the American contribution 
to that system. Self-determination and issues such as which 
territories should be placed under mandate and who should be 
their administering authorities, are probed only in so far 
as they shed light on the American role in formulating and 
institutionalising the principle of international 
accountability for dependent peoples. Throughout, the 
emphasis is on the influence of the American anti-colonial 
tradition on the Wilson Administration's efforts to enshrine 
the principle of international accountability within the 
League mandates system.
Three general factors should be borne in mind. The 
first is the relative lack of planning undertaken by the 
United States prior to the Paris Peace conference of 1919 on 
either the envisaged League of Nations or the problems of 
dependent peoples. The chief vehicle for official American 
planning on these questions during the First World War was 
the American Commission of Inquiry (popularly known as the 
Inquiry), set up under the direction of Colonel House in 
the autumn of 1917, not the State Department.^ The 
"Inquiry's studies of African, Asian, and Pacific problems 
suffered for lack of qualified, trained scholars":
"With almost no exception, no writer whose services were 
mobilized by these divisions of the Inquiry could have 
been described as of 'expert' calibre in terms of his 
assigned subject at the time he started his work.
Numerous missionaries, lawyers, and ancient historians 
took up the cudgels, accepting invitations to submit 
reports on subjects for which prior knowledge might prove 
valuable but was not judged prerequisite by the Inquiry's 
leadership. American higher education had not become 
alive to African, Asian, and Pacific studies before 
1917."7
The American National Archives lists 54 Inquiry papers 
on Africa, 220 on the Middle East, 131 on the Far East 
including India, and 23 on the Pacific Islands including
o
Australasia. Unfortunately, the Inquiry failed to liaise 
sufficiently with the State Department and was not very
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successful in communicating with the President.^ The nBlack 
Book" listing the various Inquiry "recommendations" was not 
presented to the five American plenipotentiaries until the 
opening of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919.^ 
Moreover, prior to the Conference opening, no concrete 
proposals were officially enunciated by the United States 
regarding an international mandates system. Indeed, 
although there is some evidence to support Louis Gray*s 
claim that the Inquiry "recognised" the colonial problem "as 
one of the most important" falling within its terms of 
r e f e r e n c e , i t  was only with President Wilson*s proposed 
second draft Covenant of the envisaged League of Nations, 
dated January 10, 1919, (otherwise known as his first Paris 
draft) that the United States formulated a specific, 
official blueprint on the scope and framework of a mandates 
system. The President*s proposals, however, had part of 
their germination in earlier American wartime thinking upon 
the future international treatment of colonial problems.
The second qualifying factor is the limited nature of 
the Paris negotiations themselves on the future of dependent 
peoples. The Allies were concerned primarily with reaching 
agreement among themselves regarding the peace settlement 
and the terms to be offered to the defeated Central powers. 
The mandates system formed only a relatively minor part of 
the League of Nations. Within the Woodrow Wilson 
Administration there had been some suggestions of a wider 
review of the colonial problem and the application of 
international accountability as opposed to considering only 
the disposal of the former German and Turkish dependencies. 
For example, in November 1918, the members of the American 
Naval Planning Commission suggested that "the 
internationalisation of all of Africa except Egypt, Algeria 
and South Africa would appear to be the best solution of the 
African problem"-^. Neither the United States nor its 
allies, however, raised the general matter of European 
colonialism at the Paris Peace Conference. Colonialism at
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the Conference was confined to a specific question; 
disposing of the dependent territories formerly belonging to 
Germany and Turkey. The United States, moreover, was in a 
disadvantageous position in that those territories had all 
been occupied by her new Allies prior to American entry into 
the War. The United States controlled none of them.
The third general factor is that during the First World 
War there was little inter-Allied cooperation regarding the 
basis of any general international settlement. The 
Americans were also very suspicious of the war aims of Great 
Britain, Japan, and to a lesser extent France. Woodrow 
Wilson*s confidant and biographer, Ray Stannard Baker, 
maintained that the United States* wartime allies, **Though 
outwardly...combating imperialism as symbolized by 
Germany...were themselves seeking vast extentions of their 
own imperial and economic p o w e r " . A s  was pointed out in 
Chapter 2, the American anti-colonial tradition contributed 
to that suspicion. For example, Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing told Arthur Balfour "that there still lingered in 
the minds of our people the old feeling that the British 
Empire was our hereditary foe".^ The Americans were even 
more suspicious of Japanese ambitions; suspicions which 
played a large part in the formulation of American mandate 
proposals as is shown later in this chapter.
1. The Proposals on Dependent Peoples which the United
States brought to the Paris Peace Conference
The following analysis of the specific proposals on 
dependent peoples which the United States brought to the 
Paris Peace Conference is divided into three broad inter­
related themes; the proposals' restricted nature; American 
views on the future of the enemy dependencies; and the 
attention paid to the best interests of the dependent
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peoples concerned. In so doing the evolution of the mandate 
idea within the Wilson Administration is also traced.
In January 1918, President Wilson enunciated his famous 
Fourteen Points, intended as proposals for achieving a just 
peace settlement. Point V was on colonial claims:
"A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment 
of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of 
the principle that in determining all such questions of 
sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned 
must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title is to be determined.
There was no condemnation of colonialism as such, 
merely its possible abuse. The vagueness of Point V and the 
President's various declarations on self-determination 
caused some fear in Great Britain and France of a possible 
American desire to re-open all colonial questions. The 
official Cobb-Lippmann commentary on the Fourteen Points 
refuted any such intention:
"Obviously it is not so intended. It applies clearly to 
those colonial claims which have been created by the war. 
That means the German colonies and any other colonies 
which may come under international consideration as a 
result of the war."1®
The commentary proceeded to state that the future of 
the German colonies after the war would be determined by 
resolving "Equitable" claims and the "interests of the 
populations concerned":
"What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Britain and 
Japan.... that the colonies cannot be returned to Germany? 
Because she will use them as submarine bases, because she 
will harm the blacks, because she uses the colonies as 
bases of intrigue, because she oppresses the natives.
What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Germany?
That she needs access to tropical raw materials, that she 
needs a field for the expansion of her population, that 
under the principles of peace proposed, conquest gives her 
enemies no title to her colonies. 17
President Wilson opposed the return of the German 
colonies because he believed that Germany's rule had not 
been in indigenous inhabitants' best interests. This, 
attitude reflected the views of his advisers. Thus, George
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Louis Beer wrote in February 1918, that "there is no reason 
for the re-establishment of German rule":
"In view of Germany's total failure to appreciate the 
duties of colonial trusteeship in the past, it affords 
scant assurance that in the future these colonies would be 
administered by her in the interests of the natives and of 
the world as a whole.
In addition to moral scruples, it was realised in 
Washington at an early stage that it would be futile to 
favour a restoration policy no matter how qualified, as this 
would be rejected by the Allied powers now occupying the 
German colonies. For example, George Louis Beer observed 
that return of the Bismarck Archipelago and the German Samoan 
Islands, "to Germany would be bitterly resented by Australia 
where a policy akin to the Monroe Doctrine has been firmly 
rooted in the popular mind. A strong feeling prevails 
against permitting any European Power to gain a foothold 
south of the Equator, and the original establishment of 
Germany was resented as an i n t r u s i o n . i n  another report 
for the Inquiry, Beer noted South Africa's desire for an 
"African Monroe Doctrine" and opposition to restoring South 
West Africa to Germany. He also underlined an interesting 
historical analogy with America's colonial experience drawn 
by H. C. Egerton in June 1915:
"British statesmen are well aware of the part that 
bitterness at the return of Louisbourg - New England's 
conquest - to France in 1748 played in bringing on the 
American Revolution... and they will not lightly risk a 
renewed schism in the Commonwealth of Nations for such a 
cause."^1
President Wilson himself, moreover, in October 1918 
informed the British government via Colonel Wiseman that he 
was "absolutely opposed" to restoration.^ While on route 
for the Paris Peace Conference, the President declared his 
opposition both to returning Germany's colonies or their 
annexation by one of the Allied great powers. Instead, he 
thought "the German colonies should become the common 
property of the League of Nations and administered by 'small 
states'".23
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With regard to the Turkish Empire, it should be 
remembered that the United States never declared war on 
Turkey and thus took no formal part in the actual disposal 
of the Turkish dependencies. Point XII of the Fourteen 
Points, however, dealt with the Turkish dependencies:
**,,, the other nationalities which are now under Turkish 
rule should be assured g^ n undoubted security of life and 
a n  absolutely unmolested opportunity for autonomous 
development. 2^
While no mention was made of their becoming sovereign
entities, it was realised in Washington that the Porte’s
control over parts of the Turkish Empire had often been no
more than nominal; de facto sovereignty resting with either
local overlords or the European powers. For example, in a
paper for the Inquiry dated July 31, 1918, this point was
underlined by David Hunter Miller who argued that the
American programme did not "necessarily*1 require "the
abandonment of Turkish sovereignty" over its dependencies
"in a strictly technical sense", but any remaining
sovereignty "should be no more than nominal".2** Some
members of the Inquiry also recognised that Anglo-French
ambitions precluded both restoration and immediate
independence for the Turkish dependencies. For example, the
Cobb-Lippmann commentary on the Fourteen Points stated that
"Syria has already been allotted to France by agreement with
Great Britain", the latter being "clearly the best mandatory
for Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia".2** Indeed, as early
as January 1918, George Louis Beer proposed a mandate for
Mesopotamia, and in February of that year, one for the 
97Cameroons. '
This early American interest in a mandates system is 
somewhat at variance with the assumption of some writers, 
including his biographer Ray Stannard Baker,2^ that 
President Wilson took over the mandates idea from Jan Smuts*
pamphlet, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion,
9Qafter he reached Europe. y Similarly, David Hunter Miller 
attributes the development of the essential ingredients of
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the mandates system to General Smuts not Dr. Beer in his 
authoritative text, The Drafting of the Covenant.^0 
Certainly, the first American draft proposals for a League 
of Nations made no reference to a mandates system; this only 
appeared with President Wilson's first Paris draft Covenant 
after he had read General Smuts' pamphlet.^ Nevertheless, 
as Charles Seymour pointed out, the latter was not published 
until December 16, while on December 10, 1918, when still 
aboard the "George Washington", the President expressed "his 
hope that the territories taken from the German and Turkish 
Empires would become the property of the League", with small
oo
not great powers acting as administrators. ^ Indeed, in the 
previously mentioned conversation with Colonel Wiseman in 
October 1918, Woodrow Wilson stated that while having 
"little faith in international administration for the German 
colonies" he favoured administration by single states "in 
trust" for the League of Nations.^3
Until roughly the formulation of his first Paris draft 
Covenant, however, the President's views were somewhat 
nebulous and incomplete compared with General Smuts' precise 
proposals for applying the mandate concept "to the peoples 
and territories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria, and 
Turkey".^ For example, Woodrow Wilson's suggestion of 
small states as mandatories was never a viable proposition. 
In the words of his own Secretary of State, Robert 
Lansing,"It seemed obvious from the very first that Powers, 
which under the old practice (of taking enemy territory as 
the spoils of war) would have obtained sovereignty over 
certain conquered territories, would not be denied mandates 
over those territories".^ The Secretary of State also 
emphasised that Jan Smuts' mandate suggestion "caught the 
fancy of the President, as was evident from his frequent 
repetition and approval of it in discussing mandates under 
the League. Just as General Smuts had adopted the 
President's 'self-determination', Mr. Wilson seized upon the 
Smuts idea with avidity and incorporated it in his plan. It
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unquestionably had a decided influence upon his conception 
of the right way to dispose of the colonial possessions of 
Germany .'*36
It was realised quite early on in Washington that the 
proposed mandates would need differing models of 
administration; one common factor being "open door" 
provisions, George Louis Beer’s previously mentioned report 
of January 1918 stressed that administrative 
responsibilities "must be entrusted to different States 
acting as mandatories of the League of Nations. These 
mandates cannot, however, be uniform but must vary with the 
circumstances of the different cases".^ The report also 
stressed that there should be a "deed of trust" embodying 
"most rigid safeguards both to protect the native population 
from exploitation and also to ensure that the interests of 
other foreign States are not injured either positively or 
n e g a t i v e l y " . T h e  Cobb-Lippmann commentary on the Fourteen 
Points also stated that "exploitation should be conducted on 
the principle of the open door" so far as the former German
oq
colonies and Turkish dependencies were c o n c e r n e d . I n  his 
previously quoted conversation aboard the George Washington, 
President Wilson underlined that in his envisaged mandates 
system "the resources of each colony should be made 
available to all members of the League of Nations".^®
As has been indicated in the preceeding analysis, 
President Wilson and his advisers like George Louis Beer 
paid considerable attention to the application of the sacred 
trust principle to the future administration of the former 
German and Turkish dependencies. For example, the 
Cobb-Lippmann commentary declared that the "interests of the 
populations concerned" was one of the principles under which 
the former German colonies* future was to be settled:
"That they should not be militarized, that exploitation 
should be conducted on the principle of the open door, and 
under the strictest regulation as to labor conditions, 
profits and taxes, that a sanitary regime be maintained, 
that permanent improvements in the way of roads etc. be 
made, that native organisations and custom be respected,
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that the protecting authority be stable and experienced 
enough to thwart intrigue and corruption, that the 
protecting power have adequate resources in money and 
competent administrators to act successfully
The commentary made no reference either to the 
dependent peoples right to self-determination or their 
cooperation in the day-to-day administration of the 
territories concerned. It did emphasise, however, that 
Administering powers should be accountable to the 
international community in e x e c u t i n g t r u s t :
"a colonial power acts not as owner of its colonies, but as 
trustee for the natives and for the interests of the 
society of nations, that the terms on which the colonial 
administration is conducted are a matter of international 
concern and may legitimately be the subject of 
international inquiry and that the peace conference may, 
therefore, write a code of colonial conduct binding upon 
all colonial powers.
The last quoted phrase appears to indicate that the 
United States favoured an international covenant covering 
the administration of colonies other than the ex-enemy ones. 
This is somewhat at variance with the commentary’s statement 
quoted earlier that Point V was limited to the "colonial 
claims which have been created by the War". Indeed, there 
is some evidence that the Inquiry toyed with the idea that 
the future peace conference should draw up a general code of 
colonial administration applicable to territories other than 
the former German ones. For example, in a memorandum by 
George Louis Beer, dated December 31, 1917:
"In the case of any transfer of territory in Central 
Africa, and possibly even in the existing dependencies, it 
might... be definitely established that the state 
exercising sovereignty in Africa is proceeding under an 
international mandate and must act as trustee primarily 
for the natives and secondarily for the outside world as a 
whole. There could be elaborated a code of native rights, 
prohibiting forced Labour in all its forms thus assuring 
to the native his legitimate rights to the soil, and 
protecting him from the evils of western civilization, 
such as intoxicants."^
Nothing concrete materialised, however, from these 
American flirtations with the idea of extending the scope of
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international accountability beyond the former German and 
Turkish dependencies, apart from the provision in Article 
23(b) of the League Covenant whereby Members of the League 
undertook "to secure just treatment of the native 
inhabitants of territories under their control". Indeed, at 
that time there was little possibility of the principle of 
accountability being extended beyond the former German and 
Turkish dependencies due both to the practical difficulties 
involved and, more significantly, the jealousy of the 
European and other colonial powers at any apparent 
infringements of their colonial sovereignties.
In conclusion, the American plans for a measure of 
international accountability for dependent peoples prior to 
the Paris Peace Conference can be summarised as follows: 
first, essentially restricted to the former German and 
Turkish dependencies; second, if possible, placing them 
under the aegis of the smaller powers acting as League 
agents; and third, a colonial charter guaranteeing them good 
government, but little faith in the dependent peoples 
exercising the right of self-determination at any 
foreseeable date; this being further off in the case of the 
former German colonies than for the Turkish ones. The 
United States, however, had not developed comprehensive 
schemes for the practical embodiment of the colonial aspects 
of the Fourteen Points in the peace settlement; still less a 
detailed mandates system. George Louis Beer was almost 
alone among official Americans in seriously considering even 
some of the problems involved in formulating a mandates 
system. President Wilson himself believed in democratic 
precepts and the "open door", but had done little deep 
thinking about the practical application of his Fourteen 
Points generally or a future League mandates system 
specifically. But then, as President of the United States, 
he had more pressing claims on his time than international 
accountability for dependent peoples. In one vital respect,
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however, the President was adamant; the Allied powers should 
not annex the former German and Turkish dependencies.
2• The American Role in the Creation of the League of
Nations Mandates System at the Paris Peace
Conference.
This section is divided into three parts: the
emergence of the mandates system as a method of disposing of 
the former German and Turkish dependencies; the American 
role in promoting the interests of the latter's indigenous 
inhabitants including some suggestions by President Wilson 
which if they had been adopted would have further 
safeguarded those interests; and the attention which the 
United States paid to its own interests. Particular 
attention is paid to the American efforts to restrict 
Japanese control over the former German Pacific islands 
north of the equator.
Disposing of the German and Turkish Dependencies. There 
were four possible solutions to this problem: restoration,
independence, annexation, or some form of international 
responsibility for their administration. Restoration was 
not favoured by the Allied and Associated Powers. The 
common belief was that German pre-1914 colonial 
administration had been inferior to that of the other 
colonial powers. Moreover, as was shown earlier, President 
Wilson opposed their return , while France, Great Britain 
and Japan had various territorial claims based on actual 
occupation and secret wartime treaties.^
A measure of independence had been envisaged for 
Turkey's various dependent peoples, but the German ones were 
widely regarded as "barbarians" who Jan Smuts in his 
pamphlet on The League of Nations maintained "not only 
cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be
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impracticable to apply any idea of political self- 
determination in the European sense**. ^  As already 
indicated, although in general agreement with this 
statement, President Wilson favoured **no annexation**, while 
General Smuts believed that they should be annexed by 
suitable Allied powers. In fact, the Conference’s 
negotiations over their future was essentially a conflict 
between the proponents of outright annexation and those 
favouring some degree of international accountability. Of 
the Allied powers interested in the question, only the 
United States in the person of President Wilson actively 
opposed annexation. His first Paris draft of the League 
Covenant dated January 10, 1919, strongly advocated non­
annexation and applying the mandates system to all ex-enemy 
colonies
Belgium, France, and Japan put forward claims to German 
and Turkish dependencies. The British stand was ambiguous. 
Although there were some territorial ambitions and advocates 
of annexation in the Cabinet, at an early stage Great 
Britain was **willing to accept the trusteeship principle, 
because the mother country had no desire for further 
colonies, Lloyd George declaring that 'it exactly described 
the British colonial system as it then existed***.^  Lloyd 
George, however, could not ignore the annexationist 
ambitions of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. On 
grounds of national security, Australia and New Zealand 
demanded certain Pacific possessions such as Samoa and New 
Guinea, and South Africa wished to acquire South West 
Africa. The issue was essentially between the United States 
(in the person of her President) and the Dominions, 
particularly the two Australasian ones, rather than between 
the United States and Great Britain.^
The British **Draft Convention Regarding Mandates**, 
based in large part on Jan Smuts* original mandates plan, 
was acceptable to President Wilson. It envisaged two types
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of mandate; corresponding to what became the **B** and "A" 
class mandates:
11‘vested territories* which in consequence of the late war 
are to be transferred to any states shall be held by such 
states upon trust to afford to their inhabitants peace, 
order and good government**: and '**assisted states*
which,., are to attain their independence, shall be 
entitled to such assistance as they may desire for the 
purpose of securing peace, order,and good government for 
the population of those states.**^y
France accepted the British distinctions after 
President Wilson agreed to a special concession whereby she 
could raise native troops in her mandated territories.^^
The three Dominions opposed the British plan, however, and 
insisted on exceptions being made for the former German 
Pacific Islands south of the Equator and South West Africa. 
Although deadlock threatened when President Wilson refused 
to agree, the problem was resolved by General Smuts* 
suggestion of what became the **C** class mandate:
**there are territories, such as South West Africa and 
certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which owing 
to the sparseness of their population, or their small 
size, or their remoteness from the centres of 
civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the 
mandatory state, and other circumstances, can be best 
administered under the laws of the mandatory state, as 
integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above 
mentioned in the interests of the indigenous 
population. **51
President Wilson played the dominant role in rejecting 
undiluted annexation and adopting the mandates system. In 
addition to the power and prestige of the United States 
combined with his own idealism and tenacity (or obstinacy), 
two factors strengthened his position. The first is that 
the pre-Armistice agreement in so far as reference was made 
to former enemy dependencies, was based on the Wilsonian **no 
annexation** principle. Thus, as they were committed to this 
principle in theory, the proponents of annexation had to 
couch their demands in the form of justifiable exceptions to 
the principle. The second and perhaps key factor emerged 
during the actual Paris discussions; namely, the states
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favouring annexation secured, or at least believed they 
secured, enough of the substance of annexation within the 
mandates system mechanism to make unnecessary further 
opposition to the President’s "no annexation" precepts. In 
fact, Woodrow Wilson himself did not rule out dependent 
peoples eventually expressing a "desire" for "union" with 
their m a n d a t o r i e s . ^  Nevertheless, he d i d  secure the 
colonial powers' acceptance of the principles of no 
annexation and international accountability in exchange for 
mandates being allocated by the Allied and Associated Powers 
instead of the League of Nations and recognising the 
occupying powers as the actual mandatories. Furthermore, 
the immediate impact of President Wilson's brand of anti­
colonialism was diluted, but it had helped to gain 
international acceptance of a new formula for dealing with 
colonial questions. Although at the time limited to a 
specific solution to a particular problem,, it provided a 
precedent for more general application in the future and as 
such was a major landmark in the development of the 
principle of international accountability for dependent 
peoples•
The United States and the interests of the former German 
and Turkish dependent peoples. The American and British 
delegations played the leading roles in formulating the 
notion of "trust" contained in Article 22 of the Covenant on 
the best interests of the indigenous populations of the ex­
enemy dependencies (for details of Article 22, see Appendix 
4 of this thesis). Those interests were emphasised in all 
three of President Wilson's Paris draft Covenants. South 
Africa (Jan Smuts) and Great Britain, however, were 
responsible for most of the actual drafting of the relevant 
paragraphs of Article 22. The Permanent Mandates 
Commission, moreover, so crucial in the evolution of the 
principle of international accountability for dependent 
peoples, was a British not an American conception;
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originating in clause 7 of the British "Draft Convention 
Regarding Mandates" of January 24, 1919.^
The principle of international accountability would 
have been further extended if four proposals outlined in one 
or other of President Wilson's three Paris drafts of the 
Covenant had been adopted. The first was the right of 
peoples under mandate to approve of their mandatory. His 
first Paris draft Covenant "demanded approval of the 
mandatory by the area's inhabitants",*^ but the second Paris 
draft merely maintained that "whenever or wherever possible 
or feasible the agent or mandatory" should "be nominated or 
approved by the autonomous people or territory". The third 
Paris draft was further limited and stated only that so far 
as "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire" were concerned, their "wishes... must be a principal 
consideration" in selecting the mandatory p o w e r . T h e  
President's "consent" principle was eventually only applied 
to what became the "A" class mandates. The phraseology of 
President Wilson's third Paris draft was exactly reproduced 
in Article 22, paragraph 4 of the Covenant:
"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development when their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognised subject to the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as 
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these 
communities must be a principal consideration on the 
selection of the Mandatory." (Italics added)
Apart from the King-Crane Commission, however, there is
little evidence to suggest that real attempts were made to
ascertain the indigenous inhabitants' wishes. President
Wilson had obtained reluctant French and British agreement
in principle to send an investigatory commission to the
Middle East to ascertain Arabs opinion. He sent an American
commission when they failed to take any action.*^ The King-
Crane Commission's report of August 1919 showed considerable
feeling against French administration in any form by the
Arabs of the Fertile Crescent; over 60% of the petitions it
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received, opposed a French mandate as the Arabs believed 
that in practice this would mean little less than outright 
annexation. They desired independence and if that was 
impossible, the preference was for the United States and 
Great Britain as mandatories in that order.^ The report 
had no influence upon mandate distribution; and the United 
States took no official part in the discussions leading to 
the Turkish Peace Treaty and hence was not involved in the 
actual distribution of the Turkish dependencies.
The second of President Wilson*s unadopted proposals 
was outlined in Supplementary Agreement III of his second 
and third Paris draft Covenants. It maintained that the 
purpose of all **tutelary oversight and administration on the 
part of the League of Nations shall be to build up in as 
short a time as possible out of the people or territory 
under its guardianship a political unit which can take 
charge of its own affairs, determine its own connections, 
and choose its own p o l i c i e s * * . D u r i n g  the Paris Conference 
deliberations it was agreed that **Af* class mandates should 
eventually achieve independence, but for the **Bf* and **C'* 
class mandates this remained at best an indefinite goal; as 
was mentioned previously, President Wilson himself being 
prepared to countenance the ,*CI* class ones eventually 
becoming integral parts of their respective mandatories* 
sovereign domains.
President Wilson’s third proposal was related to the 
second one. Supplementary Agreement III stated that **the 
League may at any time release*' a territory under mandate 
and "consent to its being set up as an independent unit".^ 
Article 22 makes no reference at all to this point. The 
President was forced to drop this proposal; Australia and 
New Zealand in particular being completely opposed to giving 
the League the right to terminate mandates. Indeed, as 
already pointed out, the future mandatories objected to 
their mandates being handed to them by the League; the 
eventual disposition being made by the Council of Ten.
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Lord Curzon, then British Foreign Secretary, underlined in a 
speech to the House of Lords in June 1920 that, "It is quite
a mistake to suppose that under the Covenant of the League
or any other instrument the gift of a mandate rests with the 
League of Nations, It rests with the Powers who have 
conquered the territories, which it then falls to them to 
distribute."^
The fourth proposal concerned the right of petition.
It had two aspects and was referred to in all three of 
President Wilson*s Paris draft Covenants. The first aspect 
was that peoples under mandate should have "the right to 
appeal to the League for the redress or correction of any
breach of the mandate by the mandatory state or agency or
for the substitution of some other State or agency, as 
mandatory". The second was that it should "be their right 
and privilege to petition the League" to release them from 
tutelage:
"upon such petition being made it shall be the duty of the 
League to take the petition under full and friendly 
consideration with a view to determining the best 
interests of the people or territory in question in view 
of all the circumstances of their situation and 
development."bl
Neither proposal is mentioned in Article 22. The 
European colonial powers objected to it on two grounds: 
first, it was impractical; and second, the right of petition 
would cause unrest in mandates and make the mandatories* 
work unduly difficult. Underlying the objections was the 
consideration that rights of petition would diminish the 
mandatories* unfettered control over mandates. Although 
prepared to pay limited lip-service to international 
accountability, the powers concerned were unwilling to 
concede very much to ensure that the principle was actually 
implemented.
At an early stage, however, the inhabitants of mandates 
began to petition the League. Consequently, acting on a set 
of British proposals, the Permanent Mandates Commission
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approved procedural rules for handling petitions in January 
1923, These permitted appeals regarding the redress of 
grievance in a very limited sense only; there was no right 
of petition for removing a bad mandatory or granting
c. o
independence.  ^ In practice, the right of petition was used 
primarily by the inhabitants of the "A** class mandates, 
rarely by the "B" and "C" class ones. The emerging right of 
petition served two principal purposes: first, the
indigenous inhabitants had an opportunity to air grievances; 
and second, the petitions themselves were important sources 
of information and supervisory power for the Permanent 
Mandates Commission, The development of the right of 
petition went some way towards making international 
accountability a meaningful as opposed to a nominal part of 
the administration of the mandated territories. 
Unfortunately, as she failed to join the League, the United 
States took no part in this process,
American interests and the formulation of Article 22, These 
were largely responsible for the 'open door* provision in 
Article 22 that the mandatories will "secure equal 
opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of 
the League'*, The clause applied only to t'he "B" class 
mandates specifically, however, and the United States later 
attempted to make arrangements with the mandatories of the 
"A" and "C" class ones to implement open door arrangements 
in her favour. This aspect is considered further in Section 
3 of this chapter.
The Covenant references in Article 22 to "no 
fortification" and prohibitions on the military training of 
the indigenous inhabitants of "B" and "C" class mandates, 
owed much to influence of American anti-colonialism in 
general and American security interests in the Pacific in 
particular. According to his biographer, Ray Stannard 
Baker, President Wilson disliked the use of native troops in 
the First World War.^^ General Smuts' pamphlet on The
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League of Nations had suggested that in territories formerly 
belonging to Austria, Russia and Turkey, mandate 
arrangements should prohibit "military forces beyond the 
standard laid down by the League for purposes of internal 
police".^ Woodrow Wilson, as with many of his other 
mandate proposals, extended this suggestion and applied it 
to the former German colonies in his first Paris draft of 
the Covenant: "The mandatory state or agency shall in no
case or form maintain any military or naval forces in excess 
of definite standards laid down by the League itself for the 
purposes of internal police".^ As previously mentioned, 
the President agreed to France's right to raise native 
troops; a condition for her acceptance of the mandate 
system. Ray Stannard Baker's concluding remarks on the 
question of native troops as a whole, aptly summarises the 
disquiet of Woodrow Wilson and his associates at "the 
process of militarizing Africa" and the passible historical 
parallels with the fall of the Roman Empire:
"One recalls the Roman Empire, in its declining days, 
conscious of being the exponent of some of the highest 
aspects of civilization, calling in the resources of 
jungle savagery to defend her against her stronger, 
cruder, more virile neighbours. The Romans themselves, 
depleted and debilitated, posted their barbarian legions 
on the European frontiers - Ethiopians, Arabs, Persians, 
and what-not.... But such forces, called in from without, 
and bred steadily from within, failed to ggve the Roman 
Empire, and rather hastened its decline.
This general fear of the possible consequences to 
Western "civilization" of arming non-white peoples is 
related to the American desire at the Paris Peace Conference 
to limit Japanese control over the former German islands 
north of the equator; the "no fortification" clause of 
Article 22 being an important part of the Wilson 
Administration's overall strategy. Mention was made in 
Chapter 2 of the American suspicions of Japanese ambitions 
in the Pacific region. Woodrow Wilson himself both 
mistrusted Japan and recognised the strategic value to the
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United States of the German "islands in the North Pacific 
which Japan held":
"these islands lie athwart the path from Hawaii to the 
Philippines and....were nearer to Hawaii than the Pacific 
coast was, and....could be fortified and made naval bases 
by Japan; that indeed they were of little use for anything 
else and....we had no naval base except at Guam."®'
The Japanese claim to the islands at the Paris Peace
Conference was based on possession by conquest and the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of February 1917. In a report to the
Inquiry in November 1918, George Blakeslee pointed out "that
all classes in the Japanese population agreed on the
retention of the islands by Japan".^ A major preoccupation
of American diplomacy was limiting Japanese control of the
islands in the interests of American security.
Dr. Blakeslee underlined that "the greatest value of these
islands to Japan from a naval and strategic view would be in
potential or actual conflict with the United States".^
Consequently, notwithstanding President Wilson*s
various pronouncements on no annexation or territorial
gains, it is perhaps hardly surprising that American
acquisition of the German Pacific islands was mooted by
members of his Administration. For example, Assistant
Secretary of State, Breckinridge Long, in a memorandum to
the American peace mission in Paris, dated December 14,
1918, revealing suspicion of Great Britain as well as Japan,
proposed that Germany’s former Pacific possessions be
restored to her prior to their acquisition by the United
States from Germany in payment of war reparations:
"The United States was not interested in the islands held 
by British forces, except Samoa, in which America had a 
* considerable interest*. For strategic reasons America 
had an interest in some of the guano islands surrounding 
Samoa. These should be transferred from Great Britain to 
the United States. The Japanese-occupied islands were of 
*great importance* to America because of their strategic 
situation in relation to Guam and the Philippines. The 
United States could not claim these islands directly since 
Japan and Great Britain would have equally rightful 
claims, so the United States should insist that the 
islands be returned to Germany. Once they were again in
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German possession the United States should ask for them in 
lieu of German reparations. This.... could not 'morally' 
be done while the [peace] conference was in session, and 
it would be difficult to explain to the American people 
why the islands should be returned to Germany; but, on the 
other hand, the possession of these islands by Great 
Britain or Japan would be a 'constant menace to the.United 
States and its dominant position in the Pacific'.
The naval members of the American planning Commission, 
in November 1918, recommended to Admiral William Benson, 
Chief of Naval Operations, that the Carolines, Marshalls, 
German New Guinea, and German Samoa be internationalised; 
Japan being compensated by giving her a free hand in Eastern 
Siberia:
"from the standpoint of our own interests and future 
plans, the solution of the Pacific colonies of Germany and 
the Eastern question would be....The Marshalls, Carolines, 
German New Guinea and Samoa to be internationalised [and] 
Japan to be given Eastern Siberia."'1
Secretary of State Lansing also "wished Japan to expand 
not eastward but westward, and thought her possession of the 
Marshall and Gilbert Islands a source of danger".^ George 
Blakeslee's solution to the problem accorded more with 
President Wilson's principles in that he suggested 
submitting the question to the inhabitants of the former 
German islands in a plebiscite:
"If the natives of the Marshalls and the Eastern Carolines 
could determine their destiny they would choose to be 
under American rule. Their reason for deciding in favour 
of the United States stems from their belief that 
'civilization' had been brought to their islands by the 
missionaries of the American Board (Protestant) to whom 
they feel indebted."'^
However, as George Louis Beer pointed out, from the 
American point of view the unfortunate factor was that, "The 
United States has absolutely no legitimate right to these 
islands and to advance such a claim would not only be 
considered a gratuitous affront by Japan but would undermine 
the moral influence of the United States in the settlement 
of other questions".^  It was with this consideration in 
mind that Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, the Inquiry's Far East
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specialist, maintained that "the ideal situation would be to 
place all the German Pacific Islands under American or 
British control, but in view of the impossibility of this 
action he advocated putting * the region at the disposal of 
the League of Nations; the League to place the islands, 
either collectively or by groups, under the administration 
of one or more powers as Mandatories *ft. ^  Another American 
senior Far East specialist, E.T. Williams, disagreed with 
Dr. Hornbeck's recommendations "in so far as they 
contemplated leaving the government of the islands north of 
the equator to Japan, either as a mandatory of the proposed 
League of Nations or otherwise**. He observed that *'if Great 
Britain and the United States stood together on the question 
of the islands, Japan could do nothing, for Germany and 
Russia could not aid h e r " . ^
The island of Yap in the Caroline group was important 
to American communications as it served "as a cable centre 
to China, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and 
Guam".^ The American cable and communications expert, 
Walter Rodgers, suggested **that whatever the fate of the 
island of Yap may be, that under proper guarantees the cable 
system be turned over to the Netherlands". But, if by any 
mis-chance the cable should fall into Japanese control, 
before consent is given, "Japan should be compelled to agree 
to grant cable landings on Japanese territory**. He 
emphasised that "whatever disposition is made of the German 
Pacific cable system, whether returned, handed over to some 
other country, leased or sold, the transaction should carry 
with it stipulations requiring a waiver of all exclusive 
rights, full publicity for all its transactions and 
agreements, prohibition of any preferential treatment as to 
rates or service, and an agreement to submit to full 
regulatory control, including fixing of rates by the League 
of Nations".^
The basic security problem confronting the United 
States was summarised by E. T. Mills; "whether as a
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mandatory or as the sovereign power in the islands north of 
the equator, Japan would be a more serious menace to the 
Philippines and to Hawaii than Germany ever was in the South 
Pacific to British possessions for the reason that Germany 
in the South Pacific was far from her base, while Japan in 
the islands north of the equator is but a short distance 
from her home ports • 7 Overall, as Professor(Fifield 
points out, "The majority of American specialists, it is 
clear, were aware of the strategic importance of the 
Nipponese-occupied islands and were not in favour of 
outright Japanese acquisition of the area if it could be 
prevented by some formula*'.^ In the United States, 
however, there was no strong popular demand for American 
control of the islands:
"Throughout the war sporadic references to the strategic 
value of the islands could be found in the press. 
Uneasiness about Japanese expansion into the Pacific 
never quite disappeared, yet these apprehensions were 
neither sufficiently strong nor widespread enough to 
provoke popular demand for American annexation of any 
islands•
While recognising their strategic value, "President 
Wilson personally made no effort at the Paris Peace 
Conference to acquire the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas 
for the United States".^ Nevertheless, he consistently 
disputed Japan's treaty rights to the islands. Thus, when 
informed in December 1918 of the British treaty obligation 
to support Japanese claims by David Lloyd George and Arthur 
Balfour, the President "was by no means prepared to accept 
the Japanese treaty, and was doubtful whether Japan could be 
admitted there even in the capacity of a mandatory Power. 
They had not succeeded in moving him from this position.
In fact, the President observed to the Council of Four on 
April 22, 1919, that "as has happened in many, instances, he 
was the only one present whose judgement was entirely 
independent. His colleagues were bound by treaties, 
although perhaps he might be entitled to question whether 
Great Britain and Japan had been justified in handing round
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the islands of the Pacific, This, however, was a private 
opinion".^ Unfortunately, however, in the words of Ray 
Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson was confronted by the fact 
that "Japan had the powerful nine points of actual 
possession*'.^ Moreover, to quote Seth Tillman, she 
"probably could not have been dislodged by means short of 
military force".^
Indeed, President Wilson's initial opposition to the 
South African, Australian and New Zealand annexationist 
ambitions in southern Africa and the Pacific respectively, 
can be interpreted as a matter of self-interest as well as 
of principle. If the British Dominions were to annex their 
conquered spoils of war, then in logic it would be difficult 
to refute the Japanese claims to the former German islands 
in the Pacific north of the Equator. Ultimately, Japan 
received the Carolines, Marianas, and Marshall islands as 
"C" class mandates, to be "administered under the laws of 
the mandatory state as integral portions thereof"; Japan 
secured the substance of her "ambitions in the North Pacific 
without effort as a by product of the Anglo-American 
mandates controversy".^ Although President Wilson disliked 
the enhanced position of Japan in the northern Pacific, it 
would have been "utter inconsistency" to attempt "to deny 
mandates of the third category to Japan in the North Pacific 
while conceding them to Australia and New Zealand in the 
South P a c i f i c " . I n  the words of Professor Fifield, the 
President settled for the best feasible alternative "to the 
unachievable goal of excluding Japan, a "C" mandate whereby 
the islands were placed under Japanese administration with 
certain restrictions, including, of course, a non­
fortification c l a u s e " . W o o d r o w  Wilson believed that 
American membership of the League, particularly her role on 
its Council, combined with the qualifying clauses relating 
to the no fortification rule, would enable the United States 
to counteract any attempts by Japan to use her mandated 
islands in any way prejudicial to American security or other
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interests* Indeed, at the time his "support of the mandate 
principle was not entirely accredited to unselfish 
internationalism". Given the Japanese presence in the 
islands and the United States* own anti-colonial tradition, 
"observers noted that, to say the least, the mandatory 
principle was a smaller evil for America than the possession 
of the colonies by a foreign p o w e r " . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  the 
failure of the United States to join the League and 
withdrawal into isolationism, rendered many of Woodrow 
Wilson’s hopes and calculations largely inoperative*
3. American Involvement in the League Mandates System
In March 1920 the Senate of the United States failed to 
ratify the peace treaty with Germany to which the League 
Covenant was attached. American non-membership of the 
League meant that the United States did not have a direct 
voice in the running of the League mandates system generally 
and the Permanent Mandates Commission in particular. During 
the 1920s the various Republican Administrations preferred 
to have as little as possible to do with the League. There 
was some change of emphasis under Franklin Roosevelt*s 
Administration during the 19$0s, but the United States still 
remained outside the League; continuing to have no official 
involvement in the practical working of the system of 
international accountability which President Wilson had done 
so much to create. She had disputes with particular 
mandatories, largely carried on and settled outside the 
auspices of the League. Before surveying these disputes, 
however, the American refusal to undertake mandatory 
responsibilities should be examined.
The United States as a mandatory. Some of President 
Wilson’s advisors favoured the United States undertaking 
mandatory responsibilities. For example, George Louis Beer 
believed that the "United States would be the most 
satisfactory mandatory" for the Cameroons, especially as
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this "would be a powerful factor in acquiring adequate 
protection for native rights".^ The British government was 
apparently also keen for the United States to accept 
mandatory responsibilities. David Lloyd George stated that 
within the Imperial War Cabinet there "was not only a 
readiness, but even an eagerness to bring in America and to 
hand over to her a mandate in respect of some of these 
German p o s s e s s i o n s " . ncertainly inferred" that the 
overwhelming majority "would not be averse to handing over 
the Mandate for East Africa to the United States".^ The 
British also favoured the United States becoming the 
Mandatory for Constantinople and A r m e n i a a n d  there was 
some inclination towards an American mandate for Palestine. 
For example, Lord Robert Cecil suggested to a Cabinet 
committee in December 1918, that there "are advantages in 
having the Americans" in Palestine.^ Arthur Balfour, at 
the Paris Peace Conference, "warmly advocated" that the 
Palestine mandate "should be undertaken not by Great 
Britain, but by the United States".^ Lord Curzon's 
comments, however, reveal that that opinion was by no means 
universal in British ruling circles:
"Remember the Americans have no experience of this sort of 
work or this kind of people. Their standards of 
administration, their methods of work, are entirely 
different from our own. Their method of handling Eastern 
people would be different from ours, and I suggest that 
the Americans in Palestine might be a source not of 
assistance but very much the reverse to ourselves in 
Egypt."97
British policy-makers were also well aware of the 
American disinclination to accept mandatory 
responsibilities. For example, Colonel House told Lloyd 
George that "he was not disposed to regard with favour the 
idea of an American mandate for any of the former German 
colonies:
"America could not run colonies. Their experiment with the 
Philippines had not been a great success. You required a 
special knack for handling colonies, which did not
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interfere with theqDopulation, and which allowed them to 
go their own way.1'98
Lloyd George later recorded, however, that at the Paris 
Peace Conference, Colonel House stated that while "not in 
the least anxious to take these mandates*1, the United States 
"felt she could not shrink her share of the burden and he 
thought America would be prepared to take mandates for 
Armenia and Constantinople".^ Although endorsing these 
sentiments, at the Conference President Wilson "refused to 
consider a suggestion made to him that America should 
undertake a mandate for any of the African Colonies of the 
German Empire":
"* the Philippines are still burning our hands*. America 
was....not prepared to extend the experiment to the 
government of negro populations in Africa. They had 
already as many negroes under their flag at home as they 
could well manage.
American reluctance to meet the costs of protecting 
dependent peoples was demonstrated by David Hunter Miller*s 
comment on the possible "financial obligations imposed upon 
a mandatory** under the provisions of President Wilson’s 
first Paris draft Covenant:
"the representative or agent of the mandatory cannot 
perform his functions without the support of a powerful 
military force. Will the United States, for example, be 
expected to maintain in some foreign country an armed 
force of their own in order to perform their functions as 
mandatory?....The people of the United States will 
understand that a great burden is contemplated to be 
thrust upon them by this plan.*'101
American attitudes were influenced by anti-colonial 
sentiments and suspicions of the motives of the colonial 
powers. For example, Robert Lansing’s comments on a 
possible American mandate for Armenia:
"From the beginning to the end of the discussions on 
mandates and their distribution among the Powers it was 
repeatedly declared that the United States ought to 
participate in the general plan... but it was never, to my 
knowledge, proposed, except by the inhabitants of the 
region in question, that the United States should accept a 
mandate for Syria or the Asiatic coast of the ftegean Sea. 
These regions were rich in natural resources and their 
economic future under a stable government was bright.
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Expenditures on their behalf and the direction of their 
public affairs would bring ample returns to the mandatory 
nations. On the other hand, there was a sustained 
propaganda - for it amounted to that - in favour of the 
United States assuming mandates over Armenia and the 
municipal district of Constantinople, both of which.,, 
would be a constant financial burden to the Power 
accepting the mandate, and, in the case of Armenia, would 
require that Power to furnish a military force estimated 
at not less than 50,000 men to prevent the aggression of 
warlike neighbours and to preserve domestic order and 
peace.
It is not too severe to say of those who engaged in this 
propaganda that the purpose was to take advantage of the 
unselfishness of the American people and of the altruism 
and idealism of President Wilson in order to impose the 
burdensome mandates on the United States and to divide
European Powers.
In his comments on President Wilson's second Paris 
draft Covenant, David Hunter Miller similarly remarked that 
"doubtless the United States will get such of those 
[mandates] as Great Britain thinks too difficult for 
herself, and those will lie in the hands of the United 
States as a bulwark of the British Empire; such as 
Armenia"• ^ 3  He also noted that American "control of German 
East Africa" would be "disadvantageous and burdensome. Any 
one who looks at the statistics and facts of the matter will 
have to admit this; but there is much clearer proof.
Suppose that the British and the League of Nations offered 
to transfer the territory to us, either in the form of a 
Mandate or annexation or anything else, it would perhaps be 
difficult to find any American foolish enough to want his 
country to take it over."-*-^
The "prospect", however, of an American "Mandate for 
Armenia and Constantinople", in the words of Lloyd George, 
"appealed to President Wilson's idealism":
"The trust would have been an entirely unselfish one so far 
as America was concerned. No one could have imputed to 
her any sordid design to grab territory belonging to other 
countries merely for her own profits and advantages. It 
would have been a permanent contribution made by the 
American people to the cause of humanity and of permanent
those which among the
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The United States was offered these mandates at a 
meeting of the Council of 4 on May 14, 1919, and President 
Wilson accepted "on behalf of the United States of America 
and subject to the consent of the Senate thereof". 
Unfortunately, as the President intimated to Georges 
Clemenceau and David Lloyd George, there was no certainty 
that this "novel idea" would be accepted, especially as "he 
had no command over the majority in Congress, and that men 
like Lodge would probably oppose any plan that emanated from 
hi m " . ^ ^  The Senate debate on the question of the American 
mandate, aptly demonstrated the influence of the American 
anti-colonial tradition. For example, Senator Cummins of 
Iowa argued that for the United States to accept mandate 
responsibilities would not be in accordance with her 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n  the wake of the Senate's rejection of 
the Versailles Peace Treaty to which the League Covenant was 
attached, President Wilson had to report in November 1920 to 
the League Council that the United States could not accept 
the mandate invitation due to Senate o p p o s i t i o n . I n  the 
end, no mandate was allocated for Armenia. Details of the 
territories placed under mandate are set out in Appendix 2 
of this thesis.-^®
The American failure to become a mandatory had its 
immediate causes in the intricacies of American domestic 
politics, the fact that these responsibilities might well 
prove burdensome, and a disinclination to increase the 
numbers of her non-white subject peoples. Underlying and 
intimately related to them, were two of her related 
ideological heritages; isolationism and anti-colonialism.
The strength of isolationist sentiment in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries militated against the United 
States entering into firm international commitments and 
responsibilities, and had made her very reluctant to take 
part in the First World War itself. With the termination of 
hostilities, American distrust at involvement in the world 
outside the Western Hemisphere became predominant again. At
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the same time, anti-colonial sentiment reacted against the 
United States assuming formal responsibility for territories 
whose ultimate destiny was not envisaged as statehood in the 
North American Union. Inherited suspicion of British 
colonial activities further predisposed the United States to 
be wary of any proposals which appeared to involve her in 
mandatory and other colonial-type activities. These 
sentiments were held by a substantial and at times very 
vocal body of American public opinion.
The Inter-War Years. Following her failure to join the 
League and refusal of the Armenian mandate, the United 
States played no formal role in the working of the mandates 
system. Nevertheless, she emphasised her treaty rights; 
disputes with her erstwhile wartime Allies being focussed 
primarily on believed American *open door* rights.
Washington was unwilling to bear the burden of mandatory 
responsibilities, but insisted on American citizens and 
corporations sharing in any commercial or other economic 
benefits accruing from the mandate system. The United 
States was also anxious to foster the work of those 
Americans undertaking educational and missionary work in the 
mandated territories:
"In agreeing to the French and British mandates in Syria 
and Palestine the United States....gained the right for 
its nationals by treaty * to establish and maintain 
educational, philanthropic and religious institutions in 
the mandated territory, to receive voluntary applicants 
and to teach in the English language*, subject to the 
provisions of any local laws *for the maintenance of 
public order and public morals*. A similar provision 
appears in the American treaty with Japan with reference 
to the North Pacific Islands. 111
American relations with the European and Dominion 
mandatory states regarding Germany*s former colonies are of 
relatively minor importance and need only be briefly 
outlined. Washington succeeded in negotiating treaties with 
the European mandatory states which secured the United 
States the same rights as League members in respect of the
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’open door* and the receipt of annual reports: agreements
were signed with Belgium regarding Ruanda Urundi, France
regarding the French Cameroons and French Togoland, and
Great Britain regarding the British Cameroons, British
Togoland, and Tanganyika. Despite repeated efforts,
however, Washington failed to reach agreement with
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa regarding provision
for nondiscriminatory treatment and the ’open door* in their
respective ”C” class mandates. The matter was complicated
by the lack of diplomatic representation between them and
the United States together with the fact that ”C” class
mandates could be administered as ’’integral parts of their
territory” without any obligation to maintain the open door.
In effect, as there was no ’open door' in their mandates,
the Dominions did not discriminate against the United States
11?as League members received the same treatment• ±x‘e‘
Regarding France's mandate over the former Turkish 
territories of Syria and the Lebanon, initially Washington 
was unhappy "at the lack of specific provisions for an open 
door policy” in the mandate agreements approved by the 
League Council in July 1922. But the "last American 
scruples were removed by further French-American exchanges” , 
which resulted in 1924 with a Convention "covering American 
rights and the open door".-*--^ The United States was 
especially concerned that her extra territorial privileges 
in the Fertile Crescent gained during the era of Turkish 
rule should continue until she expressly renounced them. 
American policy apparently rested "on the theory that the 
capitulations constituted a sort of servitude permanently 
attached to the territory".
The American interest in the Japanese mandate for the 
Pacific islands north of the equator was primarily that the 
islands should not be used for military-purposes; a 
secondary concern was promoting her 'open door' rights on 
the same terms as League members. The United States 
obtained its immediate 'open door' objective of securing
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cable rights on the island of Yap in the Caroline group by a 
treaty signed in February 1922, The security aspect is 
considered more fully in Chapter 6 when examining the 
attitudes within Franklin Roosevelt's Administration to 
establishing the United Nations trusteeship system. For the 
moment it is sufficient to state that Washington's disputes 
with Tokyo over the latter's policies in its mandated 
islands has to be viewed against the general diplomatic 
background of American-Japanese relations during the 
interwar years. While never close, relations were 
acceptable during the 1920s, but deteriorated sharply in the 
1930s. There were three key factors: naval rivalry in the
Pacific, American apprehension over Japanese ambitions and 
then aggression in China, and Japanese resentment of 
American immigration laws discriminating against orientals.
American apprehension over possible Japanese military 
use of the mandated islands came to the fore in the early 
1930s when Japan began an active policy of aggression in 
China and withdrew from the League of Nations. American 
disquiet grew when the Japanese placed the mandated islands 
under military administration in 1935, casting an ever 
increasing cloak of secrecy over them. Neither the United 
States nor the European powers, either within or outside the 
context of the League, were able or willing to do much about 
believed Japanese violations of its mandate obligations. In 
effect, Japan was able to ignore with impunity the terms of 
its mandate agreement, the League Council, and American 
treaty rights. The Roosevelt Administration's frustration 
regarding Japanese use of the islands was expressed in the 
President's message to Congress just after the attack on 
Pearl Harbour:
"Japan violated the mandate under which she had received 
the custody of the Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Islands 
after the World War by fortifying them and not only 
closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding 
any foreigner even to visit them.
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The commercial aspects and the American inclination to 
desire influence and privilege without responsibility are 
aptly illustrated by the United States relations during the 
interwar years with the British mandates in the Middle East; 
Iraq (Mesopotamia) and Palestine. The Anglo-American 
dispute over the ’open door* in Iraq was more protracted 
than the French-American one regarding the Lebanon and 
Syria. The disagreement focussed on the desire of North 
American oil interests to take part in developing 
Mesopotamia’s oil deposits. The disagreement first arose 
when the State Department endeavoured to support the 
American oil lobby during the second half of 1919. The 
lobby was especially vociferous against British regulations 
which sought to ensure that seeking and operating oil fields 
in British territory, including the then envisaged mandated 
Mesopotamia, be confined to British nationals; this was at a 
time when the North American oil lobby believed that there 
would be an oil shortage in the United States. Washington 
maintained that Great Britain and France had come to an 
agreement over Mesopotamia’s oil resources during the San 
Remo negotiations on a peace treaty with Turkey in April 
1920 which ignored American interests. The American 
ambassador in London delivered an official protest in May 
1920:
"He outlined the general principles of equal opportunity of 
the Open Door policy as especially applicable to areas to 
be placed under mandate, and pointed out the 
discriminatory action against American citizens taken by 
the British authorities in Palestine and Mesopotamia.
The three underlying issues in the dispute between the 
United States and Britain over the exploitations of oil 
resources in Mesopotamia were: was the United States as
an ally entitled to share with the other allies in the 
mandated territories since it had not declared war against 
Turkey? Could United States citizens claim a share in the 
economic exploitation of the oil resources of the area 
when a concession had already been granted to the Turkish 
Petroleum Company? And, finally, was the San Remo 
agreement discriminatory and in violation of the 
principles of the Open Door?1'11**
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There was an increasingly bitter exchange of notes. On 
the American part there was particular resentment regarding 
Lord Curzon's implication in August 1920, that American 
advocacy of the 'open door' was motivated by the ambitions 
of North American oil interests rather than disinterested 
idealism. At a later stage in the negotiations, Lord Curzon 
stated that he was pleased to agree with the American 
contention that "the world's oil resources should be thrown 
open for development without reference to nationality". 
Unfortunately, "he found American policy in Philippines, 
Haiti, and Costa Rica out of harmony with this 
principle".
The dispute was again raised by the Lausanne 
Conference's consideration of the Mosul problem in July 
1923; American oil companies having an interest in the 
area's oil fields. The various twists in American policy 
arising from this diplomatic support have been ably 
summarised by Benjamin Schwadran:
"....in order to achieve the desired end - outside oil 
resources - the State Department had to find practical 
solutions to overcome the abstract principles of the Open 
Door policy. The monopolistic character of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company was overcome by a scheme of subleasing; 
the free and equal participation of all American companies 
and individuals who were willing to venture into the 
Middle East was overcome by the assertion that no other 
companies except those in the American group were ready 
and willing to participate: the objection to the validity
of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession was overcome 
by the device of making the Iraqi Government grant the 
T.P.C. a new concession. The State Department completely 
condoned the self-denial provision of the agreement 
between the American group and the Turkish Petroleum 
Company despite the fact that this was a restrictive 
measure on the members of the Company and a complete 
repudiation of the basic principles of the Open Door."11®
It was not until July 1928 that an apparent agreement 
was reached.11^ Even then, the British Government had 
little intention of abiding by the undertakings regarding 
subleasing and eliminating the Turkish Petroleum Company as 
a bidder at public auctions; the latter provision being
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inserted "in the concession simply to meet the stubborn
insistence of the State Department".-^0 In April 1931, the
then American Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, reminded
Great Britain that it had been agreed that the Iraqi
Government "was not to grant a concession covering any of
the oil lands in question without affording Americans,
individuals and corporations, an equal opportunity to bid,
and that the United States expected the British to intervene
with the Iraqi Government to protect their rights".^ 1
Although the British Government replied that there was no
Iraqi obligation "to put every concession up for public
tender before granting it", to meet American objections, the
Iraqi Government went through the motions of accepting four
tenders for the oil concessions concerned. Perhaps not
surprisingly, it then announced that the British Oil
Development Company’s bid was the best and accordingly
accepted!^ 2  Throughout the 1930’s, British oil interests
further consolidated their control over Iraqi oil; despite
occasional protests, the United States was forced to accept
the inevitable. The formal ending of the British mandate in
1932 made no difference to the British grip on Iraq's oil 
123resources.
So far as Palestine and Transjordan were concerned, the 
United States obtained the same rights as those accorded to 
League members in December 1924. Anglo-American disputes 
over Palestine arose not from differing interpretations of 
'open door' rights, but rather because of British refusal to 
allow greater Jewish immigration into the mandated 
territory. American criticism of the British failure to 
give a more liberal interpretation to the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917 promising the Jews a "national home" in 
Palestine, became especially strong in the 1930s with Nazi 
Germany's persecution of the Jews which eventually 
culminated in the holocaust; American criticisms deriving 
their impetus from the strong Zionist lobby in the United 
States. The desire to further the Zionist cause and
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establish a Jewish national home in Palestine led the
United States to overlook the fact that the over-whelming
majority of Palestine's population were Arabs, implacably
opposed to the Zionist cause.
The United States itself in the most immediate
practical sense, moreover, did little more than pay lip-
service to the Jewish cause. Indeed, M. Hyamson underlines
that, with much greater resources at her disposal, she
allowed a much smaller percentage of Jews to settle in her
domains than Great Britain permitted in Palestine. To a
Palestine "population of 752,048 (83,790 Jews) in 1922,
377,966 authorised immigrants (345,338 Jewish) were allowed
in the course of the next 23 years"; the figures taking no
account of illegal immigration. So far as Jewish
immigration to the United States was concerned, from 1925 to
1943 (after that year separate classification of Hebrews was
abandoned) "244,246 Jews were allowed to settle in the
United States"; the total United States population in August
1945 was "estimated at 139,682,000". Moreover, during the
seven years of the Nazi regime up to the outbreak of the
Second World War, "when the need of refuge by the European
Jews was at its greatest, [only] 92,133 Jews were allowed to
settle in the United States, an average of 13,162 per 
124annum •
4. An Overall Survey
Despite the various qualifications contained in the 
preceeding passages of this chapter, American traditions and 
historical experience played a very important role in 
establishing the League mandates system. American anti­
colonialism was such that the Wilson Administration was 
predisposed to oppose either returning their erstwhile 
dependencies to Germany and Turkey or their annexation by 
any of the Allied and Associated Powers. This was not true 
of all Americans, however, as is shown in the case of
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Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, President Wilson*s main 
antagonist and the principal architect of the Senate's 
defeat of the Versailles Treaty, He favoured annexation by 
the powers in possession and referred to the fact that the 
United States seemed to have involved itself "already in 
serious difficulties with the Australians and the Boers of 
South Africa - populations with which we have always been 
most friendly and sympathetic"• ^ 5  Other Americans believed 
that adherence to the League Covenant "would compel the 
United States to assume the burdens of a mandate over any 
part of Europe, Asia or Africa that was assigned to it".
Some senators, in fact, expressed the fear that the League 
could be used as an engine of repression to bolster British 
rule in Ireland and India.^ 6
It should be underlined again that American traditions 
did not entail the belief that non-white peoples were 
automatically equipped for the task of self-government.
While there was some support for the Arab's right to 
national self-determination, her traditions made the United 
States susceptible to the idea of some form of international 
administration to solve the problem of the German and 
Turkish dependencies. A solution hased on direct 
administration or some form of condominium was not favoured 
because of the belief that previous examples of these types 
of control had proved unsatisfactory. In truth, the United 
States was predisposed to favour what became the League 
mandate system almost by default, there being no other 
possible solution in keeping with her traditions.
Two important American political considerations are 
relevant here. The first was President Wilson's belief that 
future world peace depended on the success of the envisaged 
League of Nations; the latter's chances of success would be 
enhanced by "possession of property". He realised very 
early on that his initial ideas on small states becoming the
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mandatories for this property were impractical and would 
have to be revised. The only chance for the mandate idea to 
be acceptable to America's wartime allies would be if the 
states actually in possession of the former German and 
Turkish dependencies became their mandatories. The second 
consideration was the importance of the former German 
Pacific islands to American security. Although especially 
desirous to keep them out of Japanese hands, the United 
States was confronted by the fact that Japan had occupied 
these islands north of the Equator and to remove her might 
well require the use of force. If all the German colonies 
were placed under League mandate, however, it was hoped that 
American membership should ensure that any Japanese mandates 
would not threaten the security of the United States.
The American contribution to Allied wartime thinking on
a future mandates system should not be unduly stressed. The
Round Table Group and Anglo-French socialists provided much
of the impetus to thought. The principles of "self-
determination" and "no-annexation" were not peculiar to the
United States, but implicit in the general philosophy of the
Allied cause and had been enunciated by Lloyd George before
President Wilson elaborated his Fourteen Points. For
example, in June 1917, Lloyd George referred to the need to
consider "the wishes, desires, and interests" of the
inhabitants of the German colonies before determining their
future; while three days before the Fourteen Points Speech,
he stressed the importance of a territorial settlement based
on the consent of the governed even more strongly than did
197the American President. ' Jan Smuts, moreover, published 
The League of Nations, a Practical Suggestion, before 
President Wilson drafted his first mandates scheme. The 
Smuts mandate plan, however, was applicable only to the 
subject peoples of the Habsburg, Russian, and Turkish 
Empires. While much influenced by this plan, Woodrow Wilson 
"universalised it", extending the idea further than General 
Smuts intended:
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"the President perceived that the direct annexation of 
those vast colonial territories in Africa, Asia, and the 
Pacific, with their millions of population and their great 
strategic, political, and economic value to be quite as 
dangerous in practice and as likely to be the cause of 
future conflict as was the annexation of parts of Turkey, 
Russia, or Austria.
Most of the practical details of the League mandates 
system originated in schemes devised by British and Dominion 
statesmen. If they had been adopted, however, some ideas 
contained in President Wilson’s Paris drafts of the Covenant 
would have extended the principle of international 
accountability even further. Indeed, perhaps the most 
important American contribution to the intellectual genesis 
of the League of Nations mandates system was Woodrow 
Wilson's election to the Presidency in 1912. There was 
considerable rhetoric by the "American political 
establishment" regarding the "unselfishness of the American 
people", but little inclination to assume responsibilities 
which might prove costly or otherwise inconvenient to the 
United States. President Wilson, however, was willing for 
the United States to take part in the search for a new world 
order generally and to assume mandatory responsibilities 
specifically. His faith in liberal precepts was crucial to 
the Paris Peace Conference's creation of the mandates 
system; the United States could have been represented by a 
much less fervent proponent of her democratic value system. 
The President's greatness is evinced by his tenacity in the 
fac^ of the ambitions of the annexationists; the other 
leading allied statesmen accepted his ideals in principle if 
not in complete substance or spirit. Japan, however, did 
not actually annex the German Pacific islands north of the 
equator. President Wilson spoke in terms of principle; 
fortunately, moral precept corresponded with the national 
interests of the United States!
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Unfortunately, the United States failed to join the 
League of Nations and become a member of the League Council
i I CNN ^ . #
and [the Permanent Mandates Commission, Although examining 
historical "might-have-beens" is in one sense somewhat 
pointless, it can be surmised that if the United States had 
been represented on the two institutions, then both would 
have been more critical of the administering powers than 
they usually tended to be. This point, however, should not 
be overstressed. For example, Australia largely ignored the 
Permanent Mandates Commission’s repeated criticisms of her 
’whites only* immigration policy in her mandated 
territories• In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the 
United States' own internal race relations, it is unlikely 
that the Australians would have taken kindly to American 
preaching on that subject. Similarly, there is little 
evidence to suggest that an American presence in the League 
would have made much difference to Japan's administration 
and general use of her mandated islands. Finally, however, 
if the United States had joined the League of Nations, the 
extra experience of the practical difficulties of colonial 
administration might have modified American anti-colonial 
sentiment.
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Chapter 5: Franklin Roosevelts Administration and the
Trusteeship Principle
QAdt SocAcAisV
During the First World War, British liberal(opinion had 
taken the lead in pressing for some form of postwar 
international accountability for the administration of 
dependent peoples, but during the Second World War, the 
impetus primarily came from American sources. The earlier 
roles of the Round Table Group and British socialist thinkers 
and organisations was assumed by American labour unions, 
professional associations and church groups. Even prior to 
American entry into the war, the Round Table's Second World 
War American counterpart, the Commission to study the 
Organisation of Peace, argued that "the whole of Africa (apart 
from.... South Africa) and the whole of the Polynesian Island 
Group now under colonial administration, should cease to be 
regarded as projections of Western power interests and be 
placed under varying forms of international administration and 
supervision".^ Official American policy and determination 
played the leading role in the actual formation of the United 
Nations trusteeship system. Such men as President Franklin 
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the Under 
Secretary of State Sumner Welles, differed over details and 
the best path to choose, but were even more determined than 
had been President Woodrow Wilson two decades or so before to 
introduce some form of international colonial new deal. The 
Roosevelt Administration at a much earlier stage and in a much 
more systematic manner than the Wilson Administration, 
formulated plans for postwar machinery for international 
accountability.
The plans were also given higher priority than had been 
the case during the First World War. They were modified 
frequently, however, due to American national interests and 
those of her allies, particularly Great Britain. This is not 
to infer that the United States sympathised with or supported
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Great Britain and the other colonial metropoles, rather the 
reverse. But she had to work with them both in waging the 
conflict against the Axis and in the future settlement of the 
postwar world of which the colonial domain was only a part; 
albeit an important part in the eyes of many members of the 
Roosevelt Administration, including the President himself. 
While Washington could bargain and cajole, and perhaps even 
occasionally force her European allies to take actions they 
believed ran counter to their best interests and those of 
their dependent peoples, those interests could not be ignored 
(especially British ones) when rhetoric and sentiment were 
translated into concrete proposals for action.
In fact, throughout the war, American official attitudes 
to what eventually became the United Nations trusteeship 
system reflected the tensions and ambivalences within the 
American anti-colonial tradition; particularly the dichotomy 
between what was desired and what was feasi-ble. The majority 
view within the Roosevelt Administration was that dependent 
peoples had a right to eventual freedom from their colonial 
masters which could probably best be achieved by international 
cooperation rather than individual actions by the colonial 
metropoles. This 'idealism1, however, was such that the 
United States' own colonial-type interests were somehow 
regarded as being intrinsically different to those of the 
European colonial powers. Idealism, moreover, was often 
ignored when conflicting with the national interests of both 
the United States and her wartime allies; the latter having 
views on the future of dependent peoples frequently very 
different to American ones. Indeed, the Roosevelt 
Administration found that declarations "of a general nature as 
to the future of dependent peoples could not be entirely 
fulfilled when it came to transforming expressions of general 
aims into an actual international system. This is not to be 
cynical about declarations of ideals made by allies while 
fighting a war; the point is rather that such declarations
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must be taken as goals to be strived for and not pledges of 
specific action.
The Roosevelt Administration*s various proposals on 
international accountability for dependent peoples are 
investigated in this chapter and the two following ones. The 
evolution is traced until they become part of Chapters XI,
XII, and XIII of the United Nations Charter on Non-Self- 
Governing Territories and Trusteeship as formulated by the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945. This chapter considers the 
Roosevelt’s Administration attitude to trusteeship from prior 
to American entry into the Second World War up to the American 
military’s declared desire in 1944 to annex the Japanese 
Pacific islands mandate. It is divided into four sections: 
trusteeship in the Americas prior to the attack on Pearl 
Harbour; the plans formulated from roughly that attack until 
the American military’s intervention into the policy-making 
process; President Roosevelt’s trusteeship .conceptions; and 
early British wartime views on trusteeship. The chapter is 
primarily concerned with the specific blueprints of the State 
Department and the ideas of Franklin Roosevelt. British 
attitudes are reviewed only in so far as they demonstrate 
differences of attitude and interest which eventually underlay 
modifications in American plans.
1• Trusteeship in the Americas
The first of the Roosevelt Administration’s proposals for 
international trusteeship arose primarily as a by-product of 
its desire to protect American interests in the Western 
Hemisphere. The proposal envisaged collective trusteeship by 
the American states for European colonies in the New World 
threatened by a change of sovereignty to another European 
power due to the Second World War: the proposal being given
explicit expression by the Act of Habana of July 1940.
The idea was not new and reflected President Roosevelt’s 
desire to protect American interests without territorial 
expansion or antagonising the Latin American Republics. In
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August 1936, for example, the President rejected the 
possibility of the United States purchasing the Galapagos 
Islands from Ecuador, and instead suggested "that because of 
the extra-ordinary natural history value of the islands ... it 
might be possible to set them aside as a Pan American National 
Park - the cost of conservation being assumed by many American 
Republics".^ By 1939 the President envisaged joint inter- 
American trusteeship whereby the Galapagos Islands would be 
administered as an international wild life reserve by a Board 
of the Pan American Union. Although remaining "nominally" 
under Ecuadoran sovereignty, the latter would be limited and 
the Islands "kept under constant vigilance by an international 
joint patrol representing the American republics".^ President 
Roosevelt's purpose was to further his 'Good Neighbour' policy 
in the Western Hemisphere through inter-American cooperation. 
He stressed the Galapagos Islands' value to natural science 
rather than potential value as strategic bases to control the 
western entrance to the Panama Canal.
By March 1938, however, President Roosevelt had began to 
place more emphasis on the strategic value of Latin American- 
owned islands on the west coast of South America. In a 
memorandum to Sumner Welles he stated that "under no 
circumstances" should Easter Island be transferred to "any 
non-American nation" as it was "a definite possibility as a 
stopping place for trans-South Pacific planes, commercial or 
military". A combination of reluctance to seek direct 
territorial expansion in the Americas, the detrimental effects 
which acquiring Easter Island might have on relations with her 
Western Hemisphere neighbours, and the improbability of 
"getting any large appropriation through Congress", caused him 
to "doubt the political wisdom of its purchase by the United 
States".'* Instead he suggested placing Easter Island along 
with the Galapagos Islands under Pan-American trusteeship:
"Would it be possible to tie up Easter Island and the 
Galapagos in a Pan-American trusteeship; the islands to be 
preserved for all time against colonization and for natural 
science? Ecuador and Chile....would be paid for the
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Islands over a period of years, the sovereignty to rest in 
the trustees; the trustees to protect them and prevent their 
use for military purposes.*'6
Similarly, in August 1939, German and Japanese interest 
in the Antarctic, led the President to suggest "a new form of 
sovereignty":
"....a claim to sovereignty of the whole sector lying south 
of the Americas on behalf of, and in trust for, the American 
Republics as a whole. Under this the United States, being 
the only Republic which has taken the initiative in 
exploring and possibly settling the area, would act not only 
on behalf of its own exclusive sovereignty but would include 
all the other Republics - and if in the future - the 
American sector proved valuable in any shape, manner or 
form, its sovereignty could be managed by an inter-American 
Republic governing body."'
By the late spring of 1939, however, an important faction 
within the Roosevelt Administration desired actual American 
control of the Galapagos and other islands. The islands* 
potential strategic value for controlling the western entrance 
to the Panama Canal, led the War Department to favour a 
pending Congressional resolution authorising negotiations to 
acquire the Galapagos Islands and Cocos Island. Sumner Welles 
pointed out that this was an advance upon the Department’s 
previous belief that they were of little "strategic value" to 
the United States, but "might be useful to a non-American 
power". ** He obtained President Roosevelt’s authorization to 
inform both the Secretaries of War and the Navy that "you do 
not desire these two Departments at this time to recommend the 
approval of resolutions pending in the Congress for the 
acquisition by the United States of territory belonging to the 
other American republics". The question of purchasing Latin 
American owned islands was then put aside apart from periodic 
requests by the War and Navy Departments for the use of 
’limited* base facilities.^
The Habana Formula. The notion of inter-American trusteeship 
was revived in 1940 to solve the problem of European colonies 
in the New World threatened by a change of ownership from one
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European power to another. The problem became of immediate 
importance in May 1940 when British and French troops 
respectively occupied the Dutch islands of Aruba and Curacao 
to protect their vital oil refineries without prior notice to 
the United States. The latter believed that this action might 
set precedents for Japan to land troops in the Netherlands 
East Indies^® and similar actions in the Western Hemisphere by 
either the European colonial powers or Nazi Germany. Another 
consideration emanating from traditional American suspicions 
of Great Britain, was that once she occupied a territory, her 
stay might prove to be a long one and removal excessively 
difficult. By May/June 1940, the war in western Europe was 
going very badly for those European colonial powers involved 
in it. Washington was confronted with the ever-growing 
likelihood of French capitulation, possible German demands for 
the secession or occupation of French and Dutch Caribbean 
territories, and more British unilateral aetion regarding 
other European dependencies in the Americas.^ In June, at 
the time of the Dunkirk evacuation, Congress passed a State 
Department sponsored resolution declaring that "the United 
States would neither recognise nor acquiesce in any transfer 
of sovereignty over American territory from one non-American 
power to another".^
At the same time, Cordell Hull instructed Frances Biddle, 
the American Ambassador to France, to remind the new French 
Government under Marshal Petain of the "traditional policy of 
the United States with regard to the Western Hemisphere which 
would make it impossible for the United States to recognise 
any transfer or to acquiesce in any attempt to transfer any 
geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non- 
American Power to another non-American Power". If it became 
necessary, "the United States would be prepared in conjunction 
with the other American Republics to undertake to institute an 
*an inter-American trusteeship* for the French possessions in 
the Western Hemisphere". A few weeks before, in reply to a 
query from Mrs Roosevelt about the availability of the
200
British, French and Dutch Guianas for refugee settlement, the 
President had stated that he was "considering the broad 
thought of creating a form of Pan American trusteeship.... It 
is a new idea in international or Pan American relationships, 
but it is worth studying - especially if there is a remote 
possibility that the American Republics may be forced to do 
something about European possessions in this Hemisphere.
In July 1940, the United States convened at Habana a 
consultative meeting of the American Republics to consider the 
question of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The 
meeting endorsed United States* proposals for emergency action 
by the American Republics regarding European colonies in the 
Western Hemisphere, permanent inter-American opposition to 
transferring sovereignty over the American possessions of one 
non-American state to another one, and inter-American 
trusteeship:
"should the American republics find it neoessary in order to 
prevent occurences in contravention of’the principles of 
policy herein set forth to assume measures of control over 
the geographic region in question, there shall be 
established a collective trusteeship participated in by all 
of the American republics which ratify this convention.
The American position was essentially cautious and even 
envisaged returning the European colonies to their metropoles 
once the threat of Axis possession ended. For instance,
France was privately informed that in the event of the 
possible transfer of her colonies to another non-American 
power, "the United States would be prepared in conjunction 
with other American Republics to undertake to institute an 
inter-American trusteeship", but "of a temporary character and 
to continue only until such times as the complete autonomy and 
independence of France were fully restored".^ In his public 
opening address to the Habana meeting, however, Cordell Hull 
left open whether restoration or independence would be the 
eventual destiny of European colonies coming under inter- 
American trusteeships:
201
"The purpose of a collective trusteeship must be to further 
the interests and security of all the American nations.... as 
soon as conditions permit, the region should be restored to 
its original sovereign or be declared independent when able 
to establish and maintain stable self-government."1'
Ruth Russell and Jeannette Muther have summarised the 
inter-American trusteeship scheme adopted by the Habana 
meeting:
"an emergency committee, including a representative from each 
republic, to administer any colony in the hemisphere 
threatened or attacked; ....a change in sovereignty or 
control of any colonies in the New World would automatically 
bring its provisions into effect. These would place the 
colonies in question under the temporary government of an 
Inter-American Commission for Territorial Administration 
until they could either govern themselves or be restored to 
their former possessors. ^
While never put into operation, these arrangements 
illustrate the Roosevelt Administration’s early ideas on 
trusteeship and shed light upon the nature of American anti­
colonialism. President Roosevelt and the State Department did 
not advocate automatic independence for colonial peoples in 
the Americas. Moreover, although wishing to protect American 
national interests, they preferred to do so by at least 
adopting the guise of collective action and stopping short of 
outright annexation of territories of strategic importance to 
the United States.
2. The United States Original Plans for United Nation
Trusteeship
Throughout the Second World War, the State Department 
played the leading role in formulating policies and 
pronouncements of possible application to colonial peoples 
such as the Atlantic Charter Declaration of 1941. Tentative 
proposals for postwar international trusteeship were made 
within twelve months of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. 
Within the State Department and the various official groups 
considering colonial problems, there was a marked divergence 
between the cautious limited approach of Cordell Hull and the 
more radical position of Sumner Welles. Their differences
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were only settled with Sumner Welles's resignation in
September 1943, The differences were aggravated by
uncertainty as to President Roosevelt's own views and the fact
that Sumner Welles probably had closer working relations with
him than did Cordell Hull.
Official American consideration of a future international
trusteeship system commenced in August 1942, with the
investigations of a Special Subcommittee on International
1 9Organisation under the chairmanship of Sumner Welles. The
Special Subcommittee's proceedings assumed an eventual 
international organisation of the League of Nations type, an 
assumption not then shared by President Roosevelt himself. It
was also influenced by Sumner Welles' preference for a 
regional approach as opposed to Cordell Hull's inclinations 
towards a universal one. The League mandates system 
influenced the Subcommittee's work, especially through the
activities of Benjamin Gerig, a former League official and an
90authority on that system. w
The Draft Protocol on Trusteeship devised by the Special 
Subcommittee was completed by October 1942 and intended to 
apply to all non-self-governing territories except for those 
in the Western Hemisphere.^ it would have to be voluntarily 
accepted by the Allied colonial powers, although Japan woU\& 
toS£ Kfcf o^.oAof^ possibly other
Oo VvOtS, "
t e r r i t o r i e s T h e  system's goal would be independence for all 
non-self-governing peoples except those who chose full self-
government in association with their colonial metropole. A
new general international organisation, composed of regional
representatives from colonial metropoles, would decide whether
dependent peoples were ready for independence or self-
government. Direct administration by this body would normally 
9 9be avoided. x A series of regional councils would be created 
under its auspices through which the colonial metropoles would 
be held accountable for exercising their trusteeship. The 
administrating authorities would be responsible for ensuring
economic, social and political progress by their dependent 
peoples and safeguarding the economic and security interests 
of the international community as a whole. They would submit 
reports on their trusteeship, while the new international body 
would possess the right to carry out inspections of colonies 
and dependent peoples be able to petition it directly.
American concern with security questions, especially the 
strategic value of island bases, was reflected in a provision 
for fortifying trust territories if the international 
executive believed that this would contribute to world 
security.^3 The overall ethos was of a more radical, but 
regionally based, reformed League mandates system.
Cordell Hull disapproved of the Protocol's failure to 
distinguish between colonies in general and "dependent 
territories under mandate or to be detached from enemy states 
after the war". He modified the plan submitted to the 
President in November 1942, such that the proposed new 
trusteeship system would "include only the Axis dependencies 
and the territories mandated by the League of Nations". His 
modifications were undertaken "for obvious reasons of 
political feasibility" which at least made possible some sort 
of eventual dialogue with the British on international 
trusteeship.^
The Atlantic Charter and National Independence. The wartime 
roots of Chapter XI on Non-Self-Governing Territories of the 
United Nations Charter are to be found in the draft 
declaration entitled "The Atlantic Charter and National 
Independence" which Cordell Hull also submitted to President 
Roosevelt in November 1942. It grew out of the American 
belief that the Atlantic Charter's principles were universally 
applicable; an interpretation with which the British 
Government did not agree. Winston Churchill's address to the 
House of Commons of 9 September, 1941, maintained that Article 
3 of the Atlantic Charter on "the right of all peoples to
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choose the form of government under which they will live", 
applied only to those "now under Nazi yoke":
"So it is quite a separate problem from the progressive 
evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and 
peoples which owe allegiance to the British crown. ^
To Winston Churchill, the British Empire's future was of 
no concern to the Americans; a viewpoint which they could not 
accept. For example, Cordell Hull had India in mind in his 
radio address of July 23, 1942;
"We have always believed - and we believe today - that all 
peoples without distinction of race, colour, or religion, 
who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities 
of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment.... It has been our 
purpose in the past - and will remain our purpose in the 
future - to use the full measure of our influence to support 
attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, 
show themselves worthy of it and ready for it."^°
Cordell Hull maintained, however, "that at no time did we 
press Britain, France, or the Netherlands for an immediate 
grant of self-government to their colonies.- Our thought was 
that it would come after an adequate period of years, short or 
long depending on the state of development of respective 
colonial peoples, during which these would be trained to 
govern themselves".^ He did not agree with those 
"vociferous" Americans like "Vice President Wallace who argued 
for an immediate grant of independence" and "disregarded the 
magnitude of the problem":
"When a certain Texan argued with me along the lines of 
separating all colonies from their mother countries and 
particularly urged that Britain should return Hong Kong to 
China. I retorted that Hong Kong had been British longer 
than Texas had belonged to the United States and I did not 
think anyone would welcome a move to turn Texas back to 
Mexico.
Cordell Hull was fully aware of the limitations on the 
pressure which the United States could exert on the European 
colonial powers regarding "eventual independence":
"We had frequent conversations with these parent countries, 
but we could not press them too far with regard to the South 
West Pacific in view of the fact that we were seeking the 
closest possible cooperation with them in Europe. We could
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not alienate them in the Orient and expect to work with them 
in Europe,
His remarks refer specifically to the South West Pacific, 
but are also apposite to American influence vis-a-vis 
European colonial domains in other parts of the world. It is 
against such limiting factors that the American draft 
declaration on "The Atlantic Charter and National 
Independence" has to be assessed. It was "to apply to all 
dependent peoples":
"the proposed declaration made it incumbent on governments 
controlling dependent peoples to help them qualify for the 
responsibilities of independence. At the same time the 
colonial peoples would be obligated to equip themselves 
politically, socially, and economically for the independence 
they aspired to. It declared the Atlantic Charter 
applicable to all peoples, of whatever degree or condition 
of dependence or freedom and emphasised the special 
responsibility of the United Nations, as trustee or 
fiduciary, to ward peoples released from political ties with 
other nations by either world war but still unprepared for 
full independence. Finally, the signatory governments would 
commit themselves to observe the policies, obligations, and 
methods set forth in the declaration in dealing with their 
respective colonies."^
Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence. 
President Roosevelt approved the proposals and a State 
Department group drafted a "Declaration by the United Nations 
on National Independence"; submitted to the President in March 
1943. It was designed as a basis for discussions with the 
wartime allies and maintained that states responsible for 
dependent peoples had a "duty" to "cooperate fully" with them 
"towards their becoming qualified for independent national 
status". A colonial metropole had five basic duties:
"a. To give its colonial peoples protection, encouragement, 
moral support and material aid and to make continuous 
efforts toward their political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement;
b. To make available to qualified persons among the 
colonial peoples to the fullest possible extent positions in 
the various branches of the local governmental organization;
c. To grant progressively to the colonial peoples such 
measure of self-government as they are capable of
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maintaining in the light of the various stages of their 
development toward independence;
d. To fix, at the earliest practicable moments, dates upon 
which the colonial peoples shall be accorded the status of 
full independence within a system of general security; and
e. To pursue policies under which the natural resources of 
colonial territories shall be developed, organized and 
marketed in the interest of the peoples concerned and of the 
world as a whole.
The dependent peoples themselves should "create, conduct 
and maintain,... efficient structures of stable self- 
government based on sound principles of social and political 
morality". Helping defeat the Axis would demonstrate their 
capacity for "freedom". To assist colonial peoples achieve 
independence, the states interested in particular areas should 
collaborate and consult among themselves within the framework 
of regional commissions. The "colonial peoples concerned" 
should "have appropriate opportunity to participate and to 
have or to achieve representation" in the commissions. The 
United Nations would assume a special responsibility for 
League mandates and other colonial territories detached from 
Axis control. This should be done via an International 
Trusteeship Administration composed of United Nations 
representatives and other states cooperating in "applying the 
provisions of the Atlantic Charter". This Trusteeship 
Administration would "operate through regional councils", 
themselves also composed of states with major interests in the 
respective regions. They should be "so designed as to give 
the peoples of the territories held in trust in its region 
full opportunity to be associated with its w o r k " . * ^  The 
powers and relationship between the "regional commissions" and 
the "regional councils" was left unclear in the proposed 
declaration. Although all colonies would come under the 
auspices of the regional commissions, there would be actual 
international supervision only for former mandates and ex­
enemy territories.
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Trusteeship and the Draft Constitution on International
Organisation, The next American blueprint for a postwar 
international trusteeship system came from the Special 
Subcommittee on International Organisation working under 
Sumner Welles. The Subcommittee in its Draft Constitution on 
International Organisation of July 1943, based its proposals 
on the October 1942 Draft Protocol on Trusteeship. All 
colonies were to be placed under trusteeship and there would 
be three levels of supervision: the states or groups of
states entrusted with the day-to-day administration; Regional 
Councils of states interested in the region concerned; and the 
Council of the International Organisation. The latter1s 
decisions on trusteeship and most other matters would be by 
two-thirds majorities and the concurnVw} votes of its four 
permanent members (China, Great Britain, the United States and 
the USSR). The League mandate system's "no fortification" 
rule was abandoned, there were provisions for the "open door" 
in all the territories under trusteeship, and the latter's 
inhabitants would be prepared for self-government. Unlike the 
League mandates system where no such rights existed, moreover, 
both "the Council of the International Organisation and the 
Regional Supervisory Councils [would] have the right of 
inspection" in trust territories. Another improvement on the 
League system in the direction of greater international 
accountability was that the trust territories' inhabitants 
would have the right of petition directly to the Regional 
Supervisory Council of that area".^
The Draft Constitution's trusteeship proposals were 
prepared despite Cordell Hull's earlier rejection of such a 
radical approach, and the more modest schemes he submitted to 
President Roosevelt in November 1942 and March 1943. The 
differing proposals reflected the continuing disagreements 
between Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles on the scope of a future 
international trusteeship system. They were not resolved 
until the latter resigned in September 1943 and was succeeded 
as Under Secretary of State by Edward Stettinius. Another
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important factor was that Franklin Roosevelt had not yet 
finally committed himself on the trusteeship question, 
although officially apparently accepting Cordell Hull's more 
cautious approach. The latter suspended work on the Draft 
Constitution in the summer of 1943, and it's trusteeship 
provisions were not put forward for international 
consideration.
The Staff Charter on the United Nations and Trusteeship, The 
next stage in the State Department's trusteeship proposals was 
reached with the formulation of Article 11 on "Territorial 
Administration" of "The Charter of the United Nations". In 
formulating Article 11, the officials started from the ideas 
contained in the revised Draft Protocol on Trusteeship and the 
Draft Declaration by the United Nations on National 
Independence; they were aware of the President's views and the 
adverse British reaction to the proposed Declaration. Work on 
the Staff Charter began in the summer of 1943 and completed by 
August 1943.^4 in accordance with Cordell Hull's views and as 
a concession to British hostility, the Staff Charter limited 
international accountability to "territories which may be 
placed under the authority of the United Nations by treaty or 
other agreement". Ruth Russell and Jeannette Muther point out 
that this provision recognised that special arrangements 
"would have to be made to transfer the mandates to United 
Nations jurisdiction and assumed that the major powers would 
have to agree on placing territories taken from Japan and 
Italy under the new organization. It also left the way open 
for further voluntary placements of territories under it, 
should some of the President's ideas on postwar trusteeship 
materialize. "^5
Responsibility for territories under trusteeship was 
vested in the Council of the new United Nations Organisation. 
The latter's "General Conference" consisting of all United 
Nations members would have no role in matters relating to 
"Territorial Administration". China, Great Britain, the
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United States and the USSR would have permanent representation 
on the Council and its decisions would require their 
concurring votes.^6 This would enable the leading colonial 
power, Great Britain, to block arrangements she disliked, but 
the anti-colonialists (the United States, the Soviet Union and 
China), would also have a voice in dependencies under 
"territorial administration". The principle of Big Four 
unanimity would also help the United States protect her own 
interests in the former Japanese islands mandate.
The provisions designed to ensure the well-being of 
dependent peoples under territorial administration were almost 
identical even in phraseology to those of Article 12 of the 
Draft Constitution on International Organisation, apart from 
one important exception. Whereas Article 12, clause 4(a) had 
referred to "the preparation and education of the inhabitants 
for self-government", Article 11, clause 2(a) of the Staff 
Charter referred only to "the education and- cultural 
advancement of the inhabitants".^ Dependent peoples not 
placed under territorial administration, were catered for only 
by a provision requiring all United Nations members 
controlling them to observe "the same standards of 
administration" as were required for those coming under 
territorial administration.^ It was generally accepted that 
Great Britain and the Commonwealth would retain their "B" and 
"C" class mandates, but in view of President Roosevelt*s more 
radical ideas on trusteeship matters, direct administration by 
the Council was allowed as well as administration by single or 
groups of states.
While the Council would be responsible for overall 
policy, the actual executive role in ensuring international 
accountability would lie with special commissions (not 
designated as regional but conceived of as such). The 
"number, composition and powers" of these commissions to be 
defined by the Council. Unlike the Draft Constitution, the 
dependent peoples under territorial administration were not 
given the right to petition the Council or the commissions,
210
although the latter could "conduct inspections in territories 
under [their] supervision to ensure that the policies of the
reports and recommendations to the Council".
The Informal Political Agenda Group and International 
Organisation for Maintaining International Peace and Security. 
The Staff proposals for territorial administration were not 
considered formally by either Cordell Hull or President 
Roosevelt. The next stage in the evolution of American plans 
arose from the President’s request for State Department 
recommendations on a postwar international security 
organisation following his return from the December 1943 
Teheran meeting with Stalin and Churchill. The State 
Department responded with an outline for establishing an 
"International Organisation for the Maintenance of 
International Security" of December 1 9 4 3 .^- it envisaged an 
"agency for trusteeship responsibilities" reporting to the 
"General Assembly" of all the member states; the "Executive 
Council" of the Great Powers having responsibility for 
security matters only. The President approved the overall 
suggested structure of the new international organisation in 
February 1944.
The Informal Political Agenda Group then began to 
consider specific proposals, including trusteeship ones. It
Secretary of State and the Under Secretary. Among its members 
with special interests in trusteeship questions, were 
Benjamin Gerig, Stanley Hornbeck and Leo Pasvolsky of the 
State Department, and Isaiah Bowman, the President of Johns 
Hopkins University. Leo Pasvolsky was particularly important. 
He had previously played a large part in formulating the draft 
"Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence", 
and became the "Group’s member primarily responsible for 
trusteeship affairs and incorporating American proposals
Council [were] being carried out, and [would] make periodic
consultations with both the
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regarding them into the overall scheme for creating a postwar 
international security organisation".^
The earlier ideas and proposals contained in the Draft 
Constitution and the Staff Charter formed the basis for the 
deliberations of the Informal Political Agenda Group and the 
State Department drafting technicians working alongside it. 
Their trusteeship proposals fall into three categories: 
general principles relating to all dependent peoples; regional 
commissions; and international trusteeship machinery for 
specific territories.^  The new American Draft Declaration 
regarding Administration of Dependent Territories conceived by 
the Agenda Group, omitted the phrase "National Independence" 
because of the strong British objections to its inclusion in 
the March 1943 Draft Declaration. It was now also realised 
that references to target dates for independence might result 
in demands by peoples not yet prepared for it. Some members 
of the Agenda Group also realised that genejral declarations of 
principle on "independence" or "self-government" and the 
general welfare of colonial peoples, might well be seen by the 
European colonial powers as applying to American domains like 
Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands, and even the 
treatment of the North American Indians and Negroes. Largely 
because of such considerations, instead of the references in 
the earlier "Declaration by the United Nations on National 
Independence" to the colonial powers* "duty" to work for "the 
earliest practicable moment1* to grant "full independence" to 
colonial peoples, the new proposed Declaration merely 
referred to the "duty" of administering authorities "to foster 
the development of political institutions suited to their 
needs and to develop their capacity for self-government*'. In 
accordance with this objective, colonial powers would 
safeguard the dependent peoples' political and civil rights, 
traditional cultures and institutions, increase their 
participation in local public services and "any regional 
institutions which may be established in the area", promote 
local self-government, and extend the franchise where
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feasible. Eventually, in the light of the interests of the 
world community and the wishes of the dependent peoples 
themselves, administering authorities would grant self- 
government "on the basis either of independence or of 
autonomous association with other peoples within a state or a 
grouping of states".
The colonial powers would undertake to implement economic 
and social objectives in all their colonies similar to those 
contained in the draft "Declaration by the United Nations on 
National Independence", the draft Constitution on 
International Organisation, and the Staff Charter. There was 
an "open door" clause permitting third parties to take part in 
the development and trade of dependent territories. The 
colonial powers were also "to apply locally the provisions of 
general international conventions on such subjects as 
commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, the 
abolition of slavery and slave trading, and- the control of 
traffic in arms, in dangerous drugs, and in women and 
children".^
The State Department’s officials working alongside the 
Political Agenda Group proposed five regional commissions (for 
south, west, and central and east Africa, south east Asia, and 
the central and southern Pacific) to oversee the Draft 
Declaration’s application to colonies not placed under 
international trusteeship. At this time, both the British and 
the Americans believed that the wartime Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission afforded a good model for other regional 
agencies.^ The new commissions would have advisory and 
collaborative roles only; dealing with common problems within 
regions like trade and economic development, transport, 
agriculture, health, education, housing, labour, civil rights, 
and law enforcement, but not political matters. Security 
questions were also excluded except in so far as they affected 
economic and social matters. Their membership would consist 
of the region’s colonial powers, independent states, outside 
states with major interests in the region, dependencies
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already enjoying a high degree of self-government, the new 
world organisation, and any trusteeship administration created 
under its auspices. Under the American plan, "wherever 
feasible", the dependent peoples themselves should be 
associated with or represented on their respective 
commissions. Provision was made for international 
accountability by giving each commission the right to review 
annual reports prepared by the colonial powers on "the 
political, economic, and social conditions" in each dependency 
and on "all efforts being made to give effect to this 
Declaration". The relationship with the new world 
organisation, however, was unclear. The Americans would have 
liked the regional commissions to be a link between the world 
organisation and colonial powers whose dependencies in a 
region were not under trusteeship, but the colonial powers 
might refuse to participate in the commissions if specific 
links were made with the world organisation-. Thus, the plan 
allowed for the commissions to function independently at 
first; the private hope being that an organic link would 
develop later with the world body.
The Political Agenda Group examined the regional 
commission plan in the spring of 1944, and made some
conservative amendments. In part these were a result of
Isaiah Bowman*s consultations with the Colonial Office when
visiting London in April 1944 as a member of an American
mission headed by Under Secretary of State Stettinius.^ The 
revised American plan retained the notion of regional 
commissions, but excluded the actual list of proposed 
commissions. In the light of British criticisms, so far as a 
region's dependent people were concerned, the new commissions 
would merely "consider" the "advisability" of regional 
meetings in which both the colonial powers and dependent 
peoples were associated. The proposed element of 
international accountability was diminished. Membership of 
the regional commissions was restricted to the administering 
powers and others with major economic and/or security
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interests in the region concerned. Initiatives for creating 
the commissions would come from the region*s administering 
powers themselves, not the world organisation. The latter*s 
role would be limited to encouraging the formation of 
commissions only and to being represented on them 
ex. officio. The proposal that administering powers "submit 
annual reports to the appropriate regional commissions'* was 
retained. The commissions, however, were given no definite 
powers to ensure international accountability, and presumably 
would function as repository bodies for the reports only; as 
libraries rather than investigating instruments.
Nevertheless, the Agenda Group still desired a link between 
the world organisation and all the dependent territories of a 
region. Clause (c) of the "Arrangements for Territorial 
Trusteeships" of July 1944, empowered the new world 
organisation's General Assembly "to establish advisory 
commissions of a regional or technical char-acter with respect 
to trust territories situated in a given region".^
The most important aspect of the Informal Political 
Agenda Group's efforts to promote greater international 
accountability was the scheme for trusteeship directly under 
the new world organisation. Unlike the earlier Article 12 of 
the Draft Constitution intended to apply trusteeship to all 
dependent territories, the State Department drafters and the 
Political Agenda Group followed the more conservative lines of 
the Staff Charter and restricted it to League mandates, other 
non-self-governing territories of the Axis, and territories 
which might be voluntarily placed under the system. The 
reasoning behind the latter category in part was that it would 
assist in fulfilling President Roosevelt's objective of having 
French possessions like Indo China and Morocco helped to 
independence via some form of international trusteeship. It 
was hoped that this category would be accepfa*b\g, to the 
colonial powers by making it a 'voluntary' form of 
trusteeship. The system's objectives resembled those of the 
earlier American plans in that there were references to
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furthering international peace and security and all members of 
the new international organisation receiving non- 
discriminatory treatment in trust territories. The 
realisation of the need to obtain British agreement to the 
plan is shown by the fact that while the political, economic, 
and social advancement by peoples under trusteeship was to be 
promoted, the ultimate objective was "self-government"; no 
mention was made of independence.
The question of where sovereignty lay under the League 
mandates system had never been satisfactorily settled.^ The 
Political Agenda Group disposed of this question for trust 
territories under the new system by the notion of collective 
sovereignty shared by all the members of the new international 
organisation. The administering authority for each trust 
territory would be an individual state or a "specially 
constituted international administration". The mandatories, 
apart from Japan, would retain their existing responsibilities 
and arrangements unless the new international organisation 
decided otherwise for particular cases. The particular 
circumstances and interests of individual trust territories 
and trustees, including those of the United States in the 
former Japanese mandated islands, were covered by a provision 
permitting the territorial charters constituting "the 
fundamental law" of each trust territory to "be so drawn as to 
take into account the special circumstances" of individual 
territories.
The State Department drafting group at first proposed 
giving responsibility for the trusteeship system to the new 
Executive Council of the Great Powers assisted by a 
"Trusteeship Commission"; the latter being a revised and 
strengthened version of the League Mandates Commission. They 
eventually placed the trusteeship system and the new 
"Trusteeship Commission" under the new international 
organisations General Assembly, although giving the Executive 
Council responsibility for security issues relating to trust 
territories if these involved creating military bases; a
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provision later omitted by the Informal Political Agenda 
Group. Under the original State Department blueprint the 
Trusteeship Commission would have two types of member: the
states administering trust territories; and an equal number of 
representatives plus one from non-administering states elected 
by the General Assembly. The Agenda Group, however, revised 
this provision so that there would be equal representatives 
from administering and non-administering states; thereby 
hoping to make this particular element of international 
accountability more acceptable to the existing mandatories.
The Trusteeship Commission would be a political body composed 
of government representatives rather than well-qualified 
individuals as had been the case with the Permanent Mandates 
Commission. In finally approving the trusteeship plan, the 
Postwar Programmes Committee^ changed the name of the 
"Trusteeship Commission" to the "Trusteeship Council". It 
also underlined more firmly the General Assembly*s right to 
initiate action and to take final decisions on the retitled 
Trusteeship Council*s recommendations. The respective powers 
of the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council as finally 
accepted by the Postwar Programmes Committee were as follows:
**1. The general assembly should be empowered: (a) to call 
for, receive, and consider the reports, recommendations, and 
decisions of the trusteeship council; (b) to take action 
upon the recommendations of the trusteeship council 
concerning the initial territorial charters, alterations in 
such charters, designation of administering authorities, 
removal of such authorities for good cause, and the 
conditions of termination and the act of termination of 
trusteeship in any territory; (c) to establish advisory 
commissions of a regional or technical character with 
respect to trust territories situated in a given region; and
(d) to encourage and facilitate cooperation between the 
administering authorities and the specialised agencies 
brought into relationship with the international 
organisation.
2. The trusteeship council exercising general supervision 
over trust territories, should be empowered: (a) to advise 
the administering authorities; (b) to examine reports from 
the administering authorities; (c) to interrogate 
representatives of those authorities; (d) at its discretion, 
to receive petitions and to hear petitioners in person;
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(e) to recommend or pass comment upon economic projects of 
more than a minor local character and to conduct 
investigations relevant to such projects; (f) to conduct 
periodic inspections in the trust territories; and (g) to 
make recommendations to the general assembly regarding the 
territorial charters, the administering authorities, and 
other aspects of the trusteeship system. °
Reconsideration and Postponement Immediately prior to the 
trusteeship scheme's consideration in June 1944 by the Postwar 
Programmes Committee, the Political Agenda Group reconsidered 
the scope of its proposed trusteeship system because of 
objections from within the State Department itself and, more 
importantly and significantly for the future, from the Navy 
and War Departments.^ The objection from within the State 
Department came from those who continued to urge a wider 
international trusteeship system embracing all dependent 
peoples. They believed that this would be an important 
vehicle for assisting more advanced dependencies to at least 
some measure of "self-rule" and in so doing help reduce 
political instability due to the rising tide of nationalism 
among colonial peoples. This understanding of the situation 
in many ways reflected the views of President Roosevelt 
himself. The desire for a wider trusteeship system, however, 
was rejected by the Political Agenda Group on the practical 
ground that Great Britain and the other European colonial 
powers would almost certainly refuse to accept or to 
participate in such a scheme. Another consideration was that 
the wider trusteeship scheme might well cause severe strains 
on the new world organisation.
The Navy and War Departments' objections to trusteeship 
are considered in Chapter 6. At this stage however, it should 
be underlined that they believed that the Political Agenda 
Group's trusteeship formula would hamper unfettered American 
control of the Japanese mandated islands. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff had informed Cordell Hull in May 1944 that they "support 
the concept of national as distinguished from United Nations' 
jurisdiction as regards the Japanese Mandates in the
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P a c i f i c " . T h e  Agenda Group tried to satisfy the military 
concern by suggesting a qualifying clause "that would permit 
the states concerned with areas to be brought under 
trusteeship to make whatever security arrangements they 
wished, regarding the mandated and ex-enemy territories, 
before turning their rights over to the new organisation".51 
It also emphasised to the Postwar Programmes Committee that 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be consulted before definitive 
recommendations were made regarding the Japanese mandated 
islands.
The Postwar Programmes Committee approved with minor 
modifications the Agenda Group’s various proposals on 
dependent territories. The "Arrangements for Territorial 
Trusteeships" was accepted as part of the American "Tentative 
Proposals for a General International Organisation" to be 
discussed with Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China at 
the Dumbarton Oaks meeting on a new postwar-international 
organisation due to commence in August 1944; subject to their 
being acceptable to the Navy and War Departments.
3. President Roosevelt and International Trusteeship
Franklin Roosevelt's dislike of European colonialism 
should be seen against two predominant Second World War 
considerations: successfully prosecuting the war against the
Axis; and safeguarding American interests in the postwar 
world, especially the security interests. In fact, his 
wartime views on colonialism in many respects reflect his 
concern with security issues. The President mixed idealism 
with caution. The long-established American tradition of 
political isolation and the failure only some twenty years or 
so before of President Wilson's attempt to commit the United 
States to joining the League of Nations, were constant 
warnings of the dangers of taking too precipitate steps in the 
direction of world organisation. Franklin Roosevelt himself 
had been the Democratic Party's candidate for Vice-President 
in the 1920 American presidential election when the
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Republicans led by Warren Harding swept to power on a wave of 
isolationist anti-League sentiment symbolised by the slogan 
"back to normalcy11. It is hardly surprising therefore that 
President Roosevelt did not wish to be identified with schemes 
to resurrect the League of Nations.^2 Consequently, although 
advocating some kind of international accountability for 
colonies, he was not favourably disposed to the mandates 
system. This was demonstrated in November 1942 when writing 
to General Smuts about his ideas concerning "certain 
trusteeships to be exercised by the United Nations where the 
stability of government for one reason or another cannot at 
once be assured11:
"I am inclined to think that the mandate system is no longer 
the right approach, for the nation which is given the
mandate soon comes to believe that it carries sovereignty 
with it."5^
Overall, despite a predilection for testing radical 
ideas in private conversation, the President was very careful 
in public wartime pronouncements on postwar international 
cooperation not to be too far in advance of American public 
opinion, and, so far as policy issues were concerned, to carry 
Congress with him and to develop a bipartisan approach. 
Moreover, in some respects his public anti-colonial 
enunciations can be interpreted as attempts to appeal to 
deeply ingrained American sentiments and prejudices.
President Roosevelt's preference for informal methods and 
channels of administration creates problems when trying to 
analyse his various wartime policy motives. Ruth Russell and 
Jeanette Muther suggest that "he was less interested in 
systematically developing a detailed plan of postwar 
organisation than in testing reactions to various ideas and in 
launching 'trial balloons' without committing himself". 
Certainly, his various utterances on the future of dependent 
peoples can be interpreted in this light. The President often 
discussed his ideas on trusteeship and other matters freely 
and informally, giving his listeners, fellow Americans and
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wartime Allies alike, the impression that his views were 
evolving independently of the State Department,
Notwithstanding his informality, however, in so far as it 
was possible to do so, he controlled the State Department and 
kept its policies in line with his own; this was especially 
the case when Edward Stettinius became Secretary of State.
The uncertainty arising from the President’s informal 
manipulative methods, is well illustrated by the fact that in 
the early war years so far as trusteeship questions were 
concerned, Under Secretary of State Welles appeared to be 
closer to the President than did Secretary of State Hull; 
although publicly, the President supported the latter's 
moderate line in preference to the former's more radical one. 
Moreover, while publicly supporting the State Department's 
plans for international trusteeship which would include the 
Japanese mandated islands, there was sufficient doubt as to 
his views to predispose James Forrestal and-Henry Stimson, 
respectively Secretaries of the Navy and War, to believe that 
they could obtain his agreement for unfettered American 
control of those islands.
There is evidence to suggest that during his youth, 
Franklin Roosevelt was by no means an anti-imperialist and 
endorsed the expansion of American influence in the Caribbean 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
However, he gradually came to see "the error of his thinking 
on imperialism and strongly sponsored a different sort of 
p r o g r a m m e " . T h u s ,  in an article for Foreign Affairs in July 
1928, he strongly criticised American imperialist policies in 
the Caribbean:
"The time has come when we must accept not only certain facts 
but many more new principles of a higher law, a new and 
better standard in international relations. We are 
exceedingly jealous of our own sovereignty and it is only 
right that we should respect a similar feeling among other 
nations • '
The outbreak of the European phase of the Second World 
War in 1939 and the growth of Japanese power in South East
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Asia, confirmed President Roosevelt in his anti-colonial 
sentiments. Well before the United States entered the war, he 
saw the need to convince the peoples of Asia as well as of 
Europe that the cause of freedom was the Allied cause. For 
example, his address to the White House Correspondents 
Association on March 15, 1941:
"There has never been, there isn’t now, and there never will 
be, any race of people on earth fit to serve as masters over 
their fellow men. We believe that any nationality, no 
matter how small, has the inherent right to its own 
nationhood.
Like many Americans, Franklin Roosevelt believed that 
colonialism, particularly the British brand, created 
artificial barriers harming both international trade and the 
dependent peoples concerned. For example, he maintained that 
because of the British Empire*s trade arrangements, "the 
people of India and Africa, of all the colonial Near East and 
Far East, are still as backward as they are".-^ The President 
also believed that "the colonial system means war"^. His 
anti-colonial sentiments were firmly rooted in the belief that 
independence was a natural and desirable goal for most if not 
all dependent peoples to pursue. The President*s images of 
the successful American War of Independence from British rule 
and the United States* historical experiences since then, lay 
at the back of his distaste for British colonialism. Winston 
Churchill believed that Franklin Roosevelt*s ideas on the 
British Empire were antiquated, especially regarding British 
rule in India:
"The President’s mind was back in the American War of 
Independence, and he thought of the Indian problem in terms 
of thirteen colonies fighting George III at the end of the 
eighteenth century.
President Roosevelt maintained, however, that all the 
European colonial powers could profit from the lessons of the 
American relationship with the Philippines: "I like to think
that the history of the Philippine Islands in the last forty- 
four years provides in a very real sense a pattern for the 
future of other small nations and peoples of the world".^ The
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crucial point is that no matter how well or how poorly founded 
his perceptions of colonialism, the wartime leaders of the 
European colonial powers could not ignore them, Winston 
Churchill, for example, might be irritated by what he 
perceived as the President*s naive, simplistic, historical 
perspective on colonial questions, but he had to accept them 
and attempt to contain his feelings as Great Britain was 
irrevocably linked to the United States in the war against the 
Axis; Franklin Roosevelt's good will being essential both 
before and after American entry into the war in December 1941. 
As Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald Ridinger observed, it was 
also the President's "apparent conviction that the 
overwhelming need of Churchill to assure British survival 
would enable the United States to exercise decisive pressure 
in favour of an entirely new approach to colonial problems 
everywhere".^
The President's brand of anti-colonialism was essentially 
a mixture of idealism and American national advantage. He 
genuinely believed that dependent peoples should be held in 
colonial bond only until they were ready to rule themselves; 
and that the United States had a unique record in colonial 
matters which the European colonial powers could usefully 
follow, Franklin Roosevelt was also opposed to any of the 
wartime Allied powers bringing more dependent peoples into 
their colonial domains; a prohibition which included the 
United States. At the same time, however, he believed that 
various small islands, especially the Japanese mandated 
islands in the Pacific, were vitally important for American 
national security. Unlike his military advisers, the 
President opposed their annexation by the United States, and 
instead maintained that she should administer such islands on 
behalf of the international community on a long if not 
perpetual lease. On first sight such a policy stand might 
appear to be no more than a hypocritical or opportunist cloak 
for annexation. Perhaps a truer image is that he genuinely 
conceived American and world security interests as synonymous.
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Another policy consideration was that if the United States 
annexed the Japanese mandated islands, Great Britain and the 
other European colonial powers might well annex their mandates 
and generally attempt to extend their colonial domains.
The Four Policemen, Trusteeship and International Security.
The equation between American and world interests in the 
President’s understanding of postwar international cooperation 
emerges from his comments in September 1941 to Myron C.
Taylor, his Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII:
"there seems no reason why the principle of trusteeship in 
private affairs should not be extended to the international 
field. Trusteeship is based on the principle of unselfish 
service. For a time at least there are many minor children 
among the peoples of the world who need trustees in their 
relations with other nations and peoples, just as there are 
many adult nations or peoples which must be led back into a 
spirit of good conduct.
Ruth Russell and Jeannette Muther point out that the 
President was giving the trusteeship principle "a new turn"; 
this particular presidential objective eventually evolved into 
what became known as the "Four Policemen" concept; "whereby 
the great powers would patrol the world for the benefit of all 
peace-loving nations".^ Within the President’s general 
ideas, there were two related considerations so far as 
trusteeship and dependent territories were concerned. First, 
to assist them to protect world peace, the principal members 
of the Allied wartime coalition should control certain 
strategic bases or areas located in what were colonial 
dependencies; ostensibly holding these "strategic" trusts on 
behalf of the international community. Second, in addition to 
their peacekeeping duties, the "Four Policemen" would be 
responsible for the progress of the dependent people 
concerned. Essentially, Franklin Roosevelt believed that one 
lesson of the first half of the twentieth century was that 
small states were incapable of defending themselves against 
aggressors, and had to rely on the help of more powerful 
states. The Four Policemen (China, Great Britain, the United
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States and the USSR), would act on behalf of the weaker 
members of the international community. From this concept 
emerged both the notion of special rights for these 
"Policemen11 in what become the United Nations' Security 
Council and the idea of "strategic trusts".^
Molotov's Visit to Washington of May 1942. Although postwar 
security arrangements involving colonial territories depended 
more on British than Soviet consent, it was to the Russians 
that President Roosevelt initially disclosed his thoughts on 
the strategic aspects of the colonial question. This first 
occured during Foreign Minister Molotov's visit to Washington 
in May 1942. In the course of discussing the future global 
peace activities of the "Four Policemen", the President stated 
"that there were all over the world, many islands and colonial 
possessions which ought, for our own safety, to be taken away 
from weak nations", and suggested establishing "some form of 
international trusteeship over these islands and possessions". 
He even suggested applying this principle to the Japanese 
Pacific islands mandate and British held islands:
"the Japanese.••.mandate over the previously German Islands 
in the Pacific....ought not to be given to any one nation. 
The Japanese should....be removed, but we did not want 
these islands, and neither the British nor the French ought 
to have them either....Perhaps the same procedure should be 
applied to the islands now held by the British. These 
Islands obviously ought not to belong to any one nation, and 
their economy was substantially the same everywhere. The 
easiest and most practical way to handle the problem of 
these islands for a long period would be to-put them under 
an international committee of 3-5 members.
Anthony Eden's Visit to Washington of March 1943. At the time 
of this visit, the then American Secretary of the Navy, Frank 
Knox, intimated to President Roosevelt that it might be 
opportune "to attempt an understanding with the British that 
they will support and approve after the war, our control and 
possession of all the Japanese mandated islands in the 
Pacific".^ The President did not follow this advice as he
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continued to desire American control of the islands under some 
form of trusteeship. In fact, when Anthony Eden said that 
they should become the property of the United States, the 
President maintained that the islands should be "under some 
kind of trusteeship". The British Foreign Secretary for his 
part was extremely suspicious of Franklin Roosevelt's 
suggestion that so far as security in the Far East was 
concerned, China should be a trustee power and Hong Kong 
returned to her as a token of "goodwill".^ On the whole, 
however, in view of British antipathy to outside interference 
in her colonial domains, President Roosevelt refrained from 
referring to the use of British dependencies as strategic 
bases for the "Four Policemen". He was not so restrained so 
far as French ones were concerned:
"All other Pacific islands (with exception of the two groups 
mentioned below) would remain under their present 
sovereignty, British, French, or whatnot, but would have a 
common economic policy such as is to be set up in the West 
Indies. The French Maro/iesas and Tuamotu Islands would pass 
to the United Nations, for use respectively as stages on the 
northern and southern air routes across the Pacific from the 
Caribbean area to Australia and New Zealand. Korea and 
French Indo-China would pass under international 
trusteeship; for the former the trustees might be the United 
States, the Soviet Union and China."
Franklin Roosevelt's ideas, moreover, were global in 
scope and not confined to the Pacific area. He suggested, for 
example, that "Dakar and Bizerta were of the greatest 
importance for the defence respectively of the United States 
and the Mediterranean. His idea was that the United States 
should act as policemen for the United Nations at Dakar and 
Great Britain at Bizerta".^0
The Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow, October 1943. At 
the briefing session on October 6, 1943 for the American 
delegation prior to their departure for Moscow, Franklin 
Roosevelt told Cordell Hull and Admiral William Leathy that 
the United States "ought to lay great stress on the
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possibilities of the trusteeship idea and apply it widely to 
all sorts of situations":^
”1. The Baltic passages - Kjel and the Straits - might 
each be set up as a free zone, under international trustees,
2. A similar zone might be arranged for Russia and the 
Persian Gulf,
3. The British might, as a gesture of generosity, return to 
China sovereignty over Hong Kong and its peninsula^ while 
China might, in return, immediately declare Hong Kong a free 
Port under international trusteeship,
4. Indo-China might be placed under international 
trusteeship.
5. The mandated islands of the Pacific might be taken away 
from Japan and placed under international trustees.
6. Security points in many parts of the world might be 
placed under international trustees - Truk, Bonine Islands, 
Kurile Islands (although the Kuriles should really go to 
Russia), Rab$ul or some point in the Solomons, appropriate 
points in the Dutch East Indies, Ascension Island, Dakar, 
some point in Liberia."'^
Franklin Roosevelt emphasised that a "variation of the 
Trusteeship idea might be applied tq? colonial areas". He said 
that the American draft "Declaration of the"United Nations on
4
National Independence" had "great possibilities", especially 
its "inspection and publicity features, which would be 
powerful means of inducing colonial powers to develop their 
colonies for the good of the dependent peoples themselves and 
of the world".^ However, as Anthony Eden had already written 
to Cordell Hull stating that "in general" Great Britain could 
not agree with the American draft Declaration, the Secretary 
of State distributed it to Eden and Molotov at the Moscow 
meeting "solely to give.... an idea of the [American] 
position".^ Anthony Eden would not discuss it and repeated 
that "his Government was not in agreement with the views set 
forth".^
The Tehran Conference of November/December 1943^  During the 
deliberations between Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt 
and Joseph Stalin at the Tehran Conference, the use of 
colonies as strategic bases was again raised. The President 
reiterated that the United States did not want sovereignty
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over the Japanese Pacific islands mandate. He also criticised 
France*s record and suggested that at least some of her 
colonies be placed under trusteeship:
"He mentioned specifically the question of New Caledonia and 
Dakar, the first of which he said represented a threat to 
Australia and New Zealand and, therefore, should be placed 
under the trusteeship of the United Nations. In regard to 
Dakar, the President said he was speaking for twenty-one 
American nations when he said that Dakar in unsure hands was 
a direct threat to the Americas."''
Harry Hopkins elaborated on the President's notion of 
strategic bases to Eden and Molotov:
"The location of these future strong points and what they 
will require in the way of land, sea and air forces will 
have to be worked out with a view as to who would be a 
potential enemy. The President feels it essential to world 
peace that Russia, Great Britain, and the United States work 
out this central question....the question of building up 
bases in the Pacific should not be a difficult one. The 
Americans do not want sovereignty over any of the islands 
that are freed from the Japanese. The United Nations may 
exercise some sort of protective influence over them. As 
regards the Philippines, when they gain their independence 
we would still consider it advisable to have naval and air 
bases there under United States rather than United Nations 
control."'8
Winston Churchill made it very clear that "with 
reference to the occupation of bases and strong points in the 
vicinity of Germany and Japan", there was no question of 
British territory being placed under trusteeship for such 
purposes. He "stated that as far as Britain was concerned 
they do not desire to acquire any new territory or bases, but 
intended to hold on to what they had":
"He said that nothing would be taken away from England 
without a war. He mentioned specifically Singapore and Hong 
Kong. He said a portion of the British Empire might 
eventually be released but that this would be done entirely 
by Great Britain herself, in accordance with her own moral 
precepts. He said that Great Britain, if asked to do so, 
might occupy certain bases under trusteeship-provided others 
would help pay the cost of such occupation. '9
Thus, so far as his ideas on strategic bases under 
trusteeship were concerned, the President was left in little 
doubt that the traditional colonial power among the designated
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"Four Policemen", Great Britain, opposed them, especially if 
they appeared to threaten British sovereignty over her 
dependencies•
Apotheosis. President Roosevelt*s perception of trusteeship 
as a vehicle promoting international security reached its 
apotheosis in the early part of 1944. The fundamental point 
to grasp is that he continued to see no contradiction between 
American and global security. The use of trust territories as 
bases for an international police force or furthering 
international trade remained a constant theme in his 
conception of the postwar peace settlement in general and the 
colonial settlement in particular. That his views on the 
future of such disparate territories as the Bonins, Dakar, and 
Hong Kong, aroused the suspicions of the United States*
Western European wartime allies, was of comparatively minor 
concern to the President in the early part of 1944. By the 
time of the Yalta Conference between the Big Three in February 
1945, however, the President’s enthusiasm for trusteeship as a 
vehicle to internationalise strategic and other bases had 
somewhat waned. This was due in part to preoccupation with 
more immediate wartime issues and a general loss of energy 
because of his declining health. As is be shown in Chapter 6, 
there was also the need to take into consideration both the 
American military*s desire for strategic bases, especially 
unfettered control of the Japanese mandated islands, and Great 
Britain’s intention to retain full control of her 
dependencies•
Franklin Roosevelt and the Future of Dependent Peoples. 
Although the President*s perception of trust territories as 
bases for the future international policemen reached its peak 
in the first half of 1944, there is no real evidence to 
suggest that he ever qualified his belief that the interests 
of dependent peoples would be served best by placing them 
under some form of international trusteeship. As already
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indicated, however, President Roosevelt did not believe that 
dependent peoples could necessarily achieve independence 
immediately or that it would be wise for them to do so.
Instead, he favoured building on the American experience in 
the Philippines and having independence as a goal to be 
achieved within a finite time period; this process taking 
place within the context of some form of international 
trusteeship. His views were explained to Molotov during the 
latter*s visit to Washington in May 1942:
"Turning to the question of colonial possessions, the 
President took as examples Indo China, Siam, and the Malay 
States, or even the Dutch East Indies. The last-mentioned 
would some day be ready for self-government, and the Dutch 
know it. Each of these areas would require a different 
lapse of time before achieving readiness for independence, 
but a palpable surge towards independence was there just the 
same, and the white nations thus could not hope to hold 
these areas as colonies in the long run. Chiang Kai-Shek... 
therefore had the idea that some form of interim trusteeship 
would be the best mode of administering these territories 
until they were ready for self-government. They might, the 
President added, be ready for self-government in twenty 
years, during which the trustees might endeavour to 
accomplish what the United States did for the Philippines in 
forty-two years."80
The essential ingredient of Franklin Roosevelt’s advocacy 
of international trusteeship for advancing dependent peoples, 
was that the colonial powers could not be trusted to do this 
if they retained unrestricted sovereignty. His own wartime 
journeys and observations, albeit of necessity of a cursory 
nature, merely confirmed and reinforced his dislike of 
colonialism. For example, his comments on British rule in 
Gambia following a brief stay in Bathurst, the colony’s 
capital, while on route to his Casablanca meeting with Winston 
Churchill in January 1943:
"This morning.... at about eight thirty, we drove through 
Bathurst to the air field. The natives were just getting to 
work. In rags... glum-looking... They told us the natives 
would look happier around noon time, when the sun should 
have burned off the dew and the chill. I was told the 
prevailing wages for these men was... one shilling 
ninepence. Less than fifty cents ...
... Fifty cents a day. Besides which they’re given a half­
cup of rice... Dirt. Disease. Very high mortality rate.
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... Life expectancy ... Twenty-six years. Those people are 
treated worse than the livestock. Their cattle live 
longer."81
These became a frequently quoted example of the inquities 
of colonialism. Thus, he described his impressions of the 
Gambia to a press conference in February 1944:
"I think there are about three million inhabitants, of whom
one hundred and fifty are white. And it's the most horrible 
thing I have ever seen in my life .... the natives are five 
thousand years back of us. Disease is rampant, absolutely. 
It's a terrible place for disease."8*^
To President Roosevelt, British rule in the Gambia aptly 
demonstrated that colonialism was "just plain exploitation" of 
the dependent people concerned:
"I looked it up .... and I got to the point of view that for
every dollar that the British, who have been there for two 
hundred years, have put into Gambia, they have taken out 
ten."8'3
At the Cairo Conference of November 1943, he emphasised 
that the French "would have no right, after-the war, simply to 
walk back into Indo-China and reclaim that rich land for no 
reason other than it had been their colony":
"the most the French should have was a trusteeship of their 
colonies responsible to a United Nations organisation 
looking toward eventual independence, once the United 
Nations were satisfied that the colonies could manage their 
own affairs."8^
At the Teheran Conference which immediately followed the 
Cairo one, the President confided his views on the future of 
Indo-China and trusteeship privately to Marshall Stalin:
"The President said....that after 100 years of French rule in 
Indo-China, the inhabitants were worse off than they had 
been before. He said that Chiang Kai-shek had told him 
[that].... the people of Indo-China were not yet ready for 
independence. To which he had replied that when the United 
States acquired the Philippines the inhabitants were not 
ready for independence.... He added that he had discussed 
with Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of a system of 
trusteeship for Indo-China which would have the task of 
preparing the people for independence within a definite 
period of time, perhaps twenty to thirty years".8*3
Indeed, a constant theme in the President's views on the 
postwar world, was that Indo-China should be placed under some
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form of international trusteeship in the best interests of its 
native inhabitants. The British were aware of his views on 
this matter. For example, Franklin Roosevelt had raised the 
issue during Anthony Eden*s visit to Washington in March 1943, 
and raised it again with the British Ambassador to Washington, 
Lord Halifax, in the early part of 1944:
"I... told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that 
I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo- 
China should not go back to France but that it should be 
administered by an international trusteeship. France has 
had the country.... for nearly one hundred years, and the 
people are worse off than they were at its beginning11.
The Cairo Declaration of December 1st, 1943, signed by 
China, Great Britain, and the United States, in the 
President*s eyes at least was a milestone setting forth 
universal rights to independence. He emphasised this right in 
a radio address to the American people:
"At Cairo....we were able to discuss certain.... long-range 
principles which we believe can assure peace in the Far East 
for many generations to come.
Those principles are as simple as they are fundamental. 
They involve the restoration of stolen property to its 
rightful owners and the recognition of the rights of 
millions of people in the Far East to build up their own 
forms of self-government without molestation....
Britain, Russia, China and the United States.... must be 
united and cooperate with all the freedom-loving peoples of 
Europe, and Asia, and Africa, and the Americas. The rights 
of every Nation, large or small, must be respected and 
guarded as jealously as are the rights of every individual 
within our own Republic.
The doctrine that the strong shall dominate the weak is 
the doctrine of our enemies - and we reject it.11®'
Overall, President Roosevelt’s personal commitment to the 
notion of some form of international trusteeship to aid 
dependent peoples achieve independence was of crucial 
importance. His views were vague and at times rather home- 
spun, frequently expressed in an anecdotal fashion. Often, 
they were not fully thought-out to their logical conclusions; 
too concerned with generalities to be able to withstand 
sustained criticism. But what else could be expected? As the 
head of the most important member of the Allied wartime
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coalition, he had more immediate matters calling for his 
attention than the postwar future of dependent peoples. It is 
also true that he did not keep his Administration fully 
conversant with his plans on trusteeship; particularly the 
various groups within the State Department working on specific 
blueprints to institutionalise international accountability in 
the postwar world. Indeed, so far as the Cairo Declaration 
was concerned, the State Departments Territorial Sub­
committee actually working on plans regarding the Japanese Far 
Eastern empire, did not have "any indication as to the 
contents of the declaration1" and only learned of its details 
as they "appeared on the ticker tape".^ Y6t even if his 
advisors were not always fully coversant with his ideas, 
neither they nor the United States* British wartime allies 
could be in any doubt of the President’s general dislike of 
colonialism and desire to see some form of trusteeship 
established in the postwar world.
Moreover, while often ambiguous, a constant theme in his 
ideas was that international trusteeship would assist 
dependent peoples achieve at least a measure of self- 
government more efficiently and rapidly than would the status 
quo system where the colonial metropoles had unrestricted 
control. Even if trusteeship meant little more than 
the right to inspect dependencies by the international 
community, this was preferable to untrammelled sovereignty by 
the colonial powers. President Roosevelt also interpreted 
trusteeship in a sufficiently elastic manner to regard it as 
synonymous with American national interests. The importance 
of the Japanese mandated islands to American security was as 
clear to him as it was to those Americans who wished to annex 
them; their number including many of his closest and most 
senior military and civilian advisers as well as leading 
members of Congress. Indeed, in many ways, it would have been 
easier for him to have given way and annexed those islands.
The United States* wartime allies would certainly not have 
objected. In fact, Great Britain suggested such a policy and
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would have welcomed it; especially as it might help protect 
her control of the British Empire in the postwar world. 
President Roosevelt opposed annexation; anti­
colonialism being an integral part of his political 
philosophy. There is much truth in Willard Range's assessment 
that Franklin Roosevelt was generally consistent "in his 
desire to see colonialism and spheres of influence replaced by 
trusteeships and independent states formed on the basis of 
self-determination. As a practical politician faced with 
specific problems he was often forced to compromise and accept 
half a loaf."®^ President Roosevelt has the greatest claim to 
be called the father of the United Nations trusteeship system 
because of the constancy and conviction of his ideas rather 
than their actual substance. Like Woodrow Wilson and the 
League mandates system, Franklin Roosevelt's strength of 
purpose preserved the notion of trusteeship when others might 
well have compromised.
4. Great Britain and the postwar future of dependent
peoples^
Although there were considerable Anglo-American 
misunderstandings over international accountability throughout 
the war, there was also much greater trans-Atlantic 
communication at all levels, from diplomatic summits by 
Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt to exchanges by 
relatively minor officials, than had been the case with the 
Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson Administrations during the 
First World War. Yet there was still suspicion and the 
absence of clear perceptions of each others' motives clouding 
Anglo-American discussions and collaboration over colonial 
questions. To many British officials at all levels, American 
suggestions of trusteeship for the Japanese mandated islands 
in the Pacific and some European dependencies, were merely 
guises for promoting American interests. Richard Law, for 
example, suggested that the desire for an Anglo-American 
declaration on the principles to govern colonial
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administration expressed by Isaiah Bowman in his visit to 
London in April 1944, was partly determined by Franklin 
Roosevelt's strategy for the 1944 American presidential 
elections:
"If no such declaration were made, the President would 
be accused, during the forthcoming Presidential Election 
in the United States, of being a champion of imperialism."^
The basic attitude of Winston Churchill's wartime 
government to colonial problems was two-fold: no diminution
of the British Empire and no interference in its affairs by 
outside forces - whether they were the United States or the 
envisaged postwar United Nations. The views of the Prime 
Minister were in many respects anachronistic, influenced as 
they were by his formative years and experiences as a young 
man during the later years of the Victorian age. His 
attitudes in large part had been determined by first-hand 
observations of the British Raj, the struggle against the 
barbarous hordes of the "Mad" Mahdi and his" dancing Dervishes 
in the Sudan, and the vicissitudes of the Boer War. These 
observations might have been over-glamourised, simplistic, and 
even false, but they underlay a firm belief that an essential 
ingredient for a secure and peaceful postwar world was a 
strong and prosperous British Empire.
Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary for much of the 
war, agreed with Winston Churchill in opposing international 
supervision of the British colonies. In March 1943, he 
publicly stated that "the administration of British colonies 
must continue to be the sole responsibility of Great 
Britain".^ xo satisfy the Labour members of the British War 
Cabinet and the Roosevelt Administration, however, the 
Colonial Office did countenance essentially voluntary 
"consultative committees" at the regional level, nothing more. 
Moreover, the Colonial Office view was that the League 
mandates system itself should be abolished.
The Foreign Office, however believed that the Colonial 
Office's hard line was a mistake; a belief which grew stronger
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as the Second World War progressed and Great Britain*s 
dependence on the United States became more apparent. For 
example, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary 
of State, suggested that obtaining future American economic 
assistance might become more difficult because of Colonial 
Office intransigence on the question of international 
accountability. There was a colonial quid quo pro for 
American aid:
"the United States approach to the problem would probably be 
that we were asking them to ‘underwrite* the British Empire 
and that from their point of view it was natural that they
should expect to have some say in how the British Empire was 
run. **93
Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence 
Official British plans on the international dimensions 
regarding the future of dependent peoples for much of the war 
were essentially negative and often merely a response to 
American initiatives, real and imagined. Thus, as already 
indicated, the British Government opposed the American 
proposal for a Declaration by the United Nations on National 
Independence. London disliked all pronouncements suggesting 
that "independence" was the inevitable goal of benevolent 
colonial policy. Anthony Eden told Cordell Hull at the first 
Quebec Conference in August 1943, that the word "independence1* 
troubled him as he had to think of the British Empire system 
which was built on varying degrees of self-government:
"running from the Dominions through the colonial 
establishments which had in some cases, like Malta, 
complete self-government, to backward areas that were 
never likely to have their own government. He added that 
Australia and New Zealand also had colonial possessions 
that they would be unwilling to remove from their 
supervisory jurisdiction."9^
Anthony Eden*s objection to the word "independence" 
prevented any agreement even though Cordell Hull pointed out 
that his intention was only "to give encouragement to the 
peoples in dependent areas":
"This was not with any view to their being given, tomorrow 
or next week, complete independence as separate entities,
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but to offer them, at some time when they could prove they 
were capable of independence, the possibility of so 
conducting their political development that they might be 
able to hope for this achievement."^
American proposals, however, did provide the impetus for 
the British to rethink and formulate schemes of their own. 
Anthony Eden especially attached "the greatest importance" to 
Great Britain "taking the initiative" as if matters were 
allowed to drift, it could "well be confronted by a draft 
Declaration composed by the Americans" which could "be far 
less satisfactory" from the British point of v i ew.^
Regional Cooperation The first official British plans were 
formulated in September 1942 and based on voluntary regional 
cooperation by the administering powers as an alternative to 
trusteeship and international accountability. The then 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Cranborne, envisaged 'Regional 
Councils' to replace the Permanent Mandates-Commission:
"the functions of the international supervisory body would be 
analogous to the Mandates Commission but that instead of 
being composed of representatives of small states having no 
practical experience of colonial administration it would 
consist of representatives of the administering States 
themselves and would be in a sense an expert body of which 
the members, in considering particular problems would be 
aware of kindred problems in the territories under their own 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . '
He proposed "consultative Committees" in each main 
"Colonial area, the Far East, Africa, and the Caribbean"; to 
be "composed of representatives of all the nations interested 
territorially in those particular areas". While the United 
States would have to be represented on the "Caribbean 
Committee" where she "would be a great nuisance" and 
"constantly be interfering in the internal affairs of our West 
Indian Colonies", she could be "excluded" from "the African 
Continent" as "they have no territorial interests there".
There would be no accountability to any international body:
"These regional committees would in one essential respect be 
different from the [Permanent Mandates Commission]....That 
body was formed to ensure the application in the mandated 
territories, of certain principles, and to report to an
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outside body, the League. The Committees which I have in 
mind would have nothing to do with any outside body."y°
Lord Cranborne's successor as Colonial Secretary, Oliver 
Stanley, developed the regional idea. His ideas were outlined 
to the House of Commons in July 1943. He pointed out that 
"developments of modern transport and modern communications 
have brought close together vast areas which before were 
widely separated". Therefore, it would be sensible to 
establish cooperative machinery in the form of "Commissions 
for certain regions" as "many of the problems today are common 
problems and can only be solved in cooperation, for problems 
of security, of transport, of economics, of health, etc., 
transcend the boundaries of political units". The 
Commissions "would comprise not only the States with Colonial 
Territories in the region, but also other States which have in 
the region a major strategic or economic interest". He 
implied that these regional commissions would function better 
than the Permanent Mandates Commission as it would now "be 
possible to have international cooperation which consisted of 
something more than theoretical discussion" and "able to 
grapple with realities and get down to the solution of 
individual problems". While emphasising that "We retain 
complete control of our administration", there was an 
international dimension, albeit regional and collaborative 
rather than global and accountable:
"While each State would remain responsible for the 
administration of its own territory, such a Commission would 
provide effective and permanent machinery for consultation 
and collaboration so that the States concerned might work 
together to promote the well being of the colonial 
territories.
Participation in the work of the regional commissions 
would be optional not compulsory on the part of the 
administering powers. It was proposed, moreover, "to confine" 
the commissions' powers to "mutually helpful and consultative" 
ones.^®^ In fact, implicit throughout was the policy doctrine 
that Great Britain's colonial administration was not to be
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accountable to the regional commissions or to any other 
international body. vk*.r>
The scheme was based on the assumptionj/held by Winston 
Churchill and others, that the world was too large and too 
complex to be organised as one single international system; 
therefore, it must be divided up into a few suitable regions 
(Africa, America, Asia, Europe and so forth) for the purposes 
of all future international c o l l a b o r a t i o n . g o  far as the 
United States was concerned, the primary objective of British 
policy was to divert the State Department away from schemes 
envisaging a single global institution with responsibilities 
for dependent territories and towards plans for specific 
regional commissions for particular territories.
Unfortunately, from the British point of view, while President 
Roosevelt was inclined to favour regional schemes as a part of 
the accountability system, the American Secretary of State, 
Cordell Hull, believed that international problems were best 
tackled on a global rather than a regional basis.
The discussions which Isaiah Bowman had in London with 
British ministers and officials in April 1944 on future 
international collaboration regarding dependent peoples 
demonstrated the difference in emphasis between Great Britain 
and the United States over the regional aspect. The British 
were left in little doubt that the Americans believed that 
solely regional solutions to questions of international 
accountability for dependent peoples, would be insufficient 
and that there must be a truly international element:
"He stressed the fact that public opinion in the United 
States demanded that something should be said on the subject 
in connection with the World Organisation and that it was 
not sufficient to leave it to evolve from whatever regional 
organisations might be set up. " ^ *
Oliver Stanley*s attitude to making regional commissions 
accountable to the envisaged United Nations or to any other 
international body, was assessed by Dr. Bowman; "he would see 
us in Hades before he agreed to such a proposal". The 
Colonial Secretary, however, had by then come to accept that
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administering powers should publish flannual reports which 
[should] be transmitted to a receiving centre attached to the 
World Organisation11. But this "organisation would do nothing 
more than acknowledge receipt and retain the reports available 
for i n s p e c t i o n " . H e  was determined to give nothing else 
away in the direction of international accountability. In his 
mind at least, there was no question of the reports being used 
as the basis for some form of supervision regarding dependent 
territories.
In August 1944 the British delegation arrived at the 
Dumbarton Oaks meeting on postwar international organisation 
expecting to discuss elaborate American plans for 
international accountability regarding dependent peoples.
These were not forthcoming due to an American decision made on 
July 18, 1944, at the insistence of the American Joint Chiefs 
of Staff:
".... for the overriding military reasons o f .... avoiding 
questions directly or indirectly related to the subject of 
postwar territorial settlements, the decision was made to 
omit the section on international trusteeship from the 
Proposals and to remove this subject from the scope of 
matters to be raised by the United States in the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conversations."10-*
At Dumbarton Oaks, however, there were important 
conversations on the trusteeship issue between leading 
American officials such as Leo Pasvolsky and Benjamin Gerig, 
and British ones like Hilton Poynton-1-^0 and Gladwyn Jebb.
These conversations along with the American military's 
opposition to trusteeship are examined in Chapter 6. Suffice 
for the moment to state that the State Department officials at 
Dumbarton Oaks hoped their British counterparts would submit 
proposals on international accountability for dependent 
peoples which would assist them in their internal dispute with 
the American military authorities. In effect, the anti­
colonialists of the State Department wanted the aid of the 
British "colonialists" in their disagreements with the 
American military "annexationists" regarding a strengthened 
system of international accountability for dependent peoples
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under the new United Nations Charter, Politics at all 
levels and of all varieties can lead to some very strange 
bed-fellows and alliances!
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Chapter 6: Conflict and Resolution : Annexation or
Trusteeship
The American military disliked the concept of 
international trusteeship.^ President Roosevelt wished to 
internationalise the Japanese mandated islands, but the 
military favoured their annexation and also American control 
of island bases belonging to the European colonial powers.
For example, in April 1943, the General Board of the Navy 
maintained that in the interests of national security, the 
United States should acquire Pacific islands belonging to her 
wartime allies,
'*(a) The transfer to the United States by Britain or the 
British Dominions of the sovereignty of British Samoa, 
British Line Islands, Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands, 
British Phoenix Islands and the Union Islands.
(b) The transfer to the United States by France of the 
sovereignty of the Marquesas, Society, and Tubuai Islands, 
the Tuamotu Archipelago, and the New C&leionia Colony 
which includes the New Caledonia group, tne Loyalty Group, 
and the Wallis Islands."^
Indeed, the need to accommodate the military's desire 
for unrestricted control of the Japanese mandated islands in 
large measure underlay the modifications in the State 
Department's more sweeping blueprints for international 
accountability for dependent peoples in the postwar world. 
Even the limited trusteeship formula proposed by the Informal 
Political Agenda Group in the summer of 1944, was disliked 
by the military, although it had been devised with their 
views (as well as British ones) in mind.
The analysis in this chapter begins with a section on 
the roots and impact of the military's opposition to 
trusteeship and wish to annex the Japanese mandated islands. 
This is followed by a section on the continuing Anglo- 
American trusteeship dialogue. These two sections provide 
the necessary background for section 3 which investigates the 
attempts to resolve the internal American debate on 
trusteeship or annexation regarding the Japanese mandated
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islands and the impact this had on the American proposals for 
dependent territories immediately prior to the opening of the 
San Francisco Conference in April 1945, The chapter 
concludes with a summary of those proposals.
1. Military Objections to Trusteeship
The American military establishment believed that the 
United States should obtain sovereign powers over all bases 
deemed essential to American security. Admiral William 
Leathy, for example, "always felt that any bases considered 
essential for the security of our own country should be under 
the sovereignty of the United States". He did not like 
President Roosevelt*s "plan for a series of strategic bases 
all over the world to be controlled by the United Nations":
"His argument, particularly in regard to strategic areas in 
the Japanese mandated group which we had captured at a 
great cost in American lives, was that the United States 
did not wish to acquire any territorial gains as a result 
of the war. That was a fixed principle with him.
Roosevelt believed that we would get the same protection 
if the mandated territory was under the United Nations.
I thought he was wrong then and have not changed my 
mind.
The roots of American military thinking on this question 
lay at least as far back as the strategic concepts explored 
by Admiral Alfred Mahan at the turn of the twentieth century 
which were examined in Chapter 2. The essential idea was 
that island bases near to the homeland should be secured in 
case they fell into the hands of an actual or potential 
enemy. Conversely, island bases near to the territory of 
enemies could be used to concentrate forces and for 
retaliation. Thus, Japan could and eventually did use her 
Pacific islands mandate to attack Hawaii, the Philippines and 
other American overseas possessions. Therefore, an essential 
prerequisite of United States security was that these islands 
should be firmly under American control. As was pointed out 
in Chapter 4, however, the United States had entered the 
First World W7ar too late to obtain control of the German
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island colonies in the Pacific, At the Paris Peace 
Conference, the importance to American security of these 
islands played a large part in President Wilson’s successful 
efforts to have the no-fortification rule written into 
Article 22 of the League Covenant. Thanks largely to 
American pressure, Article 4 of the treaty mandating the 
Carolines, Marianas, and Marshalls to Japan stated:
f,The military training of the natives, otherwise than for 
purposes of internal police and the local defense of the 
territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military 
or naval bases shall be established, or fortifications 
erected in the territory."'*
Again, largely due to American pressure, the Washington 
Disarmament Conference of 1921/22^ also made arrangements to 
limit Japan's military use of the islands:
"1. A ten-year non-aggression treaty in regard to the 
islands in the Pacific....
2. A five-power (United States, Japan, British Empire, 
France, and Italy) agreement to maintain the status quo 
with regard to fortification and naval bases until 31 
December 1936.
3. A Japanese-American treaty by which the United States 
agreed to the mandate, obtained for itself the same rights 
as a member of the League, and full privileges in regard to 
the use of Yap for cable and radio installations. Japan 
also assured the 'usual comity' to American nationals and 
vessels visiting the islands. °
Despite these theoretical limitations on Japanese 
military use of the Pacific islands mandate, during the 
Second World War it was widely believed in the United States 
that Japan had fortified and used them as indispensable bases 
for her military adventures from the 1930s onwards. In fact, 
the American "Army's Pearl Harbour Board linked this disaster 
of December 7, 1941, directly to [the United States] failure 
to have a showdown with Japan on her fortification of the 
Mandated islands".'7 Indeed, as early as 1921, a top secret 
Marine Corps planning document predicted hostilities between 
Japan and the United States in which the mandated islands 
would play key strategic roles:
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"Japan would initiate a war against the United States,
Japan*s objectives in launching an attack would be Hawaii, 
Wake, Midway, Guam, and the Philippines, It was dangerous 
to give Japan control over the mandate islands. The United 
States counter-attack plan, after the Japanese initial 
strike, called for seizure of key islands in the Marshall 
and Caroline Islands, These objectives would be necessary 
to provide the Fleet with bases from which to launch a 
counter-attack against the Philippines. The eventual 
advance on the Japanese homeland would have to be made via 
the Marianas and Bonin Islands."®
There is some doubt, however, as to whether Japan did 
fortify her Pacific islands mandate and the extent to which 
they were used as strategic platforms for launching her 
aggressive Far Eastern policies. Although Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes strove to limit Japan*s scope for using 
the islands for military purposes in the Washington naval 
treaties, "Dorothy Borg, an authority on American policy in 
the Pacific in the interwar years, reports in her writings 
that throughout the 1920s the State Department made no more 
than *half-hearted* efforts to get permission for the United 
States Navy to send ships into the islands for visits. The 
Japanese paid little attention and took no action to these 
r e q u e s t s . T h i s  position continued throughout the 1930s as 
is shown by Cordell Hull*s evidence to the Senate Committee 
on Naval Affairs in 1939:
"Secretary Hull admitted.... that the Japanese authorities 
had denied every request (four in number) that the (State 
Department).... had made for....visiting harbours and 
waters of the mandated islands....he asked the committee to 
keep this information secret. Under hush-hush precautions, 
the State Department replied to another query....the United 
States has at no time raised any question.... in regard to 
the obligations of Japan to the United States with respect
to the Japanese mandated islands."-*-0
Withdrawal from League membership in 1 9 3 5 ^  brought no 
change in Japan’s legal rights regarding her Pacific islands 
mandate:
"There was much unofficial discussion of Japan’s right to 
continue as a Mandatory Power, but no member of the League 
raised the question officially. Japan*s annual reports 
continued to arrive in Geneva for a few years more; but in
1938 she ceased to collaborate with the League.
Significantly, the final report submitted (late in 1939)
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failed to contain the usual paragraph to the effect that 
Japan had.not constructed fortifications or bases in the 
islands."1'"
Colonel /Haigwood points out that as well as "the 
publications and press coverage of the suspicions of the 
Mandates Commission, the United States Government was itself 
receiving information through its representatives in Japan 
that the Japanese might be fortifying Yap, Saipan and 
P a l a u " . T h e  potential dangers were noted as early as March 
1933 by the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Joseph Grew:
"There was abundant first hand evidence that Japan was 
engaging in military preparations on the mandated islands 
and that the whole problem of fortifications on the islands 
was full of potential dynamite and might yet cause as much 
trouble as Manchuria."1^
After examining the contemporary and other evidence, 
including the responsible Japanese military and naval leaders 
concerned, however, Colonel Haigwood concludes that "it seems 
conclusive that the Japanese did not fortifLy the Pacific 
mandated islands in the classic, dictionary sense of building 
large and permanent strongholds in violation of the League of 
Nations Mandates and the status quo provisions of the 
Washington Naval Conference":
"Prior to the commencement of World War II in Europe, 
evidence indicates that they did not build concrete gun 
emplacements, hardened command and control centres, and 
other construction associated with 'fortification1. 
Additionally, no organized military units were permanently 
stationed in the mandated islands during the period in 
question.
On the other hand, there appears to have been 
considerable cooperation between the commercial 
construction programmes of the Nanyo Corporation and the 
requirements of the Japanese military forces. These 
facilities provided the basic structure for naval bases, 
fuel facilities, repair shops and airports which were 
easily converted to military use when the requirement was 
generated in the late 1930s. Additionally, the many 
surveys made by the Japanese Navy and its air arm during 
the 1920s and 1930s made it possible for the military to 
launch almost immediately into required fortifications and 
building programmes when the war was about to start.
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Once the United States entered the Second World War, the 
American military were determined to obtain unfettered 
control over the mandated islands. Their view was that under 
Japanese rule the islands had become "permanent air craft 
carriers". They subscribed to the opinion summarised by 
Willard Price in the Spring 1944 edition of the Yale Review:
"It is now painfully clear that no power can hope to hold 
the Philippines and Guam unless it holds also the 
enveloping archipelago of Micronesia. Any strong nation 
with bases in the Carolines which approach to within 500 
miles of the Philippines, or the Marianas of which the 
nearest to Guam is less than fifty miles distant, can take 
both of these objectives within the first few weeks of 
war."^°
The islands were conquered at great cost in American men 
and resources,^ and by the end of the war, in American eyes 
at least, "Micronesia had emotional values aside from those 
of victory. It was the collective Louisbourg, the multiple 
Heligoland of the 1940*s - the enemy’s f o r t r e s s . I t  was 
widely held within the American military' establishment that 
Japan could not be permanently crushed. In the words of 
Captain H. Pence, a naval liaison officer working with the 
State Department:
"The Japanese would be our enemies for the next hundred 
years. If any strength is left to them they will seek 
revenge. The United States must make its position so 
secure that such a cataclysm shall never arise again.
A string of bases was absolutely necessary for our 
security.
The military opposed international obligations which, 
even if only in theory, limited their freedom of action with 
regard to Micronesia. As early as June 1943, Captain Pence 
left his State Department colleagues in no doubt regarding 
the military’s desire for American sovereignty over the 
islands:
"He personally believed that the security of the United 
States lay in the acquisition of absolute sovereignty over 
the mandated islands. Control over the mandated islands 
was closely connected with control over the Pacific Islands 
in general. The Pacific was ’our lake*; the United States 
should control a string of islands from Clipperton by way 
of the Marquesas to the Far East."2^
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The American military rejected even the tenuous 
international supervision which the League had exercised over 
the Japanese mandate. They were even more vehement in 
opposing supervision by an international body possessing 
inspection rights; they demanded "absolute base rights and 
administrative control'*. There was one-unnegotiable maxim; 
Micronesia was to be under national, not international
O -I
mandate. x Their primary objective was American annexation 
in the interests of national security. Frank Knox, then 
Secretary of the Navy, in March 1944, told the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee that his personal opinion was that "those 
mandated islands have become Japanese territory and as we 
capture them they are ours".^
The American military also opposed the Japanese mandated 
islands and other strategic areas being used as bases for an 
international police force on the grounds of impracticality. 
Vice-Admiral Russell Willson of the Joint Chiefs Strategic 
Survey Committee underlined this opposition to Leo Pasvolsky 
and his State Department colleagues in March 1944:
"He said that an international police force was altogether 
visionary as a practical proposition. Modern warfare was, 
in his opinion, so complex in operation that the genius of 
the best brains was tried even to handle national 
arrangements effectively. He said he could not visualize 
the possibility of taking people loyal to a number of 
different nations and welding them into an effective 
military organisation. He considered the idea of a 
permanent international force absolutely visionary." ^
On July 4, 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically
requested President Roosevelt for an assurance that the
United States would retain sovereign control over the
islands. At roughly the same time, James Forrestal, the new
Secretary of the Navy, informed Edward Stettinius that "it
seems to me a sine qua non of any postwar arrangements that
there should be no debate as to who ran the Mandated
Islands".^ In replying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
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July 10, 1944, President Roosevelt stated that he was working 
on a scheme to reconcile American interests with trusteeship:
"we have agreed that we are seeking no additional territory 
as a result of this war.
I am working on the idea that the United Nations will 
ask the United States to act, as Trustee for the Japanese 
Mandated Islands. With this will go....the military 
authority to protect them, i.e., fortifications, etc.
It does not necessarily involve a decision on permanent 
sovereignty.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, continued to prefer 
to have the trusteeship issue kept in abeyance until the 
Roosevelt Administration made a definite commitment for the 
United States to retain unfettered control of the mandated 
islands. As pointed out at the end of Chapter 5, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff along with the Secretaries for the Navy and 
War, James Forrestal and Henry Stimson, successfully insisted 
on the omission of Section IX on "Arrangements for 
Territorial Trusteeships" from the "Tentative Proposals for a 
General International Organisation" which the United States 
submitted to the Dumbarton Oaks meetings. Although not 
agreeing with the American military, their viewpoint was ably 
summarised by Cordell Hull:
"The Joint Chiefs felt that a discussion of the trusteeship 
system would inevitably embrace concrete questions of who 
should be trustee over what territories, and that 
dissension might therefore arise among the major Allies.
Furthermore, they were anxious to keep the whole matter 
open pending a determination within our own Government of a 
definite policy with regard to the subsequent disposal of 
some of the Japanese islands in the Pacific, including 
those held by Japan under mandate. It was their view that 
complete control of these islands by the United States for 
military purposes was necessary to our national security, 
and they felt that this could perhaps best be achieved 
through outright annexation rather than through a 
trusteeship system."^®
Moreover, there was considerable sentiment in the United 
States generally and in Congress particularly favouring 
annexation. For example, in April 1945, Representative James 
Wadsworth asserted that the United States must retain 
unfettered control of the "Japanese mandated islands
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recovered by our blood and treasure".^ Like Franklin 
Roosevelt, the American military and their supporters tended 
to equate American security with world security. However, 
whereas the President believed this could be achieved within 
the context of the security aspects of international 
trusteeship which would also be in the best interests of the 
dependent people concerned, the military believed in 
protecting the United States through self-reliance which, so 
far as the Japanese mandated islands were concerned, meant 
annexation. The wishes and interests of the dependent 
peoples involved were either overlooked, considered 
irrelevant, or seen as best served by being placed under 
American sovereignty.
Members of the American military establishment were also 
aware of British opposition to trusteeship. Admiral Leathy, 
for example, accompanied President Roosevelt to the Teheran 
and Yalta Conferences, and witnessed with approval Winston 
Churchill*s trenchant distaste for all attempts, via 
trusteeship or any other device, to interfere in the affairs 
of the British Empire.^ However, Oliver Stanley and his 
Colonial Office officials were unaware of the American 
military's viewpoint; when visiting Washington they met State 
Department personnel and had little if any contact with the 
American military.
2. The Continuing Anglo-American Dialogue
The British delegates to the Dumbarton Oaks meetings on 
postwar international organisation were extremely surprised 
when the Americans omitted all reference to international 
trusteeship in their formal proposals and the tentative 
conference agenda. Largely at American behest, and one with 
which the British were only too willing to concur, 
trusteeship was not formally discussed at Dumbarton Oaks. 
Consequently, the blueprint for a postwar United Nations 
Organisation set forth in the Dumbarton Oaks "Proposals for 
the Establishment of a General International Organisation",
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contained no reference to international trusteeship.^
When they arrived at Dumbarton Oaks, the British 
delegates were unaware of the extent of the differences 
within the Roosevelt Administration over the trusteeship 
question. They would have welcomed American annexation of 
the Japanese islands mandate, especially as such a move would 
enhance Great Britain's own efforts to preserve her colonial 
domains; a policy calculation of which the Americans were 
very much aware. As was intimated in Chapter 5, this had 
been underlined as far back as March 1943 in Anthony Eden's 
Washington conversations with President Roosevelt, Cordell 
Hull, and Harry Hopkins.
There is evidence to suggest that prior to the Dumbarton 
Oaks meetings, the Foreign Office did have some inkling that 
the State Department's trusteeship schemes were being subject 
to review because of the American military's desire to annex 
the Japanese mandated islands. J. E. Williams maintains that 
in the course of the Stettinius Mission to London in April 
1944, the "impression" was given "that this was the real 
cause of the change in American policy" away from the State 
Department's earlier "more idealistic schemes involving 
trusteeship and dependent peoples". The problem confronting 
the Roosevelt Administration was how to justify seizing the 
mandated islands and avoid the charge of imperialism? "The 
only solution Washington believed, was to create a world 
organisation that appeared to have supervisory powers over
qrv
all colonies including the Marshall and Caroline Islands." 
Gladwyn Jebb records Isaiah Bowman as stating that "there was 
a particular reason which weighed heavily" with Franklin 
Roosevelt and Cordell Hull:
"It was essential in their view that the United States 
should by one means or another control the Japanese islands 
in the Pacific. On the one hand, they could not annex 
these outright without violating the Atlantic Charter and 
other statements regarding 'aggrandisement'. Consequently 
they would be bound to camouflage their action by some, 
arrangement under which the United States would be acting 
at the instance and in the interests of the United Nations. 
It would in their view be far more easy to arrive at such
261
an arrangement if some previous arrangement had been 
previously come to providing for an increase of United 
Nations ’interest1 in all colonial areas.1,31
Undoubtedly, if the British had been fully conversant 
with the magnitude of the differences between the American 
military and the State Department over trusteeship, then they 
would have endeavoured to exploit the situation to attempt to 
sink the notion of international accountability for dependent 
peoples once and for all. It is therefore somewhat 
paradoxical that in informal talks during the Dumbarton Oaks 
meetings, Leo Pasvolsky and his colleagues endeavoured to 
persuade the British delegates to develop the notion of 
international trusteeship so that they, the State Department 
officials, could use such a British initiative to advantage 
in their differences with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the Navy and War Departments. Henry Willard actually 
told Hilton Poynton that the "War and Navy Departments 
frankly advocated annexation". ^ 2 Leo PasvoT.sky, however, 
informed Gladwyn Jebb that "some kind of new system would 
have to be applied to the Italian and Japanese Empires".^3 
Indeed, it was clear to the British that American anti­
colonial sentiment was such that Great Britain would be 
unlikely "to secure the abolition of the mandates" system 
without it "being assimilated to whatever regime is decided 
for the Italian and Japanese colonies".^
Nevertheless, the generally ambiguous and rather 
conciliatory attitudes of Leo Pasvolsky and the State 
Department team at the Dumbarton Oaks and related informal 
meetings, developed a misleading sense of security in the 
British. In particular, Leo Pasvolsky told Hilton Poynton 
that he would welcome a British initiative on the colonial 
question and failed to "raise the question of supervision".^ 
As is shown by Lord Halifax’s memorandum to Anthony Eden, the 
British underestimated the amount of work which the State 
Department had already done on international trusteeship and 
the almost-finalised nature of its plans:
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"On these points vagueness and obscurity of much of what 
Pasvolsky said appeared to arise largely from the fact that 
he was evidently groping himself for ideas and phrases; and 
seemed to indicate that American thinking is still in an 
embryonic stage where we can do much to influence it."^°
The Colonial Office decided to respond positively to Leo 
Pasvolsky's intimation that Washington would welcome a 
British initiative on the trusteeship. To quote Oliver 
Stanley; "It was important that we should take the initiative 
and should not wait for the Americans to make the first move, 
lest they should put forward schemes which were 
unsatisfactory from our point of view, but might attract 
support."*^ Work on the document which eventually became the 
"International Aspects of Colonial Policy", began in the 
middle of October and was presented to the British Cabinet on 
December 16, 1944.^ Primarily the work of Hilton Poynton 
and Kenneth Robinson, the document was the most c\eY&\\e\ 2 
British policy paper on trusteeship developed during the
o q
Second World War, y It was essentially a synthesised 
development of earlier official British ideas. Throughout 
constant themes were the inadequacies of the League mandates 
system and the desirability of its more useful functions 
being assumed by new regional bodies. The objective was a 
modicum of international responsibility for dependent peoples
'Met- •via regional commissions; accountability being secured ofivf-\V\Q, 
publicity.
The only real element of internationalism in the future 
government of the League mandates and the Italian colonies 
was to be via the new regional commissions. The well-being 
of these and other dependencies was the subject of Part I of 
"International Aspects of Colonial Policy" which stated that 
the objective of all good colonial administration was "to 
promote to the utmost the well-being of colonial peoples 
within the world community". This could not be best secured 
by international schemes like the mandates system due to 
uncertainty regarding the future of the dependencies coming 
under such schemes. Parts II and III set forth the
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document*s suggestions regarding international 
accountability. International collaboration regarding 
dependent territories would take place via “Regional 
Commissions*'; themselves a continuation of the earlier 
regional schemes advocated by Oliver Stanley among others.
The commissions would be consultative bodies only, dealing 
with social and economic matters of common interest in 
particular regions, but not constitutional ones. Membership 
would come from states with important interests in the region 
concerned. Sovereignty would not be infringed by 
international visits of inspection.
One provision to promote international collaboration was 
for ''Functional Agencies". These agencies, like the 
International Labour Organisation on which they were 
modelled, were designed to call attention to universal 
standards relating to "the problems of colonial 
administration which have a legitimate international 
interest". Although ruling out infringements of national 
sovereignty, the standards promoted by these functional 
agencies were considered applicable to the Red Indian tribes 
of North American as well as to the various peoples under 
British rule in the Indian sub-continent. A related 
proposal, outlined in "Measures to Ensure Publicity in 
Colonial Administration", was establishing an "International 
Colonial Centre". The papers to be kept in this new-style 
international colonial library would be available for public 
inspection, but the Centre itself would not have any powers 
involving policy initiatives; even in the field of research 
into colonial problems.
The "International Aspects of Colonial Policy" was 
approved by the War Cabinet on December 20, 1944, and became 
official governmental policy. Somewhat surprisingly, Winston 
Churchill made no objection to the "International Aspects of 
Colonial Policy" document when it was discussed by the War 
Cabinet.^ The Prime Minister, however, still had 
considerable misgivings. Thus, regarding Oliver Stanley's
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visit to Washington in January 1945, clear limits were set 
on discussions of colonial problems with Leo Pasvolsky and 
his colleagues:
"(1), to secure international agreement to the 
termination of the Mandate System and avoid its extension 
to enemy territories conquered in the present war and,
(2), to allow foreign powers a means of expressing 
their reasonable and legitimate interest in colonial 
territories without affecting our sovereignty and executive 
authority, or entitling them to meddle in constitutional 
questions, or establishing international bodies possessing 
powers of interference divorced from responsibility."^1
During his visit, Oliver Stanley stated publicly that 
Great Britain believed that so far as her dependencies were 
concerned, the desirable goal was self-government within the 
British Empire rather than independence as such.^ The most 
important aspect of his visit so far as international 
accountability was concerned, were discussions with Leo 
Pasvolsky, Charles Taussig, and Benjamin Gerig on January 18, 
1945.^ Although paying tribute to the work of the Permanent 
Mandates Commission, especially in publicising colonial 
problems, the Colonial Secretary maintained that the mandates 
system should be replaced by regional commissions. He 
accepted the notion of reporting to the new United Nations 
organisation via these commissions, and even countenanced the 
former having the power to frame the questionnaire on which 
the reports were to be based. Participation in the regional 
commissions and the submission of reports, however, would be 
a "voluntary" act by the colonial metropoles. He opposed 
"inspections" on the grounds that they "would weaken the 
position of the administering authorities in the eyes of 
native peoples and could only create confusion", and believed 
that "the petitioning by natives over the heads of the 
administering authorities was not helpful or practicable". 
Oliver Stanley was unable to accept Leo Pasvolsky*s 
distinction between colonies on the one hand, and mandates 
and detached Axis territories on the other. He argued that 
with regard to the British crown colony of the Gold Coast and
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the Togoland mandate, for example, "there was no point in 
preserving a distinction which had no practical meaning"•
The British view was that sovereignty over mandated 
territories rested with the respective administering powers, 
but the Americans held that it rested with the Allied and 
Associated Powers who had signed the peace treaties at the 
end of the First World War. Oliver Stanley left Washington 
with little doubt that the American State Department was 
committed to at least preserving the principles of the 
mandates system.^
The Yalta Conference. However, Oliver Stanley told Anthony 
Eden that in his opinion the United States would not press 
trusteeship issues at the forthcoming Yalta Conference 
between Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph 
Stalin. The latter so advised Winston Churchill:
"if the President should revert to this question during the 
forthcoming conference (and only of course if he does; you 
might very suitably say that we hope very shortly to 
present to his Government a well-considered plan for 
international collaboration in these problems. You might 
add that you would greatly hope that the Americans for 
their part would not circulate any papers on this subject 
until they had carefully studied our proposals•
Winston Churchill was thereby encouraged to attend the 
Yalta Conference with a false sense of security so far as the 
trusteeship question was concerned. The British complacency 
is demonstrated by the fact that there was no Colonial Office 
representative in the British delegation. The Foreign Office 
team accompanying Winston Churchill,^ whilst also concerned 
with preserving the integrity of the British Empire, attached 
more importance than did the Colonial Office to both 
preserving good Anglo-American relations generally and 
establishing the future United Nations. Notwithstanding the 
objections of his military advisers, however, President 
Roosevelt himself still desired "that the principle of 
international trusteeship be firmly established and that the
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international organisation should provide adequate machinery 
for that purpose*1:
"He said that the Army and Navy have been urging upon him 
the point of view that the United States should take over 
all or some of the mandated islands in the Pacific, but 
that he was opposed to such a procedure because it was 
contrary to the Atlantic Charter."^'
Indeed, immediately prior to the Yalta Conference,
Franklin Roosevelt maintained "that we are going to be able
to bring pressure on the British to fall in line with our
thinking in relation to the whole colonial q u e s t i o n * * . T h e
State Department, moreover, contrary to British expectations,
intended to try to obtain some agreement on the trusteeship
question at the Yalta Conference. There had been
considerable disquiet among American officials at Oliver
Stanley’s suggestion during his Washington visit that "other
colonial powers" take part in the discussions on trusteeship
as well as the Big Four. They interpreted this as "designed"
to offset the anticipated Chinese and Russian support for the
American desire to extend the principle of international
accountability, by winning ''support" from the European
colonial powers. The Americans also felt considerable
disquiet when Oliver Stanley made it "clear" that he wanted
"to eliminate" the distinction between "trust territories and
all other territories"; a procedure they "would regard as
retrogressive" . ^
At Yalta, the State Department officials intended to
forestall British attempts to place mandated territories
under more limited arrangements. Due to the American
military's reservations, there was no reference to specific
territories, but the Briefing Book the delegation took to the
Conference contained detailed trusteeship proposals. It was
considered "of utmost importance.... to get an agreement on
the principle of trusteeship".-^ A three part approach to
the problem of dependent territories was proposed:
"a. Creation of trusteeship mechanism by which the 
International Organisation would assume direct 
responsibility for the administration of certain dependent
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territories, in order to promote the social, economic, and 
political advancement of the peoples of trust territories 
and to enable these territories to contribute to 
international peace and security;
b. Establishment of regional advisory commissions for 
dependent territories generally, on the model of the Anglo- 
American Caribbean Commission, which would include the 
States administering dependencies in the particular region 
and other states having major strategic or economic 
interests therein; and
c. Adoption of a general declaration of principles 
designed to establish minimum political, economic, and 
social Standards for all non-self-governing territories, 
whether colonies, protectorates or trust territories•"***■
The Americans realised that the "British probably will 
propose regional advisory commissions as the sole device for 
expressing international responsibility with respect to 
dependent territories". With the sentiments recently 
expressed by Oliver Stanley in mind, the Americans surmised 
that the British view will be that regional commissions 
"could be employed to discharge, through consultation, a 
limited international accountability for'the administration 
of dependent territories". The Americans believed, however, 
that while "desirable", these commissions should be only "one 
part of an over-all international system".^2 jn actual fact, 
primarily because of Winston Churchill*s "outburst" on 
trusteeship at the Yalta Conference, neither the American 
regional scheme nor the general declaration of principles 
were raised at the Yalta Conference.
At the Malta meeting immediately prior to the Yalta 
Conference, Alger Hiss and James Byrnes informed Anthony Eden 
and Sir Alexander Cadogan that the United States wanted an 
agreement on the trusteeship "formula", but this overture was 
not passed on to either Winston Churchill or the Colonial
c o
Office. J Alger Hiss next raised the trusteeship question 
with Gladwyn Jebb at the outset of the Yalta Conference on 
February 4, 1945:
"He said that the American Administration were firmly of the 
opinion that to assimilate the existing mandates to 
existing territorial empires - even if this was part and 
parcel of some larger deal for the Colonies as a whole - 
would be a ’retrograde step*. He further argued that for
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such areas as the Japanese mandated islands and, notably, 
Korea, it would almost certainly be necessary to set up 
some kind of new machinery as a result of this war and that 
the British idea of having one State solely responsible for 
every {Impendent area could not therefore in practice
Alger Hiss then proposed a formula which stated that the 
Americans, British, and Russians were "agreed that there 
should be considered at the [forthcoming] United Nations 
Conference the subject of Territorial Trusteeships and 
Dependent Areas and that provision should be made in the 
[United Nations] Charter covering these points". Gladwyn 
Jebb realised that if Great Britain accepted this "formula it 
would be evident that we shall come near to committing 
ourselves to the principle of mandates both existing and 
possible, which we particularly want to avoid". Accordingly, 
he played for time and informed the Americans that the 
Colonial Office was drafting a set of proposals for Anglo- 
American discussion, and that if the Big Three agreed now on 
the principle of trusteeship, then "the French would 
immediately conclude that the whole World Organisation scheme 
was some kind of plot designed to deprive them of their 
colonial possessions".-^ Anthony Eden was not unduly alarmed 
as he had had a hint "from Harry Hopkins that the President 
himself may not press this too hard". He therefore suggested 
to Winston Churchill that "we wait to see what proposal [the 
President] makes, if any":
"the Americans have raised with us the question of 
'Territorial Trusteeship'.... their idea was that agreement 
should be included in the Charter of the World 
Organisation.... I expressed my doubts about this as it 
might commit us to a continuation if not an extension of 
the Mandates system.... They have now suggested that we 
should here agree to include in the records of this 
Conference an (unpublished) Protocol to the effect that 
this question 'should be considered at the United Nations 
Conference'. I am against this."-*°
The British delegation, however, misjudged both the 
persistence of the State Department officials and Franklin 
Roosevelt's own personal commitment regarding trusteeship as
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was shown when the question was raised in the Big Three 
discussions on February 9.-^ The Americans also 
underestimated Winston Churchill*s strength of feeling on the 
issue. On the morning of that day, on an American 
initiative, the three foreign ministers agreed that prior to 
the planned conference on the proposed United Nations, the 
envisaged five permanent members of the Security Council 
(China, France, Great Britain, the United States and the 
USSR) should hold discussions among themselves on "machinery 
in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship 
and dependent a r e a s " . A s  underlined in Chapter 2, when the 
issue came before the Big Three, Winston Churchill 
"exploded":^
"I absolutely disagree. I will not have one scrap of 
British territory flung into that area. After we have done 
our best to fight in this war and have done no crime to 
anyone I will have no suggestion that the British Empire is 
to be put into the dock and examined by everyone to see 
whether it is up to their standard. No one will induce me 
as long as I am Prime Minister to let any representative of 
Great Britain go to a conference where we will be placed in 
the dock and asked to justify our right to live in a world 
we have tried to save.
In a very fraught atmosphere, Edward Stettinius 
explained that the reference to creating trusteeship 
"machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire":
"it had in mind particularly dependent areas which would be 
taken out of enemy control, for example, the Japanese 
islands in the Pacific. He said that it was felt that 
provision had to be made for machinery to handle the 
question of trusteeship for dependent areas taken from the 
enemy and he repeated that this was not intended to refer 
to the British Empire.
Winston Churchill appeared to accept the Secretary of 
State*s explanation and stated that "if it is a question of 
solely dealing with enemy territory acquired during the war, 
it might be proper to put them into some form of trusteeship 
under the United N a t i o n s " . ^  After a brief intermission, the 
British accepted a trusteeship formula based on the three 
categories formulated by the State Department:
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"The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its 
being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only 
apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;
(b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the 
present war, (c) any other territory which might 
voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no 
discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the 
forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary 
consultation, and it will be a matter for subsequent 
agreement which territories within the above categories 
will be placed under trusteeship."63
Because of the continuing differences between the
American military and the State Department (discussed in
section 3), the "preliminary" five power conversations on
trusteeship agreed upon at Yalta, were delayed. In fact, for
all practical purposes, they were conducted concurrently with
the broader issues on international organisation at the San
Francisco Conference itself. From the British standpoint,
unwittingly, they had accepted the principle of international
trusteeship. Winston Churchill had apparently not considered
the American formula too closely; his hesitations and
suspicions being modified by Edward Stettinius's specific
assurance that it did not apply to the British Empire. In
the interest of the wider and more important issue of
continuing Anglo-American cooperation, moreover, neither
Anthony Eden nor Alexander Cadogan publicly objected to this
American trusteeship formula. Whether innocently or
deliberately, the superior diplomatic expertise (or tricks!)
of the Americans, had committed Great Britain to
incorporating the League mandates into a new United Nations
Ltrusteeship system. *
The Foreign Office was now confronted with the awkward 
task of reassuring the Colonial Office that nothing really 
significant had been conceded at Yalta. In particular, the 
Colonial Office wanted to know if Great Britain could still 
raise the fundamental issue of abolishing the League mandates 
system. The various explanations were somewhat disingenuous, 
and would have been interpreted by the Americans as not in 
accordance with the agreed Yalta formula. For example,
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Anthony Eden argued "that a great deal depended on what the 
Americans meant by the words "Territorial Trusteeship" and 
maintained that it was still open to Great Britain "to argue 
the case for the abolition of the Mandate System".
British Policy Reconsidered. Although not present at Yalta, 
Oliver Stanley was in little doubt that Great Britain "could 
hardly argue that [she] did not know what territorial 
trusteeship meant":
"if we did, it would be open to the Americans to inquire why 
in that case we had signed the Yalta Protocol. He was 
inclined to think that the Americans meant by territorial 
trusteeship something on the lines of the old Mandate 
system, but modified to make supervision more strict."®®
Oliver Stanley had misjudged the American intention to
press the trusteeship issue at Yalta, but his Washington
visit had convinced him that the United States had given
considerable thought to the whole question.^ He noted that
"the reception was most disappointing" when he had referred
to the Colonial Office scheme to replace the mandates system
with regional arrangements. Oliver Stanley wanted to avoid a
situation whereby Great Britain had to withdraw the programme
outlined in the "International Aspects of Colonial Policy"
during the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. To do so,
"would mean throwing the whole Colonial Empire open to
discussion by this motley assembly, a procedure which I
should regard as hazardous in the extreme".^
His appreciation of the American position, combined with
Australian and New Zealand opposition to abolishing the
C O
mandates system00 and the international legal difficulties 
involved in doing so, led Oliver Stanley to undertake a 
reorientation of British policy regarding trusteeship. Thus, 
while still preferring the arrangements outlined in the 
"International Aspects of Colonial Policy" document as the 
better solution to the international aspects of the colonial 
problem, he accepted the need for a new global system based 
on the mandates model. He remained opposed, however, to
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extending the principle of international accountability 
beyond that set out in Article 22 of the League Covenant.
The Colonial Office*s new proposals were approved by the War 
Cabinet on April 3, 1945, and formed the British draft 
chapter on "Territorial Trusteeship** submitted to the San 
Francisco Conference.^
The draft chapter*s most striking feature was the 
omission of the regional schemes upon which so much official 
care and time had been devoted. The new proposals were based 
on a more restrictive League mandates system; the terminology 
closely following that of Article 22 of the League Covenant. 
The first paragraph set out general principles for 
administering all dependent territories.^ There was no 
provision for international machinery to ensure that these 
principles were applied to all dependent territories; this 
was provided only for the categories designated by the Yalta 
formula. Economic and social advancement generally were 
emphasised. No reference was made to "independence" as the 
goal of trusteeship, although "self-government" was an 
objective where appropriate. The provisions in Article 22 of 
the Covenant on the "open door*1 were omitted as the British 
believed that dependencies should control their own economic 
development. While recognising that "questions of security 
policy are also bound to arise**, overall "the well-being of 
the inhabitants" was to be "the major objective of the 
trusteeship system". ^
Regarding the types of dependency to be placed under 
"Territorial Trusteeship*', the British draft chapter repeated 
the Yalta formula of three categories. In the case of the 
third category of dependencies "voluntarily** placed under 
trusteeship, there was some apprehension in the Colonial 
Office lest the Americans create a dangerous precedent by 
putting all their overseas dependencies under trusteeship. 
Oliver Stanley maintained that Great Britain would "be 
continually under pressure from some elements in the United 
States to take advantage of this proposal to bring the whole
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of our Colonial administration under international review” . ^  
Australia and New Zealand had also stressed that the French 
and Portuguese dependencies presently occupied by Japan might 
be placed under the trusteeship via the "voluntary” third 
category. In actual fact the British fears proved ill- 
founded as no states, including the anti-colonial United 
States, took advantage of the "voluntary” clause to place 
their dependencies under trusteeship.
The British envisaged individual not collective 
trusteeships; the details of particular agreements being 
"matters for subsequent agreement between the State entrusted 
with the administration of the territory and the United 
Nations” . It was emphasised that, "No revision of existing 
League of Nations Mandates exercised by States Members of the 
United Nations shall be made without the agreement of the 
Mandatory Power concerned” . ^  The no-fortification and no- 
military- training provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant 
were believed to be out of date. Instead, the British 
proposed that it "should be the duty" of individual 
administering states "to ensure" that territories under 
trusteeship played their "part in the maintenance of 
international peace and security".^
International accountability would be limited. With 
regard to security matters, the appropriate body would be the 
Security Council (where Great Britain would have a veto 
according to the three-Power Yalta Agreement), not the 
General Assembly. Administering states would be required to 
"furnish to the Security Council such information" respecting 
their trust territories as the "Council on the advice of the 
Military Staff Committee may require, as regards any forces 
facilities, or assistance" which it might employ from the 
territories when discharging its "obligations in respect of 
international peace and security under this Charter".^ 
International accountability was confined to the 
administering powers rendering "annual reports to the 
Economic and Social Council on the economic and social
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advancement of the inhabitants and the civil administration" 
of the trust territory. The role of the League's Permanent 
Mandates Commission would be undertaken by a "permanent 
commission" which would "prescribe the form of the annual 
reports". It would receive and examine the reports, and 
apart from security matters, "advise the Economic and Social 
Council on all matters relating to the observance of the 
terras of trusteeship".76 The commission would be a
subordinate body coming "under" the Economic and Social 
Council.^ Finally, the British deliberately excluded^ 
rights to inspect the trust territories by either the new- 
style commission or the Economic and Social Council.
Overall, the most surprising aspect of the proposals was 
not their conservative nature, but the complete absence of 
references to regionalism so far as dependent peoples were 
concerned. So much time and effort had been spent on 
regional-type plans that the actual proposa-ls presented to 
the San Francisco Conference can only be described as a 
negation of earlier British ideas. The change in direction 
of British policy can almost wholly be ascribed to pressure 
from the State Department. Indeed, insofar as anti-colonial 
sentiment underlay the American pressure, then a direct 
correlation may be deduced between American anti-colonialism 
and changes in British policy. Unfortunately, we will never 
know what the position might have been if Great Britain, 
particularly Oliver Stanley and the Colonial Office, had been 
more fully aware of the extent of the American military 
establishment's opposition to the State Department's plans!
There were no more Anglo-American discussions on 
trusteeship until after the San Francisco Conference began.^ 
The Americans did send out invitations for Big Five 
consultations on trusteeship at a technical level prior to 
the San Francisco Conference as agreed at the Yalta meeting. 
In fact, a major reason for the Colonial Office's speed in 
reformulating its trusteeship plans was that these 
consultations were due to begin during the second week of
H>p«Kh«u
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April ("around” April 8), Although by the beginning of 
April, China, France and Great Britain had agreed to send 
representatives, the meeting was delayed because of 
continuing disagreements within the Roosevelt Administration 
over the nature and scope of the American trusteeship 
proposals.^ In London, however, numerous rumours (well and 
ill founded) abounded regarding the radical scope of the 
proposals the Americans were formulating.oyj
3. Towards an American Consensus
There was no real attempt until the end of 1944 to break 
the internal deadlock over trusteeship within the Roosevelt 
Administration caused by the virtual "veto" which the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had cast on the State Departments proposals 
for the Dumbarton Oaks meetings. After those meetings, an ad 
hoc State Department group reconsidered the whole matter; its 
membership included Leo Pasvolsky, Harley Notter, Benjamin 
Gerig, and Ralph Bunche. Senior State Department officials 
also began "a number of informal conversations with Admiral 
Russell Willson of the Joint Chiefs of S t a f f " . I n  November 
1944, President Roosevelt approved Edward Stettinius' 
suggestion for an "Interdepartmental Committee on Dependent 
Areas", but this Committee did not begin reconsidering the 
State Departments trusteeship proposals until February 2, 
1945; thus, it had no influence on the Yalta trusteeship 
deliberations. The Committee was chaired by Leo Pasvolsky, 
and its membership included Isaiah Bowman and Nelson 
Rockefeller for the State Department, Generals Embick and 
Fairchild for the War Department and Air Corps respectively, 
Admiral Russell for the Navy Department, and Abe Fortas for 
the Interior Department. Among the experts attending the 
Committee’s meetings were Benjamin Gerig and Charles Taussig, 
the United States Commissioner on the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission who was also a confidant of President
O O
Roosevelt. This last-mentioned fact was particularly 
important as the key to interdepartmental conflicts generally
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in the Roosevelt Administration was often the ability to 
catch the President*s ear. This was the case regarding the 
State Department*s dispute with the War and Navy Departments 
over the trusteeship question. Notwithstanding his failing 
health, a measure of President Roosevelt’s personal authority 
was that his decisions were accepted as final. Before 
examining the work of the Interdepartmental Committee, 
mention must be made of two important background factors: 
the impact of the war against Japan’s on the trusteeship 
question; and Henry Stimson’s intervention in the debate on 
the future of Japan’s Pacific islands mandate.
eo*r\y
The Japanese War and Trusteeship. I n £1944, the Japanese war 
was expected to be long and costly. It had been deliberately 
subordinated to the war against Germany, but as 1944 drew to 
a close and Germany’s ultimate defeat came into sight, the 
Japanese war became much more significant.w So far as the 
European colonial powers were concerned, with victory over 
Germany, they could be expected to take a larger part in the 
war against Japan. What would be the attitude of the United 
States to aiding her European allies to re-occupy their Asian 
and Pacific dependencies? It was at first expected that most 
of these dependencies would be liberated by American troops 
after much bloody conflict.^ Would the United States merely 
hand back the erstwhile colonies to European rule; a 
difficult dilemma confronted Washington in the light of 
American anti-colonial sentiments! At the very least, the 
Americans would expect to be consulted on future arrangements 
in southeast Asia and the Pacific.
In these areas, Washington had endeavoured to retain a 
separate American identity from its European allies in all 
matters other than military ones. Especially galling to the 
Americans was the Japanese propaganda practice of linking 
them with European colonialism and the damage caused to 
their image among dependent peoples. Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg noted the testimony of William Phillips,
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President Roosevelt’s personal ambassador to India, to the 
Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 11, 1943:
"Phillips minced no words, India's demands for independence 
are a major factor in the postwar picture, and Churchill's 
incorrigible refusal to surrender British dominion, now or 
later, creates one of the greatest dangers to the Allied 
cause. Further, India has swung over from an opinion that 
America, was her friend to the view that we are supporting 
British domination and will continue to do s o . " ^
Collaboration between the United States and Great 
Britain over the whole Near and Far East was fraught with 
mutual suspicions throughout the war. General Joseph 
Stilwell's political adviser noted the harm to the American 
anti-colonial image through cooperating with the British in 
the South East Asia Command (SEAC):
"In so far as we participate in SEAC operations, we 
become involved in the politically explosive colonial 
problems of the British, Dutch and possibly French. In so 
doing, we compromise ourselves not only with the colonial 
peoples of Asia, but also with the free peoples of Asia, 
including the Chinese. Domestically, our"Government lays 
itself open to public criticism - 'why should American 
boys die to recreate the colonial empires of the British 
and her Dutch and French satellites? Finally, more Anglo- 
American misunderstanding and friction is likely to arise 
out of our participation in SEAC than out of any other 
theatre."85
In fact, Cordell Hull observed that the United States 
"declined" to permit American civil affairs officers to serve 
under Lord Mountbatten in SEAC because "we wished to 
dissociate ourselves from British colonial policy as much as 
we could".88 The American military wanted to concentrate on 
the direct attack on the Japanese homeland and not become 
involved in removing the Japanese from the European colonies. 
Thus at the meeting of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of 
Staff during the Malta Conference in February 1945, it was 
made clear to Lord Mountbatten that when his troops began 
the liberation of Malaya, American forces would not be 
available as they would be needed in future operations 
against Japan. Indeed, following the Yalta Conference,
United States commanders in the Pacific theatre were informed
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of American "plans for turning over to the British 
responsibility for operations in the Netherlands East Indies 
and New Guinea".
The fact that American troops would not be directly 
involved in re-occupying the European colonies, had two 
immediate consequences so far as the trusteeship question was 
concerned. The first was that it would now be comparatively 
easier for the colonial metropoles to reassert control over 
their Far Eastern dependencies as most of them were now due 
to be liberated by troops under British command. The second 
was that if the dependencies were not liberated by American 
forces, then it would be more difficult for Washington to 
have a decisive voice in their future disposal. The State 
Department, however, had consistently maintained that the 
United States expected to be consulted regarding their 
future; especially as it believed that "the indefinite 
continuance of the British, Dutch, and French possessions in 
the orient in a state of dependence provided a number of foci 
for future trouble and perhaps war". Cordell Hull proposed a 
solution to the American dilemma to President Roosevelt in 
September 1944 which involved "early, dramatic, and concerted 
announcements" by France, Great Britain and the Netherlands 
of "definite commitments as to the future of the regions of 
Southeast Asia" resting on the twin principles of 
independence and trusteeship:
"It would be especially helpful if such concerted 
announcements could include (1) specific dates when 
independence or complete (dominion) self-government will be 
accorded, (2) specific steps to be taken to develop native 
capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of economic 
autonomy and equality of economic treatment toward other 
nations.
.... The value of such concerted announcements would be 
still further enhanced if each of the Colonial Powers 
concerned would pledge a formal declaration of trusteeship 
under an international organization for the period of 
tutelage.
While nothing substantial came from these and similar 
proposals, they do illustrate the American dilemma. The
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State Department wished to prod the European metropoles in 
the direction of independence for their dependent peoples, 
preferably within the framework of international 
accountability. The issue was of the greatest importance as 
it believed that only by actions along the proposed 
trusteeship lines, could future peace be assured. The 
requirements of military policy, however, limited the 
pressure which could be exerted on the European states 
concerned, who themselves were to say the least reluctant to 
comply with American wishes on this matter. The American 
military establishment, moreover, wished to annex the 
Japanese islands mandate. If this became official United 
States policy, it could negate all her previous efforts to 
obtain some kind of international accountability for the 
European dependencies in South East Asia. It is against this 
strategic-political background that the inter-departmental 
dispute between the State Department and the American 
military over trusteeship must be assessed.
Henry Stimson's intervention into the trusteeship debate.
The State Departments position was not helped by the fact 
that one of its foremost opponents on the trusteeship issue 
was Henry Stimson, then Secretary of War. His reputation and 
experience were unrivalled. A Republican elder statesman who 
had joined the Roosevelt Administration as a gesture to 
wartime bipartisanship, he had held the post of Secretary of 
War before the First World War and been President Hoover's 
Secretary of State. A patriot, a man of honour with a strong 
personality, his authority was unmatched on all matters 
relating to international security. In fact, Henry Stimson 
was one of the few members of the Roosevelt Administration of 
sufficient stature to be able to challenge the President's 
views with some hope of obtaining a decision in his favour. 
Secretary Stimson did not like the notion of international 
trusteeship, especially in so far as it was related to 
American security in the Pacific region. To him, the State
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Department’s plan that the Japanese islands mandate be held 
by the United States "only in trusteeship from the United 
Nations" was "dangerously unrealistic". His own immediate 
concern "was to protect United States interests in the 
Pacific islands and he did not believe that any useful 
purpose was served by classing such islands with colonial 
areas containing large populations and considerable economic 
resources".^ Henry Stimson argued this case in a memorandum 
to Secretary of State Stettinius, dated January 23, 1945:
"You are proposing to include [the mandated islands] under 
your future principles of ’trusteeship* or ’mandates*.
They do not really belong in such a classification. 
Acquisition of them by the United States does not 
represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. 
Instead it is merely the acquisition by the United States 
of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of 
the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose 
they must belong to the United States with absolute power 
to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are 
outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the 
general doctrine of self-defense by the power which 
guarantees the safety of that area of the world.
•••• For that reason you will get into needless mazes if 
you try to set up a form of trusteeship which will include 
them before the necessity of their acquisition by the 
United States is established and recognized.
•••• They are of an entirely different nature from the 
German colonies in various parts of the world, quite 
unessential to the defense of any protecting power, to 
which was applied the doctrine of mandates under the League 
of Nations formula.
To Henry Stimson his "proposition seemed beyond debate: 
World War II had made wholly evident the fact that the United 
States must be the principal guarantor of the peace of the 
P a c i f i c " . H e n r y  Stimson failed in his immediate objective 
of specifically exempting the islands from any trusteeship 
formula agreed to at the Yalta Conference. However, within 
his exposition of the problem (the value of some islands as 
strategic bases) lay the seeds of the "strategic trust" 
formula. As was demonstrated earlier, the idea had been 
foreshadowed by some of Franklin Roosevelt’s own utterances 
on using some trust territories as bases for the "Four 
Policemen". The difference was that whereas Secretary
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Stimson conceived these island bases in terms of national 
interest, the President saw them more in international terms. 
The “strategic trust1* formula was developed further in the 
deliberations of the Interdepartmental Committee on Dependent 
areas.
The Interdepartmental Committee on Dependent Areas The 
Committee*s work was at first complicated by the fact that 
some members like Nelson Rockefeller had no previous 
experience of trusteeship affairs. The Committee began by 
considering revised State Department proposals designed to 
take into account the military objectives; leaving unchanged 
the July 1944 draft*s basic structure and objectives. The 
new proposals followed the Yalta three-fold category of trust 
territories; emphasising that no territories could be placed 
under the trusteeship system except by the voluntary act of 
the colonial metropole concerned.^2 The influence of the 
British distaste for "independence*' is to be seen by the fact 
that the system’s twin objectives were advancing trust 
territories towards "self-government" and furthering 
international peace and security. Trust territories could be 
administered by an individual state or "a specially 
constituted international mixed commission"; this latter 
provision reflected President Roosevelt’s belief that some 
territories could be administered by two or more states. The 
rule of the administering powers would be supervised by a 
Trusteeship Council working under the broad aegis of the 
General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council itself would be 
composed of equal numbers of administering and non­
administering powers. Trust territories would be governed by 
territorial charters adopted concurrently by the General 
Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. These two bodies were 
given the concurrent authority to amend the charters, 
designate or remove administering powers, and end 
trusteeships under conditions determined by the United
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Nations. As was proposed in the July 1944 draft, the United 
Nations would also possess powers of inspection, 
investigation, and supervision.
The representatives of the Navy and War Departments had 
three principal criticisms of the revised proposals. The 
first was that there were no special provisions for 
territories considered of strategic importance. The second 
concerned the rights given to the General Assembly to remove 
administering powers and end trusteeship status. The 
military representatives did not want the Assembly to possess 
any authority which might threaten American control over 
Japan’s islands mandate. The third criticism was related to 
the clauses providing for common international standards of 
administration and those giving the United Nations inspection 
and investigatory powers. Essentially the military did not 
want the new United Nations interferring in territories 
considered of strategic importance to the United States: 
namely, Micronesia.
The Committee’s deliberations were wide ranging and at 
times ill-informed and acrimonious. Admiral Willson took the 
lead in opposing trusteeship, while Abe Fortas played an 
important role in attempting to reconcile the differences 
between the State Department and the military 
representatives. Admiral Willson maintained that the United 
States must put its own interests first and have "exclusive 
control" of Micronesia. The smallness of the islands, both 
in terms of size and population, was emphasised, and the 
"church vote" and the "international welfare boys" of the 
State Department dismissed with derision. The disagreements 
appeared to be resolved by the Fortas-Willson conception of 
two types of trust territory; strategic and non-strategic,
The former would come under the Security Council’s final 
authority where the United States would have veto powers as a 
permanent member of that b o d y . ^  The "states concerned", 
moreover, would have the right before any territory was 
placed under the trusteeship system to draw up the terms of
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each territorial "charter" for approval by the United 
Nations.^ Essentially, the military obtained a formula 
whereby the United States would be able to designate 
Micronesia as a strategic area and draw up its "charter" for 
approval by the Security Council where she could veto 
proposed amendments by other Council members. Her authority 
in actually administering the territory would again be 
safeguarded by the American Security Council veto. Great 
Britain's objections to trusteeship should also be at least 
partially assuaged by the provision whereby the administering 
powers not the United Nations would determine the conditions 
under which dependencies were placed under the trusteeship 
system.
The Interdepartmental Committee held its final meeting 
on March 15, and produced an agreed draft entitled 
"Arrangements for International Trusteeship". The basic 
objectives of the trusteeship system would be "to further 
international peace and security", promote "the political 
economic, and social advancement of the trust territories and 
their inhabitants and their progressive development toward 
self-government", and "to provide for non-discriminatory 
treatment in trust territories for the economic and other 
appropriate civil activities of the nationals of all member 
States". The system would apply to the territory categories 
agreed at the Yalta Conference; and "strategic areas" could 
be designated "in the interest of security, of certain 
territories, or parts thereof". The administering authority 
could "be either a member State or an international mixed 
commission". Responsibility for the trusteeship system would 
be "exercised" through "the General Assembly and the 
Trusteeship Council, each acting by a two-thirds vote of 
those present and voting, and, with respect to matters 
concerning strategic areas, also by the Security Council, 
acting with the concurrence of all of the Permanent members". 
The Trusteeship Council would be composed of equal numbers of 
administering and non-administering states; the latter being
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"named for three-year periods by the General Assembly"
The Assembly and the two Councils (the Security Council only 
in the case of strategic areas), acting concurrently were to 
have the authority:
"a. to alter the trusteeship arrangements;
b. to amend the territorial charters within the scope 
of the respective trusteeship arrangements;
c. to remove an administering authority for failure
to fulfil the territorial charter, and to arrange for 
the designation of another administering authority;
d. to determine the conditions which must be met for 
the attainment of self-governing status; and
e. to terminate trusteeship over any territory when 
these conditions have not been met."
The General Assembly's powers included considering the 
Trusteeship Council*s reports and decisions, making 
recommendations on "the economic, social, and political 
development of any trust territory", and instituting 
"investigations into any aspect of the trusteeship system and 
administration, subject, in the case of strategic areas, to 
such provisions in the respective trusteeship arrangements as 
may be required for security purposes'*. The Trusteeship 
Council was empowered to advise administering authorities, 
call for reports from them, receive petitions, and conduct 
periodic inspections in the territories, "subject, in the 
case of strategic areas, to such provisions in the respective 
trusteeship arrangements as may be required for security 
purposes".^
The Direct Intervention of the Secretaries for War and the 
Navy State Department approved the new proposals on 
March 20. They were also submitted to the Secretaries of the 
Interior, War, and the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
for clearance. The Interior Secretary, Harold Ickes, took 
the view that the United States should be "the administering 
power for the Japanese mandated Islands", but not insist upon 
"complete sovereignty" because "this would give an opening 
for the British" to claim "absolute title areas in the Middle 
East" which would injure "American security interests as well
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as commercial interests involved in the United States great 
stake in Middle Eastern Oil".^
The Secretaries for War and the Navy, Henry Stimson and 
James Forrestal, however, were still not satisfied that 
American security interests were satisfactorily safeguarded 
so far as Micronesia was concerned. They had little 
knowledge of the State Department’s earlier detailed 
trusteeship plans. Indeed, Henry Stimson subsequently stated 
that "he knew nothing of the Yalta agreement on trusteeship 
until the results were made public".^ The two Secretaries 
were aware, however, of the President's view that the Pacific 
islands should be held securely by the United States, but 
under a trusteeship agreement.^ Nevertheless, they 
continued to take the view that trusteeship arrangements 
would not be sufficient to protect American interests 
adequately. At a meeting between them on March 30, Henry 
Stimson "expressed great concern over the trend of thinking 
as regards the trusteeship discussion at San Francisco":
"He said he was fearful.... that we might be tempted into 
making quixotic gestures the net result of which might be 
that we would surrender the hardly won islands which we had 
taken in the Pacific to the principle of trusteeship, 
whereas the British, Dutch and French would not."100
The matter was discussed by the Secretaries of State,
War and the Navy on April 2. Henry Stimson and James
Forrestal apparently pursuaded Edward Stettinius that "they
should try to get postponement of the whole subject of
trusteeship at the San Francisco Conference and that they
should also draft a public statement, to be made either by
the President or the Secretary of State", to the effect that
the United States intended to keep Micronesia, but "only for
the continued insurance of peace and equity and liberty for
all nations and peoples adjacent to the Pacific".101 Edward
Stettinius was apparently then wholly in agreement with this
course of action. When they met again on April 9, however,
he "baulked" and said "that he did not propose to associate
himself with the document", but "to let the document go as a
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statement by War and Navy, informing the President that he 
reserved judgement” . Edward Stettinius further stated that 
”while his private views accorded with” those of his War and 
Navy colleagues, ”he was under orders to the contrary” .-^2
There are various interpretations of this cryptic remark 
by Edward Stettinius. Ruth Russell and Jeannette Muther 
infer that ”if Forrestal recorded Stettinius' words 
literally” , then it "clearly referred to a presidential 
authorization” as "there are not, after all, many people from 
whom the Secretary of State takes ' orders Another
explanation, however, is that he was under pressure from his 
Department to retract his agreement. This explanation is 
borne out by the discussions which Hayden Raynor and Benjamin 
Gerig from the State Department had with colleagues from the 
War and Navy Departments on April 7. At this meeting it was 
first revealed to the War and Navy Departments that Edward 
Stettinius had changed his rnind.-^^ Edward. Stettinius 
himself records that he informed James Forrestal on April 9 
of "my enforced position - a position taken by the [State] 
Department without full consultation with me - on the U.S. 
policy for trusteeships” . On April 12, moreover, he records 
telephoning "particularly to ask if he would explain to 
Colonel Stimson that I was disassociated from the State 
Department memorandum on Trusteeships, and Forrestal promised 
to pass on to the Colonel the information that 
I was out of town when our [the State Department's] 
memorandum was prepared” . E d w a r d  Stettinius' leadership 
qualities are outside the purview of this study. It is 
sufficient merely to state that it would have been very 
difficult for him to resist the pressure which his nominal 
subordinates were able to bring to bear. Their weapons were 
impressive; a long-established and tested bureaucratic file, 
the Yalta Agreements on trusteeship (to which Stettinius 
himself had been a party), and President Roosevelt's well- 
known preference for trusteeship arrangements for the 
Japanese Pacific islands mandate.
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Benjamin Gerig noted the remaining differences between 
the State and the War and Navy Departments over the 
compromise trusteeships plan:
"I# That the trusteeship arrangement should be negotiated 
by the Security Council instead of the General Assembly; 
and
2. That a policy statement should be made when the plan 
is presented, so that the public would clearly understand 
that strategic rights, especially with respect to the 
Pacific areas, are fully safeguarded and that the 
trusteeship principle in these areas is applied in form but 
not in substance. They believe that candour in this 
respect is necessary and desirable."10®
Edward Stettinius enlarged on the remaining differences 
in his memorandum to President Roosevelt of April 9, 1945:
"The Secretaries of War and Navy are stating their position 
separately. As we understand their view, it is that this 
Government should retain complete control over certain 
strategic areas in the Pacific and that we should make this 
known unequivocally to other nations and to the world 
before participating in any discussions.,..
The Department of State agrees.... that- any plan must 
provide for our retaining such strategic positions, as of 
right, in the Pacific, as you and your military advisers 
deem necessary. It believes that this is provided for in 
the draft plan....within the system of international 
trusteeship.... The Department of State believes further, 
that if we do not include these areas with adequate 
safeguards, within the trusteeship system we shall 
prejudice all possibility of international trusteeship, and 
that it would appear to large sections of the public to 
violate our expressed statements against annexation as a 
result of the war."^'
In other words, the State Department still advocated 
protecting American interests via international trusteeship 
arrangements; albeit that so far as Micronesia was concerned, 
the international aspects were more a matter of form rather 
than substance. This stance was determined by a number of 
diverse factors; the weight of State Department bureaucratic 
preference, various American1 commitments such as the 
Atlantic Charter Declaration, Anglo-American relations, 
possible future instability in colonies, and the general 
ethos of American anti-colonialism.
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The War and Navy Departments paid lip-service to 
international obligations, but placed the emphasis on 
safeguarding American interests via the United States* own 
efforts. They wished to annex Micronesia within a thin guise 
of international sentiment. Franklin Roosevelt agreed to 
discuss the trusteeship differences with the Secretaries of 
State, War, and the Navy on April 19. He also telegraphed 
Edward Stettinius that "your message on International 
Trusteeship is approved in principle".10** The Secretary of 
State "interpreted" this "as meaning that the trusteeship 
question should be discussed at San Francisco.100
The President*s views on the trusteeship question at this 
time are demonstrated by a discussion he had with Charles 
Taussig on March 15, 1945:
"I....told the President that the military had indicated 
that they would interpret strategic areas as an entire 
area - for instance, all of the Japanese islands, north of 
the Equator, that might come under the administration of 
the United States. I told him that under their 
interpretation, the entire group of islands irrespective of 
whether they were fortified or not would be exempt from 
substantially all of the international agreements 
pertaining to civilian populations; that the military had 
been unwilling to agree to divide strategic areas into two 
categories - closed areas and open areas.
The President said that he would favour these two 
categories and that the open areas should be subject to 
international agreements. He said that if the military 
wanted, at a later date due to change in strategy, to make 
all or part of the open area a closed area, it should be 
provided that this could be done with the approval of the 
Security Council.'*110
Further clarification of the President's views on 
Micronesia's future is given by his comments at a Cabinet 
meeting on March 9, 1945. He "said that his idea, which he 
had advanced to Stalin and Churchill [at the Yalta 
Conference] was based on a concept of 'multiple sovereignty'
- sovereignty rested in all the United Nations". So far as 
the Pacific islands were concerned, the United States "would
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be requested by them to exercise complete trusteeship for the 
purpose of world security".111
President Roosevelt continued to place great emphasis on 
preserving American security and had no hesitation in 
advocating retention of control over any necessary overseas 
bases, especially in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. This 
determination is demonstrated by his remark to Charles 
Taussig during their conversation of March 15 regarding the 
United States* Caribbean bases; "we must keep the bases 
active and leave no room for doubt that we are there to 
stay".11^ The President’s wish to safeguard American 
security via . trusteeship arrangements for Micronesia was 
dictated by his belief that these would assist the dependent 
peoples to independence and thereby prevent the international 
conflict which otherwise might arise because of their 
resentment at continued colonial bondage:
"He said that there are 1,100,000,000 brown people. In many 
Eastern Countries, they are ruled by a handful of whites 
and they resent it. Our goal must be to help them achieve 
independence - 1,100,000,000 potential enemies are 
dangerous. He said he included the 450,000,000 Chinese in 
that."113
President Roosevelt continued to believe until his death 
that if the United States annexed Micronesia, the European 
colonial powers might not be willing to adopt more liberal 
policies so far as colonial independence was concerned. The 
United States must set a good example. He intimated to 
Charles Taussig "that it might provide a useful trading 
point" at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference if the 
United States, "at an auspicious time", volunteered to have 
its "own territories report" to the United Nations, "and also 
to respond to requests from the Organization for specific 
information".11^ He was aware of the problems inherent in 
persuading the European colonial powers to place territories 
under trusteeship:
"French Indo-China and New Caledonia should be taken from 
France and put under a trusteeship. The President 
hesitated a moment and then said - well if we can get the 
proper pledge from France to assume for herself the
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obligations of a trustee, then I would agree to France 
retaining these colonies with the proviso that independence 
was the ultimate goal."11'*
In answer to a question at a press conference on 
April 5, moreover, as to whether the United States "will be 
the controlling government" in the Pacific island mandates, 
the President replied, "I would say the United Nations. Or 
it might be called - the world."11** Thus, it may be 
confidently surmised that although ill, tired, beset with 
numerous vexed problems, until the very end of his life, 
Franklin Roosevelt retained his faith in the virtues of a 
trusteeship system under the auspices of the new United 
Nations. While continuing to equate American with world 
security, and more aware perhaps of the vexed problems 
pertaining to trusteeship than in the earlier days of the 
Second World War, he still preferred it to continued 
colonialism without international accountability. To the 
President, the nominal authority of the United Nations so far 
as the Japanese mandated islands was concerned, was a 
worthwhile price to pay!
Interdepartmental Agreement. Tragically, Franklin Roosevelt 
died on April 12, and was succeeded by Harry Truman. Edward 
Stettinius announced on April 13 that President Truman had 
authorised him to say that there would be no change of 
purpose or break of continuity in American foreign policy. 
Among the problems confronting him, the new President had to 
decide whether trusteeship should be discussed at the San 
Francisco Conference. In a memorandum dated April 13, Leo 
Pasvolsky summarised the three options:
"A. To have no discussion at the Conference itself but 
rather to postpone the consideration of the whole matter to 
some future date.
B. To include in the [United Nations] Charter a provision 
that, after its creation, the organization would undertake 
to set up a trusteeship system.
C. To include in the Charter the substance of the material 
contained in.... [the interdepartmental] paper; thus 
setting up the machinery of trusteeships, stating the
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objectives of the system, defining the powers and basic 
procedures in this respect of the various organs of the 
Organization. '
It was decided to place the problem before the American 
delegation to the San Francisco Conference, and invite the 
Secretaries of the Navy and War to be present at a delegation 
meeting on April 17. At the meeting, Edward Stettinius 
outlined the dilemma confronting the State Department:
"on the diplomatic side.... we would be in a weak position 
if we cannot deal with the question in some way at the San 
Francisco Conference. The Department.... is in complete 
agreement with the Army and Navy with respect to the 
necessity for full protection of our security interests, 
but the Department also appreciates the difficulty in which 
this country would find itself if it should lay itself open 
to the charge of expansionist ambition by pursuing a policy 
of annexation. An annexation policy would be contrary to 
the policy consistently followed by the late President 
Roosevelt."*1°
For his part Henry Stimson underlined "that under no 
circumstances should anything be done which, would prevent the 
United States from presenting a united front at San 
Francisco". He then proceeded to elaborate on his earlier 
arguments that the Japanese islands mandate were not 
exploitable "territories with substantial economic resources 
and significant populations" and as such suitable for 
trusteeship: "some of them have almost no population and
almost no resources, and many of them are mere atolls in the 
Pacific". The military wanted them as strategic bases to 
protect the region from future aggression; "the United States 
must be affirmatively provided with full power over necessary 
protective b a s e s " . S e n a t o r  Vandenberg summarised the 
delegation’s perception of the problem:
"The Army and Navy are insistent that we must keep full 
control of most of the Pacific bases taken from the 
Japs.... Secretary of War Stimson.... said he didn’t care 
so much about the ’title' to these Islands if we have 
absolute, undisputed control over our base needs.... But 
the State Department is right in insisting that this must 
be accomplished without setting a precedent for all the 
other Big Powers to take what they claim they need for 
their defense.•.•Stassen and Dr. Bowman.... insisted that 
while we must follow War and Navy advice, we must also make
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it plain that we seek no right of social or economic 
exploitation in respect to any of these peoples.
The discussion illustrated the American continuing 
dilemma and, in effect, delusion within the United States 
regarding colonial and trusteeship problems. In the American 
view, the Pacific islands which the United States needed were 
somehow different to those belonging to or desired by the 
European colonial powers; their small size, tiny populations, 
lack of economic resources and "unselfish11 American motives 
were all quoted in support of the supposed differences. 
Senator Tom Connally raised "the possibility of American 
bases on New Caledonia". Representative Eaton "observed that 
while the United States would not seek annexation, it would 
undertake it if it became necessary". Commander Stassen 
"stated that it should be the policy of this Government that 
any bases which are essential to the security of the world 
and to our own security would be held in trusteeship, and 
that we would define the terms of the trusteeship". Dr. 
Isaiah Bowman pointed out that the United States had "been 
led into a situation in which the world expects us to do 
something on trusteeship. We are faced with such questions 
as whether we wish Somaliland to go to the British". Few if 
any other members of the American delegation appeared to 
recognise that, in principle, there was no intrinsic 
difference between Great Britain annexing Italian Somaliland 
and the United States doing so regarding Micronesia.
Somewhat idiosyncratically, John Foster Dulles favoured the 
United Nations having "the authority to look into the 
condition of colonial peoples", and maintained that this was 
"not inconsistent with the right of military defenses" 
claimed by the American military authorities: "He could see 
no conflict in this respect."121
On April 18, the delegation approved a formula 
previously agreed by the three Secretaries, whereby the War 
and Navy Departments accepted the principle of trusteeship 
and discussion of its "possible machinery" at San Francisco.
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Henry Stimson had taken the lead in this endeavour, spurred 
on in large part by the need to preserve national unity in 
the aftermath of Franklin Roosevelt*s death and at least to 
mitigate the vexed problems confronting Harry Truman in his 
new presidential duties. President Truman approved the 
compromise on the same day as its acceptance by the American 
delegation. -^2
The delegation discussed the trusteeship issue again 
on April 23 and 26, and approved the new draft trusteeship 
system worked out by the State, War and Navy Departments. -^3 
The State Department*s requirements were satisfied by 
accepting that a trusteeship system should be established 
along the lines of the Yalta formula and without any public 
American declaration of reserved rights in Micronesia. The 
War and Navy Departments* objectives were satisfied by the 
provision that *'all functions of the [United Nations] 
Organisation relating to strategic areas including the 
approval of the trusteeship arrangements and their alteration 
or amendment, should be exercised by the Security 
Council*'. -*-24 President Truman underlined the essentials of 
the compromise:
"I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issue of 
the security of the bases. But I also saw the validity of 
the ideal for which the State Department was contending - 
that the United Nations should not be barred from local 
territories beyond the bases, if at any time the United 
Nations should want to look ipfcp the social and economic 
conditions on these islands.
Overall, the American debate on trusteeship exhibited a 
high degree of agreement on the need to protect American 
interests in Micronesia. Henry Stimson high-lighted the 
differences between the State Department and the War and Navy 
Departments; "a curious aspect of the debate within the 
Government was that American interests in the islands under 
discussion must be protected". President Roosevelt was "just 
as keen as anybody else to take the full power of arming them 
and using them to protect the peace and ourselves during any 
war that may come, and for that reason his people at San
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Francisco will be trying to form a definition of trusteeship 
or mandate which will permit that to be done” • The problem 
with this approach as Henry Stimson perceived it, "was that 
it camouflaged the realities of the situation":
"The State Department proposals were meticulously building 
up a world organisation which was to be the trustee and we 
were proposing that we should turn over these bases to this 
trustee and then take back the management of them and try 
to make the powers of management big enough to give us the 
power which we now hold from our efforts in the war."
To Henry Stimson, this procedure seemed "pointlessly 
roundabout". He preferred "to state plainly that the defense 
of strategic islands was essential to the United States and a 
definite advantage to all Pacific powers"; the United States 
would "have met with no objection to retaining enough bases 
to secure our position in the Pacific".^ 6
The point so far as Franklin Roosevelt and the State 
Department were concerned, however, was that the colonial 
powers would also use this as a precedent to secure their own 
positions in their overseas dependencies. As Arthur Krock 
argued in The New York Times, if the State Department had 
given way to the military, this would have resulted in 
"reservations of other territory by other nations until the 
non-aggrandizement plan of the Atlantic Charter would become 
a mockery". -^7 This eventuality, especially regarding south 
east Asia and the Pacific, was viewed as a sure receipt for 
future disaster due to the efforts of the peoples concerned 
to rid themselves of colonial rule. The previous analysis of 
British dislike of trusteeship in this thesis, tends to 
validate the State Department's premise that without American 
encouragement and positive example, there would be no United 
Nations trusteeship system. The almost all-pervasive, 
influence of the American anti-colonial tradition is aptly 
demonstrated by President Truman's justification of the 
decision to hold to the Pacific islands under trusteeship:
"My attitude was always that while it was necessary for us 
to control certain islands in the Pacific until peace was 
established, these territories should not be closed to the 
rest of the world.... I intended to try to get as near to
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self-government as we could wherever we had the 
responsibility.... I had always been opposed to 
colonialism. Whatever justification may be cited at any 
stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans. 
America fought her own war of liberation against 
colonialism, and we shall always regard with sympathy and 
understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of 
colonial bondage."1^8
4. The Trusteeship Proposals brought by the United States 
to the San Francisco Conference 
A note attached to the additional chapter on 
"Arrangements of International Trusteeship" proposed by the 
United States for inclusion in the United Nations Charter 
underlined that it dealt "with principles and mechanism only 
and makes no assumption about the inclusion of any specific 
territory".-^9 There was no reference in the American 
proposals to either regional arrangements for dependent 
territories or general principles for the conduct of good 
colonial administration. The omissions were surprising in 
view of all the earlier American work on these topics. In 
planning for the Dumbarton Oaks meeting, the State Department 
had prepared a paper on regional collaboration, but only in 
case this approach was raised by Great Britain. Similarly, 
the American Briefing Book on "Dependent Territories" for the 
Yalta Conference had a section on "Regional Advisory 
Commissions for Dependent Areas" which was not discussed.
The reduced importance placed on regional collaboration was 
primarily due to two inter-related factors. The first was 
Cordell Hull's general belief (referred to in Chapter 5) that 
the new United Nations organisation should encourage global 
rather than regional cooperation in all its spheres of 
interest. The main advocate of regional cooperation in the 
colonial sphere had been Sumner Welles who had resigned as 
Under Secretary of State in September 1943. The second 
factor was the State Departments desire not to deviate 
unduly from the centralised precepts of the League mandates 
system.
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A draft declaration on the principles which should 
govern colonial administration had also been part of the 
Briefing Book for the Yalta Conference. The 
Interdepartmental Committee did consider a two-part chapter 
on trusteeship; the first being on the principles to govern 
administration, and the second on the trusteeship system 
properly speaking. This was rejected in favour of a separate 
trusteeship proposal with a separate declaration lying 
outside the main Charter provisions. The Interdepartmental 
Committee had expected to reconsider this matter, but in the 
event did not do so.
Thus the only proposals the United States took to the 
San Francisco Conference regarding dependent territories were 
those set out in the "Arrangements for International 
Trusteeships". The objects of the system were the same as 
the previous proposals considered by the Interdepartmental 
Committee; furthering "international peace and security", 
promoting "the political, economic and social advancement of 
the trust territories and their inhabitants and their 
progressive development towards self-government", and 
providing "for non-discriminatory treatment in trust 
territories with respect to the economic and other 
appropriate civil activities of the nationals of all member 
states". This open door provision reflected that aspect of 
the American anti-colonial tradition which held that the best 
interests of both the indigenous inhabitants and the 
international community at large would be served if the 
commerce of dependent territories were not closed or confined 
to the nationals of the administering power. Of particular 
interest with regard to the objects of the trusteeship system 
was the provision for "self-government" rather than 
"independence". Although the official American position was 
that the differences between "self-governing" and 
"independence" was merely one of phraseology, this was a 
substantial retreat from the earlier, more idealistic 
American pronouncements in favour of independence. This
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dilution of the American anti-colonial tradition was brought 
about by a combination of three factors: realisation that
American interests were involved in so far as independence 
was not envisaged for some of her territories; the 
recognition that some dependent territories were too small or 
otherwise unsuited for an independent existence; and finally, 
the vehement British opposition to the notion of 
independence. The American position on "independence" or 
"self-government" is considered further in Chapter 7.
The trusteeship system was to be applicable only to 
those territories categorised in the Yalta trusteeship 
formula. Gone forever were the earlier State Department 
idealistic hopes, in large part under the inspiration of 
Sumner Welles, that all dependent territories would come 
under a system of international accountability. This change 
in American policy was again largely due to the inter­
relation of three factors. First, the realisation that to 
advocate such a system would entail placing some American 
dependencies under it; a failure to do so would leave the
United States open to the charge of hypocrisy. Second, the
recognition that it would be unwise to burden the fledgeling 
United Nations with all the vexed and wide ranging problems 
associated with colonialism. Some dependencies were suitable 
for independence, while in others the inhabitants were still 
believed to be living largely in Stone Age cultures. Some
were the size of a sub continent (like India), others only a
few square miles (such as many of the Pacific islands). 
Similarly, some were poor, but others prosperous. The final 
factor was the consideration that Great Britain and the other 
European colonial powers would not agree to place their 
dependencies under such an international trusteeship system. 
Although the United States could endeavour to persuade her 
wartime allies, she could not compel their cooperation. 
Without that cooperation, the envisaged trusteeship system 
could not succeed.
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To satisfy the requirements of the American military 
authorities and, indeed, Great Britain, the "trusteeship 
arrangement for each territory to be placed under trusteeship 
should be agreed by the states directly concerned*1.
Moreover, as a distinct concession to the annexationist 
ambitions of the War and Navy Departments (and, in fact, a 
large section of American public and Congressional opinion) 
regarding the Japanese islands mandate, some trusteeship 
arrangements would permit **a strategic area or areas which 
may include part or all of the territory to which the 
arrangement applies**. In fact, '*all functions of the 
organisation relating to strategic areas, including the 
approval of the trusteeship arrangements and their alteration 
or amendment, should be exercised by the Security Council*'. 
The United States, as a permanent member of the Security 
Council, would have the right to veto all suggestions she did 
not agree with. Thus, because of the demands of the American 
military with regard to the Japanese islands mandate, the 
trusteeship arrangements for strategic trusts were all but 
annexationist. The international role, or rather the ability 
of the international community to advance ideas or schemes 
with which the United States did not approve, were to say the 
least emasculated if not purely nominal.
The American perception of the role of the United 
Nations regarding non-strategic trusts, however, constituted 
a significant step towards greater international 
accountability for dependent peoples. The functions of the 
United Nations would be exercised by the General Assembly 
assisted by a Trusteeship Council operating under its 
authority. The Trusteeship Council would be composed of 
"specially qualified representatives, designated (a) one each 
by the states administering trust territories; and (b) one 
each by an equal number of other states named for three-year- 
periods by the General Assembly". This institutional 
arrangement represented a significant advance in one respect 
over the League mandates system. In the latter, final
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responsibility was vested in the Council under whose 
authority the Permanent Mandates Commission acted, but under 
the new United Nations system, the United States envisaged 
this resting with the General Assembly in which all members 
of the organisation were represented. The Latin American and 
Arab States would almost certainly subject the administering 
powers to much greater scrutiny and criticism than had been 
the case regarding the relationship between the European- 
centred League Council and the mandatory powers. Indeed, the 
American proposals gave substance to and proved well-founded, 
Winston Churchill’s fear that American trusteeship schemes 
could result in the British Empire being placed in the anti­
colonial dock by such states as Ethiopia, Egypt and Equador.
It was in the teeth given to the General Assembly and 
Trusteeship Council that the American proposals made the 
greatest advance in developing the principle of international 
accountability for dependent peoples. The-administering 
authorities would be required to make annual reports to the 
General Assembly upon the basis of questionnaires formulated 
by the Trusteeship Council. The General Assembly and 
Trusteeship Council were empowered to consider these reports, 
accept petitions and to institute investigations into 
conditions in trust territories. This last-named provision 
was especially important. Investigatory powers had been 
denied to the Permanent Mandates Commission and subsequently 
rejected by the British in all their trusteeship schemes.
The right to ask questions and to follow up those questions 
was a very real test of the degree of international 
accountability. This the United States proposed to give to 
the new trusteeship system. Despite all the various 
compromising warts of national self-interest, the ethos of 
the American anti-colonial tradition meant that the United 
States was pre-disposed to advocate a system of international 
rather than national trusteeship.
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Finally, the strength of the American anti-colonial 
tradition played the predominant role in the actual, 
practical formulation of the principle of international 
accountability for dependent peoples in the negotiations 
leading up to the San Francisco Conference, notwithstanding 
the various complications caused by the United States* own 
strategic interests. Much of the credit for progress towards 
ensuring good government for dependent peoples must go to 
British traditions, deficient and obtuse as they sometimes 
appear to modern eyes. The British tradition was one of 
national accountability, however, tinged with a dislike of 
interference by meddlesome foreigners. For a variety of 
reasons, the United States gave an international dimension to 
the British concept of trusteeship. No so much from their 
actual plans and own example, but rather from the influence 
of anti-colonial sentiment on individual American policy­
makers; particularly Franklin Roosevelt.
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Chapter 7 : San Francisco and Beyond
When the San Francisco Conference opened on April 25, 
1945, the American proposals on trusteeship had still not 
been finalised because of continuing internal divisions not 
wholly resolved even after President Roosevelt’s death. At 
San Francisco, however, the United States played the leading 
part in formulating the new United Nations* constitutional 
provisions regarding dependent territories. These 
provisions were subsequently used by the anti-colonial powers 
to attack the whole ethos of Western European colonialism. 
Despite her anti-colonial tradition, the United States was 
not their leader for a number of reasons: in particular,
continuing military ambitions to annex Micronesia; the need 
to ensure the European colonial powers* compliance to 
trusteeship; and growing awareness of the complexity of 
colonial problems. Rather, both at San Francisco and during 
the actual work of the United Nations, the American role was 
a moderating one; endeavouring to reconcile or at least to 
ameliorate the differences between the European colonial 
powers and their anti-colonial opponents.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
examines the American role during the San Francisco 
deliberations on trusteeship. There are three main areas of 
analysis: self-government or independence for dependent
peoples; the proposed Declaration on Non-Self-Governing 
Territories; and establishing the trusteeship system. There 
is also an overall summary of the American contribution to 
extending the principle of international accountability at 
the San Francisco Conference. The second section 
investigates the American position regarding the 
constitutional aspects of United Nations concern with 
colonial problems. Again there are three main areas of 
analysis: the submission of the trusteeship agreements;
American administration of Micronesia; and the anti-colonial
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powers* attempt to "bridge the gap between the trusteeship 
system and the non-self-governing territories"^- which 
culminated with the United Nations Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 
December 1960 and the establishment of a Special Committee to 
report on its implementation in November 1961.^
Constitutional developments since November 1961 and United 
Nations involvement in threats to international peace and 
security arising from colonial situations lie outside the 
scope of this thesis. Throughout the chapter, the underlying 
theme is the interplay between American anti-colonial 
sentiments, protecting American interests, the need to 
accommodate the interests of the European colonial powers, 
especially Great Britain, and the desire to see dependent 
peoples achieve independence in an orderly manner.
1. The San Francisco Conference
o
The Big FiveJ had not reached agreement on the 
trusteeship provisions to be included in the new Charter 
prior to the opening of the San Francisco Conference. Their 
consultations did not begin until April 30. The 
participants, "known as the Five Power Consultative Group, 
were regular members, rather than chairmen, of the five 
delegations". The proposals to be considered included the 
American and British plans plus one from Australia. "After 
some opening discussion of the American plan, the French and 
Chinese delegations presented what, in effect, were revised 
versions of this draft. Two weeks later, formal Soviet 
amendments to the United States proposal were received from 
Moscow".^ Preparation of draft trusteeship provisions based 
on the Five Power Consultative Group*s deliberations "was 
assigned to a technical committee, II/4, working under 
Commission II which itself had charge of provisions relating 
to the General Assembly. The Committee, under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Peter Fraser, then Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, met sixteen times from May 5 to June 20, 1945, and
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was composed, as were all other committees of representatives 
of all states participating in the C o n f e r e n c e " . C o m m i t t e e  
II/4 "technically” formulated and approved the trusteeship 
decisions, but the real negotiations were undertaken and the 
fundamental decisions reached in private by the Five Power 
Consultative Group or within their individual delegations. 
Among them there was a general understanding that "they would 
present a united front in Committee II/4, while continuing 
informal consultation on those questions not as yet 
settled".^
The United States took the lead during the Five Power 
Consultative Group negotiations and the deliberations of 
Committee II/4. The American role was crucial. If it had 
not been for American anti-colonial sentiments and desire for 
a measure of international accountability, the future of 
dependent peoples might well have figured less prominently at 
San Francisco. In particular, the United States recognised 
that the trusteeship "provisions of the Charter had to be 
voluntarily accepted" by the colonial powers.^ The overall 
American role, however, was diminished by the a failure to 
"define" her own position precisely enough due primarily to 
the continuing debate in Washington over the fate of the 
Japanese islands mandate.^
Unlike the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the American 
delegation was well-balanced politically. Two senators were 
members; Tom Connally of Texas, Democratic Chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, and a Republican member of that 
Committee, Arthur Vandenberg. There were two members from 
the House of Representatives; a Democrat, Sol Bloom of New 
York, and a Republican, Charles Eaton of New Jersey, both 
members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Bloom, 
Connally and Eaton had taken part in the trusteeship 
discussions of the State Department Advisory Committee during
1942-43. Harold Stassen, a former Governor of Minnesota and 
future presidential candidate, was the delegation member 
responsible for Conference negotiations on trusteeship
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affairs.9 He also chaired the Five Power Consultative 
Group’s trusteeship discussions. The advisors included John 
Foster Dulles, the future Republican Secretary of State, and 
numerous authorities on colonial matters such as Isaiah 
Bowman, Benjamin Gerig, Leo Pasvolsky, and Charles Taussig.
The delegation met frequently during the Conference, 
sometimes twice daily, and were in regular contact with 
President Truman, Congress, and the State, Navy and War 
Departments. The liaison role was particularly important 
because of the continuing strong pressures within the United 
States to annex the Japanese islands mandate throughout the 
San Francisco Conference and beyond. For example, on "3rd 
May, the Naval Affairs Sub-Committee of the Senate headed by 
Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, arrived at San Francisco to 
press for annexation: ’There should be no question that we
have control of them when it is deemed to be necessary for 
our security'."-^ During the Conference deliberations on 
trusteeship, the American delegation had nine guiding 
principles:
"(1) Recognition that the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter are applicable to all peoples of the world, 
including dependent peoples;
(2) Recognition of the principle that the administration 
and development of dependent peoples is a proper concern of 
the world community and of the international organisation;
(3) That, subject to prior agreement of the states directly 
concerned;
(a) territories now administered under the mandate 
system may be placed under the new trusteeship system if 
and when such agreement is reached;
(b) territories which are detached from enemy states in 
this war may be placed and administered under the 
trusteeship system when such agreement is reached; and
(c) the trusteeship system should be available to 
dependent territories other than those in (a) and (b) 
above when the states controlling them voluntarily 
agree;
(4) That the trusteeship system evolved as a part of the 
Charter should be so designed as to fully protect the 
security interests of an administering power;
(5) That self-government or independence should be the 
ultimate goal for all peoples who are capable of 
exercising the responsibilities involved, and the 
administering states should be responsible for the
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political advancement of the peoples under their authority;
(6) That all dependent territories should be administered 
in accordance with the principles that the interests of the 
inhabitants and their welfare and development are a primary 
concern;
(7) That the welfare and development of dependent peoples 
and the maintenance of international peace and security are 
closely inter-related;
(8) That the trust territories should be administered under 
the principle of equal treatment in social, economic, and 
commercial matters for all members of the international 
organization and their nationals;
(9) That the proposed Trusteeship Chapter of the Charter in 
and of itself should not alter the existing rights of any 
states or any peoples, but that alterations of the terms of 
existing mandates or other territories could be made only 
by subsequent agreement of the states directly concerned 
subject to the approval of the Organization."^
The Five Power Consultative Group agreed to a "Proposed 
Working Paper for a Chapter on dependent Territories and 
Arrangements for International Trusteeship" on May 14.
Harold Stassen presented it on behalf of the Consultative 
Group to the fifth meeting of Committee II/4 on May 15. The 
paper was divided into two parts: Part A, a general policy
statement on dependent territories from the
British proposals; and Part B on arrangements for a 
trusteeship system based primarily on the American 
proposals.1 Before examining these proposals, however, 
mention must be made of the Conference deliberations on 
whether independence or self-government should be the goal 
for dependent peoples. This underlay the discussions on both 
parts of the Working Paper as did consideration of ways to 
promote the general welfare of dependent peoples, the 
requirements of international security, and the need for 
international accountability. In fact, all the deliberations 
of both the Five Power Consultative Group and Committee II/4 
were inter-related. Nevertheless, to simplify the 
examination, the three areas of analysis are treated 
separately as self-contained units.
Another point to be borne in mind is that "Anglo- 
American collaboration" played a major role in resolving
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problems relating to non-self-governing and trust 
territories. In particular, throughout the San Francisco 
Conference, Harold Stassen and Benjamin Gerig "worked 
effectively with their British counterparts", Lord Cranborne 
and Sir Hilton Poynton. Despite divergent views on 
colonialism as such, "it was in the interest of both the 
British and the Americans to try to reach agreement on 
fundamentals". To quote William Roger Louis; "on the whole 
the Americans held the upper hand. The draft of their 
proposal had been years in the making. The best the British 
could produce was a warmed-over version of Article 22 of the 
League Covenant, understandably enough, since they were 
prepared to go no further than a renewal of the mandates 
system." Intense and secret discussions were "held between 
the American and British groups, and between the British 
delegation in San Francisco and the authorities in London. 
During the first half of May, Cranborne and Stassen 
successfully worked towards a concord that carried the 
conference and laid the basis of the trusteeship system.
(a) Independence or Self-Government
The Soviet amendment to the American draft trusteeship 
proposal stated that a principal objective should be the 
"progressive development" of dependent peoples "toward self- 
government and self-determination" with their "active 
participation" in order "to expedite the achievement by them 
of full national independence".^ The Russians "originally" 
wanted this objective "included in Part A of the Working 
Paper, the declaration of principles regarding dependent 
areas generally, as well as in the objectives for territories 
coming under the trusteeship system".^ The Chinese also 
proposed "progressive development toward independence or 
self-government as may be appropriate".^ During the 
deliberations of Committee II/4, Egypt, Iraq and the 
Philippines among others argued that "independence" should be 
an option for all dependent peoples. The Chinese and the
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Russians vigorously "emphasised that the word 'independence1 
had appeared in Article 22 of the League Covenant", that 
Iraq, a mandated territory, "had become independent, that 
independence was the goal of many dependent peoples whose 
hopes would suffer if a backward step were now taken by 
excluding the term, and that the principle of the 'right' of 
self-determination is recognised in Article I of the 
Charter".^
Great Britain led the European colonial powers' 
opposition to these arguments. Her draft chapter on 
"Territorial Trusteeship" proposed only that for "dependent 
territories inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world", there should be "the development of self-government 
in forms appropriate to the varying circumstances of each 
territory".-^ In the Five Power Consultative Group 
discussions, she "maintained that many dependent peoples 
desired liberty rather than independence, which would be 
impracticable for some in the foreseeable future. The 
multiplication of weak units was undesirable in itself. 
Moreover, in areas where independence was contemplated in the 
near future, administering powers might be reluctant to 
continue investing their own resources."^ The French 
supported the British objections and argued that "the 
interests of dependent peoples would best be served by the 
development of their political institutions under some form 
of federal unity with the metropolitan country; language that 
favoured the 'hatching' of small, independent units would 
only lead to confusion, whereas reference to the development 
of political institutions could include self-government or 
independence, as appropriate in each case."^
The Americans, with considerable heart-searching, 
supported the Anglo-French arguments. The American draft 
proposal "Arrangements for International Trusteeship" 
referred only to the "progressive development toward self- 
government" by peoples placed under trusteeship.^ This was
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very restrictive compared to the earlier sweeping American 
proposals examined in Chapters 5; proposals similar to the 
Chinese and Russian ones at San Francisco. In fact, as late 
January 1945, the official State Department view was that 
while in "British opinion the goal should be self-government 
within the framework of empire", the United States favoured 
"independence as the goal of those dependencies capable of 
enjoying it". It "might be acceptable", however, to permit 
"such territories the option of freely choosing whether to be 
independent or to remain within an empire".22
The more conservative American approach at San Francisco 
was due to a combination of the internal dispute over the 
Japanese mandated islands, the possible implications for 
American dependencies of radical measures, and the 
recognition that the European colonial powers, especially 
Great Britain, would not agree to a general declaration on 
independence for all dependent peoples. Nevertheless, 
although publicly siding with the European colonial powers, 
albeit reluctantly, the United States found a compromise 
solution; based on the view expressed by Harold Stassen "that 
there was no limit to self-government. It might lead to 
i n d e p e n d e n c e . "23 After discussions within the Five Power 
Consultative Group, "it was agreed that ’independence' would 
be included in the stated objectives of the Trusteeship 
System (Chapters XII and XIII), but would be excluded from 
the Section now known as the Declaration Regarding Non-Self- 
Governing Territories (Chapter XI)".2^ The latter would 
refer to 'self-government' only.
The debate within the American delegation on 
"independence" or "self-government" throws considerable light 
on American anti-colonial sentiments. There were the anti­
colonialists embued by the spirit of Franklin Roosevelt. For 
example, the view of Charles Taussig:
"Independence as a goal for all peoples who aspire to and 
are capable of it has been the traditional and sacred 
policy of this Government. It has been exemplified in our 
policy in the Philippines, and it has been reiterated on
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numerous occasions by President Roosevelt and former 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull."^5
He emphasised that President Roosevelt had felt that to 
"deny the objective of independence**, could **sow the seeds of 
the next world war**. The United States **should take the 
leadership and indicate to the Oriental peoples that we do 
not back the imperial role of the handful of non-Asiatics".^ 
Harley Notter sympathised with this view and argued that to 
**take any position short of independence would simply not 
satisfy the colonial peoples*' and that "spearheading for the 
British, Dutch and Belgian colonial empires", inevitably 
"would be very unpopular in the Far East". The problem was 
one of "approach" as "there was no fundamental difference in 
objective between those who favoured self-government and 
those who favoured independence, since self-government 
implied the possibility of independence".^
The pragmatists within the delegation were more 
concerned with American interests as opposed to ideological 
anti-colonialism. Harold Stassen questioned whether it was 
the American "intention to give complete independence to 
Hawaii",^8 while Sol Bloom pointed out that the United States 
"had bought and paid for Puerto Rico and that they were 
asking not for independence but for statehood".^ Isaiah 
Bowman believed that the key consideration was the future 
"inevitable struggle" with Russia; "Would we have the 
support of Great Britain if we had undermined her 
position?"^ Harold Stassen maintained "that the word 
'inter-dependence' rather than 'independence' was the word of 
the future" and that "the concept of progressive development 
toward self-government was as far as one could go in the 
direction of independence". Moreover, if the United States 
"sided with the Chinese and the Russians on this issue, there 
probably would be no trusteeship system since the British 
will never accept the position".^
Even the pragmatists, however, were influenced by anti­
colonial sentiments. Leo Pasvolsky underlined the "dilemma"
319
in that whereas "too much emphasis on independence as the 
sole good was bad", but "emphasis on independence was in our 
tradition".^2 Indeed, Harold Stassen also accepted that the 
"United States could not really place itself in a position of 
denying the principle of 1 self-determination1".^  Because 
President Roosevelt "had declared that the Atlantic Charter 
was applicable to the Pacific and Atlantic areas", it "would 
be difficult" for the American delegation "to defend any 
language less strong than the Atlantic Charter".^
(b) The Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories
Section A of the Five Power Consultative Group’s Working 
Paper on Non-Self-Governing Territories formed the basis of 
what became Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter; the 
"Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories".^ It 
O u b o f  paragraph one of the British proposal for 
"Territorial Trusteeship".^ This proposal, analysed in 
Chapter 6, resembled the terminology of Article 22 of the 
League Covenant; resting on the principle that United Nations 
members responsible for administering "dependent territories 
inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves 
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, accept 
the principle that it is the sacred trust of civilisation to 
promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of 
these territories within the world community".^7
As was pointed out in Chapter 6, the American 
trusteeship proposal contained no reference to a general 
colonial declaration. The only original American 
contribution/was to add the phrase to further international 
peace and security" to the list of British objectives in the 
Working Paper. In fact, when during internal American 
delegation discussions, Nelson Rockefeller "asked whether it 
had ever been planned to place all territories under 
trusteeship", Leo Pasvolsky "declared that there had never 
been any serious plans of this nature, although there had 
been some ’wild* ideas concerning a complete trusteeship
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system".^® No doubt Mr Pasvolsky had good reasons for being 
somewhat economical with the truth. As was pointed out in 
Chapter 5, the State Departments first wartime proposals, 
the Draft Protocol on Trusteeship completed under the 
direction of Sumner Welles in October 1942, was intended to 
apply to all colonies outside the Western Hemisphere.
During the deliberations of the Big Five Consultative 
Group and Committee II/4, the United States supported the 
successful Iraqi objection to the reference to "civilization" 
in the Working Paper*s phraseology and, more significantly, 
the Australian amendment to provide "the means whereby the 
general principles of Section A would be carried into 
effect".^ After consultations with the Australians, British 
and French, the American technical advisers prepared a new 
draft of Section A "based on the Australian amendment but 
with some language also from early Department of State drafts 
on trusteeship principles".^ Provisions were added on 
"political" and "educational advancement"; respect for "human 
rights" without discrimination; promoting "economic 
development"; inter-state cooperation through United Nations 
"functional organs" and "appropriate regional bodies"; and 
compiling and sending "regularly to the Secretary General" of 
the United Nations "full statistical and other information of 
a technical nature relating to the political economic, social 
and educational conditions".^
Within the American delegation there was some support 
for expanded provisions in line with the general ethos of 
American anti-colonialism. John Foster Dulles stated that 
the United Nations "should have the authority to look into 
the condition of colonial p e o p l e s " . ^  Similarly, Harold 
Stassen favoured making information "available" to the United 
Nations* Secretary General on American dependencies "in order 
to set a precedent which would be followed by other 
administering powers throughout the world*'.^ Charles 
Taussig supported by Benjamin Gerig among others, even stated 
that "Section A constituted a tremendous advance and that the
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inclusion of the word ‘political* would make it a paragraph 
of even more importance**• ^  From outside the delegation, 
Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, wanted the 
United States to "sponsor a declaration of general policy 
respecting all dependent territories**. Among other things 
this "should reiterate** the American "historic commitments to 
the rapid political, economic and social advancement of 
dependent peoples to... first, self-rule and second, 
independence** • ^
In general, however, the additional clauses caused 
considerable disquiet within both the American delegation 
and the new Truman Administration in Washington; in 
particular, the Navy and War Departments favoured more 
limited objectives as in the earlier drafts of Section A of 
the Working Paper. Their objections were based on the 
possible dangers to American security and sovereignty; 
especially the transmission of information, albeit of a 
"technical nature** only, on American dependencies. Similar 
fears were raised in the American delegation. Senator 
Vandenberg declared that "the whole Chapter was not worth the 
trouble it had taken if it implied any jurisdiction*' by the 
United Nations "no matter how remote, over Hawaii and 
Alaska".^ Majority opinion within the delegation also 
opposed including the word "political" among the types of 
information to be transmitted and recognised that Great 
Britain and the other European colonial powers would not 
agree its inclusion. Harold Stassen stated that such 
information should be sent "on a voluntary basis" only.^
The differences were "resolved in the direction of the 
military views''^ which together with British and French 
objections, resulted in a more restricted set of principles 
being incorporated into Chapter XI of the Charter. In 
particular, Article 73(e) made no reference to the 
transmission to the Secretary General of "political" 
information and emphasised that only "statistical and other 
information of a technical nature relating to economic,
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social, and educational conditions*1 was to be sent and even 
then "subject to such limitation as security and 
constitutional considerations may require*1. As Emil Sady 
pointed out, at San Francisco there was **no misunderstanding** 
of the limited nature of the "obligations undertaken by 
administering states*', or that "the Charter contained no 
provision for machinery to supervise the administration of 
any non-self-governing territories that were not placed under 
trusteeship".^
(c) Establishing the Trusteeship System
Section B of the Working Paper drawn up by the Five 
Power Consultative Group was substantially based on the 
American trusteeship p r o p o s a l s . C o m m i t t e e  II/4 began 
discussing Section B on May 16, and with relatively minor 
amendments it became the basis of the United Nations 
trusteeship system; Chapter XII of the Charter on objectives 
and principles (Articles 75 to 85), and Chapter XIII on the 
Trusteeship Council (Articles 86 to 91). Within the confines 
of the Yalta formula limiting the categories of territory to 
be placed under trusteeship and safeguarding American 
security interests by creating the special category of 
"strategic" trusts, the United States played a much more 
positive role than in the debate on what became the 
Declaration on Non-Self-Governing Territories. She leaned 
more towards the anti-colonial viewpoint, but opposed their 
more extreme demands like the Philippines' one "that the 
principle of trusteeship should be applicable to all 
dependent territories";^  an idea originally advocated by 
Sumner Welles among others.
During the trusteeship discussions, the American 
delegation was under constant pressure from Congress and the 
Navy and War Departments to safeguard the American position 
regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Despite the 
compromise between the State and the Navy and War Departments 
which led to the "strategic" trust formula, the pressures for
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annexing the islands persisted throughout the San Francisco 
deliberations. Congressional opinion favoured annexation as 
did some members of the delegation. For example, Senator 
Connally stated "that we are going to take these islands and 
hold them, but if we hold them under trusteeship we might get 
into difficulty with our Allies*1. ^ 2 Isaiah Bowman put the 
alternative viewpoint; *'the world expects us to do something 
on trusteeship1* and if the United States annexed the islands, 
she would be in a very weak position to oppose British 
ambitions in, say, **Somaliland*'. ^ 3
The anti-colonial argument triumphed, but only within 
the confines of the ‘'strategic trust" formula, the provision 
that the arrangements for each territory placed under 
trusteeship should "be agreed upon by the states directly 
concerned", and Great Power agreement that trusteeship 
principles only would be discussed at San Francisco, not 
specific territories. In reality, the United States would 
annex the Japanese mandated islands in all but name. She had 
possession and, in the words of Harold Stassen, "would define 
the terms of the trusteeship".-^ Nevertheless, outright 
annexationist pressures still persisted within Congress and 
the Truman Administration^. It was not until November 6, 
1946, that President Truman announced that the United States 
would definitely "submit a trusteeship agreement for 'any 
Japanese islands for which it [had assumed] responsibilities 
as a result of the Second World War'".-^
The additions and amendments made by the Five Power 
Consultative Group to the American trusteeship proposals on 
the whole were relatively minor.^7 "Among the provisions of 
Part B not contained in the United States draft was one taken 
from the Chinese proposals enabling the international 
organization to become administering authority of a trust 
territory. Soviet demands for representation of all 
permanent Security Council members on the Trusteeship Council 
were also met. For the benefit of mandatory powers, a so- 
called 'conservatory clause' was introduced to preserve
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existing rights of an administering state or trust people in 
any territory•
The debate over the trusteeship system within the 
American delegation, the Five Power Consultative Group and 
Committee II/4 highlights the conflict between American anti­
colonial sentiments and perceived national interest 
requirements. In resolving this conflict, the United States 
actually protected her own interests, but also extended the 
boundaries of international accountability; certainly further 
than Great Britain and the other European colonial powers had 
anticipated. In addition to the already mentioned question 
of "independence" or "self-government" for trust territories, 
the conflict between sentiment and interest took place within 
the context of three issues: strategic requirements and
control over the Japanese mandated islands; the 'open door'; 
and the Trusteeship Council's composition and powers.
Strategic requirements. To reiterate; the United States 
desire to retain unrestricted control of the Japanese islands 
mandate was such that she would only agree to a trusteeship 
system which included "strategic trusts" coming under the 
Security Council where there would be American veto powers. 
Within the Five Power Consultative Group, however, Great 
Britain at first opposed special treatment for strategic 
areas on three grounds. First, "as the interests of the 
indigenous inhabitants are a paramount consideration", 
international "supervision is just as necessary in strategic 
areas as in other areas". Second, "particularly in large 
territories", it was not "possible to draw a hard and fast 
line separating strategic areas from non-strategic areas". 
Third, administering powers should be able "to mobilise the 
war potential" of their trust territories so long as this 
conformed with their "obligations" under the United Nations 
Charter. Great Britain therefore proposed that 
administering authorities report on security functions to the 
Security Council and on other functions to the Trusteeship
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Council." The Soviet Union, moreover, "wanted to provide 
that such strategic areas should be named on recommendation 
of the Security Council, as the only agency that would know 
the full world security picture and, therefore, where 
strategic areas were needed".^
These proposals, "for obvious political reasons",^ were 
not acceptable to the United States. The American 
delegation's military advisers, General Stanley Embick and 
Admiral Russell Willson, made it clear that strategic trusts 
were the minimum that was acceptable in the interests of 
American security.^ Harold Stassen included the strategic 
trust concept in the Working Paper and no more was heard of 
the British, Chinese and Russian objections. Great Britain 
had long favoured American retention of the Japanese islands 
mandate and "giving way on the issue of the strategic trust 
territory" would help create "a spirit of goodwill" with the 
Americans. "It cost the British nothing, and it helped in 
bringing the two parties t o g e t h e r . N o w  that "all trust 
areas" were to be integrated "into the international security 
system", however, it was "basically inconsistent" for the 
United States to continue to advocate the 'no fortification' 
rule devised by Woodrow Wilson in large part to restrict 
Japan's militarisation of her Pacific islands mandate. 
Accordingly, she dropped her opposition to the British and 
Australian proposal to remove the restrictions on using 
mandates for military purposes. The Working Paper permitted 
administering authorities to use "volunteer forces, 
facilities, and assistance from trust areas"; a provision 
written into Article 84 of the Charter.^
In addition to the strategic trust concept, there were 
some constitutional or technical suggestions which the United 
States either advocated or opposed to deflect possible future 
attempts to reduce her hold over the Japanese mandated 
islands. As already mentioned, the United States emphasised 
that the arrangements for each territory could be made only 
by the "states directly concerned", and "would include terms
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of administration for the territory and establish whether it 
was to be a strategic trust". All functions "would be 
exercised by the Security Council" where the United States 
would have a veto. The General Assembly "would be similarly 
responsible in the case of non-strategic t r u s t s " . 65 The 
American position was that if no "subsequent agreement" was 
reached by the "states directly concerned", then a territory 
"could not be placed under the [trusteeship] system".66 
Regarding the Japanese islands mandate, in the words of 
Harold Stassen, "the United States has the right of 
possession. This right of possession, he emphasised, can be 
kept if the country has national backbone and if satisfactory 
trusteeship arrangements for these territories cannot be 
negotiated. "67
The United States opposed "an Australian proposal to 
give the General Assembly power to declare dependent 
territories under trusteeship and to name the individual" 
administering authorities. It "was not even debated" in the 
Five Power Consultative Group.68 Another proposal 
"unacceptable" to the United States was the Chinese one "for 
action against violation of a trust agreement" as this "would 
be a matter of international concern, and hence should be 
brought before the Assembly or Security Council, as 
a p p r o p r i a t e " . ^  The American Working Paper was also "silent" 
on criteria "for terminating a trust or transferring it from 
one administering authority to another". In actual fact, 
however, as the "states directly concerned" had to concur in 
"any alteration or amendment" of the original trusteeship 
arrangements, "neither termination nor transfer could occur 
without the consent of the original administering authority". 
During the discussions on this point in Committee II/4, the 
Americans and British stated that if an administering 
authority "withdrew" from the United Nations "for good 
reasons, it could continue to cooperate so far as its trust 
responsibilities were concerned. In less happy 
circumstances, however, the resulting situation ’could only
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be judged by the General Assembly and the Security Council on 
its merits', in view of the prevailing circumstances," The 
anti-colonialists in Committee II/4 had to accept this 
"interpretation", no matter how reluctantly.^ The United 
States' position regarding the Japanese mandated islands or 
any other territories she assumed trusteeship 
responsibilities for, was absolutely secure. She had 
possession of the mandated islands and was "constitutionally" 
safeguarded if leaving the United Nations "for good reasons"; 
if the reasons were not good, then the United Nations was 
extremely unlikely to take any effective action against her. 
Ernst Haas' observation is most apt: "Thus established, the
Trusteeship System seemed innocuous enough to satisfy the 
sentiments of the most hardened isolationist".^
The Open Door was a basic objective of the "Arrangements for 
International Trusteeship" proposed by the United States. 
Paragraph 2(c) stated that the trusteeship system should 
"provide for non-discriminatory treatment in trust 
territories with respect to the economic and other 
appropriate civil activities of the nationals of all" United 
Nations' members.^ As well as being "in line with American 
policy against discriminatory policies in all international 
economic matters" and an integral part of the ideological 
core of American anti-colonialism, the "equal-treatment 
guarantee" had a "specific background" in American relations 
with the League mandates system as discussed in Chapter 4.
In essence, the least developed "C" class mandates, "were 
normally administered as integral parts of the mandatory 
states, which had never extended to United States commerce 
the non-discriminatory 'open door' policies enforced in other 
mandates. This had long been an issue between them and the 
United States.
An "open door" clause was "significantly absent" from 
the British trusteeship proposals.^ Along with the other 
colonial powers, Great Britain strongly opposed the "non-
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discriminatory treatment of nationals of member states” ;
”This would have the effect of assimilating the status of 
C Mandates to that of B Mandates, thus altering the terms 
of the contracts under which the states responsible for 
C Mandates had agreed to accept them. It would also 
perpetuate in B Mandates the existing non-discriminatory 
clauses, which had not always operated to the advantage of 
the dependent peoples concerned.” '5
The Americans ”proved to be adamant about the free trade 
clauses” , ^  and the colonial powers were forced to agree to 
the essentials of the American demands. Some concessions 
were made, however, ”albeit reluctantly by the economic 
advisers of the American delegation, in a qualification that 
equal treatment should be ensured in the trust territories to 
the extent that it did not prejudice the advancement of the 
local inhabitants” . ^  American anti-colonialism triumphed to 
the extent that the relevant phrase of Article 76(d) reads 
"to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and 
commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and 
their nationals” .
The Composition and Powers of the Trusteeship Council. It 
was with regard to the Trusteeship Council that the United 
States played her most positive role in extending the 
principle of international accountability for dependent 
peoples. It was primarily due to her efforts that the 
Council became a "principal” organ of the United Nations.
The American proposals specifically referred to a Trusteeship 
Council "to assist the General Assembly to carry out those 
functions under the trusteeship system not reserved to the 
Security Council” . ^  The British proposal had advocated only 
a "permanent commission” to advise the Economic and Social 
Council.^ This was rejected in favour of the American 
proposal in the Working Paper compiled by the Five Power 
Consultative Group; the American conception being eventually 
incorporated into the United Nations Charter.
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Another American proposal incorporated into the Charter 
was that the Trusteeship Council "should consist of specially 
qualified representatives" from states. The proposal also 
suggested that these representatives should be equally 
divided between representatives from administering and non­
administering states. To take "care of the Soviet request 
for a seat on the Council", during the discussions in 
Committee II/4, the United States later suggested the same 
equal proportion of administering and non-administering 
states, but including all five permanent Security Council 
members; a provision eventually written in to Article 86 of 
the Charter. While there is no veto power in the Trusteeship 
Council, during the San Francisco deliberations the United 
States did consider making its decisions by "a two-thirds 
majority" as this "would be safer than a simple majority in 
order to protect the administering p o w e r s " . T h e  idea was 
not pursued.
This desire to protect the administering powers was also 
evident in the American attitude to the Trusteeship Council’s 
powers regarding strategic trusts. The United States did 
agree to the Security Council being assisted by the 
Trusteeship Council in non-military affairs; in large part 
"to meet British objections to the distinction between 
strategic and non-strategic areas, originating in the fear 
that the economic and social well-being of strategic area 
inhabitants would be neglected by their removal from 
Trusteeship Council s u p e r v i s i o n " . T h e  Americans, however, 
"would not agree to any reporting on the strategic trusts, 
rejecting even a Chinese suggestion that such reports might 
be made to the Security Council on the basis of a 
questionnaire drawn up by it". When asked in Committee II/4 
why there was no "provision for the Security Council to 
receive reports, accept petitions, and visit the strategic 
trust territories, the United States replied merely that the 
Security Council powers were sufficiently broad to cover the 
situation. The point was not further pursued."^
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Subsequently the United States did allow petitions from and 
visits to Micronesia and compiled reports on them for 
discussion in the Trusteeship Council; the reports being then 
sent to the Security Council where no formal action is 
usually taken. But at San Francisco, she took a more 
restricted view of international accountability.
Regarding non-strategic trusts, however, American anti­
colonial sentiment did help to extend international 
accountability compared with the mandates system. The 
American proposals obligated "the administering authority in 
each trust territory within the competence of the General 
Assembly1* to ‘'make an annual report to the General Assembly 
upon the basis of a questionnaire formulated by the 
Trusteeship Council". Under the League system, the Permanent 
Mandates Commission had examined the annual reports and 
advised the League Council, not the Assembly. An even more 
radical innovation was the American proposal empowering the 
General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council "to accept 
petitions" and "to institute investigations".®®
These American proposals were at least "anti-colonial in 
potential",®^ and were in marked contrast to the British ones 
which made no mention of petitions or investigations. In the 
debate within the Five Power Consultative Group, Great 
Britain and France opposed the American proposals. Harold 
Stassen was adamant that the United States was "standing firm 
on the right to petition and would insist on some right of 
inspection within the general trusteeship territories".®® 
Although not making any concessions regarding principles, the 
Americans were willing to modify the wording of their 
proposals and "strike out the specific reference to 
investigation" and substitute "a provision relating to the 
right of periodic visits to the trust territories" in order 
"to satisfy the British and the French who balked at the 
concept of investigation".®® Thus amended, the American 
proposals were accepted and incorporated into Article 87 of 
the Charter empowering the General Assembly and the
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Trusteeship Council to "accept petitions and examine them in 
consultation with the administering authority" and to 
"provide for periodic visits to the respective territories at 
times agreed upon with the administering authority".
(d) An overview of the American role at San Francisco 
The United States played the dominant role in the San 
Francisco deliberations leading to the formulation of 
Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the United Nations Charter.
She made few concessions to the anti-colonial powers during 
the meetings of either the Five Power Consultative Group or 
Committee II/4. The conservative approach of the European 
colonial powers, also played an important part in ensuring 
that the new trusteeship system was not unduly liberal. The 
new system itself was 'voluntary' and no action taken on 
Egypt's suggestion that in selecting administering 
authorities, attention should be paid "to the wishes of the 
p o p u l a t i o n " ; a  notion Woodrow Wilson had advocated at the 
Paris Peace Conference. The Covenant distinction between 
"A", "B" and "C" class mandates was abolished, but at 
American insistence there was now a division between 
"strategic" and "non-strategic" trust territories.
The emphasis the United States placed on security and 
unrestricted control over the Japanese islands mandate in 
part can be explained by the wartime ethos, the believed use 
of the islands by Japan to launch her aggression in the 
Pacific, and the cost in American blood of capturing them.
But this explanation is not wholly adequate. Although a 
frequent critic of European colonialism until well after the 
Second World War, she had a long-standing history of 
resenting any apparent infringements of her sovereignty. "Do 
as you would be done by" was usually not an apt phrase for 
describing the United States' response to unfavourable 
comments on her conduct of colonial and other affairs.
Despite long-standing and radical State Department plans 
for international accountability, the demand of the American
332
Navy and War Departments for exclusive United States control 
over the Japanese Pacific islands mandate, meant that the 
actual American proposals brought to San Francisco were a 
compromise. Thus, notwithstanding her anti-colonial 
tradition, the United States did not give either whole­
hearted support or much public sympathy to the anti-colonial 
powers. If President Roosevelt had lived, the United States 
might have played a more positive anti-colonial role in 
extending the principle of international accountability for 
dependent peoples. But he died before the San Francisco 
Conference began. His successor as President, Harry Truman, 
was both inexperienced in international affairs and not so 
concerned with colonial problems as Franklin Roosevelt. To 
President Truman, these problems were not even of secondary 
importance compared to taking up the reins of office and 
continuing the war against the Axis. He was essentially a 
patriot and more willing to compromise on the side of the 
military over the trusteeship issue in general than President 
Roosevelt; especially when confronted with the arguments of 
the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, a former Secretary of 
State and a man of great charisma and acknowledged integrity.
Even if the United States had been a whole-hearted 
member of the anti-colonial camp, however, it is extremely 
doubtful whether the colonial powers would have agreed to 
either greater United Nations control over the trusteeship 
machinery or a more radical declaration on non-self-governing 
territories. Cordell Hull among other Americans had long 
recognised that United States could not impose radical 
measures of international accountability on reluctant 
colonial powers. Their cooperation was essential for United 
Nations supervisory machinery on dependent peoples to work 
satisfactorily.
Where her own security and sovereignty were not directly 
threatened, the United States was willing to extend the 
principle of international accountability for dependent 
peoples in opposition to the European colonial powers.
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American anti-colonialism might have been somewhat muted at 
San Francisco because of the desire for unfettered control 
over the Japanese islands mandate, but it still played an 
essential role in both preserving and extending the principle 
of international accountability for dependent peoples.
Without the United States, the European colonial powers might 
well have tried to terminate the mandates system without 
replacing it with the trusteeship system.
2. The Constitutional Aspects of United Nations Concern
with Colonial Problems
The constitutional provisions of the United Naitons 
Charter regarding non-self-governing and trust territories 
have been used by the anti-colonial powers as an instrument 
to attack Western European colonialism. In their hands, the 
institutional measures for greater international 
accountability regarding non-strategic trust territories 
became a constitutional "time bomb**.^® In particular, in 
attempting to bridge the constitutional divide between trust 
and non-self-governing territories, the Afro-Asian states 
argued that the American-sponsored Charter provisions on the 
right of petition and periodic visits should be applicable to 
all dependent peoples.
The American response to this attempt to turn the United 
Nations into an anti-colonial forum and to reshape the 
international climate of opinion on colonial problems is best 
understood by the inter-play of five closely related factors 
in the postwar world. The first is the relative decline in 
Western European influence and the shift in the centre of 
gravity of world power to the United States and the Soviet 
Union whose ubiquitous interests made their involvement in 
Western Europe*s retreat from its colonial outposts almost 
inescapable. The second is that the United States had to 
take into account third world reaction against white, 
especially Western European, domination in the underdeveloped 
regions of the world. The third world states, moreover,
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tended to perceive Western European colonialism not Soviet 
imperialism as the major threat to world harmony. The third 
factor was Moscow's use of anti-colonialism as an ideological 
weapon to further both international communism and Soviet 
imperialist ambitions. This posed American policy-makers 
with an acute dilemma as although the United States had 
inherited a distaste for colonialism, the European colonial 
powers were her closest allies in the global confrontation 
with communism. The fourth factor was the increasing Western 
European acceptance in principle of the eventual independence 
of most of their colonies. This modified American 
difficulties from an ideological standpoint, but from a 
practical one, precipitate decolonization could offer an 
opportunity for communist penetration. Even if there were no 
communist takeovers, there might well be domestic upheavals 
in the new Afro-Asian states which could not be ignored by 
the United States.
The fifth factor was the Afro-Asian use of the United 
Nations as the focal point for their anti-colonial crusade. 
United Nations membership involved the United States more 
intimately in colonial problems than would otherwise have 
been the case. American policy-makers themselves became more 
aware of the complexities of colonial rule. The anti­
colonial attempt to extend the United Nations' role into the 
affairs of all dependent peoples, threatened American 
sovereignty as well as that of the European colonial powers. 
To a considerable extent the various dilemmas arising from 
colonial problems had to be resolved by the United States in 
an open forum. The public nature of United Nations 
deliberations forced American spokesmen to be more 
circumspect in their statements to avoid giving undue offense 
to either the colonial metropoles or the emergent Afro-Asian 
states. Open-voting in the General Assembly, Security 
Council, and Trusteeship Council meant that the United States 
had to stand up and be counted instead of retreating into 
vague, ambiguous pronouncements. The third world states
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wanted positive support and usually rejected as hypocritical 
sentimental American protestations of ideological sympathy.
It is against this general background that this section 
briefly examines the implications for the United States of 
the constitutional aspects of United Nations involvement with 
colonial problems. The emphasis is on international 
accountability and the American anti-colonial tradition. The 
section is divided into three parts: the United States and
the submission of the trusteeship agreements; American 
administration of Micronesia; and the American position on 
the anti-colonial powers' efforts to give the United Nations 
a bigger constitutional role regarding non-self-governing 
territories. The latter also embraces American attitudes to 
submitting political information under Article 73(e). It 
concludes with the establishment of the Special Committee to 
report on the implementation of the 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
(a) The Submission of the Trusteeship Agreements
The United States Trust Territory of the Pacific 
(hereafter referred to as Micronesia) is the only one of the 
eleven territories placed under trusteeship which still has 
that status.^ Consideration of the American draft trusteeship 
agreement for Micronesia is deferred to the next sub-section 
on the United States' administration of the territory.
Details of the other ten territories are provided in 
Appendix 3. The debate on the arrangements whereby they were 
originally placed under trusteeship illustrates American 
anti-colonial sentiments and the principle of international 
accountability. As at the San Francisco Conference, the 
United States tended to play a conciliatory role which 
usually came down on the side of the colonial powers with 
anti-colonial sentiment being subordinate to national 
interest. Nevertheless, the American role was usually 
constructive. For example, regarding the discussion on the 
draft trusteeship arrangements, John Foster Dulles declared
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Only Palau now remains under trusteeship. In December 1990, by a vote of 14 in 
favour to one against (Cuba), the Security Council adopted resolution 683 (1990) 
terminating the Trusteeship Agreement for the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. See United Nations 
Information Centre (London Office), NS 131/90.
that "the Soviet proposal to consider in detail each article 
was theoretically ideal11, but "it would not be practical" as 
it would be "too big a task".^^ Similarly, he stated that 
the United States opposed the United Nations itself becoming 
an administering authority as colonial administration 
required considerable "experience" and "involved certain 
responsibilities and technical capacities which the United 
Nations did not thus far possess. The Organisation was in 
fact only just learning to administer its own affairs and to 
make up its own mind."^
Eight draft trusteeship agreements were considered by 
the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in November- 
December 1 9 4 6 . i t  was "understood, though not formally, 
that a decision taken for Western Samoa would in general be 
followed by the Fourth Committee with respect to the other 
drafts".^ Over such issues as the Indian suggestion over 
target dates for Western Samoan independence along the lines 
of the American model for the Philippines, the United States 
agreed with the New Zealand contention that "fixing" a "time 
limit" was "completely i m p r a c t i c a l " . ^  Anti-colonial 
sentiment was more to the forefront, however, in the 
qualified and successful American opposition to Article VII 
of the draft trusteeship agreement for Western Samoa stating 
that it could be treated "as an integral part of New 
Zealand". John Foster Dulles declared that "he interpreted 
it to mean 'as jLf it were an integral part'".^ The word 
"if" was eventually incorporated into Article VII as in the 
Australian draft agreement for New Guinea. The American 
contention was that this made it clearer that sovereignty did 
not rest with the administering power.
The self-interested aspect of the United States anti­
colonialism in the guise of the *open door' and ’non- 
discrimination' in part underlay the American wish to 
restrict granting private monopolies in trust territories. 
Both Belgium and Great Britain wanted to create such 
monopolies for the advantage of the native inhabitants. John
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Foster Dulles stated that "customs, fiscal or administrative 
unions" could be "in the interests of the peoples concerned"; 
Philippine independence "had not been impeded by the customs 
union which existed with the United States".^ Benjamin 
Gerig, however, emphasised that where "monopolies" were 
established, "in such cases of departure from the principle 
of economic equality, there should be no discrimination on 
grounds of nationality in the selection of non-governmental 
agencies". The American view was "that the exceptional right 
to create monopolies, other than fiscal monopolies and 
essential public works and services, should be subject to 
prior review by the Trusteeship Council".^ The principle of 
prior notification to the Trusteeship Council was defeated; 
Great Britain arguing that "such a procedure would give to 
the Trusteeship Council an administrative duty which it was 
not empowered, under the Charter, to exercise".^ Belgium 
and Great Britain, however, "did agree to include in their 
agreements a provision to prevent discrimination on grounds 
of nationality in the granting of private monopolies and 
declared that such monopolies would be granted only when 
essential for economic development of interest to the 
inhabitants".^
There were also two issues embracing the draft 
trusteeship agreements for all ten non-strategic trust 
territories where American anti-colonialism was clearly 
subordinate to national security; military bases in trust 
territories and the role of "states directly concerned" in 
agreeing to trusteeship agreements. In both issues 
increasing suspicions of Soviet intentions and the emergence 
of the cold war were major considerations in the formation of 
American policy. The Soviet Union supported by India and 
other anti-colonial states strongly opposed the provisions in 
the first eight draft trusteeship agreements to give 
administering authorities the right "to establish naval, 
military and air bases and to erect fortifications" and "to 
station and employ armed forces" in trust territories.^
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Their opposition was based on the belief that it "would be an 
extension of Article 84 of the Charter, and that unless 
military bases were declared strategic trust areas under 
Articles 82 and 83, they could be established only pursuant 
to agreements made with the Security Council under Article 
43".100
Although the original no-fortification provisions of the 
League mandates system were an American conception, the 
United States now supported the successful contention of the 
administering powers that a degree of militarisation was 
within the philosophy of the Charter. John Foster Dulles 
maintained that "Article 84 of the Charter required the 
participation of Trust Territories in the maintenance of 
world peace, and Article 51 of the Charter recognised the 
inherent right of self-defence, which surely applied equally 
to Trust Territories". Certainly neither the United States 
nor its allies wanted the issue to go to the Security Council 
where the Soviet Union would have a veto. To quote John 
Foster Dulles; "the use of the veto power in the Security 
Council was destroying the confidence of many nations in that 
organ". For these reasons, "the Soviet proposal was looked 
upon with some scepticism".
Article 79 of the Charter required trusteeship 
arrangements to be approved by the "states directly 
concerned" as well as by the United Nations. The United 
States originally insisted upon this phrase during the San 
Francisco Conference to give herself a voice in the 
disposition of the League mandates in general and to help 
secure her hold over the Japanese mandates islands in 
particular. The Soviet Union maintained that as one of the 
"Big Five", it was directly concerned with all trusteeship 
arrangements. Neither the United States nor the 
administering powers were prepared to agree to what, in 
effect, would be a Soviet "veto" on all trusteeship 
agreements, especially with the early onset of the cold war. 
The Americans by-passed the Soviet objections by successfully
sponsoring a resolution by which the General Assembly would 
approve the trusteeship agreements "without prejudice to 
future determination of the * states directly concerned*11.102 
The Soviet Union continued to contend that the trusteeship 
agreements were illegal, but all eight of them were approved 
by the General Assembly on December 13, 1946.^^
The complex and tortuous series of events whereby 
Somaliland was placed under trusteeship also illustrates the 
American inclination to place self-interest first regarding 
colonial p r o b l e m s . O n e  reason why the United States 
supported the Italian claim to the Somaliland trusteeship was 
the importance of the Italian vote in New York to the 
Democrats in the 1948 presidential election. The believed 
strategic importance of the former Italian colonies was 
another important consideration. At the Potsdam Conference 
in July 1945 the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in 
having the trusteeship of one of the ex-Italian colonies. 
Although the State Department itself favoured Italian 
trusteeship, the new Secretary of State, James Byrnes, 
proposed a collective trusteeship with the United Nations as 
the administering authority; a "trusteeship established 
solely to assist the inhabitants of the colonies to develop 
the capacity for self-government so that the people might be 
granted independence".-^-*
By the summer of 1948, however, the realities of power 
were such that the interests of the inhabitants of the 
colonies received a lower priority. The United States now 
advocated Italian trusteeship for Somaliland, while the 
Soviet Union favoured a collective United Nations 
trusteeship. The matter was eventually settled in accordance 
with American wishes in December 1950 when the General 
Assembly decide that Italy (not then a United Nations member) 
should have the trusteeship of Somaliland for a ten year 
period. To quote George Thullen, the whole episode 
illustrates that "both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, while professing anti-colonialism, demonstrated that
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where national interests considered vital were involved, they 
did not hesitate to place strategic considerations before 
safeguarding trust peoples* rights and well being".
(b) The United States and Micronesia
Within congressional and military circles there remained 
demands for American annexation of the Japanese mandated 
island^despite the San Francisco compromise and statements by 
Edward Stettinius and others that the trusteeship provisions 
of the United Nations Charter safeguarded the United States* 
control over the islands.10  ^ For example, at a meeting 
called by President Truman in October 1946, Admiral Chester 
Nimitz, speaking as Chief of Naval Operations, argued **that 
the sovereignty of the ex-Japanese mandates should be taken 
by the United States**:
'*the ultimate sovereignty of the United States depends in 
major part on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean, 
that these islands are part of the complex essential to 
that control, and that the concept of trusteeship is 
inapplicable here because these islands do not represent 
any colonial problem nor is there economic advantage 
accruing to the United States through their ownership.**108
When President Truman announced in November 1946 that a 
trusteeship agreement would be submitted for the mandated 
islands, it was made clear that if the United Nations did not 
accept the arrangements as proposed by the United States, the 
islands would still remain under American control. The draft 
trusteeship agreement was discussed by the Security Council 
in February-March 1947, and accepted on April 2. Despite 
objecting to the agreement, there was no Soviet veto;10^ in 
fact, the Security Council voted unanimously for approval.
The debate on the trusteeship agreement provides further 
evidence of the limits on American anti-colonialism where the 
United States* own interests were concerned.110 The 
Americans accepted a Soviet amendment to add "independence" 
to the goal of self-government, but otherwise made few 
concessions. There was to be no *open door*, despite the 
United States long-standing criticisms of believed European
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closed colonial doors and her arguments during the 
discussions on the earlier trusteeship agreements. She did 
agree to delete the phrase "as an integral part of the United 
States" from Article 3 of the agreement, but United States 
laws could be applied as appropriate. Article 9, moreover, 
stated that the United States "shall be entitled to 
constitute the trust territory into a customs union, fiscal 
or administrative union or federation within the territories 
under United States jurisdiction, or to establish common 
services between such territories and the trust territory 
where such measures are not inconsistent with the basic 
objectives of the international trusteeship system and with 
the terms of this agreement". Indeed, there was "the most 
complete Imperial Preference"^^ in the right of the United 
States under Article 8 to grant her nationals and companies 
more favourable economic treatment than those of other 
countries.
The degree of international accountability which the 
United States had insisted upon for the non-strategic trusts, 
was muted if not absent from the American draft agreement.
In particular, "The provisions of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Charter shall be applicable to the trust territory provided 
that the administering authority may determine the extent of 
their applicability in any areas which may from time to time 
be specified by them and closed for security reasons". In 
effect, nothing could be done without the consent of the 
United States. Article 15 of the draft trusteeship agreement 
read that its terms "shall not be altered, amended or 
terminated without the consent of the administering 
authority". The Americans firmly rejected a Soviet proposal 
that, "the terms of the present agreement may be altered, 
supplemented, or terminated by decision of the Security 
Council". Overall, the principle of international 
accountability was so diluted that Micronesia as the former 
Japanese mandated islands came to be called, was annexed by 
the United States in all but name.
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The American administration of Micronesia (the Caroline, 
Marshall, and Mariana island groups) at first definitely 
placed United States security interests before the welfare of 
the native inhabitants. The latter was relatively neglected 
until after 1960, although the United States did follow the 
institutional precepts of international accountability to a 
greater degree than might have been expected in view of the 
original strong pressures for actual American annexation of 
the islands. Originally the islands were administered by the 
American Navy, but in 1951 all of them except for Saipan and 
Tinian in the Marianas, were transferred to the Department of 
the Interior; in 1962 the latter also assumed responsibility 
for Saipan and Tinian. The United States' intention to 
absorb the islands into her security system was made very 
clear from the beginning. "The problem of Japanese 
settlers... was solved quite summarily", the American 
authorities "just shipped them all home".*-^ Military 
installations were constructed, tight security precautions 
maintained, and some islands used for atomic tests. At 
first, the United States limited "access to the territory to 
Americans with security clearance", restricted "the travel of 
Micronesians outside the territory", and discouraged 
"American investment in the area".^^ There were closed 
areas such as the Bikini and Eniwetoka atolls where atomic 
tests were carried out, which unauthorised persons were not 
allowed to visit.
At first the islands were relatively neglected in 
economic terms. In fact, some commentators otherwise 
favourable to the American administration, felt it 
"regrettable" that there was "a tendency among keepers of the 
United States Congressional purse-strings to be niggardly in 
providing adequate funds for the Trust Territory 
Administration for the development of the native economy and 
for cultural p r o g r e s s " . A n o t h e r  factor inhibiting 
material progress was the geographical nature of the islands. 
Micronesia "covers some 3 million square miles of the Western
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Pacific Ocean, situated above the Equator, north of 
Australia, east of the Philippines and north-east of 
Indonesia. It embraces more than 2,000 islands and islets, 
lying in three major archipelagos."^-* Many of the islands 
are sparsely populated or uninhabited, and even in 1990 the 
total population HUS' still probably less than a quarter of a 
million.
The Americans did more for Micronesia's economic 
development after 1960; in part as a response to criticism in 
the Trusteeship Council and the greater intensity of the 
"United Nations spotlight"-^** following the General Assembly 
Declaration on Decolonisation and the establishment of the 
Committee of 24 in the early 1960s. In fact, in June 1961 
the United States announced that the essential elements of 
the 1960 Declaration were applicable to Micronesia. The 
islands continue to rely on American subsidies (still 
limited, although more generous than in the 1950s), but have 
developed their agricultural, fishing and tourism (especially 
from Japan) sectors; the latter being the main source of 
income. Neither the tourism or fishing sectors could be 
developed before the 1960s when American security interests 
(including atomic bomb tests) were paramount.
As American security interests in the islands waned, the 
pace of their political development increased. In the 1950s, 
they were administered from Guam, outside the trust 
territory, and the only real representative institution was 
an 'Inter-District Advisory Committee' whose members were 
appointed by the American High Commissioner. By the early 
1960s, however, more representative institutions were 
developed including an attempt to foster self-government at 
the grass roots level. In particular, "in 1962, Washington 
put the entire Trust Territory under civil administration, 
moved its headquarters within the territory (to Saipan), more 
than doubled the annual congressional appropriation for the 
islands, and reversed an earlier policy of discouraging 
private investment and d e v e l o p m e n t " . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
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political institutions were developed to a point whereby the 
native inhabitants could decide on their own constitutional 
future.
Complete independence has never been a practical goal; 
nor has statehood within the North American federal union.
The only viable political future lay with some sort of free 
association with the United States. The first step in this 
direction came in June 1975 when the Northern Mariana Islands 
voted in a United Nations observed plebiscite to establish a 
Commonwealth in Union with the United States. Differences 
among the inhabitants of Micronesia have resulted in its 
being divided into four constituent governments; the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, the Federated 
States of Micronesia (Yap, Truk, Pohnpei and Kosrae), and the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. All four have 
local autonomy and voluntary organic links with the United 
States; approved in United Nations-observed plebiscites. The 
United States still reports . to the Trusteeship
Council because the future position of Palau is not yet 
c l a r i f i e d . O n c e  it is clarified, the United Nations 
trusteeship machinery as such will be superfluous. Palau 
itself has a population of about 15,000.
On the whole the United States conscientiously fulfilled 
the institutional aspects of its commitment to international 
accountability for the trusteeship of Micronesia. Washington 
reported regularly to the Trusteeship Council and responded 
to its constructive criticisms, although refusing to accept 
that the Committee of 24 had any authority over American 
conduct of the t r u s t e e s h i p . T h e  reports have been passed 
to the Security Council where normally no action is taken. 
There have been regular Trusteeship Council visiting missions 
to Micronesia; relatively unhindered apart from some areas 
being closed to them because of atomic tests in the early 
1950s. The United States has also allowed oral and written 
petitions to the Trusteeship Council from the native 
inhabitants on relatively minor matters like land claims-^0
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or more serious ones such as that from the Marshall Islands 
on radioactive fall-out from the hydrogen bomb explosion at 
Bikini in March 1954 where Washington might have sheltered 
behind the shield of national security.121
It is with regard to the atomic tests, however, that the 
United States can be criticised for betraying the spirit if 
not the letter of its trusteeship. These tests were 
devastating on the areas of Micronesia involved. For 
example, regarding the Bikini test, in 1979, twenty-five 
years after the explosion, the Trusteeship Council was still 
"deeply concerned about the plight of the displaced 
populations, particularly those of Bikini Island*1 and noted 
**that it would be another 30 to 60 years before Bikini would 
be safe for agricultural p u r p o s e s " . 122 It is difficult to 
see how atomic and hydrogen bomb tests accord with the United 
States obligation under Article 76 of the Charter to promote 
the best interests of the native inhabitants!
(c) Political Information and the Division between Trust
and Non-Self-Governing Territories
From its first meeting, the Fourth Committee of the 
General Assembly was used by the anti-colonial powers to 
attack Western European colonialism. In particular, they 
employed their ever-increasing numerical majority in the 
Assembly to endeavour to elicit political information on non- 
self-governing territories and to extend the United Nations 
authority regarding all colonial dependencies by bridging the 
Charter's constitutional gap between non-self-governing and 
trust territories. The United States often sided with Great 
Britain and the other Western European colonial powers in 
their resistance to the anti-colonial pressure. In 
particular, a jealous regard for her sovereign prerogatives 
was such that like them, she often retreated into the defence 
that under Article 2(7) of the Charter the issue in question 
was a matter of domestic jurisdiction. At the same time, 
however, the United States tended to sympathise with the more
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moderate anti-colonial objectives and, as with the 
consideration of the original trusteeship agreements, to play 
a conciliatory yet constructive role. On institutional 
issues, moreover, she was much more inclined than the 
European colonial powers to extend the limits of 
international accountability.
With regard to the Charter obligation under Article 
73(e) to submit information on non-self-governing territories 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the "United 
States was the first nation to comply**. On August 19, 1946, 
she ‘'submitted reports on conditions in Alaska, American 
Samoa, Guam^ Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, and colonial possessions in the Pacific".^ 3  
The American understanding of the term non-self-governing 
territory was a broad one in that under Chapter XI of the 
Charter it appeared "to apply to any territories administered 
by a member of the United Nations which do not enjoy the same 
measure of self-government as a metropolitan area of that 
Member".1^4 Washington ceased to submit information on the 
Canal Zone after Panama protested that it retained 
sovereignty despite American administration, on Puerto Rico 
in 1953 after it became a commonwealth associated with the 
United States, and on Hawaii and Alaska in 1959 when they 
achieved statehood in the North American federal union. The 
anti-colonial powers, however, called upon the United States 
to re-submit information on Puerto Rico as they continued to
1 o c
regard it as a colony. The American position, supported
by the European colonial powers, was that it was for the 
administering power "to determine the constitutional position 
and the status of any particular territory under its 
sovereignty".126
The United States supported the European colonial powers 
at the San Francisco Conference in resisting a requirement to 
submit 'political' information under the Declaration on Non- 
Self-Governing Territories. Both before and during the 
Conference, however, it was intimated that she was not
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opposed in principle to submitting such information on a 
voluntary basis. The "Standard Form for the Guidance of 
Members in the Preparation of Information to be Transmitted 
under 73(e) of the Charter" drawn up in 1947, was based on an 
American initiative. The United States suggested an 
"optional category" embracing general information on the 
government, history and people of a territory; under social 
conditions there were provisions relating to human rights and 
race relations. It was on this voluntary basis that by 1949, 
the United States along with Australia, Denmark and the 
Netherlands transmitted political information under Article 
73(e). Great Britain only grudgingly accepted the Standard 
Form, and did not submit constitutional and political 
information even as a voluntary act until 1961.
The United States also played a constructive, moderate 
role in establishing institutional machinery to consider 
information submitted under Article 73(e).^ 7  >phe United 
States supported the General Assembly's setting up of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Information transmitted under Article 73(e) 
in December 1946; the Ad Hoc Committee consisted of sixteen 
members equally divided between states submitting information 
and those who did not. Along with the European colonial 
powers, however, she used her influence to make it clear that 
the Ad Hoc Committee did not have the status of an organ of 
the General Assembly. The European colonial powers, unlike 
the United States, disliked the very principle of such 
machinery. They maintained that it was a constitutional 
innovation designed to act as a "parallel to the Trusteeship 
Council", and succeeded in limiting its duration to one year. 
It was renewed for one year periods in 1947 and 1948.
In 1949, however, the United States supported the anti­
colonial powers in establishing it as a Special Committee for 
a three year period despite the determined opposition of 
Belgium, France, Great Britain and South Africa who argued 
that it violated the spirit of Chapter XI of the Charter. 
Their threat not to participate in its work, helped to defeat
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an attempt to establish it on a more permanent basis. In 
1952, the United States played a leading role in having the 
word "Special” dropped from the Committee's title and 
favoured its automatic renewal for three year periods as 
required. The latter proposal was defeated by the efforts of 
Belgium, France and Great Britain. With American support the 
Committee on Information under Article 73(e) continued to be 
renewed for three year periods until dissolved by the General 
Assembly in December 1963 when its functions were transferred 
to the Committee of 24 on the Implementation of the 
Declaration on Decolonization. Overall, it was probably only 
due to American efforts that the principle of international 
accountability was extended by establishing the Committee on 
Information in such a way that the European colonial powers 
at least gave some support to the Committee although 
vehemently opposing the principles on which it was based.
The United States at first, however, joined with the 
European colonial powers in opposing the more radical 
measures to bridge the gap between the Charter's provisions 
for non-self-governing and trust territories. For example, 
along with them, she opposed General Assembly Resolution 850 
(IX) of November 1954 providing for a visiting "mission, if 
the General Assembly deems it desirable" and "in agreement 
with the Administering Member" to a "Non-Self-Governing 
Territory before or during the time when the population is 
called upon to decide on its future status or change in 
status". -^8 -phg united States, under British pressure, also 
abstained from voting on the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 
1960. Some members of the American delegation such as 
Senator Wayne Morse, strongly sympathised with the 
Declaration's anti-colonial s e n t i m e n t s . T h e  United States 
did vote for the General Assembly Resolution of November 1961 
establishing a Special Committee to report on its 
implementation. The November 1961 resolution received an 
affirmative vote of 97 to 0; France, Great Britain, South
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Africa, and Spain, abstained, while Portugal did not 
participate in the voting.
In many respects, and certainly so far as this thesis is 
concerned, the December 1960 Declaration and the 
establishment of the Special Committee to report on its 
implementation, marked the success of the anti-colonial 
endeavours to bridge the gap between trust and non-self- 
governing territories in the Charter. There is much truth in 
David Wainhouse's observation that ‘'although the United 
Nations has provided a sounding board for militant anti­
colonialism, the militancy has generally been tempered in the 
process of debate, negotiation, and drafting of 
r e s o l u t i o n s " . M o r e o v e r ,  "on balance, the colonial 
revolution has probably been more peaceful because of United 
Nations involvement".131 Much of the credit for this must go 
to the United States, particularly so far as institutional 
developments are concerned. American diplomacy moderated 
many of the more radical anti-colonial demands.132 Perhaps 
of even greater significance was the encouragement the United 
States gave to the European colonial powers to proceed 
further along the path towards international accountability 
than they actually desired. In this respect, at least the 
United States lived up to its anti-colonial tradition.
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Chapter 8 : The United States and International
Accountability : An Overall Assessment
This thesis set out to examine the American anti­
colonial tradition’s role in establishing the principle of 
international accountability for dependent people regarding 
the creation of the League mandates system as set out in 
Article 22 of the Covenant and the United Nations trusteeship 
system as laid down in Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the 
Charter. Throughout, the official attitudes and actions of 
the United States were compared to those of Great Britain, 
the foremost European colonial power. This chapter draws 
together all the thesis arguments and assesses the overall 
part played by American anti-colonial sentiments in 
institutionalising international accountability for dependent 
peoples. It is a brief assessment as most of the other 
chapters had their own concluding judgements on the material 
discussed in them.
Chapter 2 examined colonial relationships and the 
American anti-colonial tradition. The implications of the 
fact that the tradition derived from the War of Independence 
against the England of George III were emphasised as was the 
resulting sentimental sympathy which the United States has 
usually shown to dependent peoples endeavouring to throw off 
the chains of colonial bondage. To reiterate, the anti­
colonial tradition has three basic precepts: first, that
colonialism was a moral wrong in itself; second, that it led 
to international instability through the efforts of dependent 
people to obtain their independence; and third, that it 
hindered world commerce because of the 'closed' colonial 
door. Where anti-colonial sentiment conflicted with the 
dictates of American national interests, however, the former 
was almost always sublimated in the interests of the latter.
American anti-colonialism, moreover, did not imply that 
the United States believed that dependent peoples were 
necessarily equipped to rule themselves. Indeed, until
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comparatively recently, the innate American and European 
feeling that non-whites were inferior to whites, was such 
that the American view was that independence for non-whites 
could best be achieved only after a period (sometimes of many
years) of learning how to rule themselves. For example,
Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull "always advocated 
systematic preparation for independence".^ American
suspicions of Great Britain and the other European colonial 
powers, however, were such that the United States favoured 
this preparatory training being undertaken with at least a 
degree of international accountability.
Chapter 3 examined the two principal aspects of 
international accountability for dependent peoples; the 
sacred trust principle and institutional machinery within an 
international context to ensure that the colonial powers 
lived up to their obligations. The Chapter also demonstrated 
that although many of the precepts of international 
accountability originated within European experience, it was 
American commitment which ensured their establishment in both 
the League mandates and the United Nations trusteeship 
systems. In particular, whereas the European metropoles 
usually emphasised only their responsibility to both their 
dependent peoples and the international community for the 
conduct of their administration, the United States wished to 
give that responsibility teeth by providing institutional 
measures to make them actually accountable in practice as 
well as in theory.
The details of the official American attitudes and 
blueprints for establishing the League and the United Nations 
systems of international accountability were examined in 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. It was shown that the Roosevelt 
Administration spent much more time and effort on what 
eventually became Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter 
than the Wilson Administration did with the League mandates 
system. During the First World War, the United States did 
relatively little systematic planning at the official level
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in developing the ideas and principles eventually embodied in 
Article 22 of the Covenant, American policy stands were 
conceived primarily in response to initiatives by the British 
Empire and to circumvent unrestricted Japanese control of the 
former German islands in the North Pacific. Although 
Franklin Roosevelt was a more committed anti-colonialist than 
Woodrow Wilson, the latter played a more dominant role in 
formulating the League mandates system than the former did 
regarding the United Nations trusteeship system. At the 
Paris Peace Conference, the actual American proposals were 
largely the work of President Wilson and his personal 
advisors; the State Department as such played only a minimal 
role.
Woodrow Wilson's by-passing of his Secretary of State
Robert Lansing on matters relating to self-determination,
. Vo so***. *xv**\r
colonialism and other issues,lhad its parallel in the Second 
World War. Up to his resignation at the end of 1943, Under 
Secretary of State Sumner Welles was closer to and more 
reflective of President Roosevelt's views on the future of 
dependent peoples and other problems than was Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull. Sumner Welles for a long time "had 
continued to vex Hull by his independent dealings with the 
White House and foreign envoys".^ Cordell Hull, however, 
unlike Robert Lansing who did not agree with President Wilson 
over self-determination, was in accord with President 
Roosevelt in his dislike of colonialism, but had a more 
practical attitude which stressed the need to cooperate with 
the Western European colonial powers, especially Great 
Britain.
Unlike the Second World War, during the First World War 
there were no dramatic clashes between the State, Navy and 
War Departments over American acquisition of strategic bases 
in the Pacific. By the time the United States entered the 
war in 1917, Japan and the British Dominions had already 
occupied the German Pacific islands which the American 
military authorities would have liked to control. In the
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Second World War, however, the United States was in a much 
stronger position militarily and politically. It was 
American troops who actually conquered the Japanese mandated 
islands; islands which the Navy and War Departments were 
determined to retain, "The price that the United States had 
paid for the former mandated islands of Micronesia in blood, 
labour and treasure was too high and the islands too valuable 
strategically to be relinquished by the United States in the 
foreseeable f u t u r e . I n  so far as strategic requirements 
were involved, the American anti-colonial tradition became an 
irrelevance, at least in the eyes of the American military 
and their sympathisers.
In part the differences between the State and Navy and 
War Departments over trusteeship and the future of the 
Japanese islands mandate were aggravated because his advisers 
were not absolutely certain of President Roosevelt's 
preferred options. His advisers thought they knew his mind, 
but had differing perceptions of it. Dean Acheson ably 
summed up the general consequences of President Roosevelt's 
chameleon-like qualities:
"President Roosevelt has been praised for a supposedly 
deliberate secrecy in consultation and vagueness in 
decision that left policy fluid, relationships uncertain, 
and great freedom of manoeuvre for the President. In the 
currently fashionable phrase, his constant purpose was 'to 
keep his options open1. Flexibility in manoeuvre may be 
highly desirable in certain circumstances, but when it 
leaves one's own and friendly forces and commanders 
uncertain of the nature and purpose of the operation or of 
who has responsibility for what, it can be a handicap. 
Machiavelli was writing advice for weak princes."^
Great Britain and the United States' other allies played 
much more important roles in the First than in the Second 
World Wars. The Paris peace settlement and the League of 
Nations itself were largely concerned with European affairs. 
Lloyd George and Clemenceau were at least as important as 
Woodrow Wilson in determining the overall outcome of the 
Paris Peace Conference. Negotiations on the postwar 
settlement between the United States and Great Britain and
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France did not become intensive until after the war was over 
with President Wilson*s visits to London and Paris at the end 
of 1918 and the beginning of 1919. There were earlier 
wartime exchanges of views and high-level transatlantic 
missions, but attempts to work out agreed policies only began 
seriously when President Wilson was in Europe. Chapter 4 
demonstrated the crucial importance of Woodrow Wilson in 
creating the League mandates system. He took General Smuts* 
concept of mandates for settling central and Eastern Europe, 
and translated it into a device for disposing of the German 
and Turkish dependencies; an innovation in line with the 
ideas of some of his advisers like George Louis Beer. The 
territories under mandate were not to have self-determination 
in the foreseeable future, but they were not annexed outright 
as the British Dominions at least desired. In fact, there 
might well have been no League mandates system if it had not 
been for the determination (and obstinacy) of President 
Wilson. Unfortunately, in part because of the United States* 
failure to join the League and haveDmnc^ s^^ on th5 Permanent 
Mandates Commission, the mandates became colonies in all but 
name. The efforts of Woodrow Wilson, however, had at least 
enshrined the principle of international accountability for 
some dependent peoples among the objectives of the first 
world organisation for promoting international cooperation.
During the Second World War, the United States dominated 
both Allied military strategy and planning for the new United 
Nations Organisation. France was occupied by Nazi Germany 
and consequently unable to play a major part in Allied 
wartime negotiations despite the strenuous efforts of Charles 
De Gaulle personally. Once she entered the war after the 
attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, the United States 
rapidly obtained the dominant position in her alliance with 
Great Britain. The latter*s diplomatic leverage was weakened 
by 1945 by huge overseas debts (for the time) of over £3,000 
million and a massive balance of payments d e f i c i t . G r e a t  
Britain suffered a relative decline in power compared with
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the United States and the Soviet Union; both of whom were 
ideological and practical opponents of Western European 
colonialism.
During the Second World War there were many more Anglo- 
American meetings and negotiations, formal and informal, at 
all levels on colonial questions and international 
accountability than was the case in the First World War. At 
the highest level, the Cairo, Teheran and Yalta conferences 
and the various other wartime meetings between Franklin 
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had no parallel in the First 
World War. These meetings were primarily concerned with 
defeating the Axis, but in so far as they touched upon issues 
relating to dependent peoples, British opposition played an 
important part in modifying the more far-reaching American 
policy stands. In the opinion of Winston Churchill, American 
policy was "idealism at other people’s e x p e n s e " .^ Chapters 5 
and 6 demonstrated the crucial importance of the various 
wartime Anglo-American meetings at ministerial and official 
level on colonial questions; particularly the part they 
played in modifying American plans for international 
accountability for the postwar administration of dependent 
peoples•
Another important theme running throughout the thesis is 
the changing perception of colonialism itself. During the 
First World War, the raison d ’etre of European rule over non­
white peoples was rarely if ever challenged in the governing 
circles of the European powers (apart from the Bolsheviks in 
Russia after the 1917 revolution), and in fact was generally 
regarded as a right and part of the natural order of things. 
This was far from being the case in the Second World War.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union were committed 
anti-colonialists, and in Great Britain itself attitudes to 
colonial problems were subject to review even in traditional 
Conservative circles. The Japanese early wartime victories 
over the United States, Great Britain, France and the 
Netherlands further undermined the myth of white racial
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superiority.^ The Anglo-American Atlantic Charter 
Declaration of 1941 on the right of peoples to govern 
themselves, moreover, was widely interpreted as being 
applicable to non-whites as well as to whites under alien 
rule. Franklin Roosevelt was certainly of this view, 
although Winston Churchill definitely was not.
President Roosevelt*s views on colonialism and 
international accountability were sometimes imprecise, but he 
was a committed opponent to the principle of colonial rule. 
His confidant in the State Department, Sumner Welles, at an 
early stage in the Second World War, drew up wide-ranging 
plans on international accountability to embrace all 
dependent peoples. As was demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, 
these were first modified by Cordell Hull and then even more 
curtailed by the demands of the Navy and War Departments to 
annex the Japanese mandated islands. The determined British 
opposition to extending the principle of international 
accountability also played a large part in modifying American 
plans. For example, during a visit to the United States in 
January 1945, the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, 
publicly stated that Great Britain could not share the 
administration of her colonies **which are ours alone. We 
believe that to attempt to do so would be impracticable, 
inefficient and undesirable. We do not want advice.1* The 
Americans should substitute the old slogan of "no taxation 
without representation" with a new one of "no criticism 
without study'*.®
The trusteeship proposals the Americans brought to the 
San Francisco Conference were concerned only with the three 
categories of territory decided upon at the Yalta Conference. 
Somewhat paradoxically, it was -from the British San Francisco 
proposals that the provisions of Chapter XI of the United 
Nations Charter on Non-Self-Governing Territories were 
CvenVuAWy The Americans and others, however,
extended the provisions further than Great Britain and the 
other European colonial powers would have liked. The United
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States played a moderate anti-colonial role in endeavouring 
to reconcile the differences between the European colonial 
powers and the anti-colonialist ones. Her own strategic 
interests were protected by her non-negotiable suggestion of 
the category of strategic trusts. This meant, in effect, 
that the United States could annex the former Japanese 
islands mandates in all but name. With regard to non- 
strategic trusts, however, the United States was primarily 
responsible for extending the principle of international 
accountability much further than the Western European 
colonial powers desired. In particular, it was the United 
States which proposed and was responsible for making the 
Trusteeship Council a principal organ of the United Nations 
and for incorporating the right of petition and visiting 
missions into Article 87 of the Charter.
On the whole, although protecting her own national 
interests, at the San Francisco Conference, the United 
States' anti-colonial sympathies played a constructive role 
in developing the principle of international accountability. 
John Foster Dulles' testimony to the hearings of the Senate's 
Foreign Relations Committee on the United Nations Charter 
presciently summed up both the advances made in the colonial 
field at the San Francisco Conference and the substantial 
American contribution:
"It is said that this Charter will perpetuate colonial 
imperialism. Well I admit that the Charter does not at a 
single step terminate all colonial imperialism. But I say 
that the greatest single step in advance that has ever been 
made in modern times is the fact that by this Charter every 
colonial power, without exception, subscribed to the 
proposition that the administration of colonial peoples is 
a sacred trust to be administered with a view to their 
ultimate self-government and the establishment of their 
free institutions.... those people who battled at San 
Francisco for the colonial peoples feel that, at least, 
this Charter is a great achievement which opens a door, 
such as the world has never seen before, to a liberation 
ultimately of the colonial dependent peoples of the
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Section 2 of Chapter 7 examined the role played by 
American anti-colonial sentiments in the submission of the 
original trusteeship agreements and the administration of 
Micronesia. Surprisingly perhaps in view of her 
annexationist ambitions, the United States became quite 
liberal regarding visiting United Nations missions to 
Micronesia and the submission of petitions by its 
inhabitants. Moderate anti-colonialism sentiments also 
characterised the United States attitude to the Trusteeship 
Council's proceedings and the attempt by the anti­
colonialists in the General Assembly's Fourth Committee to 
bridge the constitutional gap between the Charter's 
provisions relating to trust and non-self-governing 
territories. In particular, the Americans played a 
conciliatory role which took the Western European colonial 
powers further along the path of international accountability 
than might otherwise have been the case. Unlike them, the 
United States in November 1961 voted for the Special 
Committee on the Implementation of the 1960 Declaration on 
Colonial Independence. In the thirty years since that 
Declaration, "59 Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories 
embracing a total population of 140 million peoples", have 
exercised "their right to self-determination".^
The Special Committee and its functions had been 
foreshadowed almost twenty years earlier in the State 
Department's Draft Protocol on Trusteeship of October 1942 
prepared under the guidance of Sumner Welles. The Draft 
Protocol was intended to apply to all colonies (except for 
those in the Western Hemisphere!), and to have the goal of 
eventual independence for all dependent peoples except for 
those who choose full self-government in association with the 
colonial metropole. Although subject to voluntary acceptance 
by the European colonial powers, Cordell Hull rejected the 
Protocol "for obvious reasons of political feasibility";-^ in 
particular, the European colonial powers would never have 
voluntarily accepted the Draft Protocol at that time. It
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took almost another twenty years for Sumner Welles' original 
conception to come to fruition.
Overall, so long as her national interests were 
protected, the anti-colonial sentiments of the United States 
played a major part in establishing the principle of 
international accountability for administering dependent 
peoples in the League mandates and the United Nations 
trusteeship systems. American determination (especially that 
of President Wilson) was primarily responsible for creating 
the mandates system, although British ideas were predominant 
in the actual formulation of the system's institutional 
machinery. American diplomacy and plans, however, played the 
major role in setting up the United Nations trusteeship 
machinery. Without the United States, there might well have 
been only a very diluted degree of international 
accountability. At the very least, the new system involved 
publicity in a world forum. The existence of the system 
meant that the European colonial powers endeavoured to 
present their administration in the best possible light in 
Trusteeship Council and, more significantly, General Assembly 
debates. This could and sometimes did involve re-thinking 
colonial policies to avoid adverse publicity; the revised 
attitudes and policies spilling-over from trust to non-self- 
governing territories.
Finally, from the Second World War onwards, the American 
attitude was that the ultimate purpose of international 
accountability was to equip dependent peoples to determine 
their own futures. This would require training over perhaps 
a considerable time period. In the words of Francis Sayre, 
American policy was based "upon recognition of the inherent 
human right of every people to freedom, and thus to eventual 
independence or self-government".^^ Without a doubt American 
anti-colonial sentiments hastened the eventual demise of the 
Western European colonialism. The United States played the 
decisive role in the practical development of the principle 
of international accountability for dependent peoples.
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APPENDIX 1
THE AMERICAN EMPIRE
U N I T E D  
S T A T E S
NO RTH ERN
M A R IA N A
ISLANDS
G U A M
Sim I NAVAS
f| K IN G M A N  REEF'REPUBLIC 
OF PALAU
PALM YRA
□  [ JARVIS ISLAND | ''$*
H O W L A N D  ISLA N D  
8c BAKER ISLA N D
rU~j’F£&
A M E R IC A N !
S A M O A '*!
U S T R A L I A
Uncle Sam’s islands
Dotted across the Caribbean and the Pacific—and indeed the American 
mainland—are the islands of an empire on which the dollar never sets
Source: The Economist. May 6, I989, p.17.
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APPENDIX 2
The Allocation of League Mandates
i. Territories under "A11 class mandate
(a) France had the mandates for the Lebanon and 
Syria.
(b) Great Britain had the mandates for Iraq, 
Palestine, and Transjordan.
ii. Territories under "B" class mandate
(a) Belgium had the mandate for Ruanda Urundi.
(b) France had the mandates for the French 
Cameroons and French Togoland.
(c) Great Britain had the mandates for the
British Cameroons, Tanganyika Oftis* 
British Togoland. J
iii• Territories under MCtf class mandate
(a) Australia had the mandates for New Guinea 
(north-eastern part), New Ireland, New 
Britain, and the Solomon Isles.*
(b) The British Empire (Australia, Great Britain, 
and New Zealand) had the mandate for Nauru; 
exercised through Australia.
(c) Japan had the mandate for the Marianas,
Caroline, and Marshall Islands.
(d) New Zealand had the mandate for Western Samoa.
(e) South Africa had the mandate for South West 
Africa.
I* Only the two northernmost islands (Bougainville and Buka) of the Solomon 
i Isles were under mandate. All the other islands of the archipelago
(including some ruled by Germany until sold in 1900 to join the British . 
Solomon Islands Protectorate) stayed outside the mandates system.
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-APPENDIX 3
Territories Under United Nations Trusteeship
The only remaining trust territory is the United 
States* strategic trust territory of Micronesia, Ten other 
territories were placed under trusteeship, but no longer 
have that status.
Cameroons
(British administration)
Cameroons
(French administration)
Nauru
(Joint Australian, 
British and New Zealand 
administration)
New Guinea
(Australian
administration)
Ruypjida-Urundi 
(Belgian administration)
Somaliland
(Italian administration) 
Tanganyika
(British administration)
Togoland
(British administration) 
Togoland
(French administration) 
Western Samoa
(New Zealand administration)
The northern part joined 
Nigeria in June 1961; the 
Southern part joined the 
Republic of Cameroon in 
October 1961,
Achieved independence as the 
Republic of Cameroon in 
September 1960.
Achieved independence in 
January 1968.
Joined with Papua to become 
Papua New Guinea which 
achieved independence in 
September 1975.
Achieved independence as the 
separate states of Rwanda and 
Burundi in September 1962.
Achieved independence as 
Somalia in July 1960.
Achieved independence as Tanganyika 
in December 1961. Joined with the 
People's Republic of-<Zanzibar and 
Pemba to become Tanzania in April 
1964.
Joined with the newly independent 
Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) in 
March 1957.
Achieved independence as Togo in 
April I960,
Achieved independence in January *
1962.
South Africa refused to place her South ’West African mandate under 
trusteeship. It became independent as Namibia in 1990.
APPENDIX 4
The League of Nations Covenant and Dependent Peoples
Article 22
1. To those colonies and territories which as a 
consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the 
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and 
which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world, there should be applied the principle that the well­
being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilisation and that securities for the performance of this 
trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this 
principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be 
entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their 
resources, their experience or their geographical position, 
can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing 
to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by 
them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
3. The character of the mandate must differ according to 
the stage of the development of the people, the geographical 
situation of the territory, its economic conditions and 
other similar circumstances.
4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development where their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice 
and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are 
able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must 
be a principal consideration in the selection of the 
Mandatory.
5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are 
at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for 
the administration of the territory under conditions which 
will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject 
only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the 
prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms 
traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the 
establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases 
and of military training of the natives for other than 
police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also 
secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of 
other Members of the League.
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6. There are territories, such as South West Africa and 
certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the 
sparseness of their population, or their small size, or 
their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their 
geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, 
and other circumstances, can be best administered under the 
laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, 
subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests 
of the indigenous population,
7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to 
the Council an annual report in reference to the territory 
committed to its charge.
8. The degree of authority, control or administration to 
be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously 
agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly 
defined in each case by the Council,
9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive 
and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to 
advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance 
of the mandates.
Article 23
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of 
international Conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed 
upon, the Members of the League:
(b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native 
inhabitants of territories under their control;
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APPENDIX 5
The United Nations Charter and Dependent Peoples
CHAPTER XX
DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING 
TERRITORIES
Article 73
Members of the United Nations which have or assume 
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose 
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self- 
government recognize the principle that the interests of the 
inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as 
a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, 
within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the 
inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the 
peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement, their just treatment, and their 
protection against abuses;
(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the 
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in 
the progressive development of their free political 
institutions, according to the particular circumstances of 
each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of 
advancement;
(c) to further international peace and security;
(d) to promote constructive measures of development, to 
encourage research, and to co-operate with one another, and, 
when and where appropriate, with specialized international 
bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the 
social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this 
Article; and
(e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for 
information purposes, subject to such limitation as security 
and constitutional considerations may require, statistical 
and other information of a technical nature relating to 
economic, social, and educational conditions in the 
territories for which they are respectively responsible other 
than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.
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Article 74
Members of the United Nations also agree that their 
policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter 
applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, 
must be based on the general principle of good­
neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and 
well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and 
commercial matters.
CHAPTER XII 
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
Article 75
The United Nations shall establish under its authority 
an international trusteeship system for the administration 
and supervision of such territories as may be placed 
thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These 
territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.
Article 76
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in 
accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down 
in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust 
territories, and their progressive development towards self- 
government or independence as may be appropriate to the 
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples 
and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and 
as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship 
agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of 
the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and 
commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and 
their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in 
the administration of justice, without prejudice to the 
attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the 
provisions of Article 80.
Article 77
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories 
in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by 
means of trusteeship agreements:
(a) territories now held under mandate;
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(b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as 
a result of the Second World War; and
(c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by 
states responsible for their administration.
2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to 
which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought 
under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.
Article 78
The Trusteeship system shall not apply to territories 
which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship 
among which shall be based on respect for the principle of 
sovereign equality.
Article 79
The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed 
under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or 
amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly 
concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of 
territories held under mandate by a Member of the United 
Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 
and 85.
Article 80
1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship 
agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each 
territory under the trusteeship system, and until such 
agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall 
be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the 
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms 
of existing international instruments to which Members of the 
United Nations may respectively be parties.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as 
giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation 
and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other 
territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in 
Article 77.
Article 81
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the 
terms under which the trust territory will be administered 
and designate the authority which will exercise the 
administration of the trust territory. Such authority, 
hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or 
more states or the Organization itself.
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Article 82
There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a 
strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the 
trust territory to which the agreement applies, without 
prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under 
Article 43.
Article 83
1. All functions of the United Nations relating to 
strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the 
trusteeship agreement and of their alteration or amendment, 
shall be exercised by the Security Council.
2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be 
applicable to the people of each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of 
the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security 
considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the 
Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United 
Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, 
economic, social and educations matters in the strategic 
areas.
Article 84
It shall be the duty of the administering authority to 
ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. To this end 
the administering authority may make Use of volunteer forces, 
facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in 
carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council 
undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as 
well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and 
order within the trust territory.
Article 85
1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to 
trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as 
strategic, including the approval of the terms of the 
trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, 
shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority 
of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in 
carrying out these functions.
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CHAPTER XIII 
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL 
Composition
Article 86
1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following 
Members of the United Nations:
a. those Members administering trust territories;
b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 
as are not administering trust territories; and
c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by 
the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the 
total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally 
divided between those Members of the United Nations which 
administer trust territories and those which do not.
2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate 
one specially qualified person to represent it therein.
Article 87
The General Assembly and, under its authority, the 
Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:
a. consider reports submitted by the administering 
authority;
b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with 
the administering authority;
c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust 
territories at times agreed upon with the administering 
authority; and
d. take these and other actions in conformity with the 
terms of the trusteeship agreements.
Article 88
The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire 
on the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and 
the administering authority for each trust territory within 
the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual 
report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such 
questionnaire.
Voting
Article 89
1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one 
vote.
2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a 
majority of the members present and voting.
380
Procedure
Article 90
1, The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of 
procedure, including the method of selecting its President.
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in 
accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for 
the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its 
members.
Article 91
The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail 
itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council 
and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with 
which they are respectively concerned.
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